China's Implementation of the Global Security Initiative in Southeast and Central Asia
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I'm Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Welcome to the China Global Podcast. China's push to revise the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative, or GSI, in April 2022.

A few months after Xi Jinping proposed GSI, we did a podcast episode with Minaj Kawarmani to discuss the drivers behind GSI and analyze the initial statements outlining its content. More than two and a half years have elapsed since then, and scholars have begun to investigate how China is implementing GSI in various regions around the world.

A new report from the United States Institute of Peace examines how GSI is being operationalized and received in two priority regions of Chinese foreign policy, mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The study draws on field research in both regions. The report is titled China's Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia.

The report has three authors, Bates Gill, Carla Freeman, and Allison McFarland.

And I'm delighted that Bates Gill is joining me today to discuss the report's findings. So Dr. Bates Gill is a senior fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research and a senior associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute. And he also has an affiliation with USIP. So welcome to the China Global Podcast, Bates. Thank you, Bonnie. It's great to be with you.

So what's your take on the objectives of China's global security initiative? What does GSI tell us about Xi Jinping's vision for the international order? Well, Bonnie, I think we could probably try to summarize it quickly in three. One of the main objectives was overall to reset the terms and the dynamics within the international system, within the international community.

to help make them more favorable or in China's expectations, more favorable to their national interests. And of course, this is part of a much, much broader effort underway across many, many other elements of China's foreign policy. But with regard to security in specific, secondly, then to soften the ground or to create a sort of more justifiable atmosphere for

through which can prepare the world, and especially of what it hopes will be a larger role for China as a security actor, particularly in the developing world. And then, like many other initiatives undertaken by China,

This creates a vehicle, a sort of bureaucratic and financial set of channels through which now Chinese security actors can flow and create on the ground concrete forms of cooperation with counterparts in other parts of the world. And again, especially in the developing world. I want to have one more thing, Bonnie, if I could, because in the report, we note that the

The GSI and its effort to try and soften the ground and create better conditions for China to expand its role reminds me quite a bit of the so-called peaceful rise narrative. Now, probably some 20 years ago, and the great work that you and Evan Medeiros did in tracking the evolution of the narrative of peaceful rise.

Similar in the sense that it's trying to create a greater atmosphere, a more accepting atmosphere within the international community for China's increasing role, particularly in the security area. That's really an interesting point. I hadn't thought of it that way. Great, great analogy. So obviously there were pre-existing activities that China had with China.

countries bilaterally and also multilaterally that they were doing in the security realm. So is GSI being imposed on top of these? Is it replacing some of them? Is it absorbing them? What's the relationship between what existed before and the Global Security Initiative? Well, in the report, we note that not unlike, for example, the Belt and Road Initiative,

when first announced was somewhat vague and undefined. So too, I think we're still in relatively early stages for the GSI, but in a way to create more concrete manifestations of this new initiative, activities that were already underway prior to its announcement in April of 2022,

are now sort of being brought on board, if you will, or being labeled as GSI-relevant or GSI-accommodated activities in various security areas.

This might include, for example, prior to April 2022, there were already ongoing cooperation between China and Tajikistan, for example, to help train border guards there and maybe even to establish a low profile Chinese security force presence there.

near the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. These are now being more openly labeled as GSI-related cooperative activities between those two countries. But I think, importantly now, there are more and more possibilities for what could be called GSI activities in the future.

Things like police training, provision of so-called smart city technologies that improve a government's local government's ability to surveil its populations and stepped up cooperation between law enforcement groups on either side of the borders in China's southeast, especially along the Lanzhang River, which is the name of the Mekong River.

In China, and of course, in the Mekong River Basin in mainland Southeast Asia. So it's a mix of things that have been brewing prior and are now being relabeled as GSI. Well, I think we can expect a growing pipeline of security-related activities going forward that will fall within the GSI remit.

So you and your co-authors conducted interviews, as I said at the top, in some countries. Maybe you can tell us which ones in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. I'm sure you didn't visit all of them. But talk a little bit about that.

what China's security strategic interests are in those regions and how Beijing is using the GSI to promote its interests in both Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

Over the last year, we spent time in both Southeast Asia and in Central Asia. In Southeast Asia, we sort of based ourselves in Bangkok, but invited experts from around the region to join us over a few days for a variety of interactions, workshops, one-on-one interviews, and the like. And we had participation from individuals from Cambodia, from Myanmar, from Vietnam,

and from Thailand. In Central Asia, we traveled to three countries. We were in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, went to the capitals in those first two countries, and then to both Astana and Almaty in Kazakhstan. You know, I think we found

interesting insights, both in how the region interprets China's security interests in the region and try to, through that lens, understand why the GSI has become a more prominent element of China's foreign policy engagement in the region, but then also a sense of how these regional interlocutors then have reacted positively or negatively or both to this increased emphasis on

through the GSI of China's role as a security actor in the region. By and large, I think we have to understand China's interest as, of course, evolving and very broadly speaking from an overwhelming emphasis on economics, trade and investment and the like,

as the principal vehicle through which China would pursue its interests in these regions and now moving, not abandoning economics, of course, but giving some greater and increasing priority to security issues as an important element of China's engagement in the region. And what do we mean by these security interests? Well,

Again, drawing from the conversations in these two regions, there seems to be a recognition that it is the security challenges within these regions, and principally we might call these sort of non-traditional, transnational types of security challenges. In Southeast Asia, things like cyber scamming, trafficking in people,

drugs and weapons. In Central Asia, similar challenges around the possibilities of terrorism and the like. That these internal non-traditional security issues, and of course not to mention a somewhat more traditional security challenge in Southeast Asia with regard to the infighting within Myanmar,

but all similar as far as China's interests are concerned in the degree to which they can spill over and create problems for China inside China. And hence, an increased interest on China's part to try and assist these neighbor governments to do a better job, to be more effective in tamping down, mitigating, and even eliminating some of these sources of instability within China.

those neighboring countries that could, that are now and could still in the future possibly spill over into China. So I think that's the core interest that China has in trying to, through the GSI, increase its roles as a security actor in these regions. How is it being interpreted? Well, broadly speaking, I think favorably. I think that was a strong impression that we received, that by and large, the countries in the region are open

to hearing more, to working more with China, cooperating to strengthen their ability to deal with some of these security challenges, even as, yes, there are, of course, some lingering concerns and different countries have a higher degree of skepticism or concern about the GSI than others in these different countries.

So maybe we should segue then, talk a little bit about what the concerns are. Are countries concerned about China's intentions? Are they concerned about excessive Chinese influence? And what's the sort of the balance between what they see as the benefits and maybe the potential negative side effects?

I think one thing we tried to stress in the report is that, of course, it's unfair to simply lump these two regions together or even to lump the different countries within the separate regions together as all moving in the same direction when it comes to GSI. Not the case. So we could spend a lot of time trying to differentiate. We try in the report to do so across the different countries.

But I think generally speaking, to the degree there is lingering or under the surface type of concerns or uncertainties among countries, they arise from a number of sources. One, of course, is just the longstanding histories that these countries have with China.

You know, lingering concerns about Chinese ambitions, overly powerful influence. And of course, they remain both in Southeast Asia and in some cases in Central Asia, ongoing, either territorial concerns.

or resource-based disputes between countries in these regions and China. So, you know, the degree to which those go unresolved, even as China pursues a larger security role, that's obviously going to be

problem. Also, you know, concerns that any nation state would have of becoming overly dependent upon any given external power is also going to be a factor for many countries in these regions in their relations with China. Certain countries, I think, stand out in that regard, in particular, like Vietnam. I mean, I think that's a great example of a country in mainland Southeast Asia that probably is the most skeptical or at least

cautious in going too far too fast in cooperating with China on a variety of GSI-related initiatives. In some countries, there's also the concern that GSI could be one of many aspects of China's elite capture tactics in effort to expand China's political and diplomatic influence within a given country and

Within some countries in these two regions, also a concern that GSI could contribute to further backsliding in terms of civil society development, political reform, and rule of law. So all of these and other concerns remain an issue.

But all that said, it appears as if most countries that we considered and looked at want to do more with China as a sort of cooperative security actor to help them deal with the challenges they face, especially internally. She mentioned as an example of a project under GSI would be like police training, right?

Can you give us some other examples? And then do you know how these are being funded? Are these like Chinese initiatives that are then pitched to governments that are then funded by China?

Do the governments have any say in making any requests or is anything achieved maybe through dialogue as to what would be the best fit for that country? Did you get any sense as to the process of GSI as it's being implemented?

A little bit. You know, it's still relatively early days, but I think maybe one of the best examples to look to and which I suspect might be a model for expanded cooperation going forward is the so-called Lanzhang-Mekong cooperation model.

Now, this had been established already prior to the announcement of the GSI in April 2022, but following the GSI's announcement has been explicitly identified as a so-called pilot project or pilot zone for the GSI.

And this is an effort to increase cooperation across a range of issues, but for the GSI in particular, it would be concerning security-related questions between China and the countries of mainland Southeast Asia through which the Mekong flows. So Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam.

And as we understood it, this has a small secretariat, which is basically run by the Chinese foreign ministry. There is a budget. There is funding available. We don't know the amount of that funding, but I would presume it's in the several millions of U.S. dollars, maybe more, to which

Countries in the region, counterpart governments, can apply for funding to undertake small, relatively small projects that might be police training. It might be going to China to learn more about how to counter cyber scamming. It might be

small programs for police forces to spend a week or two in Yunnan, working with the provincial public security bureau on anti-riot training or learning training on new technologies and the like. So, you know, these are relatively small projects by the standards of sort of major international development projects.

grants, but it is an effort to get something started and off the ground. And as we understood it, there would be a fair degree of agency on the part of the local governments to come up with their own plan and to try and have a significant hand in articulating their needs and then having them implemented in a way that's beneficial. There are other what will be GSI-labeled

activities where I think the Chinese would have a great deal more to say about how they're implemented. For example, Xi Jinping announcing about a year and a half ago at the China Central Asia Summit,

in Xi'an, that under GSI, there would be a program put forward for training of some, I think, 3,000 to 5,000 law enforcement personnel, and that would take place inside China. I'm not sure if that has been off the ground yet and implemented, but I'm sure the secretariat of the China-Central Asia Summit in Xi'an is working on getting that off

And that would include police, you know, judicial officials, probably a domestic intelligence personnel under this rubric of security of security officials.

The latest iteration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that was held in Islamabad in mid-October did not mention the GSI in the joint statement, which I found notable. So how do you interpret that? Do you think Beijing tried to include it, but there wasn't sufficient support for it? And if so, then why would some of the SCO members oppose including the GSI?

It's an interesting observation, I think. And while we probably can't know entirely what went on, just a few quick thoughts on that. First, it's also notable that, say, for example, in Li Qiang's speech to that meeting, he too never mentions the Global Security Initiative. But then you go back and look. The communique last year also did not

include mention of the Global Security Initiative. Xi Jinping's speech at the Head of State Summit, which is actually the more important of the two annual summits of the SCO, at the Head of State Summit on July 4th of this year, also did not mention GSI specifically, although he talked a lot about how the SCO needs to engage in various forms of security initiatives.

So how do we read this? It could be that...

for whatever protocol reasons or internal SCO decision-making reasons, no state wants to sort of tout their own initiative too much so. I would add, though, that in the bilateral communiques that come out of these multilateral meetings, you know, when the two heads of state meet on the sidelines, there you'll see a lot of favorable mentioning of the GSI.

where the heads of state from Iran, from Pakistan, from Kazakhstan heap praise.

on the GSI and on China's vision for a different sort of international security order. So it's not that it's not there, it's just not in these high-level documents. Another reason might be, and just two more thoughts. One, of course, is that India is one of the members of the SCO, and to the degree that the SCO needs to be a consensus-based organization, it could be, I don't know this for a fact, but it could be that India objected

to its being given too high prominence in the joint communique. And then lastly, and this is something we talk about in the report, I think this is really a somewhat more interesting understanding of what's going on here. We detected from our conversations in Central Asia that there seems to be diminishing interest on China's part, some diminishing interest on China's part in the SCO.

as its principal vehicle for engaging in Central Asia. Why? Well, one is because of the expansion of the organization in recent years, adding four new members, India, Pakistan, Iran, and most recently Belarus, which means, I think, a dilution of the organization's ability to address issues in Central Asia.

And that as a result, it could be, could be that China's going to not pursue the GSI as actively through the SCO as a multilateral organization, but rather through these newly created vehicles, such as the China Central Asia Summit, which was established just in the last year or so, as a more favorable pathway for China to pursue its role as a security actor in the region.

I want to ask you about Moscow's view of the GSI. As you know, the Collective Security Treaty Organization has been like the platform that Russia has used to interact with many countries in Central Asia. And there's a legal basis in the CSTO to provide security assistance to Central Asian countries that are CSTO member states.

I'm wondering if there's, I mean, is there any potential friction or conflict between the CSTO and GSI? Does Moscow see that this is a vehicle that China is using to move away from an emphasis on its economic, as you said at the outset, its economic focus in its relations with countries in Central Asia to a more solid,

focused agenda that then Russia would find problematic. And, you know, there's lots of people who've said that there are, there's inherent competition between Russia and China in Central Asia. That may be true, but we really haven't seen a lot of, a lot of negative competition. It seems to me that they have coexisted

We haven't seen this sort of bring some negative elements into the Sino-Russian relationship, which, again, some people predicted, but I think hasn't appeared. So what does the GSI look like from Russia's perspective? You know, looking at the dynamics in Central Asia between China, Russia and the government's

I think is greatly enhanced and it's an interesting lens is to apply the GSI, the evolution of GSI. And we learned, I think, some very interesting insights from our regional interlocutors on this question. And I think the first overall point to make is that our interlocutors were quite clear that while CHI is expressing an interest to play a greater role as a security partner,

in the region, the observations in the region, that is not going to happen in a way that can overtake or really compete with what remains a very powerful and influential security role for Russia. That in spite of, of course, its invasion of Ukraine.

And the concerns that creates within Central, particularly in countries that have Russian, ethnic Russian populations like Kazakhstan. And one of the major reasons for this, well, simply the historical and practical realities of Russia's role as a security actor in the region. Let's not forget, of course, these were all former Soviet states.

They continue to look to Moscow primarily as its principal security partner. One interesting observation we heard, if you're an ambitious military or even other security force official in, say, Kazakhstan or in Kyrgyzstan today, your path to future promotion is not through Beijing.

The path, the future promotion is to find a way to go to academies in Moscow, to engage one way or another with the Russian military to do so. Of course, Russian language remains the, you know, the sort of most commonly spoken language across the various trees of Central Asia. And let's not forget, Russia maintains significant military presence.

in Central Asia, either in the form of operation of space bases, space launch bases, operation of missile testing ranges, and similar. So China's not going to overtake Russia as the principal security actor in that region. Likewise, China needs to act cautiously precisely so it doesn't alienate

alienate Moscow. I suspect some of what it's doing, it does at least in some informal or loose consultation with Moscow as it expands. And it looks to me as if the forms of security cooperation are largely going to be, for lack of a better word, in softer forms. Police training, sale of technology,

and the like. So I don't think Moscow yet has really become concerned about what GSI might mean for China's expanding presence in the region. China understands, I think, its limitations in this regard because of Russian interests in the region, and so do the regional governments.

Finally, let's talk about implications for the United States. Your report argues that the GSI warrants greater U.S. attention. How do you assess that GSI is going to impact U.S. regional interests in Southeast Asia and Central Asia? What do you think the U.S. should do to respond, either by itself or along with its allies? One point to remember, of course, is that

While we focused on Southeast Asia and Central Asia in this particular report, GSI is truly a global effort. And I think there's the first sort of strategic point of U.S. interests. In addition to the sort of concrete, on the ground, relatively small efforts

activities that are being, again, GSI represents something much bigger in terms of the strategic narrative that China is trying to promote. And it's especially important to U.S. interests because, of course, it's a narrative which criticizes and U.S.-led norms and approaches to international relations.

Security, criticizes, for example, the U.S. alliance-based forms of security and makes the claim, the GSI broadly makes the claim, that it is precisely the U.S. and Western-based approach to security that's causing all the trouble in the world these days.

and that countries should not naively want to sign up and would rather approach the international security order in the way that China proposes. So that's point one. It is part and parcel of the larger strategic rivalry in the narrative space that China has launched to counteract and undermine China.

American influence. Secondly, we're going to see the GSI being promoted through various multilateral bodies, primarily ones like the United Nations, where there's going to be an ongoing effort to criticize the United States, to shape norms that are more favorable to how China would like the world to work. And more specifically then, how does that operationalize in Central Asia or in

or in Southeast Asia, and what is the problem with the United States? We mentioned it earlier. I think in part, the GSI is especially resonant and beneficial to more authoritarian governments because it helps them strengthen their ability to use their will on resistance within society through surveillance and better trained security mechanisms.

I think it's also seen with favor by some of these governments in those regions because it will promote some backsliding on political reform, on civil society development, the establishment of the rule of law. These developments would, too, run contrary to American interests. So, you know, it doesn't mean that they're

maybe some elements of GSI that the United States could welcome. I just don't think that's likely under the current political circumstances of U.S.-China relations. But by and large, it is something that U.S. interests need to work on because they are moving in a direction that is probably contrary to longer-term American interests in these regions.

Any specific actionable policies that you think the U.S. candidate should adopt going forward? Well, what was interesting in our conversations in these regions is that what was very strong expression in South Asia in particular, but I think even in Central Asia, that the needs that those countries have identified that China's GSI could help address are

are equally needs that countries like the United States or its friends and allies in the region like Japan, South Korea, Australia, others could also help them address, whether that's rolling back the growing problem of cybercrime, helping these countries deal with illegal trafficking in weapons and people and in drugs, of course,

helping these countries develop internal capacities to be more effective in addressing the domestic insecurities that they face, capacity building type of training. And yes, being open to engaging at a more strategic level with the leaderships of these countries.

countries on these very questions. The Biden administration, you know, saw to it to meet with, to hold a summit with the five leaders of the Central Asian states around the sidelines of the U.N. security, the U.N. General Assembly meetings in September last year. And

I think a similar degree of high-level engagement would also be a very positive outcome. No one in the region has high expectation that that's likely to be the case, but I think we all need to do what we can to try and encourage our senior officials to take developments in Central Asia and Southeast Asia seriously and recognize that there is a demand for American and other allied engagement

and not simply cede the field to China on these issues. We've been talking with Bates Gill, who is Senior Fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research. And the report is titled China's Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Thanks for joining us, Bates. Thank you very much, Bonnie.