Recent Developments in Sino-Russian Relations: A Conversation with Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick
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I'm Bonnie Lin, Director of the China Power Project and Senior Fellow for Asian Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In this episode of the China Power Podcast, we discuss recent developments in Sino-Russian relations and its broader implications for international security. Since this May, we have seen many important China-Russia activities, starting with the Xi-Putin meeting in Beijing that was followed by another meeting of the two leaders in Kazakhstan in July.

Shortly afterwards, we saw nearly half a dozen PRC military exercises with Russia or close Russia allies such as Belarus in July in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe. What should we take away from these recent developments? And what explains the unprecedented PRC military activities with Russia? To answer these questions and more, Dr. Elizabeth Wisnik joins us to discuss.

Dr. Elizabeth Wisnik is a senior research scientist in the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at CNA. She was a professor of political science at Montclair State University from 2005 to 2024 and the coordinator of MSU's Asian Studies undergraduate minor from 2010 to 2019. Since 2002, she has been a research scholar at Columbia University's Weatherhead East Asia Institute.

She previously taught undergraduate and graduate courses in international relations, Chinese politics, and Chinese foreign policy at Barnard College, Columbia College, and SIPA. Dr. Wyschnik has dual regional expertise on China-Russia and is an expert on Chinese foreign policy, Sino-Russia relations, Northeast Asian and Central Asian security, and Arctic geopolitics.

She received a PhD in political science from Columbia University, an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University, and a BA from Barnard College. She speaks Mandarin, Russian, and French. Liz, thank you for joining us today. Thank you, Bonnie.

There's been a lot happening with respect to China and Russia recently. Let's start with the Xipun summit this May, which I felt was relatively under-covered in the United States compared to the coverage of the meetings in 2023 or 2022.

I know the two of us had planned to write an assessment of the joint statement that came out, but that was overcome by events. As you look at the Xi-Putin meeting this May in Beijing, what were your main takeaways and did you see any major differences or developments from this year's meeting compared to last year's?

So this is an interesting meeting. And I think you're right, it hasn't gotten enough attention. And rereading the joint statements from Putin and Xi, we can see why it's so difficult to assess the China-Russia partnership. Because you can see evidence that they're both deepening their partnership and

and that there are still areas where they don't entirely see eye to eye. So to answer your question, I do see some continuity in the characterization of the partnership. So they left out, once again, the no limits language that we saw in 2022. That had disappeared last year in 2023.

And so once again, in 2024, we see them talking about priority partners. And we also see a restatement of the Chinese three no's position. So no alliance, no confrontation, no targeting third parties. And we also encounter the preferred position.

line from Chinese-Russia experts that the partnership is driven by endogenous factors. So it's not the external environment that can explain this partnership, it's factors that are internal to each country. So these are some continuities, but we did see in the 2024 joint statement a lot more detail on some practical aspects of their cooperation.

The context, though, is a little different. There's a very dark portrayal of global and regional instability as the background for the evolving partnership. They also, in the joint statement, show a lot of agreement on various issues, even when they disagree on those specific issues. So let me give you some examples of this.

So they agree that Taiwan is a part of China.

Right? And Russia's always upheld the one China principle. But if you look at the Chinese text, it says that Russia agreed that Taiwan was a part of the People's Republic of China, which would be a departure from previous statements. However, if you look at the Russian text, it doesn't say this at all. It says that Taiwan is a part of China. So that's a substantial difference.

that we see if we compare the two different statements in Russian and Chinese. So I thought that was interesting. If you look at the language about the Arctic, they do mention cooperation on the northern sea route, which is the way Russia refers to the coastal waterway above its Arctic coast. But there's no mention of the Polar Silk Road, which is how China refers to

Arctic shipping that transits the Northern Sea Route and goes to the European Arctic. Russia has not been as comfortable with that term because it just implies that Russia is a transit space for a bigger Chinese Arctic agenda. So we don't see Polar Silk Road at all. On North Korea, we only see areas where they agree.

So I'm sure that China is not all in on Russia's latest closer military connection to North Korea. But we don't see any mention of that. We just see the North Korean issue in terms of U.S. pressure. So they do both agree on U.S. pressure. So that's what they comment on in this statement.

Similarly, if you look at the South China Sea, the statement that Russia makes is very ambiguous. It says Russia supports the efforts of China and ASEAN countries to jointly defend peace and stability. It doesn't say Russia supports the Chinese point of view, the nine-dash line or something like that. On Ukraine, also, Russia says it welcomes the readiness of China to play

a constructive role. But it doesn't say it agrees with the positions that China has outlined to reach a settlement. So I think if you read this statement carefully, you can see both areas where they claim to agree and areas where they might part company.

Liz, these range of examples are super fascinating. In particular, Russia's lack of willingness to use the new PRC wording for Taiwan is notable because Russia has typically been most aligned with China on Taiwan compared to other countries, and Russia knows that it's such an important issue for China.

Overall, as you look at the areas of convergence and areas of divergence between China and Russia, would you say that the 2024 joint statement between the two countries shows that the two are moving closer than a year ago? Or would you say that they are about the same, but that in 2024, we're just seeing more details and more specific areas of cooperation now being highlighted and displayed publicly?

I would say the latter. I think that they see a more worrisome international environment and they feel, they each feel more pressure from the U.S. and allies for different reasons.

And they're trying to highlight their close partnership in response to that. So I think they're trying to emphasize their areas of agreement and downplay areas of disagreement. But I do think that there is a lot more detail in this statement about different areas of cooperation that they would like to move forward than we have seen, at least in the past year.

And was there anything that surprised you in this new joint statement? There were a few issues that caught my attention. One was a statement about increasing Chinese engagement with the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is the alliance of some former Soviet states involving Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan.

And Tajikistan, Armenia's, is now withdrawing from it. So China's not a part of this alliance. And in recent years, you have had some cooperation between Chinese legislators and a parliamentary assembly of this body. So

it's not clear what increasing Chinese engagement would mean. There have been many critics of this alliance in general. One called it a zombie alliance because it doesn't seem to do very much and it only occasionally goes into action.

So I thought this was an interesting statement about Chinese engagement with it because it seems to give the appearance that Russia is involving China in regional security in Central Asia, which has been an area where Russia has tried to maintain its dominant position, even as China increases its

its economic role and even its security role because of its concerns about the security of Xinjiang in light of developments in Afghanistan and also in Pakistan. So that was one issue. Another issue that I thought was intriguing was the discussion of navigation rights for China on the Tumen River. China has since

1858, has been prohibited from sailing down the Tumen River to the Sea of Japan. So it's just nine miles short of the Sea of Japan and has wanted this sea access. In the interim, Jilin Province has agreed with Vladivostok to make it a transshipment point for sea access, but China would really like to be able to sail down this river.

Russia and North Korea would share the river rights, have been cautious about this.

And so it will be interesting to see if something develops there, if Chinese ships are able to navigate that part of the river. This is a highly sensitive area nowadays because some of the North Korean military aid to Russia goes by rail around this area to Russian Far East ports. So it's something to watch in the future, what happens there. And a final point that I thought was interesting

highly interesting was the statement that they would jointly develop Hesiaza Island, known in Russian as Bolshoy Ussurivsky Island. And so this is an island that they had agreed to split in their border demarcation treaties. But last year on the map that the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources, this was portrayed as only a Chinese island, eliciting some pushback

pushback from the Russian foreign ministry, which stated that both Russia and China adhere to the common position on the border issue that had been completely resolved. So this plan for joint development of the island, I think, shows that Russia is reinforcing its sovereignty over this island. And I think the statement was more about jointness

in the Russian case, to reinforce that point rather than about the development of the island. So the Chinese side has been more developed than the Russian side, as is typical in the Sino-Russian border regions. And then one final thing is that Putin, after meeting with Xi, called the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to brief them, which is not very usual.

And so I think that shows some concern about China's role in Central Asia and Russia here is trying to maintain its position in that region by sharing this information about the Sino-Russian summit.

And on the agreement that gives China access to the Tumen River, for China and Russia to include it in their joint public statement, does that mean the two governments have had some form of back-channel discussion with North Korea about this in advance? Or do you think, based on your understanding of the two governments, that this is something the two of them could have decided on their own, and then they'll work with North Korea in the future? So I don't know how they would have negotiated that. I know that Russia and North Korea...

would have discussed this region in their recent talks, and presumably that there would be some kind of trilateral agreement if China were allowed to navigate that part of the river. But I'm not sure how they would move forward there. It could be that there would be some transshipment agreement, much like Jilin has agreed,

has been able to negotiate with Vladivostok. So maybe instead of giving China the rights that they claim to have lost in the mid-19th century, there would be some new agreement that would give China...

some access to some port or something like that. So I think Russia would be reluctant to revisit the Treaty of Aigun. So I think that there would be something short of a formal negotiation to give China some access if the three of them agreed to that. For China, I should add that this

is important because it would support China's interest in the Polar Silk Road by connecting northeast China more effectively to the Sea of Japan and then to the northern sea route above the Russian Arctic. Thanks, Liz. Let's move on to the next meeting between the two leaders during the Summer Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit that was held in Kazakhstan. Did you see anything new or significant emerge from that additional touchpoint?

The one new development was that Belarus became a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. And also China was beginning to prepare for taking over the rotating leadership of the SCO. As a part of this process, China urged the SCO states to resist what she called external interference. There wasn't really anything major in the

summit statement. And interestingly, Ukraine was not mentioned at all, although Gaza appeared a couple of times in the joint statement. Also,

India didn't attend the meeting, and this could have been payback for China not attending the G20 meeting in India when India was chairing that. Also, we saw Xi have two state visits to Tajikistan and Kazakhstan following the SCO summit.

And this shows the importance these two countries have for China. So I would say that really the Belarus membership was probably the key development and not really much happening in terms of China-Russia relations at this summit meeting.

We know at the SCO Summit, Xi Jinping urged countries to deepen security cooperation, including through strengthening intelligence sharing and conducting joint operations. From your perspective, do these signal new directions or changes, or are these just a continuation of what we've seen before?

There's really a lot of continuity. The SEO has never played a major role in regional security, and where it's most been involved has been in intelligence sharing and information sharing, especially on potential terrorist threats. The SEO does not have any mechanism for providing security forces in a contingency environment.

And so its regional security role is necessarily restricted. The other organization that has a potential force at hand is the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but China is not a member of that organization. And even that organization has only infrequently intervened in regional conflicts.

And Liz, just connecting the dots together, with the recent SEO summit and what you mentioned from the 2024 joint statement, it was there was a desire for more PRC engagement with the collective security treaty organization. I know these are two completely separate organizations, but are you seeing any ways in which these two developments, more Chinese activity with the SEO and China working more with the CSTO, are they related in any way or linked?

Well, as I mentioned, China's not a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but this group is now overlapping with the SCO, and now that Armenia has withdrawn from the CSTO. So the other members are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. So we see those countries being a member of both the CSTO and the SCO. I think what this statement says

meant was that Russia was trying to give the appearance of involving China more in regional security because CSTO is not that effective an organization. And so perhaps Russia was trying to institutionalize China's role

in regional security by engaging with it in the framework of that organization instead of having China go off on its own to play a role in security, which might compete with the influence that Russia is trying to maintain in the region.

So the CSTO does have regular meetings with China. There's a forum for parliamentary engagement where Chinese legislators were our regular guests.

Thanks, Liz. Now let's talk about China's recent military exercises. So around and after the SEO summit, we saw an unprecedented level of military activity between the Chinese and Russian forces. There were at least three separate China-Russia military activities or exercises in the Indo-Pacific.

In mid-July, China engaged in live-fire drill with Russia in the South China Sea titled Joint Sea 2024. That same month, China and Russia conducted a 15-day joint naval patrol in the North and Western Pacific. In late July, the two countries also engaged in their first joint strategic air patrol off of Alaska. There were also two separate exercises in Europe,

in July too. One with Russia and one China engaged in with close Russian ally Belarus. So China conducted anti-terrorism military exercise in Belarus near the Polish border in early July. In late July, we saw a lone Chinese warship join the Russian Navy for exercises in the Gulf of Finland.

I mean, this is an extraordinary amount of military exercise with Russia and Russia's close ally, Belarus, in just one month. I don't believe I've ever seen China engage in that many military exercises with a single country in a single month, let alone exercises that span the Indo-Pacific and Europe. What explains this significant uptick in activities?

On a general level, I think China and Russia both are feeling increasing pressure on two fronts. So in terms of the activities of NATO,

and the presence of the U.S. and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. So they feel these dual pressures, but of course they also exert pressure on these two areas as well. But when we look at the spate of exercises, we have to distinguish between the planned exercises, like the Joint Sea Exercise,

And then some exercises that were connected to regularly held events like the Russian Navy Day in the Gulf of Finland and reactions to military engagements by other forces. So you had the

NATO summit in July, and you had Belarus joining the SCO, and then you had the Arctic Defender Exercise in Fairbanks, Alaska, involving the US, Germany, France, Canada, and Spain, also in July. So some of these exercises were related to ongoing activities, and some were timed to coincide with the exercises of other countries.

And Liz, looking at the exercises across the board, do they, from your perspective, actually strengthen China-Russia military interoperability? Or are these exercises still more about political signaling than interoperability?

I think it depends on the exercise. If you look at the strategic bomber exercise, the patrol that involved Chinese and Russian bombers, here we do see some strengthening of China-Russia military coordination. So the Chinese bombers took off from the Russian base in Anadyr in the Chukotka region.

And had China not done that, they would not have been able to reach the Alaska Air Defense Identification Zone. It would have been out of reach for Chinese planes. And so by coordinating in this way, they enabled this mission to take place. If we look at the Joint Sea Exercise, that's a series of exercises that we've seen for over a decade.

And it takes place in various locations in the Indo-Pacific, previously in the East China Sea, the Sea of Japan, and other places in the South China Sea. So we may see some increased complexity there, but I'm not sure that interoperability is really the goal, because it's likely that

China and Russia would be acting in parallel, but not necessarily engaging in a joint mission because they have different foreign policy goals in the region. Could you elaborate a little bit more by what you mean in terms of China and Russia not needing to act in concert militarily, but acting in parallel?

I think this reflects the fact that...

Even though they have a strategic partnership, it's still not clear how far the parameters of that partnership extend. And so we're not sure if Russia would actually help China in a Taiwan contingency or a South China Sea contingency. Although China might appreciate some support, it's unclear what that might be.

And so at this stage, they are not preparing for that eventuality. They're not signaling that Russia is going to work hand in hand with China in contingencies. But they are trying to improve confidence building and their ability to coordinate one another in the event that they might decide to act in concert and not in parallel.

Great, thank you Liz. I know we've talked about a couple of these exercises, but I do want to spend a little bit of time on each exercise individually. So focusing on the Indo-Pacific first, as you look at these three exercises, you mentioned some were planned and some were for signaling purposes. What stood out to you the most from these exercises? Joint C involved a joint patrol that started to the south of South Korea's Jeju Island

with the patrol transiting through the Osumi Strait to enter the Western Pacific Ocean, and then going through the Philippine Sea before concluding in the South China Sea. So this exercise involved tactical drills, including joint live fire, air, and missile defense drills. So one thing that was notable about the exercise

So it had two parts. So first you have the live fire drill, and then you have the joint patrol. And the joint patrol had quite an extensive geographic range of 4,800 nautical miles, and it took 15 days to accomplish.

And this was time to occur at the same time as RIMPAC and U.S. Philippines Coast Guard exercises. So there was a political signaling aspect to that, as well as a substantive part in the live firing and tactical drills. One more point about the Alaska exercises.

These really weren't entirely about Alaska. So there was an element of demonstrating that China can show its commitment to freedom of navigation and international airspace, much in the way that the U.S. has its freedom of navigation exercises in the Indo-Pacific that irk China.

So there was an occasion when Chinese ships without Russian company sailed close to the Aleutian Islands in July.

And then we have these strategic bombers also approaching the U.S. air defense identification zone. So there was an element of signaling that turnabout is fair play, that China can demonstrate that it has the right to sail or fly in these international areas just like the U.S. does.

And also, as I mentioned, there was the Arctic Defender exercise taking place in Alaska at that time. So China was demonstrating, along with Russia, that they had their own framework for engaging in exercises in this region at the same time.

It's quite interesting that you mentioned all the different U.S.-involved or led military exercises, such as RIMPAC and Arctic Defender. And you noted in each of them that China is working with Russia to counter via their joint military exercises. For the United States, we have a lot of different allies and partners that we conduct operations with.

But I wonder if that's the case for China. From your perspective, as you look at Chinese operations, are you seeing China partner primarily with Russia to respond to U.S. military exercises?

That's an interesting question. I think that China and Russia have their own history of bilateral exercises, and they use these to deepen their military cooperation. Russia historically has found this a handy vehicle to sell new equipment to China for China's training, for its pilots.

and so on. But there are also multilateral exercises they have engaged in within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. And they have also had some naval exercises with Iran and with South Africa and so on. So I don't think that they're primarily responding to U.S. exercises, although they

Sometimes the timing is right for that. I think there's an element of partnership building, there's an element of signaling, and there's an element of training and also sales, military sales, at least on Russia's part. And what signal do you think China was sending going through this route that you mentioned and making this ship visit the first in the last five years and coinciding with a critical Navy engagement?

A Chinese guided missile destroyer accompanied by a replenishment ship sailed from the Horn of Africa where they were on an anti-piracy mission around Western Europe to the Gulf of Finland for Navy Day celebrations with Russian ships and a few other foreign vessels. So

So this was important for a few reasons. The Chinese ships had to sail through a NATO lake to get there. All of the countries that they passed are NATO members now. Also, the Navy Day celebrations were an opportunity for the new PLA naval commander to pay a visit to Russia, Admiral Hu Zhongming, who met with Russian officials at this time. And it was his first foreign visit since being appointed in

in December. So the visit was symbolic because it was a display of support for Russia, especially the Russian Navy, which to Moscow's surprise perhaps has been under attack from Ukraine.

And also, it showed that China has a global presence and is interested in, you know, playing a role in Europe as well as in Asia. And we've seen Chinese ships on the two ends of Russia's northern sea route. So we saw them near the Aleutian Islands.

And we also now see them on the other side in the Gulf of Finland. And so that also highlights China's commitment to what it calls the Polar Silk Road, which transits the Russian northern sea route. And Liz, from your perspective, do you view these Chinese activities with Russia and Belarus as China trying to signal greater willingness to flex its muscles in Europe? Or do you see this as China showcasing general support to Russia?

I think it shows presence, as I mentioned, that Chinese ships can be active in all regions. It's a bit of pushback to NATO. NATO members had called China an enabler of Russian aggression during their last summit in July.

It certainly highlights the Russia-China military relationship, but also it points to China's marginality to the Arctic region in the sense that military cooperation with Russia only occurs on its fringes, not above the Russian Arctic itself.

Thank you, Liz. I know we've talked a lot about what's happened in the past couple of months, so I want to end on a question that asks you to look forward. As you look at the rest of this year, do you see another opportunity for Xi to meet with Putin? And do you think the pace of exercises that we saw in July is something that we will expect later this year, or perhaps something that might be normalized as we move forward and look at China-Russia relations?

In terms of the exercises, I think this was unusual. There were some land exercises like the Joint Sea Naval Exercise in the South China Sea and the Related Patrol.

But the other ones I think were more contingent on other external events, whether it's Navy Day in Russia or exercises by other countries in the region. So I don't know that we're going to see this number of exercises occurring altogether again as a regular occurrence. About Xi and Putin, they tend to see each other at least annually and often more often than that.

So this year, they've met twice already. There are a few occasions when they could meet. The next one would be in early September for the Far East Economic Forum that happens in Vladivostok annually. She has attended that in the past, though not on a regular basis. And if there were to be an agreement on the power of Siberia to pipeline, for example, that would be a natural thing.

time for Xi to go to this meeting, but that agreement does not seem to be in the cards. So I think a visit by Xi would be unlikely. But then later on, we have the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing on October 2nd. And later in October, we have the BRICS summit in Russia.

So it is possible that Xi and Putin might meet up at the BRICS summit and possibly have some event to commemorate their 75th anniversary.

Excellent. Thank you very much, Liz. Thank you for your wonderful insights on the Shih P'un Summit, the meeting between the two leaders, again, a couple months at the SCO Summit, and then discussing five different military exercises that China has engaged with Russia and Belarus in the past month or two. Thank you again for joining me today. Thank you for your challenging and interesting questions on my favorite topic.