Ian Bremmer on Why We're Fucked
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Hey, folks, we've got a great interview with the marvelously brilliant Ian Bremmer today of the Eurasia Group and of GZERO Media. He is one of the smartest thinkers about international diplomacy in the world. But we live in a world where international diplomacy is changing by the second. We recorded this interview just before Donald Trump went in the Oval Office and savaged Vladimir Zelensky and reset America as the pro-dictator country.

So keep that in mind as you watch this. It's still a brilliant interview. He is still just a terrific thinker. Look forward to seeing you again at the next show.

Hey folks, and welcome back to the Lincoln Project Podcast. I'm your host, Rick Wilson, as always. And today I am delighted to be joined by Ian Brimmer, who's one of the smartest thinkers about American foreign policy and America's place in the world and the changing future that we create with every step that we're taking right now. And so Ian, always great to talk to you. And I just want to start out. We have a

really fundamental reset happening in Europe right now of a security structure that worked sometimes better than others, but worked, broadly speaking, for 75 years, as Trump has taken this shocking realignment of American interests and put them in the column with Vladimir Putin. And Europe has had a sort of moment of, I think, shock and awe here,

And I'm curious to get your take on where you think the NATO alliance is going. Where do you think Europe is headed? And then we'll dig in a little bit more to the Trump and Putin relationship after that. Well, Rick, first of all, happy to be with you. And I think that I have a slightly different take on where the NATO relationship is today than, let's say, the beginning of the week.

And also a different take on that than the transatlantic relationship as a whole. So let's take those separately.

In terms of NATO, President Trump has now directly affirmed his commitment to Article 5 of NATO, which means that's the core of collective security, that if a NATO member is attacked, that the U.S. comes to their aid, says we won't need to use it, but he affirms that he supports it, which was very different than what he had historically said, that if you don't pay your 2%, the Russians can do whatever the hell they want. It's very different.

Very different. And certainly at a time of great European concern that the Americans can't be trusted, that American commitments aren't necessarily worth anything, that affirmation matters. Poland, which is now moving towards 5% of spend of their GDP on defense, which is the high watermark of what the Americans have demanded, and way more than the Americans spend, is

I was going to say, it's above our number. Way above our number. The American number, of course, is way above the number of most Europeans, almost all Europeans. But President Trump met with Duda, and he also affirmed that the United States presence, military presence in Poland was not in question, that the Americans were not prepared to pull troops back from that forward deployment. Also significant.

And I think that while it is true that Trump has been pressing the Europeans to spend a lot more in defense, frankly, so did Biden, so did Trump in the first term, so did Obama. None of them have been incredibly effective. Much more effective was the reality of the Russians invading, not in 2014, but in 2022. And even then, the Europeans have been way too slow

and are mostly, except for the frontline European states, the Balts, the Nordics, the Poles, generally not doing what they need to be if they care about their own security. So I think there is absolutely still a sense that NATO functions, that the Europeans need to do more, and the Americans are not throwing NATO under the bus. That's number one. Number two is I think that the Europeans do feel

that President Trump represents a direct threat to their democracies. Not all of them feel this way, but many of them do. And this is not about NATO, but it's actually about Trump and J.D. Vance and Elon Musk directly supporting forces that they believe are anti-European,

our populist, our nativist in the case of German are explicitly neo-Nazi in the views of the Germans and that represent an existential threat to Europe.

And certainly when the soon-to-be Chancellor Friedrich Merz said that he considers American interventions in the German elections to be at the same level as Russian interventions in the German elections, this is a set of European leaders who feel like the Russians have a gun to their head on the security side.

And the Americans have a gun to their head in terms of the sustainability of Europe, in terms of their own democracies and rule of law. And it is certainly true that the biggest difference geopolitically in terms of long-term outcomes between Biden and Trump, in my view, is that Biden believed, believes, that a strong European Union is in American interests,

And Trump does not. Trump thinks that a strong EU is bad for the U.S., takes advantage of the U.S. He also believes that the Europeans are one electoral cycle behind the United States in their voting and that if you just give them another four or five years, the Reform Party will win in the U.K.,

um, AFD will win in Germany, national rally will win in France and in the European commission, um, the Patriots will end up being the largest party. And that would completely overturn, um, the present governance model across Europe and would align it fundamentally with America first ism with make America great again. I know that was a long answer and I apologize for it, Rick, and we haven't even talked about Ukraine, but I think it's a,

It kind of gives you where I see the lay of the land here. What do you think happens, Ian, in this scenario if somehow the Ukrainians and the Europeans say no to this deal that Trump is pushing and Ukraine comes out ahead? Russia's pretty tapped out in a lot of ways, financially, militarily. Is there a scenario where...

Europe funds and arms Ukraine to a sufficient point where the fragility of Putin finally becomes clear and the inability of Russia to win this war after three years. Ukraine can't win it, but Russia can lose it, as somebody said the other day. Is there a scenario where Europe comes together essentially in its own defense and interest and pulls this thing out?

They've had ample opportunity to do that over many years now, Rick, and they haven't. Europe is a multi-headed thing. And certainly, I mean, I see the Europeans more panicked

And therefore more recognizing that they need to do a lot more, but that's led to the Brits saying we can get the 2.5% spend by 2027 instead of 2.3. The French have had an impossible time just getting a budget passed and government after government failing.

unprecedented in this republic for France. The Germans are trying really hard to get a 200 billion euro special approval for defense spending. But the reason they're doing that now before the new government comes together is because their grand coalition that will be in place, a two-party coalition, will face a blocking

minority from the far left, Derlinka, and far right, AFD, that will prevent them from reforming the debt break. So I would not bet heavily that the Europeans would be capable, even if they recognize the urgency, of standing up for the Ukrainians without an American backdrop. Now, if it turns out that the Europeans do a lot more,

And they're willing to commit substantial numbers of boots on the ground after a ceasefire contingent on an American security guarantee. I could imagine at that point Trump flipping and saying, see, I'm the guy that got the Europeans to do more than Biden ever could. And so now I'm going to offer a backstop.

I mean, Lord knows he's flipped on his Zelensky positioning in the last week in quite extraordinary fashion. Right. But your question was whether I think the Europeans and the Ukrainians by themselves can do this. And sadly, I would bet very little on that.

Even though the Ukrainians have been extraordinarily courageous in fighting for their own land. And Russia's not fighting for their own land, right? Russia's fighting with much poorer morale, but with a much more capable military industrial complex and, of course, a much larger economy and a willingness to force their people to suffer unconscionable loads. I mean, over 800,000 people.

um injured yeah over a hundred thousand dead and putin's not facing any domestic pressure whatsoever and we need to recognize that not being a democracy um does have its advantages uh in in that specific way it's kind of a superpower for them to ignore um the the destruction they're causing their own people that's right i think that's exactly right uh

Russia's economy is an absolute basket case by most assessments. And I'm curious if you think that Putin's willingness and desire to manipulate Trump, I think, is pretty well established. Is part of this also for Putin that there's an economic clock where they can't pull off trickery after a certain point on this, that there is a limit to how much they can spend?

Because I know that the ruble is subject to the Russian government's whim as to what it's worth. But I'm just curious if you think that there's a fragility there economically that Putin is facing that could either force his hand to withdraw or settle or eventually push him from office. Yeah.

Push him from office? Absolutely not. I mean, you'll remember when Evgeny Prigozhin had his mutiny against Moscow, which was by far the biggest existential threat that Putin has ever faced and deeply embarrassing for him domestically. Sure. And yet there was not a single oligarch, not one general, not one minister that flipped against Putin at that period of distress.

And it's not like there's any meaningful political opposition domestically. He fully controls media and even social media to a great degree. And-

I think that there's not a domestic political threat to him. No, not at all. But economically, look, I mean, clearly the Americans and the Europeans believed that the unprecedented level of sanctions, including freezing over $300 billion of Russian sovereign assets,

was going to put a lot more pressure on the Russians. It didn't. Instead, it was the military support that was provided that made the difference on the ground for Ukraine. And in retrospect, NATO should have leaned more heavily into that military support and counted less on the ability to break the Russian economy. Let's keep in mind, Rick, that so much of what Russia produces in exports

is stuff that's actually necessary for the global economy and that the Americans are unwilling to cut off. I mean, their oil exports, right, which is, yes, being bought at a discount by the Chinese and the Indians, and they're both very happy to do so. But those imports of those countries have gone way up

They're supplanting what the Europeans were taking. The Russians aren't exporting as much gas. They're having to flare a bunch of it because they don't have the infrastructure for that, though they're trying to build it.

But uranium is still being exported, all these precious metals, a lot of timber. I mean, it's not as if Russia was ever post-Soviet times the human capital center of the world. It was all about the stuff that we all need. And our revealed preference is that we're not willing to.

to take the kind of hits on our economy and on the global economy that would really bring the Russians to their knees. And so as long as that remains true for the Americans, the Europeans and others,

I think the idea that we can force the Russians militarily to cry uncle is just not there. It's just not there. And certainly I think the Russians are much more capable of continuing to fight at this point than the Ukrainians are. And the fact that the Americans have taken a lot of the certainty, remember it was Biden that said, as long as it takes, whatever it takes, turned out that was good for less than a year.

And now that's just no longer the case because the new U.S. administration is unwilling to continue with that commitment. And that has a profound impact on morale inside Ukraine, of course. So, yeah, I mean, the Russians right now do believe that not only is time on their side, but they think they're now winning. And that's a problem because that helps Putin, of course.

I think they do think they're winning. I think that's exactly right. And I think – and I want to sort of shift the conversation just a little bit to the collapse of American soft power with killing USAID and with Trump's – and the perceptional soft power.

power part of people thinking, well, Trump is now aligning the U S away from being a nation that, that, that engages in soft power that it is instead allied with Russia in some meaningful way. Um,

China has to be delighted about this in terms of their presence in Africa, their presence in other countries, expanding their influence around the world as we've just walked away from decades of investment in saving lives and the net positive benefits we've accrued from that as a country.

China has to be, I mean, Russia can't really fill that gap in Africa. China, however, can. They must be delighted by the shutdown of AID. We'll be right back. Every day, thousands of Comcast engineers and technologists like Kunle put people at the heart of everything they create. In the average household, there are dozens of connected devices. Here in the Comcast family, we're building an integrated in-home Wi-Fi solution for millions of families like my own.

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And they're delighted at the Americans, you know, aligning with the Russians and North Koreans and Belarus and Iran in taking away territorial integrity at the UN. They feel like the Americans are really shooting themselves in the foot long term by

By taking away soft power. Now, it's not all roses for China. Their economy is doing a little better than it was six months ago, but it's still the worst economy they've had since the 90s.

The only thing that's really working is dumping massive amounts of manufacturing for export at low cost, which they're getting pushback on from all over the world. The U.S. economy is performing far better. And while Trump is threatening 25 percent tariffs against Canada and Mexico, he kicked the can on that. He hit the Chinese with 10. He's now about to hit the Chinese with another 10.

He's hitting them with additional transit fees on ships. He's going to put more export controls on technology. I mean, right now, the world's most powerful economy is taking some pretty significant whacks at China. So in the near term, the Chinese are deeply concerned about how they're going to be able to respond and deal with a much more aggressive mercantilist and industrial policy-driven U.S. But long term...

If the U.S. is going to completely end the vast majority of its USAID programs, and the U.S. had historically been providing 40% of the world's humanitarian aid, I fully accept that some of those programs would never have been supported by U.S. taxpayers.

And we're overly woke and progressive. And I blame the Democrats for allowing that to persist because it's a vulnerability that's now being exposed. But the fact is that the vast majority of those programs actually extended U.S. soft power globally. You don't shut down PEPFAR in Africa to fight AIDS. That's not a woke program that is actually doing God's work

for the United States internationally. It's one of the very few things that makes the global South feel like the Americans are a force for good. And there are a lot of things that make the Americans feel like a force for not so good historically, like Afghanistan and Iraq and in the view of the global South, Gaza and a whole bunch of other issues. So America ripping that up

I mean, the Chinese understand they're not super into soft power, but they get that it's an advantage for the Americans and that's made them start to do more. They are the one country that is situated to take advantage of the United States pulling out of the global South. There's no question.

I mean, you mentioned PEPFAR, of course, which is, to my mind, the greatest single thing George W. Bush ever did in his life was PEPFAR. It is universally admired around the world. But we're also stopping malaria programs. We're also stopping tuberculosis monitoring. Elon Musk told a whopper in the cabinet room the other day when he said, oh, we restored all the Ebola funding programs.

Ebola monitoring funding and it turns out it was only about 10% of it got restored. USAID, one of the things we accidentally canceled very briefly was Ebola, Ebola prevention. I think we all want Ebola prevention.

Republicans are really angry, by the way, in Senate. I'm sure you've heard this specifically. Oh, I have Rubio because they feel like they had good conversations with him. Um, in, uh, you know, both, both before Munich security conference at Munich security conference that he has gone radio silent over the past few days. Um,

that he has made, you know, sort of made, made promises to them that he has not followed up on. And that he's, and this is a guy that was quite well respected among Democrats and Republicans in Senate that has lost an immense amount of credibility. And I think you're going to see people that are angry in his own party that are going to come out publicly about this. I really do. Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe I'm wrong, but I, I, at this point I expect it. Well, I will tell you, I heard the other day from a Senate source that,

That Lindsey Graham and Marco had had an extraordinarily ugly, loud phone call recently. And Rubio essentially shrugged it off and said, I can't control what those guys do, the Doge guys who control all the money. And that was it. And Lindsey's point, why I'm told, was you're the fourth in line to succession to the president. You're the secretary of state. Make a deal out of it. Make a stink out of it. You're losing our ability to do –

good in the world and to protect ourselves from a whole, I mean, look, I think you're right. Rubio squandered that respect he had because he, as a person on the intelligence committee was a serious person. Yes. I've known Marco a long time. He was a serious person on that committee. And right now he comes across as an unserious person. Um,

And I think his inaction or his unwillingness to speak publicly about it has weakened the country. Well, there's a big difference between the first Trump term and the second Trump term is that the level of consolidation of power, the loyalty that Trump has –

the unwillingness of top advisors to privately push back against Trump. I mean, that is clearly radically different in 2025 than it was in 2017. And I think that USAID is a very public way, though not a way that matters to the average American voter, but nonetheless, a way that will be experienced by Americans all over the world in five and 10 and perhaps generations of years to come. And I think a really, a terrible disservice

to the values of a country that I think we should still be leaning into. Yeah, and I think those values are probably still retained by the majority of the American people, but enough of a loud minority has the high ground right now politically on that. And as you pointed out, yes, should USAID have been funding Chilean drag performances? No, it should not have. But

Should you throw out 90% of all of that aid spending for 0.0001% of the budget? Absolutely not. I wanted to ask you, as the global economy has sort of fought with inflation for the last few years, and we can't quite stamp it out, it seems,

If Trump continues with this tariff idea, I mean, I think one of the incorrect conceits of a lot of the MAGA folks is that the U.S. is the only actor on the tariff stage, and there aren't multiple counterparts who can do things with tariffs on their own. What happens to inflation in the global economy if we get into a tariff war that doesn't just include the Trump little tit-for-tat symbolic moves, but starts getting into a

big, meaningful, hard numbers. What happens to the global economy and what happens to inflation? We'll be right back.

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Thanks to IP. Learn more at PHRMA.org slash IP Works Wonders. And now back to the show. Well, I mean, the U.S. is the strongest economy in the world. In addition to being the largest economy, it is occupying the commanding heights of artificial intelligence, but not of transition energy, which is China. And they have a major lead on that.

The global economy functions better at the high level. It's more efficient. There's greater growth if you have less friction. And certainly multinational corporations and a lot of Trump's globalist donors are angry with Trump for leaning into tariffs. So there are differences inside his own base, if you will, support base, financial versus voter on this issue.

I think there are a lot of people that believe if you look at American distribution of wealth over the past 40 years. Right.

that there's been a lot of free trade, there's been extraordinary American growth, but the average American worker and the average American middle class member has not benefited from that. Their well-being, their incomes have stayed flat. So why should they support the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Obama couldn't get done? Why would they not support industrial policy to force countries and companies to bring more investment at home?

And so, I mean, a big question here, there are two questions. One is how much of Trump's tariffs are going to be implemented as opposed to will be used as a stick, and his stick is bigger than other countries' sticks, to force them to open their own markets to a greater degree, to lead to reciprocal tariffs to a greater degree. That's one question. And the second question is if we end up in a world of higher tariffs,

This will cost Americans in the near term. Inflation will go up. But will that also lead to a moving of...

of capital, a redirecting of capital towards the United States and a small number of friends that are very aligned with the U.S. on core technologies and related supply chain so that, yeah, maybe you're not going to be doing as well in your income today, but in five and 10 years, actually from a relational perspective, the United States will be better. That was certainly Robert Lighthizer's perspective, but

who was USTR in Trump 1 and who grew up in industrial but hollowed out Ohio and basically said, look, I'd rather have one TV and a good job than three TVs and no. And there is some of that. Now, of course, the problem with that argument

is number one, American presidents only last for four years and foreign policy is all over the map. So the U.S. doesn't have long-term credibility to follow through. So Biden does Inflation Reduction Act and then Trump unwinds a bunch of it and you don't get the benefits long-term than if you were China-

driving a 10, a 20, a 30-year industrial policy with the weight of the Communist Party behind you and no checks and balances. And believe me, Trump would much rather have that kind of a system for him. He ain't going to get it. So that's one challenge. And a second challenge is that the United States is the strongest economy, but doesn't call all of the shots. And the Europeans are very weak on security, but the Europeans are actually quite cohesive when it comes to trade.

And so they can hit back and you will have to lead to compromise and you will eventually get compromise. And if you don't, then they will hedge more towards the Chinese, as will much of the global south. So ultimately, you'll have a more multipolar world economically, even as you have a unipolar world still from a security perspective.

So I suspect that a lot of what Trump is doing, even if it is aspirationally making sense for the average American, they won't be able to implement and execute well on long term. Right. I mean, and I think you really pointed out something important that that a big part of the appeal of Trumpism to the middle of America, to the middle, the middle culture in America was the failure of this country.

to, as we had this massive ramp up in productivity in the last 30, 40 years, that did not move down to the people on the line. That did not move down to middle-class folks in almost any way. And I think that that appeal to them is deep and emotional. And I wonder though, I

Trump's not really even selling them a vision of a return to massive American industrialization. He's just selling them a vision of we're going to stop letting these guys take advantage of us. We're going to put them on defense for once. And I'm curious...

There are two big forces. You and I spoke about this once before. I don't know how the American middle class and the American, a lot of the upper middle class in this country is prepared for AI. And the, and I look, I'm not, I'm not one of the like, oh my God, the singularity is coming. We're all going to be uploaded into the matrix. I'm not, I'm not that guy.

But I do think the fundamentals of like the knowledge economy are going to alter so rapidly and trade policy is not going to fix that. And I don't even think industrial policy is going to fix that.

What happens when America has this big middle class of people who do things that are amenable to being shifted to AI? We're already seeing it happening. But I mean, in 10 years, you're not going to have actuaries. You're not going to have coders as we have them today. You're not going to have accountants and lawyers at the same level we do because it's all going to be done faster, cheaper in silico.

What do you think, as a country, what should we be doing in this space? Well, we shouldn't be shying away from AI just because we're scared of

of the advances. And again, the, we are so far ahead. And, and I mean, I, I completely mistrust Elon in having access to the data of American citizens. I don't feel that there are adequate checks and balances on him or oversight. And I don't like his conflict of interest writ large that he represents for the U S government. But I fully think that,

that bringing AI and the top AI minds in the world into the US government to increase efficiency is going to lead to productivity gains for the US government that the Europeans will not remotely be able to execute on, or the Japanese, for example. So, I mean, if you ask me, do I think the US will be able to do far more with less as a government in public service by bringing in AI? Yes, and God bless that process

happening. But of course, the problem with the United States historically is you drive far more efficiency and growth than you do in Europe or in Japan, but you don't redistribute any of it. And so you create massive inequalities. And what you're saying about AI is not much different than what we were saying about robotics over the last 20 years. The difference, of course, is that this is much more transformational, much faster. Now,

The thing that makes me more optimistic about AI, and this is a little perverse,

is that you're not really talking about putting working class people out to pasture. You're talking about white collar jobs. You said actuaries, lawyers, accountants, coders. I mean, these are pretty good jobs. And these are pretty good jobs, not just for adults, but for the kids of those adults. These are people that are in the top 10% of earners. They have access to political power. They donate.

And, you know, if you piss off the top 10% of Americans, that's how you get political change or a revolution. It's not pissing off the working class. It's the people that were elites that suddenly aren't elites anymore.

Right. I mean, go through history and look at when you see really social change. That's where you get it. And so I suspect that the American political system will respond more dramatically and directly to that. Remember, America is a very pay for play economic and political system for good and frequently for bad in a way that, you know, you can put a whole bunch of working class people in.

out of work by doing NAFTA or by doing robotics. And you never get a conversation on universal basic income. You never fix the fentanyl problem because people don't care about the well-being of the poor average Americans like my mom or my dad. Nobody cared about them. So that doesn't get fixed. So maybe the Americans are actually better positioned to respond to the AI problem.

It is, it is, to my mind, it is, it is going to be the most fascinating redefinition of our political economy and our broader economy. And, and, and I spend a strange amount of time, I feel like thinking about it and, and pondering it, it is changing at, at a, I mean, both the, the amplitude and the frequency of the improvements in AI are going up in a, in a, so rapidly that, that,

You know, it does touch that sort of Ray Kurzweil and logarithmic improvement curve. I don't know if it's quite, you know, as dramatic as Ray described it, but I do think we are completely unready for it as a country. The thing, you know, the thing that worries me the most is not actually the job losses, given what I just said. I'm really worried about two other things.

First, I'm worried that we are entering into an AI arms race with the Chinese.

And with no ability for dialogue on it. And we did that with the Soviets on nukes. And we kept going until 62 when we almost blew each other up. And then we started a hotline. Then we started the conversation. I'm worried that that come to Jesus moment with the Chinese is going to be much faster. Neither of us are prepared for it. So that's number one. And the second thing I'm worried about is that these new models...

that we're going to be rolling out where AI will be training on our individual data

We're going to be creating these agents that will know us better and will respond to us more compellingly than a member of our own family, than our doctor, than our teacher, than a friend, than a lover, than anything. Than our spouses. Yeah. And that when that happens, we are going to be programmed by these AI agents much more effectively and quickly than we are programming them.

And that, I think, is very, very challenging. If you look at already how algorithmic learning undermines democracy, civil society, civic engagement, and then you think of what that's going to mean with AI, I worry that democracy may not be compatible with that kind of AI revolution. That community, as we know it, may not be compatible with it. I worry a lot about that. I agree. Yeah.

Well, Ian, thank you so much for coming on the show today. Folks, you can find Ian's work at the Eurasia Group, at gzeroworld.com.

Ian, anywhere else people can find your writings and communication on social media, et cetera? Yeah, gzeromedia.com is a great place to find all of our public-facing stuff. And, of course, you can follow me on sort of your ex-facebook. All the usuals. Just like Rick. Just like Rick, yep. Just like me. There we go. Well, Ian, thank you again. You were brilliant as always, my friend. And we will talk to you again very soon. Good talking to you, Rick. Take it easy.

The Lincoln Project Podcast is a Lincoln Project production. Executive produced by Whitney Hayes, Ben Howe, and Joey Wartner Cheney. Produced by Whitney Hayes. Edited by Riley Mayne. Hey folks, if you want to support The Lincoln Project's work against Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and this MAGA craziness...

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