Frontline special - China expert Ian Williams
27:37 Share

When it comes to weight loss, no two people are the same. That's why Noom builds personalized plans based on your unique psychology and biology. Take Brittany. After years of unsustainable diets, Noom helped her lose 20 pounds and keep it off. I was definitely in a yo-yo cycle for years of just losing weight, gaining weight, and it was exhausting. And Stephanie. She's a former D1 athlete who knew she couldn't out-train her diet, and she lost 38 pounds.

My relationship to food before Noom was never consistent. And Evan, he can't stand salads, but he still lost 50 pounds with Noom. I never really was a salad guy. That's just not who I am. Even through the pickiness, Noom taught me that building better habits builds a healthier lifestyle. I'm not doing this to get to a number. I'm doing this to feel better.

Get your personalized plan today at Noom.com. Real Noom users compensated to provide their story. In four weeks, the typical Noom user can expect to lose one to two pounds per week. Individual results may vary.

How can governments play a pivotal role as the world shifts? From decarbonizing the economy to sustainable care systems, bold government strategies are needed now more than ever. Get informed by listening to Government Insights, the new podcast from EY Parthenon. This series explores how government executives can transform their strategies into actions that are future-proof and sustainable.

Government Insights is out now. Download today wherever you get your podcasts.

Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble and I executive produce the podcast. The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio, available on YouTube, with expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one from this week. I hope you find it interesting.

Hello and welcome to Frontline for Times Radio. I'm James Hansen and today I'm delighted to be joined again by Ian Williams, an award-winning journalist and China expert. His latest book is called Vampire State, The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Economy. Ian's also been a foreign correspondent for NBC News and Channel 4 News and previously worked for the Sunday Times and over the years he's covered conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine. Ian, it's always a pleasure. Welcome back. Good to be back.

Let's begin with the very dramatic events in Syria over recent weeks. There's been a lot of talk about the impact on Iran and there's been a lot of talk about the impact on Russia, but China had a lot at stake in Syria as well. So talk us through the impact on Xi Jinping and Beijing. Yeah, China cozying up to Assad was very much seen as part of their efforts to improve, to increase their influence in the Middle East.

Now, yes, we've seen Iran, Russia. This is a strategic blow to both of them. But, of course, Assad was in Beijing, in Hangzhou, visited China, given a very high-profile visit last year. China made him what they described as a strategic partner just a few months earlier. They'd allowed Syria to join the Belt and Road Initiative, this big international infrastructure building project.

that China has, although, of course, it's more than that. It's more of an influence-building program. So they were very close to Assad. And while Iran and Russia provided the muscle, provided the guns, China was providing the money, was providing the development aid. Now, how much of that

had gone in is an open question because the BRI tends to be big on promises but slower to deliver. So it's harder to say how many people China had in Damascus when Damascus fell. But certainly the embassy was rattled.

judging by what's been in Chinese state media, they were pretty shocked, pretty surprised by what had happened just as they were drawing closer to Assad and just as they were convinced that Iran and Russia had provided the stability under which they could extend their economic influence in that country and beyond.

I understand what Syria was getting out of that Chinese support. But what was China getting from Syria? I mean, OK, if you're Iran, you understand it because it's an ally and it extends the Shia crescent. I understand it from Russia's perspective because they can have naval and air bases there. What was China getting from that relationship?

It was looking to broadly extend its influence in the Middle East. And I think it saw Assad as being one more building block in this. China really very much sees itself as being in this international competition for influence with the United States, with the West more broadly. And it saw this as another building block, another way of extending that influence. Now, China traditionally, its economic relations internationally, it's not really been too bothered

by the sort of people it's cosying up to. In fact, arguably, the BRI has been more comfortable in the company of kleptocrats and thugs. And of course, they don't come worse than Assad. And even by those standards, China cosying up to him being the first, the foreign minister, the first to visit China.

Syria after the so-called re-election, the rigged election that brought Assad back to power a couple of years ago. So China really saw it as a broader chess piece, a broader way of building its influence in the Middle East. And this will be a blow to Beijing, perhaps not on the same scale as Iran and Russia, which had far more strategic interests there, but certainly a blow to China and China's prestige.

But I wonder whether Beijing, Tehran and Moscow will have a common reaction in the sense that it will remind all of them these autocratic regimes, which can appear very stable, can crumble very quickly. And if you're Putin, if you're Xi, if you're the Ayatollahs, that is alarming. Extraordinarily quickly.

I once had a conversation with Ai Weiwei, the Chinese artist, and I was asking him specifically about Xi Jinping and the stability of the Chinese regime. And Weiwei said, often if you look at Chinese history...

autocrats, emperors are at their weakest when they appear to be at their strongest. And I think you can, it's counterintuitive, but you can use that measure across a number of countries and a number of locations. And I think it will have come as a shock. It will have come as a surprise, the sheer pace at which it unfolded and their belief that by backing him, they were backing a stable leader, irrespective of the thuggery that he was responsible for.

Now, perhaps understandably, because there has been so much focus on Syria in the past week, what has almost gone unnoticed, slipped under the radar almost, is what's been happening around Taiwan. So talk us through what's been happening there, Ian. Well, this is being seen as the biggest military exercise that China has undertaken in the region since, according to some analysts, 1996, which was a year when...

Taiwan held its first fully democratic presidential elections and China threw a militarized tantrum in response to that. Now, according to reports we're seeing, there are upwards of 100 ships taking part in this. And what's significant, it's not concentrated so much on Taiwan, so much on an embargo of Taiwan, so much on rehearsing for action against Taiwan, but the area is much broader.

which suggests that the message that's being sent is equally to the United States and to Western allies. There's a – in the military jargon, there's anti-access area denial, which means effectively keeping the Americans out of the fight should –

China decide to embargo or to invade Taiwan. And this would seem to fit into that category, which suggests the message is more for the incoming administration in the States, more for Donald Trump, more equally for him as it is for the leadership in Taipei. Well, on that note, China has also launched an investigation into the American chip company NVIDIA. So is that also part of this, we're trying to send a message to the incoming Trump administration? Yes.

It is. It's part of a whole bunch of things that we've seen coming out of Beijing just in these last few days, designed to send a message to Trump, that message being that we have ways that we can retaliate and with which we will retaliate. Now, NVIDIA, which is responsible for the really high-end chips for artificial intelligence, a very valuable company. China has launched what it calls an anti-competition campaign,

Now, a lot of companies doing business in China will not be surprised by that because there are numerous tools which the Chinese government has to keep Western companies active.

on the straight and narrow to punish them, to remind them who's in charge. And this is clearly designed to do that. I mean, NVIDIA chips are not... The American government has sought to limit Chinese access to top-end chips that are made by NVIDIA. So this is the Chinese Communist Party's way of saying, well, hey, you know, we can also do a bit of damage to that company. And, of course, this comes at the same time as an embargo that China has put...

on the sale of several critical minerals to the United States and several components used in the manufacture of drones. These are minerals which China controls the supply chain of, controls the processing of. At the same time, just yesterday, China has warned that they may put sanctions on American politicians who it says to quote, have the wrong attitude on Hong Kong.

So taken together, I think this is a message to Trump that two can play at this game should the US decide to impose more tariffs on China. It's a high stakes game because economists would argue China has far more to lose and

full-throated tariffs could cut China's growth rate by half at a time when the economy is already looking pretty fragile. I want to come back to the Chinese economy in a moment, just on the sanctions on US politicians. Is there any precedent for that in America? I know in the UK, certain sort of China hawk MPs, people like Sir Ian Duncan Smith, the former Conservative leader who's been very critical of Beijing, he's been sanctioned, many other MPs as well. Is there a

a precedent for that in the US or is this new? No, several have been. In fact, the incoming Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, himself has been sanctioned with the same style sanctions that we've seen against British politicians. And again, it was for his outspoken comments on Xinjiang, on human rights abuses there. And are they going to maintain that even once he becomes Secretary of State? Well, that's the question because, of course, technically speaking...

even if he wanted to go to China, it would be somewhat limited if the sanctions were still outstanding against him. So it will be intriguing to see how that plays out as the new administration gets into its stride. It's an issue of practicality. It's a bit like whether HTS remains a prescribed terror group for the US and the UK. Indeed, yeah. I mean, you can't really do business, China can't really do business with the US if it maintains sanctions against its top diplomat.

So you mentioned the Chinese economy. Give us a sense of the struggles it's currently having and the panic, I don't know if that's the right word, that this is causing in Beijing. It is causing major concerns there. We've seen a whole slew of different...

initiatives taken by Beijing to try and boost the economy, to try and pump more money into the markets, most of which have underwhelmed and haven't had the impact they'd wanted. This week in Beijing, a top party body which goes roughly by the name the Economic Works Committee, which conjures up an image of a municipal council arranging to dig holes in the road. But it is an incredibly important committee and

Economists, investors, analysts are looking to see what emerges from that of any substance to try and help the economy get on a surer footing. But nothing which has been done so far has had that impact.

And we're seeing continuing anemic rates of growth by Chinese standards, high rates of youth unemployment, a property market which simply isn't recovering, a lack of any sort of consumer confidence. So any plans to try and get the consumer to do more, to spend more in China aren't coming through. So the economic issues are very, very significant. And China does stand to lose a lot should we see a full-fledged recovery.

or intensification of the trade war when Trump comes into office. And when you say they are now trying different initiatives to try and drive economic growth again, what kind of initiatives? Because traditionally in China, over recent decades, it's been big infrastructure. But, you know, that's also reached its limit. You've now got roads to nowhere and developments there's no one living in. So what are they trying now?

Well, yeah. I mean, the drivers of the economy until now have been property. And of course, that bubble is bursting. And a great deal, something like 70 or 80 percent of the personal wealth of the middle class in China are tied up in property. So there's no great confidence there. The bubble continues to burst.

the infrastructure spending, you're simply not getting the returns because there are only so many bridges and power stations and roads that you can build. Then there's the export-led economy, which was a driving force of the economy in the past. Well, yes, they're building factories at a massive pace. They're trying to redirect investment into particularly renewable technologies. But

But the world, and not just the West, is far more wary of that because there have been heavy subsidies. They see this as unfair competition. And it's far more difficult for China to turn that into a new motor of the economy. The other motor, which Xi Jinping talks about, is what he calls high inflation.

high-end manufacturing innovation. He wants to turn China into a self-sustaining innovation economy. But the problem is that sits at odds with his obsession with control. You know, the Communist Party wants to be in every laboratory, in every school, in every boardroom. And that's not necessarily conducive with innovation, which requires giving people a bit more room

giving them a bit more initiative, giving the market more space, giving private companies, particularly the technology companies, more room. And everything he's done has been counter to that. So it's very difficult. I mean, I would argue, I argue in the book, that I just don't think meaningful reform of the economy is possible under Xi Jinping. Because of his personality, because of his ideology. Yeah, and because of his obsession with control and power and security. Mm-hmm.

It needs a loosening of the reins, which runs contrary to everything he stands for. I mean, his position in many respects looks more secure than ever, but are there people around him who, if they were in his position, would allow some liberalisation of the economy? I think so, because...

A lot of Chinese economists and analysts recognize the issues with the economy. The last two prime ministers have essentially said the old model is unsustainable. We need a new model, a new driver for the economy. But it's difficult to see how that will emerge when you've got the sort of mindset that surrounds Xi Jinping.

And also a system which is so centralised where power is concentrated so much on Xi that people tend to tell him what he wants to hear rather than necessarily what's best for the economy. And we've seen these continuing purges in the military. For instance, one of the top military

military commanders was recently collared for corruption. Was he corrupt? It's hard to say because corruption is such an umbrella for all sorts of misdemeanors and all sorts of political opposition within China that you don't really know what's fully behind it. But you

You sense this discontent there. How deep is that discontent? What might it mean for Xi? It's much more difficult to tell. But I think with the tensions we're going to see with the new US administration playing out over coming weeks, it's intriguing. And interesting that you mentioned earlier about the fact that the middle class in China has a huge amount of its wealth tied up in property. And kind of going back to what we were talking about earlier in the way that these autocratic regimes can come under threat,

If you're an autocratic regime and the middle class is feeling poorer than they were before and a feeling that their economy is under threat, that's not a great situation. It's not. And it's always been the irony with China in that a lot of the main support for the Chinese Communist Party, a nominally communist party, has come from the middle class.

because they've tended to benefit from the phenomenal rates of economic growth that we have seen. And they've also benefited from the sort of stability, which the party would argue that it's brought to the country. And they've brought into the deal, if you like, that they will reap the economic benefits, the fruit of an expanding economy for political docility.

And the problem is when you have an economy which isn't growing, which is facing profound problems and signs we're seeing all over China, China,

on protests, for instance, on demonstrations, particularly related to property disputes, to companies going bust. Stability also is something that starts to come into question. And I think that that's one of the things we need to look out for in the year ahead. The year ahead is the crumbling of this pack.

this almost social pact between the party and particularly the middle class, you know, will give you growth, will give you economic opportunities, but forget about the politics.

Just looking at it for a moment from the US perspective, do you expect Donald Trump to further ramp up tensions and the trade war with China? I mean, Joe Biden kind of followed on from what the Trump administration started when he took office. Do you expect Donald Trump to pick up the ball and take it even further? Well, certainly he's made some pretty hawkish appointments.

Secretary of State, National Security Advisor. These are people who have been very outspoken about the need to confront China. They think that China's taken a free ride on the global economy and on the United States, has...

has stolen technology, has ignored the rules for so long that China needs to be confronted on this. But then I guess if Trump has one diplomatic strength, it's unpredictability.

And you've got, on the one hand, the China hawks who he's appointed and brought in there. On the other hand, you've got Elon Musk, whose businesses are heavily dependent upon China and Chinese favour. What's going to be intriguing, we've seen this shot across the bowels of NVIDIA, is

But of course, two of the most high profile investors in China are Apple and Tesla, two blue chip American companies, two of the best known American companies on the planet. And they are heavily invested in China as a production base, as a market. Now, you could argue that they would perhaps be juicy targets for China if it was looking for

high-profile means of retaliation. But then it's more complicated than that because Elon Musk, Tim Cook have both been big cheerleaders for engagement with China. So if you're Xi Jinping sitting in the Zhongnanhai leadership compound, you'd probably see Apple and Tesla as important assets that could actually help push your case in Washington. So you might not wish to...

sanction them or to be seen to be moving against them because they're arguing your corner. So why would you do that? And just to return to the issue of Taiwan, I mean, I feel like we ask, well, I ask this question every time I see you, but given the military exercises we've seen this week, does that make an invasion more likely in the next 12 months?

I think what we should look out for is not so much... I think an invasion would be well signposted. The sheer logistics of mounting an invasion in terms of the number of people, the number of assets, the limitations...

climate, it's all on the side of the defenders in Taiwan. It would not be easy to invade Taiwan. And to try and to fail would probably be the end of Xi Jinping and possibly the Chinese Communist Party. Far more likely, I think, is the anaconda strategy as it's been described. The squeezing of the island, perhaps elements of an embargo, stopping ships, stopping planes, questioning ships,

an intensification of the cyber war, the information war, the mysterious cutting of internet cables to outlying islands. These are all grey zone strategies which China is already engaged in and which it can intensify. And the problem for any American administration who would seek to, you know, where's your red line? Where do you say that's enough? Because China is a master at pushing that.

That line. And I would see it more likely to have an intensification of these gray warfare elements over the coming months as a way of testing the administration and testing their commitment to the defense of Taiwan.

On a slightly different note, but related to China, we're recording this two weeks from Christmas. There are a lot of the classic Christmas cyber scams doing the rounds as always. How responsible is China for those?

Well, that's a very good question because the global center, the epicenter for cyber scamming is now the Far East. There are a lot of special economic zones, as they call, which dot the Mekong River. I visited a couple of them when I was researching Vampire State. They're run predominantly by Chinese gangsters.

The biggest and most notorious is in Laos, a place called the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone run by a gangster called Zhao Wei, who's been sanctioned by America, by Britain, by numerous others for everything from gun running to drugs to wildlife trade, illegal wildlife trade. And these special zones...

Their biggest money spinner now are cyber scams. Everything from the sale of dubious investments to the infamous romance scam when you're befriended by someone who appears to, it's a stolen profile and you end up

transferring cash or other assets. Now, China has always been very close to the triads, as Chinese organized crime is called. The party has never been shy about using them. And the problem is that these special economic zones claim to be under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative.

They claim loyalty to China. The gangsters are treated by the host governments, which tend to be very weak in Cambodia, in Laos, in Myanmar, as representatives of the Chinese government. And Zhao Wei in Laos has won numerous awards, just won the other day, for so-called economic contribution to the host country. Yeah.

Law enforcement internationally and in the region is pulling its hair out because until very recently, it was very difficult to get China to take these places seriously. Recently, there have been raids on some of the more notorious special zones. But cynics would say this is because they have been targeting China instead of China.

which has sort of been regarded almost as fair game. So at this time of year when cyber scams tend to be at their height, we're seeing these areas thriving and we're not seeing China sort of take the kind of action against them, which certainly law enforcement in the region believes they should and could do.

A couple of things to finish off. First of all, what did you make of what happened in South Korea last week and the attempt by the president to impose martial law?

It was extraordinary because I, I think, and many others had assumed that South Korea, the stability of South Korean democracy, South Korean democratic institutions were deeply entrenched. And I think it was all the more shocking to see initially what is being now described as an attempted coup. I guess it's reassuring that

South Korea reasserted itself, that democracy appears to have reasserted itself, and the president is being held to account.

But certainly I was surprised. I think it did create a lot of shock among South Korea's allies and also among those who had been, you know, impressed by the president's ability to reach out to old enemy Japan to be more robust on China, for instance. Geopolitically, he was playing all the right cards with the U.S. administration, with the West, and

but has been deeply unpopular. Perhaps we took our eye off the ball. Deeply unpopular domestically. And just finally, looking into 2025, what are you expecting in terms of foreign policy from the second Trump administration? A lot of people talk about his isolationism, but do you expect him to...

withdraw America from world engagements? Or do you think maybe that's overstated? I think it's overstated. I think rhetorically, you'll see a lot of America first. And rhetorically, you'll see a lot of pressure, say, on Europe to play a bigger role, whether it's in Ukraine or in terms of their own defence.

But I think one of the issues that Trump will face is everything tends to be connected because if you put pressure on Ukraine to enter into a peace deal which benefits Ukraine,

then you're also sending a signal to China about lack of resolve in supporting an ally. And that could be very dangerous thing to do as China starts to calculate about what it should do, how fast it should increase pressure around Taiwan, even plan for an invasion of Taiwan. So I think everything is linked up.

As I say, the only thing that's predictable about Trump is his unpredictability. It's hard to know how the second presidency will pan out. To me, it was intriguing recently talking to people in Kiev and asking them about what they thought of another coming Trump administration. And I'd expected them to throw their hands in the air in horror.

But one of the replies I had was, no, well, actually, you know, dealing with Biden was deeply frustrating. The promises were slow to come. The delivery was slow. It was very difficult to the conditionality on the weapons, the type of weapons he was willing to supply. But at least with Trump, we might get some clarity. It might not be the clarity we want. And if he should try and do a deal with Biden,

Putin, he'll quickly learn that that's not possible and could well be humiliated by that, which of course Trump does not like at all. So, you know, I think I'm not...

I don't take the view that we're on an inevitable slope towards American isolationism and the undermining of Western institutions and alliances. I think the rhetoric will certainly be there, but I would be cautious to predict the direction it goes in in reality once the Trump administration is bedded in. Ian, it's always fascinating talking to you. Thank you so much for your time. A pleasure. Thank you.

How can governments play a pivotal role as the world shifts? From decarbonizing the economy to sustainable care systems, bold government strategies are needed now more than ever. Get informed by listening to Government Insights, the new podcast from EY Parthenon. This series explores how government executives can transform their strategies into actions that are future-proof and sustainable.

Government Insights is out now. Download today wherever you get your podcasts. This podcast is brought to you by Aura. 2024 has seen a surge in high-profile data breaches, raising serious concerns about the security of personal information. Dell's breach exposed 3.9 million customer records. That's why we're thrilled to partner with Aura. Aura monitors the dark web for users' phone numbers, emails, and social security numbers, delivering real-time alerts if any suspicious activity is detected.

Additionally, Aura provides up to $5 million in identity theft insurance, offering a robust safety net in the event of a worst-case scenario. For a limited time, Aura is offering our listeners a 14-day trial plus a check of your data to see if your personal information has been leaked online. All for free when you visit Aura.com slash safety. That's Aura.com slash safety to sign up for a 14-day free trial and start protecting you and your loved ones. That's

a-u-r-a dot com slash safety. Certain terms apply, so be sure to check the site for details.