In Moscow's Shadows bonus minipodcast: North Koreans in Russia?
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Hello, this is Mark Gagliotti with a bonus special little mini podcast in the In Moscow Shadows series being recorded on the 20th of October 2024 and it'll be going out to patrons right away and then everybody else later.

And I want to just spend a little bit of time talking about this whole new story of North Korean soldiers heading for the front line in Ukraine as part of the burgeoning Moscow-Pyongyang alliance. So, first of all, we have to acknowledge the degree to which this is still very much an unformed story.

We know, after all, pretty confidently that there are North Korean technical advisors there, not actually on the battlefield, but helping with the various pieces of kit, the artillery, the rockets and such like, that Pyongyang has provided. And indeed, some of them have been killed in at least one strike. But that's obviously different from actually having combat troops. And how many? Well, this is a figure which has been evolving at speed.

First of all, there was the idea that 3,000 troops were being formed as part of a special Buryat battalion within the Russian 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, and that this was going to be used specifically for combat operations inside Ukraine. Then, Ukraine's President Zelensky claimed there were about 10,000 North Korean troops preparing to fight his country on behalf of Russia being mustered.

We had from the South Korean National Intelligence Service a report that four landing ships and three escort ships belonging to the Russian Pacific Fleet had completed the first transport of approximately 1,500 North Korean special forces and that more were scheduled. And then we had Lieutenant General Kirill Budanov, the head of HUR, Ukrainian Military Intelligence,

tell the specialist outlet The War Zone that there are now nearly 11,000 North Korean infantry training in Eastern Russia to fight in Ukraine and that they will be ready by the 1st of November which is really not that much time and the first 2,600 of them will be heading to go and fight in Kursk as part of the efforts to erode the Kursk salient that the Ukrainians have. By the way, it's worth mentioning some reports have said that's four brigades of troops

Not quite true. It's actually suggested that they come from four brigades of troops, because actually four brigades, four full brigades would be something like 20,000 men. Anyway, we'll have to see. Despite all these claims, NATO's new chief, Mark Rutte, has said that there was no evidence of Pyongyang's presence at this stage, and the United States is also being pretty cautious.

And in part, I mean, I can understand why this might be the case. If it provides additional troops for Russia, that's good. It helps push back any thought of mobilisation and such like. While likewise, from North Korea's point of view, it helps cement its relationship with Moscow. And, well, firstly, it's presumably being paid in some form or another for any soldiers. And also it actually gives its troops some proper combat experience, if that's actually what's happening. However...

It has to be said, it would be a pretty big deal if these were actually used as combat troops. And it's no small matter. You can't just simply throw these people in and expect them to have some sort of really positive impact. And it was quite interesting that in the Russian newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets, Major General of Aviation Vladimir Popov was asked about this, and he said...

The fact is that we have the opportunity to use them to protect military and infrastructure facilities, railway lines, bridges, crossings, to provide and service training grounds, he said. Now the second branch of the BAM, the Baikal-Amur mainline, the railway, needs to be protected from the same Ukrainian saboteurs as well as our military plants, factories, strategically important airfields, arsenals where ammunition is stored.

At least a minimum vocabulary of words, Russian and Korean, must be developed so that servicemen of both countries can communicate with each other when performing certain tasks. This is probably what they will be doing now, because everyday language is one thing, and military technical language is a completely different matter. In addition, issues of training, combat duty, and ensuring the security of our state will be resolved now. So in other words, he's actually presenting these not as frontline combat troops, but precisely as support troops,

who would both enhance the security of the Russian rear area, but also free up Russian troops who could then be sent to Ukraine. Then he's asked, why is there suddenly a need for foreign volunteers now? I've been saying for a long time that we should ideally have a three million strong army, which incidentally is insane for a country of Russia's size, but that's another matter.

For now, we have a shortage of personnel, especially well-trained private sergeants and officers. Not quite sure who's left. Therefore, foreign specialists can fill our positions and help maintain potential deep in the rear. And we, in turn, would be more active in those territories that we have to liberate. Roughly speaking, we can send North Korean servicemen to the Far East, Siberia and the southern part of the country, and take our specialists from there. And why not? Why refuse this assistance if there is a shortage?

There are many units where we can use the military from the DPRK. We will train them now and these will be national units but of dual subordination. In other words, North Korean units but with dual subordination. They will work with both their own and our command. They'll be given a range of tasks and they'll carry them out. Well this raises a series of really quite important issues. There needs to be a sufficient language for them to communicate with the Russians.

and to do so in stressful circumstances. You know, it's one thing to do it in a classroom or in a nice, neat seminar environment, but actually in the middle of action operations of some kind or another, that's a bit trickier.

There needs to be, obviously, interoperability of kit. I mean, we've seen video, which again hasn't been confirmed, but nonetheless is plausible, of people being issued Russian army equipment, uniforms and the like, that we were told are North Korean soldiers. I mean, they could just as easily be from other parts of the Russian Far East. But nonetheless, it's not an easy matter just to insert a totally different unit.

with a different language, with a different command style, with a different military culture, and expect them to work. So this is why they may well find themselves stuck in the rear. It also makes sense, actually, from two other points of view. First of all, we're told that these are North Korean special forces,

North Korean special forces are not necessarily what we would genuinely consider to be special forces. For a start, there are meant to be 200,000 of them. Remember, North Korea has a massive army. Anyway, but 200,000 of them, how special can they be? Sure, some of them are well-trained or drilled, especially in things like martial arts and such like.

But generally, they are special only insofar as they are more special than regular North Korean levies. So, you know, we are not talking about North Korean ninjas here.

On the other hand, because they're special forces, they're probably more politically vetted and loyal. At least that's the expectation. Which really does matter, because clearly, remember, this is the North Korean, the hermit kingdom. The last thing they want is too many cultural influences coming back. Because, you know, however much some people might like to deride Russia, you know, a Russian city is actually a fairly modern place.

and would really highlight the massive gap in general prosperity and standards of living, even with Russia, let alone the West or whatever. So, yes, there is that point. Secondly, and that links to the other point, which is if they were ever to find themselves in frontline operations, some, maybe many, would presumably be tempted to desert, defect, surrender and such like.

And therefore, again, that's another good reason to keep them in fairly encapsulated locations in the rear where they don't face this temptation. But look, we're going to have to see. It's still a very, very early emerging story. But that raises really for me two other slightly more kind of abstract issues about how we think about this and how we talk about this. First of all, there's a lot of...

I won't quite put it apocalyptic, but let's just say overblown chatter that this is some kind of grand civilizational moment. The first time that Asian troops are in Europe, rather than vice versa, since, well, since the Mongols and so forth. I think we need to stop. First of all, they're not really invaders, but frankly are best considered to be mercenaries.

Second, some of the people saying this are actually ironically the same people who say that Russians are not really Europeans. So make your mind up. Thirdly, there's actually a lot more cases we should remember. I mean, think of, well, Soviet troops from Central Asia in World War II, or indeed, actually, you know, some of them in the Russian armies in World War I. Speaking of World War I, there were 140,000-odd in the Chinese Labour Corps who were deployed in Europe in that war.

And even if you exclude those because they were primarily labourers rather than soldiers, there was actually a military force from Siam, Thailand, that arrived in Europe a couple of months before the end of the war. And if we move on to World War II, India, British India, admittedly, but India contributed the third largest Allied contingent in the Italian campaign then, after, obviously, American and UK forces. So, firstly, it's not actually true.

But secondly, not everything is some grand civilizational moment that shows a reorientation of the world and so forth. Too many people are, I suspect, trying to be just a little bit too clever here. But speaking of cleverness, the final point I'd want to make is that this is also a striking example of how the media works, especially in today's age of 24-7 rolling news cycles and social media and the desperate, desperate desire to be first.

So we had from, and I'm picking on this in some ways unfairly because actually they do a lot of good work, but nonetheless the war zone, for example, had this line following the statement by Kirill Budanov of HUR about North Koreans. Budanov's statement is another indication of North Korea's growing role in Russia's all-out war on Ukraine and that it seems the size of the troop contingent that will participate has already grown larger than some had originally thought.

Now, as I said, it's a bit unfair to pick on the war zone. It does a lot of good work and so forth. And more to the point, variations of this language can be found all across the media. But the point is, this is not actual evidence to say it's another indication of a growing role. No, it's not. This is what one person is claiming about North Korea. There hasn't been really any serious attempt to confirm.

And particularly it comes from Budanov of Hur, whose job is not just simply to spread physical havoc across Russia, but also political havoc, including the use of disinformation. Remember, this is a man who, in May 2022, said that Putin was dying, simultaneously suffering from, quote, several severe illnesses, one of which is cancer. In January 2023, he

He said he's been sick for a long time, I'm sure he has cancer, I think he will die very quickly, I hope very soon. They know this for sure from people, from sources. He also said that Ukraine was going to win the war by the end of 2023, and in September 2023 suggested that Putin may already have been dead for a year and was being replaced by body doubles.

Now, either he is a serial fantasist who doesn't understand the difference between truth and imagination, which I very much doubt, or he is sometimes, maybe even often, deliberately disruptive, saying things that he knows are going to firstly help Ukraine's case in terms of pushing the West to be more robust in supporting it,

but secondly also create trouble for Russia, whether it's undermining Russian narratives abroad or at home. The problem is that Western journalists continue to be seduced by all the trappings of a meeting with Budan or a conversation with him, the secret bunker and everything else, and basically lap it all up.

Look, we deserve better. So in this respect, the North Korean story, and I honestly have no idea. I mean, it does seem to be that the North Koreans are definitely stepping up assistance. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some troops being sent, whether they'll actually go to the front line, whether there'll be as many as 11,000 remains to be seen. But the point is that at present, we still are in a situation in which allegations are treated as facts.

And the more exciting, the more dramatic they are, the more likely they are to be reported on. So we'll just have to wait and see. Let's follow this, but let's appreciate that it's not dramatic. It's not a massive change in the world. It's not going to have a massive impact on the war. It's one more of the unfolding developments of what is, after all, increasingly becoming not a world war, we have to understand that, nor yet a war between good and evil...

the west versus the axis of resistance or whatever but nonetheless a war which has been spreading for a long time it spreads in the form of economic sanctions being applied secondary sanctions and so forth it spreads in the form of the defence industrial capacity remember

Remember that, for example, South Korea is one of the main indirect supporters of Ukrainian war efforts in the sense that whenever the Americans send large numbers of artillery rounds and so forth, they are restocking from South Korea. So indirectly, it allows the Americans to support it. So, you know, we already have a conflict which has spread in that way. And now if that happens, just as there are volunteers, genuine volunteers, who

serving from all over the world on Ukraine's side, we now have what are less likely to be volunteers possibly serving on Russia's side. Bit by bit, this is a conflict which is not a world war, but it is a globalising war. And I think the distinction between the two is something that we need to understand because it reflects the interconnected nature of the modern world. And we may well find that other conflicts are going to become similarly globally interconnected.

But at that point, I'm moving well beyond my original remit, and we'll stop. Thanks very much for listening.