Syria falls: Russia and Iran await Trump's response
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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble, today joined by Toby Gillis. Over the weekend, the decades-long regime of Syria's Assad family fell, just 12 days after rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, launched its coup. The

They say they want a Syria for all and continue to deny any continued affiliation with former allied terror groups, Al-Qaeda or Islamic State. President Bashar al-Assad has been granted asylum in Russia, which, along with Iran, had upheld his regime until now. Both nations look significantly weakened by the developments.

To make sense of the future and how each of these major players might react, we're joined by Alexander Betts, Professor of Forced Migration and International Affairs at the University of Oxford. Alexander, how much can we predict the future and who might end up with a stake in Syria at this stage?

So the future is yet to be determined. Everything's up for grabs. I think many people rightly feel very positive that the Assad regime has fallen. And I think the question is, what happens next? We've got a coalition of rebels from different backgrounds that have managed to seize Damascus, take control of the country. And people are looking at HTS and saying, this is an organisation that has had past connections with ISIS and

Is this going to be a weak and fragile state that becomes a home to extremism, radicalism, and where

parties across the region from Russia to Iran to Saudi Arabia and Turkey back their preferred winners and we end up with a fracturing and a fragmentation. I hope not. I hope this is the case. This is the context unlike Iraq, unlike Afghanistan where the international community comes together, where regional powers work together

set aside their differences and we get unification across the Alawite groups, the Sunni groups, the Kurds. History tells us, though, there are reasons to be sceptical.

Let's look at Iran for a minute, which looks significantly weakened now, especially when you consider the recent decimation that has taken place in the wider Middle East of Hezbollah, which played a very important role, of course, in upholding President Assad. Can Iran really expect to exert influence in the new Syria, given its weakened position?

I mean, we can see that Iran is geopolitically weakened, that they've been deeply chastened as a result of the slightly knee-jerk action that they took to launch missiles at Israel. But I think the thing about Iran is it's unpredictable. We're looking at a theocracy that is an aspiring nuclear power that wants to be a spoiler in the region, that wants to support asymmetric conflict.

The fact that Iran is willing to work through proxy groups, whether it's Hamas, whether it's Hezbollah, whether it's other non-state armed actors, that makes them influential and potentially disruptive, regardless of their geopolitical capital, their reputational capital, and even their material strength as a power in the region. They will be a spoiler and they will exert their influence in spaces of instability and insecurity.

Is it fair to say that there are almost two ways of looking at Iran right now? I mean, this does weaken them, doesn't it, to such an extent, maybe, that it could be an opportunity for the West to pile some pressure on? Or maybe we say that their backs are so against the wall that Iran's only option really is actually to come out swinging. It's partly the nature of a theocratic regime that actually, when push comes to shove...

Are they more volatile when they have less to lose? When they've been pushed into a position where they feel bullied, they feel under pressure. And we learned that with Assad, that it was the moment when Assad felt most under pressure, the point of the peak of the Arab Spring in 2011.

that actually he aligned most strongly with neighbors. He created the alignment with Russia. He doubled down and started using force and repression against his own people. Iran is arguably at a similar point. And if you are a theocratic regime in Iran and you witness the fall of Assad, you are going to feel vulnerable and increasingly so. You've seen that the

the effect over, albeit more than a decade, of many authoritarian neighbouring states suffer regime change. And Iran will recognise that it's potentially next in line and will be aligning to prevent that. There's also a point there in your question about the role of the US, because the question is, this is almost a litmus test.

for whether Trump's America is going to be interventionist or whether it's going to stay on the sidelines of the politics of the Middle East. There's a lot at stake for Western powers here. The US are traditionally backed

Turkey, to a certain extent, its relationship with the Kurds in Syria had been very important. And let's not forget that the Kurds established and had been running many of the prisons and detention centres holding ISIS combatants. And there's a real risk that if Turkey gets to act militarily,

it tries to sweep away Kurdish influence in the new Syria, and that may unleash additional new threats as ISIS militants end up being released from those Kurdish prisons and detention camps. So how the US engages, how the US engages with Turkey, the extent to which it tries to balance Iranian and Russian power in the region is going to have a major influence. And US signalling

early on is going to give a signal to regional powers about whether they will have a free run at influencing and shaping the politics of Syria or whether the US will be a player within this.

Given that uncertainty, Alexander, I guess it's difficult to determine Russia's perception of Syria now, although, of course, Vladimir Putin has granted asylum to Assad and his family. But similar to Iran, Russia appears in a weaker position geopolitically by the removal of Assad. How much will its focus on Ukraine, coupled with the fight it might need to actually keep a foothold in Syria, mean Putin might actually just let his position there slip away?

Partly the bilateral alignment with Russia was an opportunistic moment for Putin. He saw what was happening in Syria and he sees that as an opportunity to create interference and meddle in the plans of the West. He saw the opportunity to destabilise Syria as a way of fomenting refugee movements, the migration crisis and destabilising Europe.

Whether Russia continues to have a material geopolitical stake in Syria is a different question. Was that alignment specific to the Assad regime or will Russia continue to be involved? I think what we know about Russia is Russia is a spoiler. Russia wants to create instability and uncertainty that imposes costs on Russia.

the West. And insofar as remaining involved in Syria does that, there's a likelihood that Russia will see a stake. I think we've also seen in the past dictatorships go into exile. Usually that exile results in fizzling out an acquired retirement rather than remobilising a diasporic opposition. So

I think there's every reason to feel reasonably calm that Assad is probably gone for the indefinite future, but where Russia is going to sit on this. If there were a move to offer sanctuary to a large part of the regime,

Then you start to look at something that looks more like an opposition in exile. Then you start to have a group that may be incubating a potential return. And that starts to get more worrying.

Professor Alexander Betts, thank you. The last point Alexander made about Russia's future was addressed by Major General Chip Chapman, a former British military advisor to US Central Command, who spoke to Frontline today, Times Radio's interview series available on YouTube, which the World in 10 is partnered with.

He says the removal of Russia's military bases in Syria would weaken Putin significantly, but he may have no choice in the matter. It depends if they can stitch up any agreement with a new government, if that's a sunny government.

led by Jalani or the influence of Jalani, whose objective, as I said earlier, was to get rid of Russia as the new enemy, then I don't see them having their bases in the future. So the key things are their air base,

in Latakia province and of course their Tartus naval base. Now the Tartus naval base enabled them to project power into the Mediterranean. The loss of the air base, so the Mediterranean part from the naval perspective is significant. The loss of the air base is more difficult for them in terms of projecting power into Africa. That was really the main transit route that

for the sort of Africa Corps, which is taken over from Prigogine's Wagner Group in Africa. So it sort of disrupts that. Now, that doesn't mean that is over. It just means the logistics of Russian operations are made far more difficult than they were by that base itself. ♪

That was Major General Chip Chapman speaking to Frontline. And that is it for today. Thank you for spending 10 minutes to stay on top of the world with the help of The Times. We'll see you tomorrow. In D.C., it's not always easy to save. But with unlimited welcome from Verizon...

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