2021年2月1日美國之音網站一篇報導:安卡拉有望從中東轉向中亞Ankara May Be Poised for Pivot From Middle East to Central Asia
By Dorian Jones
February 01, 2021 04:48 PM

土耳其和阿塞拜疆正在通過大規模聯合軍事演習繼續加深關係。如此地展現武力，讓一些分析師認為，安卡拉可能正處於從中東轉向中亞的外交政策重心的邊緣。

為期12天的軍事演習涉及坦克師，空降部隊和“特種部隊”。土耳其製造的武器也將發揮重要作用。
土耳其製造的無人機在10月亞美尼亞分離主義部隊的戰鬥中發揮了關鍵作用，這場戰鬥是在阿塞拜疆有爭議的納戈爾諾-卡拉巴赫飛地上進行的。阿塞拜疆的勝利被視為土耳其的戰略性勝利。伊斯坦布爾的卡迪爾哈斯大學的國際關係教授謝爾哈特·古文茨說：“土耳其在阿塞拜疆軍事上投入了大量資金。” 這些國家之間有著密切的族裔聯繫，並將他們的關係定義為“一個民族，兩個國家”。

阿塞拜疆軍事勝利的速度和決定性增強了土耳其在高加索地區的影響力，進一步鞏固了安卡拉和巴庫之間的緊密聯繫。“土耳其正在擴大其在高加索地區的影響力；將來它將進一步擴大，”安卡拉外交政策研究所所長侯賽因·巴奇說。

巴奇表示，安卡拉準備改變外交政策，他說：“土耳其不再扮演伊斯蘭和中東取向的角色，而是現在更加著重民族主義和土耳其民族主義。”

土耳其總統雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安（Recep Tayyip Erdogan）傳統上將自己定位為全球穆斯林權利的捍衛者，尤其是巴勒斯坦人。安卡拉還是整個中東穆斯林兄弟會和哈馬斯的堅強後盾，哈馬斯被美國和歐盟指定為恐怖組織。哈馬斯經常在土耳其舉行會議，而安卡拉則接待了其領導人，還給予迦薩財政援助。傳統上，這種舉動在埃爾多安的宗教票倉上發揮很好的作用。

但分析人士說，安卡拉對美國簽署的《亞伯拉罕協定》感到擔憂，該協定去年使阿拉伯聯合酋長國和巴林與以色列的關係正常化，而蘇丹緊隨其後。隨著其他阿拉伯國家（包括土耳其的親密盟友卡塔爾）準備加入《亞伯拉罕協議》的報導，巴奇所長說，安卡拉已經意識到土耳其在中東正面臨日益孤立的局面。

但是其他分析家仍然對土耳其從中東轉向向突厥中亞各族國家示好表示謹慎。古文克說：“現在說還為時過早，但是有一些跡象。”

古文茨指出，土耳其的右翼政黨在很大程度上遵循了由軍政府在1980年代初期以“土耳其伊斯蘭聯合”為旗幟的民族主義和伊斯蘭教哲學。古文茨說：“我想強調，這一綜合對Turko組成部分的理解對本屆政府來說是有意義的。”

埃爾多安（Erdogan）的議會聯盟夥伴民族主義者MHP被視為支持政策轉變。巴吉說：“有了MHP，他的聯盟夥伴，埃爾多安將在土耳其民族主義上發揮更大的作用，而不是伊斯蘭教派。”

但是，對高加索地區以及土庫曼斯坦，塔吉克斯坦和哈薩克斯坦等中亞國家的重新定位並非沒有風險。
古文茨說：“對俄羅斯來說，這肯定不會很好，俄羅斯將這一地區視為其勢力範圍”，而中國也在中亞地區增強影響力。”

德國波恩大學（Bonn University）俄羅斯和中亞地區專家扎爾·加西莫夫（Zaur Gasimov）表示，安卡拉的實力更強。他說：“與1990年代和2000年代相比，如今的土耳其具有更大的影響力，可以像俄羅斯一樣利用其經濟和移民政策來影響中亞共和國。”土耳其接待了來自中亞各州的許多移民工人，有助於發展和加強經濟和文化聯繫。為了減輕俄羅斯的強大影響力，土耳其在中亞的影響力將不斷增加。

加西莫夫說：“例如，對於哈薩克斯坦，可能需要加深與土耳其的合作，以在與莫斯科的關係中取得某種平衡。”加西莫夫說，自從俄羅斯在2014年吞併烏克蘭的克里米亞以來，哈薩克對莫斯科的戒慎一直在增加。克里米亞是一個由俄羅斯人居住的地區。他補充說：“哈薩克斯坦的精英對俄羅斯對烏克蘭的政策感到擔憂，並對俄羅斯人在哈薩克斯坦居住的北部省份感到不安全。最近有幾位俄羅斯高級政治家宣稱擁有哈薩克領土。”

但是我們要知道，土耳其與俄羅斯在傳統上曾經打過12次俄土戰爭，從17世紀打到20世紀，幾乎都是以土耳其失敗，割讓大批土地給俄羅斯帝國作終，因此想起來這段歷史就是土耳其的恥辱，但是這麼多世紀打下來的結果就是俄土雙方不可能成為真正的盟友，因為歷史仇恨太大太多了，所以即使土耳其在軍事與國家實力尚不及今日俄羅斯，但他要重回中亞突厥語系世界當回老大哥的話，俄羅斯肯定無法同意，梗別提土耳其軍隊駐軍中亞這種敏感事宜，因此我建議大家可以繼續觀察，土耳其恐怕僅能在經濟、文化、教育、移民、投資等等能稍有作為，其他政治、軍事同盟類的敏感事務，恐怕都會受到來自俄羅斯的極力抗拒與反對，甚至操作不好的話，引起第13次俄土戰爭也不是不可能的事喔(這就有點聳人聽聞了)。

ISTANBUL - Turkey and Azerbaijan are continuing to deepen ties by starting a major joint military exercise Monday. The display of force comes as some analysts suggest Ankara could be on the verge of a foreign policy pivot away from the Middle East to Central Asia.
The 12-day military exercise involves tank divisions, airborne units, and "special forces." Turkish-made weaponry is also set to play a prominent role.
Turkish-made drones were pivotal in Azerbaijan's defeat in October of Armenian separatist forces, in a battle over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan’s victory is seen as a strategic triumph for Turkey. "Turkey has invested very heavily in the Azeri military," said international relations professor Serhat Guvenc of Istanbul's Kadir Has University. The countries have close ethnic ties and define their relationship as “one nation, two states.”
The speed and decisiveness of Azerbaijan's military success boosted Turkish influence in the Caucasus, further consolidating close ties between Ankara and Baku.
"Turkey is expanding its influence in Caucasia; it will do more so in the future," said Huseyin Bagci, head of the Ankara-based Foreign Policy Institute.
Bagci suggests Ankara is poised for a shift in foreign policy, saying, "Turkey does not play the card of Islam and Middle East orientation anymore, but now rather more nationalistic, and of Turkish nationalism."
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has traditionally positioned himself as the defender of global Muslim rights, in particular the Palestinians. Ankara is also a strong backer of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East, and Hamas, which is designated by the United States and European Union as a terrorist organization.
Much to Israel's anger and Washington's dismay, Hamas routinely held meetings in Turkey, and Ankara hosted its leaders. Such moves traditionally played well among Erdogan's religious voting base.
But analysts say Ankara is concerned about the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords that saw the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain normalize ties with Israel last year, with Sudan close behind.
With reports of other Arab countries, including Turkey's close ally Qatar, ready to join the Abraham Accords, Bagci says there is awareness in Ankara that Turkey is facing growing isolation in the Middle East.
"The Islamic card and talk of Muslim unity for Erdogan doesn't function anymore, after the Abraham Accords," said Bagci. "Everybody in Turkey realizes the Arabs fight amongst each other, but they also make peace amongst each another. The Arabs are not the Turks. It's so simple. The Turkish public is more conscious of this, and the Israelis are the winners."
But other analysts remain cautious of a Turkish shift away from the Middle East and toward the courting of ethnic Turkic Central Asian states. "It's too early to say, but there are some indications," said Guvenc.
Guvenc points out right-wing political parties in Turkey have broadly followed a philosophy of nationalism and Islam, created by the country's military rulers of the early 1980s under the banner “Turkish Islamic synthesis.”
"I would say the emphasis on the Turko component of this synthesis would make sense for this government," said Guvenc.
Erdogan's parliamentary coalition partner, the nationalist MHP, is seen as backing a shift in policy. "With MHP, his coalition partner, Erdogan will play more on Turkish nationalism than the Islamic card," said Bagci.
But any reorientation toward the Caucasus and beyond to Central Asia countries like Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan isn't without risk.
"This will not go down well with Russia, definitely, which considers this region as its sphere of influence," said Guvenc. "In central Asia, Turkey has already lost the battle and struggle for influence with Russia, and the Chinese are also rising its influence."
Russia thwarted previous efforts by Turkey to project influence across Central Asia. But Zaur Gasimov, an expert on Russia and Central Asia at Germany's Bonn University, suggests Ankara has a stronger hand.
"Compared with the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey nowadays has much more leverage to influence Central Asian republics using its economy and migration policy just like Russia,” he said.
Turkey hosts many migrant workers from across the Central Asian states, helping to develop and strengthen economic and cultural ties.
A growing Turkish presence in Central Asia could be welcomed in the region to mitigate Russia's powerful influence.
"For Kazakhstan, the deepening of cooperation with Turkey, for example, could be needed to obtain a sort of balance in its relations with Moscow," said Gasimov.
Gasimov says Kazakh unease over Moscow has been heightened since Russia’s annexation in 2014 of Ukraine's Crimea, a region populated by ethnic Russians.
"Kazakhstani elites are concerned about Russian policy towards Ukraine and feel insecure about the northern provinces populated by ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. Several high-rank Russian politicians claimed Kazakh territory in the recent past," he added.
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土耳其外交政策重心將由中東阿拉伯世界轉向中亞突厥語族國家嗎? 19:31 Share

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土耳其外交政策重心將由中東阿拉伯世界轉向中亞突厥語族國家嗎?