Escalating to War between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran
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I'm Andrew Schwartz, and you're listening to The Truth of the Matter, a podcast by CSIS where we break down the top policy issues of the day and talk with the people that can help us best understand what's really going on.

To get to the truth of the matter about the escalating war between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran, we have with us one of my favorite all-time guests, Dr. Seth Jones, who is a frequent guest to this program. Seth is the president of our newly minted Defense and Security Department. He's also our Harold Brown Chair in Strategy. Seth, welcome to the podcast, as always. We need you here when we need to understand complex issues, and that's why you're here today on one of the most complex.

Andrew, it is always a pleasure to be on the best podcast in the whole world. Thank you. So, Seth, you have a new brief out with Dan Byman and Xander Palmer. It's called Escalating to War Between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran. First, let's give me the highlights of this. You have some new data that you want to share. Let's talk about that.

Yeah. So, Andrew, there's a lot of commentary on the war and violence. What there hasn't been is a lot of collection and analysis of data. So one of the things we looked at, for example, was violent incidents on both sides of the border, strikes in Israel and Lebanon by Israel and Hezbollah. And one

One of the things that really jumps out at you is how much those numbers start to increase. There's like a battle rhythm of about like 200 or so a week, 200 attacks a week that persists from...

around October 7th of 2023, so right around the time of the incident, all the way through the rest of 2023 and then through most of 2024. By the time you get to September of 2024, those numbers jump up to nearly 900. So they increase by a factor of four. So that's one thing is you really do see the change in violence. It's not just...

these visible strikes you're seeing, it is the sheer number of attacks on both sides has dramatically increased. All right, so let's just to put this in perspective, Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th, 2023. On October 8th,

Hezbollah to the north of Israel in southern Lebanon started waging attacks on northern Israel, causing 60-plus thousand Israelis to move from their homes, abandon their towns, and they're now displaced within Israel in various areas in central Israel. So you're saying that since that time, attacks on both sides, Israel and Hezbollah, have increased.

increased by four times? Four and a half to five times. So, you know, interesting. We see movement of populations on both sides of the border. So not surprisingly, we see 60, 70, 80,000 Israelis forcibly moved by the government to protect them from Israel's border with Lebanon. And we also see a number of people from the Lebanon side that

that are now in danger because there are strikes happening on both sides of the border, also move. So we've got population displacement on both sides. And we see this pattern of attacks that starts to happen. And this is the other part of the data that's interesting, is the vast majority of attacks really for most of the year, most of the full year from October 2023 up until early September,

along the Israel-Lebanon border are happening within a three to four kilometer range of the border. That's what the data suggests.

Those numbers jumped dramatically by September and certainly by October, where the average went from three to four kilometers, just inside both borders, to nearly 30 kilometers. And obviously, a range of strikes happening well outside of that range. That's just the average. The average is 30 kilometers now. So the battlefield's expanded. So you can clearly see the escalation. So the data shows...

increases in number and a big increase in geographic scope. I mean, the geographic scope is almost, in some cases, 10 times increase in the geographic scope of the violence. That really is an indication that there has been a big escalation in numbers and scope.

So, Seth, you've been to this region of both Israel and southern Lebanon. I've been in the north of Israel. We both have a sense of what the terrain is like there. And can you give a sense for listeners like what this area actually is and, you

You know, does it surprise you that it's expanded the way it has? No, not really. I mean, actually, what surprised me is how long it took to expand. When you have violence going across both sides of the border and it's happening at a level of 200 or so strikes a week, month after month.

It doesn't take a lot for, you know, in some cases it was really a Hezbollah mistake to grab an IDF soldier along the border that starts partially starts the 2006 war. So what surprised me is how we didn't get to this level earlier. And I think part of the explanation, frankly, is that Israel is primarily focused on the

Gaza and trying to get a handle on Hamas. But there's a second reason, too, and this goes back to something you said, Andrew, earlier, which is there were discussions within the Netanyahu government right after October 7th of 2023 to go into Lebanon to do kind of what the Israelis are doing right now.

And the Biden administration was very forceful in saying now is not the time to operate on multiple fronts. So there was a big push. It's been reported in the news. So this isn't entirely new. So there was a big diplomatic effort from a range of countries, including the U.S.,

focus on Gaza first. But as we've seen, you know, much of Gaza is, it's not over, but the Israelis have withdrawn a range of military units. And I think that has allowed them a little bit of time and space to try to take care of the northern challenge. So the southern challenge is in hand. The northern challenge doesn't seem like it's in hand.

How do you feel it's going for Israel against Hezbollah? And is Hezbollah getting the kind of support that it expects from Iran, its patron? Yeah. So I think there's a short-term and a long-term answer to the question of how it's going. The short-term, I think there's no question right now that Hezbollah is on its back feet. There are a range of

of operations, the pagers, the walkie-talkies, the ones that exploded in the pockets of Hezbollah operatives. There were some unfortunate killing and wounding of civilians. But that operation, in addition to Israel's targeting of senior Hezbollah leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, has

profoundly, at least in the short term, impacted Hezbollah's ability to respond to Israeli operation. One good, in my view, clear example of this is the lack of a Hezbollah response to

with standoff weapons to these Israeli actions. Hezbollah, by our estimates, has somewhere between 120,000 to 200,000 or have them, 120,000 to 200,000 standoff weapons. Those are rockets, various types of missiles, but included ballistic missiles, both guided and unguided. And their response has been really feeble. So we know they've had high numbers of

They just don't have the command and control network to operate them. A lot of people have been killed, and it looks like the Israelis have also destroyed some parts of those weapons depots. So who gives the big response? It's Iran, not Hezbollah. That really tells me in the short term Hezbollah is in disarray for a range of different reasons. The challenge over the long run is –

When you look at Iran's influence north of Israel, it has substantial influence in Lebanon. And this is mostly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard's Quds Force, the paramilitary arm of the Iranian government, the Iranian military.

It also has significant influence in Syria with militias, thanks to what the Iranians were involved in with the Russians of taking back territory beginning around 2015 and in Iraq, where the Iranians have a very close relationship with the popular mobilization forces. So you get this huge area, plus you add Yemen to it. The Iranians still have significant influence in a range of areas, which means the Israelis,

and the US for that matter, are going to have a lot to deal with over the next several months and years. Yeah. So the question I guess is, is Israel safer now than they were last year around this time? You mentioned how they've neutralized Hamas and Gaza. You said also that Hezbollah is on its back foot, but what's it going to take to really destroy, degrade that terrorist organization?

I would say Israeli leaders right now, this is from the Israeli side. We can certainly talk about the Iranians and Hezbollah as well. But from the Israeli side, I think what they're looking for is a few things. One is to curb Hezbollah's threat to Israel by degrading Hezbollah and also Iran to some degree, the military capacity. And as part of that also to deter Iran.

further actions. The current Israeli Minister of Defense said this recently, where a key goal, he said, is, quote, destroying Hezbollah's capabilities that have been built up over 20 years, including, quote, disarming entire units of the Rodwan force and leaving Hezbollah leaders kind of alone at the top. So that's one is... And most of the Hezbollah leaders are gone. Well, a number of them are gone. That's right. So and I think there has been...

been some degrading for now. So the second is to start to resettle Israelis, internally displaced persons in the north. That has not really happened yet. And there, I think the challenge is back in 2006, Israel

the Lebanese government and others involved in the negotiations established UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which essentially meant that that area south of the Latani River in southern Lebanon and north of the Israel-Lebanon border, what the UN calls the Blue Line, essentially the Israelis weren't allowed to operate in those areas. Neither was Hezbollah. It's a demilitarized zone. Basically a demilitarized zone. That has not happened. I think for Israelians,

Israel to resettle and for the Israeli population to feel safe to some degree,

There has to be some agreed upon buffer area north of the blue line, north of the Israel-Lebanon border. That has not happened. That will be a function and part of negotiations that have not been successful. So there's a military side of this on capabilities. There's also a diplomatic component to it of which there have been a lot of ongoing discussions, just not success yet. So-

Is it your belief that once something like that is reestablished, I mean, after all, 1701, the Latani River, it was established, but it wasn't enforced. They were firing back and forth at each other, and that's been going on for quite some time. But if there is some semblance of this restored, do you think Israel then backs off, or do you think Israel's really in it right now to try to finish off Hezbollah as much as they can?

So I think what Israel probably will want to do in some sense is there's no end in sight. I mean, I think anybody that looks at the last several decades of Israel-Lebanese involvement, in fact, you could go back to U.S. put boots on the ground in the 1980s, did not go well. Hezbollah was involved in blowing up and killing U.S. Marines in the barracks. So I don't think anybody expects that this will end conflict. The conflict tends to be cyclical and periodic.

But I think the hope from the Israeli perspective is that they will decimate chunks of Hezbollah's capability and willingness to strike Israel. The data actually is really interesting because what we see in one of our figures is we plot geographically the strikes by Hezbollah, many of them using anti-tank guided munitions, a

against Israel, they're all, they're virtually all happening within that area south of the Litani River and north of the blue line. So I think it is reasonable to expect that success means Hezbollah's capabilities are significantly deteriorated and where there's a negotiated buffer zone. So there's some status quo that the Israelis are able to reach.

I think the challenge, frankly, over the long run is how do the Israelis deal with Iran? Because Iran's got its tentacles in multiple countries in the region and can resupply all of them, including Hezbollah. And I think that's something that

The US, Israel, and a number of countries have to figure out. Actually, a lot of the Gulf states are in this same category. The Saudis want to figure out some kind of solution to this. How do you weaken Iran's activities in a range of countries? So Seth, let's talk about Hezbollah's capabilities for a minute. You mentioned that huge number that CSIS has been keeping about their capabilities. I've seen it cited widely in the media over the past several weeks.

What does it take to really destroy something like that? I mean, some of the reporting out of think tanks in Israel has shown that Hezbollah's tunnels are

are much more extensive than those of Hamas. And so they can even drive huge semi-trucks through semi, you know, like big rigs through some of these tunnels. And these big rigs have rocket launchers on top of them that they can pop out of the ground and shoot at Israeli targets. What does it take to really take that out for Israel? Well, so there's a, what I'll call mowing the grass component, which is

this continuous strikes against weapons depots where they're stored, components, also production facilities where a range of these materials are built, places where they can be fired. And in addition to that, because

Iran has access to and the Quds Force have access to not just Lebanon, but Syria, Iraq, and obviously Iran itself. They have the ability to move additional shipments, including components in.

by both air and by land corridors. So there's also an interdiction component that's important, and that is continuing to develop and exploit intelligence networks so you can see those shipments coming in, you know when they're happening and where they're going, and you can continue to strike them as well. This is Iran's Silk Road. This is Iran's, yeah, this is the new Iran's Silk Road. And I think it is probably greater and more extensive than

than most people realize and really make this a long-term challenge. Andrew, we may not entirely want to get into the solutions to this here, but there are also some big questions with Iran. It is close to having nuclear capability. And so a big question about to what degree there needs to be an effort to set the Iranian nuclear weapons program back. And I know that's something that the Israelis, the Americans, and others are certainly debating.

Seth, there's been some reporting in the media about fissures between the United States and Israel over Israel's tactics over what the endgame might be. What do we know about that and how much of that is accurate? Well, a couple of points. One is

Every country and every leader is going to have its own interests. It's going to have its own domestic interests. It's going to have its own foreign policy interests. So it's not unusual for U.S. and Israeli leaders to disagree in a range of issues. I mean, just think for a moment, the U.S. is in election year. It is dealing with a population that has had protests on campuses. The Israeli population is dealing with the aftermath of October 7th. The Israeli population is not in a position –

to be negotiating about its own security and survival. It's feeling a threat, not just from Hezbollah and Hamas, which is what we've talked about, but also there have been strikes by the Houthis up the Red Sea that have hit targets in Tel Aviv. So...

The Israelis are feeling it from multiple fronts. And a massive, massive strike on Israel by Iran all over Israel, which was largely deterred. But you could see where some of these missiles fell, massive damage, even though it wasn't any real infrastructure in Israel or people. Israel's Iron Dome with the assistance of the United States managed to shoot a lot of this down. So Israel's by no means in the clear. Yes. So, I mean, in that sense, it's normal.

For administrations, they have different domestic populations and interests. But I will say that at this point,

There clearly are some big strategic differences between the Netanyahu government and the Biden-Harris government. There's no question that the Israelis are operating post-October 7th from a position where they're really trying to secure the country. And it is interesting when you look at the opinion polls today.

done in Israel, there is significant support for Israeli actions. People can agree or disagree, but if you're sitting in the prime minister's office, you have a population that supports these activities where there has been disagreement within Israel has been on the Supreme Court issues that the prime minister has tried to put through. In addition, I would just say more broadly, the Biden administration has definitely been one that has been cautious about

And some have used the term risk averse on a range of issues. Every step of the war in Ukraine, there have been concerns about escalation. Do you give the Ukrainians ATAKMs or F-16s or various types of weapons that might lead Vladimir Putin to escalate the war? The same kinds of issues have been

led the U.S. administration, I think, to think very carefully, cautiously about the potential for escalation here. So I think they are definitely operating on different wavelengths here. And I think where the Israelis are at right now is, I think, in some sense,

First and foremost, they are operating to protect themselves, whatever the position of the United States is. And that may be uncomfortable for some, but that is where the Israelis are operating right now. And I think that does mean there are big fissures and gaps between where the Israelis are and where Washington is. Seth Jones, thank you very much for this perspective. I know we'll be talking about this a lot more in weeks to come. Thank you. Thank you, Andrew.

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