China-North Korea Evolving Relations: A Conversation with Dr. Feng Zhang
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I'm Bonnie Lin, Director of the China Power Project and Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic International Studies. In this episode of the China Power Podcast, we will be exploring the relationship between China and North Korea as the latter strengthens its ties with Russia. How does Beijing perceive the revival of a Russia-North Korea alliance?

Is China quietly accepting growing North Korea-Russia relations? And given this development, how much sway does Beijing still hold over Pyongyang? To explore these questions, we're joined by Dr. Feng Zhang. Dr. Feng Zhang is a visiting scholar at Yale Law School's Paul Tsai China Center. He previously held positions at Tsinghua University, Murdoch University, and the Australian National University. He specializes in Chinese foreign policy.

International Relations in East Asia, and International Relations Theory. He is the author of Chinese Hegemony, Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History, published by Stanford University in 2015. He co-authored two books with Richard Ned Labow, Taming Sino-American Rivalry and Justice International Order East and West.

His new book on China's policy towards Afghanistan since 1949 will be published shortly. His current project examines the causes and management of U.S.-China competition. So Dr. Dong, thank you for joining us today. Thank you for having me. We'd like to discuss today China-North Korea relations. I know this is a sensitive topic in China, so really appreciate you being able to talk about this publicly on a podcast.

I'll start off with asking about your assessment of the current state of China-North Korea relations. How do you view China's relationship with North Korea now? Is it one that's still very strong in terms of influence, but not one that is very close strategically? Let me give you a quick summary of the recent history of the relationship. This relationship has seen ups and downs over the past two decades, but mostly downs, but

as China brokered the Six-Party Talks from 2003 and applied steady pressure on North Korea. I don't think Pingyang was very appreciative of Chinese efforts.

And then since 2016, China has joined UN sanctions against North Korea. And when those sanctions raged up in 2017, Ping Yang accused Beijing of "mean behavior" and "dancing to the tunes of the United States." And they actually warned about catastrophic consequences for the relationship.

Between 2018 and 2019, Chinese and North Korean readers met five times to repair their relations. But this phase was interrupted by COVID and contacts between the two countries haven't been fully restored yet.

We know that in April this year, Zhao Leji, who is the chairman of the National People's Congress, visited North Korea to mark the start of the China-North Korea friendship year. But other than that, there has been very little interaction between the two countries. There are almost no people-to-people exchanges, not even academic visits. So it's a very unhealthy situation.

I'd say right now the relationship is going down again, largely because of North Korea's close alignment with Russia. Pyongyang and Moscow signed a military alliance treaty in June this year. And in October, North Korea sent troops to fight on Russia's side against Ukraine.

So these are major strategic decisions with far-reaching consequences. I don't know if Pingyang had informed Beijing of those decisions. I doubt it. If it had not, I would imagine Beijing being annoyed, if not outright angry, about these developments. At the same time, I think North Korea was also not happy with China's improved relationship with South Korea.

In May this year, China, Japan, and South Korea held a new trilateral summit after five years' suspension. And in June, on the same day as Putin was visiting Pyongyang, South Korea and China held their first round of diplomatic and strategic dialogue in Seoul. So I think Kim Jong-un could not be very happy with these developments.

And Dr. Zhang, in terms of your discussion of China's perception of North Korea declining because of growing North Korea-Russia relations, what is the actual evidence for that in terms of either Chinese actions towards North Korea or China's trade or other activities towards North Korea? Because as you mentioned earlier, there's been very little interaction at the official level.

I understand the timing of the ROK-China meeting at the same time Putin was meeting with Kim Jong-un as maybe one signal. But what are other signals that you're seeing that clearly showcases China's displeasure with North Korea? Yeah.

Well, I think the best evidence of China's waning influence on North Korea is the closer alignment between North Korea and Russia. The signing of a new military alliance treaty in June and then sending troops to fight for Russia in October. I think these are

striking evidence of China's loss of leverage over North Korea. We need to keep in mind that China and North Korea have an alliance treaty signed in 1961, which is China's only military alliance treaty today. So China ought to have a powerful say if North Korea wants to form an alliance with another state.

That said, I think China's influence over North Korea has always been more limited than many outside observers would like to believe. In modern history, the period when China had the greatest influence over North Korea was during the Korean War. This was unsurprising since China was fighting a war for North Korea. Even so, there were numerous disputes between Chinese and North Koreans over the conduct of the war.

And since the end of the war, China's influence on North Korea waxed and waned, and North Korea played China and Soviet Union off against each other in a skillful way. If we look at the post-Cold War period,

In the early 90s, North Korea failed to keep China in the loop when they sought to develop nuclear weapons. So when it comes to what it regards as vital national interests, North Korea has always disregarded China's preferences and interests. The developments this year have brought China's loss of influence into sharper focus.

And Dr. Zhang, given what you described as diminishing Chinese influence over North Korea and the growing distance between the two countries, despite the fact that there is still a mutual defense treaty, how does China currently perceive its role on the Korean Peninsula? What are China's current objectives and key interests vis-a-vis North Korea?

I think China sees itself as a great power on the Korean Peninsula. It wants to have a say in all the important strategic developments on the peninsula. Ideally, the peninsula should be free of dominance by outside powers and remain deferential.

to Chinese interests. And Beijing, I think, especially wants to have a degree of control over North Korea's foreign policy to prevent North Korea from doing anything that might seriously affect China's own interests. So in this sense, you can say that China has a conception of a sphere of influence over North Korea. In terms of strategic interests,

The Chinese government often summarizes its policy toward the current peninsula in terms of the two goals of denuclearization and regional peace and stability. In practice, there's a conflict between these goals. I think when the crunch comes, China has almost always come down on the side of regional peace and stability. So stability, not denuclearization, is its top national security priority.

And you hear from time to time, the Chinese government will say its bottom line is no war and no chaos. So China wants to maintain a minimum degree of stability on the Korean Peninsula and keep North Korea a friend, however strained their friendship may have become. And this is because many Chinese officials and analysts believe that

A destabilized or hostile North Korea will bring serious trouble. For example, a desperate North Korea might initiate military action against South Korea

So you're reigniting the Korean War. Alternatively, regime collapse in North Korea could unleash a flood of refugees on the Chinese border and possibly resulting in a unified Korean Peninsula under the control of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. And perhaps even more troublesome, a North Korea that is hostile to China can wreak havoc because it now has a

develop nuclear-capable missiles that can be trained on China. So a friendly or at least deferential North Korea can serve as a strategic buffer against

American forces in South Korea. So that is a widespread belief in China's strategic community. Interesting. Very fascinating that you mentioned the last point, which is a hostile North Korea could also have nuclear-capable missiles that can be trained on China. How widespread is this concern that if China-North Korea relations continue to deteriorate,

that North Korea could actually take military action against China? I think at this moment, it's a very remote prospect. It's one of those extreme scenarios that people sometimes talk about, but don't believe they will happen anytime soon. But it's something they have some worry about. I think the more practical concern is that

If China pressures North Korea too much, it might antagonize North Korea. It might turn North Korea into some kind of enemy.

And then North Korea would be able to create lots of trouble for China. So that's the more practical concern. And I think that in part explains China's reluctance to apply too much pressure on North Korea, for example, over its nuclear weapons and missiles program. And I want to turn to a topic that you've already talked about that China is worried about, which is

North Korea's growing ties and relationship with Russia. I'd like to maybe start off with asking your perspective from Beijing's view, how deep is the North-Russia relationship? And does Beijing view this as a true alliance or is it a marriage of convenience or a relationship that's more strategically calculated based off of current conditions?

I can tell you my own opinion on this. So as we know, in June this year, the two countries signed a new alliance treaty, pledging mutual military assistance. At that time, it appeared that they were trying to revive their Cold War alliance.

And then in October, North Korea sent troops to Russia to join the fight against Ukraine. So it looks like Kim Jong-un is fulfilling his commitment under the treaty. No doubt he was also expecting very substantial returns from Russia. And the latest news is that Russia may send North Korea early fourth generation fighter jets, which will

Pingyang are very advanced and something that they could never get from China. So I think clearly right now the relationship meets the definition of an alliance. And China cannot be happy with such a major strategic development unfolding right under its nose for several reasons. First, China generally prefers international and regional stability, not conflict.

and Russia and North Korea violated the UN Charter and other parts of international law, China likes to be seen as a pillar of the UN-centered international order. So it's embarrassing to see UN rules trampled by two of its closest partners. And second, Russia-North Korea Defense Cooperation will have

destabilizing consequences for the peninsula because North Korea may be emboldened by newly acquired military capabilities as a result of Russian assistance. And this is definitely something that China does not want to see. And third, I think China is aware of the emerging Western discourse on the so-called new axis that lumps it together with Russia, North Korea, and Iran. This is alarming, and it definitely doesn't want to be seen in such a block.

because you significantly narrow its strategic space. And finally, I think with respect to the bilateral ties with North Korea, it's becoming harder and harder for China to manage Pyongyang. And we know that North Korea has always been the embarrassing ally for China. So a closer relationship between North Korea and Russia will further reduce China's leverage.

Are there any benefits at all to China of a deepening North Korea-Russia relationship? There is a view, especially in the West, that a relationship between Russia and North Korea

is useful in China's context with the U.S. and its fight against the U.S., alleviating, to some extent, the U.S. strategic pressure on China. But I don't agree with this. I think it's going to bring more costs to China. It's going to cause more damage to Chinese interests than any supposed benefits that might bring.

Dr. Zhang, you mentioned that you don't see any benefits to China from the North Korea-Russia relationship, but you were also referencing these Western views about how it could take off some of the pressure on China from the United States. But do you think your view is the dominant view that's currently in Beijing, or are there a variety of views within Beijing? I mean, I don't know if my view is the dominant one in Beijing.

I think it's safe to say that there are a range of views regarding North Korea and regarding North Korea's current relationship with Russia. As you know, China's debate on North Korea has been extremely polarized. It has been one of the most polarized debates in Chinese foreign policy.

And now, because of the Ukraine war, China's policy toward Russia has also become extremely polarized. So we are really talking about

two of the most polarizing issues in Chinese foreign policy today. So there are bound to be different views. So I guess there will be people, maybe quite a lot of them, who would argue that what Russia has been doing recently and what North Korea has been doing is detrimental to China's national interest.

But I have no doubt that there will also be people who will be arguing, well, maybe not so much. Maybe, well, certainly what North Korea and Russia have been doing will bring costs to China, but there ought to be some benefits, as you mentioned, taking off some pressure from the U.S.,

And those people are usually on the more conservative side, and they usually hold a more antagonistic view toward the United States. So this is a very polarized debate with lots of different views on both sides.

And that leads me to my next question, which is references a recent article you wrote in which you mentioned that Beijing has a strong hand in trilateral relations, so relations between China, Russia and North Korea.

And I think if I recall correctly in your article, you say that Beijing has a stronger hand now than during the Cold War period. But for some reason, Beijing is refusing to use that hand to change how you characterize as the problematic deepening of ties between North Korea and Russia. From your perspective, why has Beijing maintained a relatively muted response?

Well, I think probably because Beijing feels that it cannot take an open and clear position right now. It doesn't want to openly support the destabilizing foreign policies of North Korea and Russia. What these two countries are doing stands against many of China's longstanding policy principles.

But it also doesn't want to openly oppose them because fundamentally China wants these two countries to be on its side amid worsening relations with the U.S. Also, although China is frustrated by the tightening alliance between North Korea and Russia, it also has some sympathy toward them because it sees them much like itself as victims of U.S. pressure.

So the same article that we were talking about earlier, in that article, you also mentioned a worry that Beijing has that tightening North Korea-Russia relations could cause North Korea to engage in venturism with Russia's support and behind China's back. And you mentioned some of that earlier. Your article also noted that how Kim Il-sung's plans in 1950 to attack and launch the Korean War were supported by Stalin, but were surprised and not supported by

by Beijing. To the extent that China is worried about North Korea adventurism today, do you think North Korea could be emboldened to the extent that we saw during the Korean War? Or do you think even Russia might not be interested in something that catastrophic, that large scale?

I think there are broad similarities in how China is played by North Korea and Russia. That's the title of my article, is China being played by North Korea and Russia? And my answer is yes. So there are broad similarities in that, but not in how North Korea would be encouraged to.

to engage venturism that could escalate into war. With respect to the Korean War, Mao certainly didn't want a war on the Korean Peninsula so soon after the founding of the PRC. As we know, he wanted to unify Taiwan with the mainland before he would support Kim's plan to unify Korea. But Stalin ultimately came down the side of Kim. And although Stalin asked Kim to seek Mao's agreement, Mao felt

that he could not really say no after Stalin had agreed to it. So in this sense, the war was forced on Mao by Kim Stalin.

The broader context of the Korean War was important here. It was the bipolar confrontation between the capitalist camp led by the U.S. and the socialist camp led by Stalin. And Stalin's support was essential to Kim's war plan. And North Korea at that time had literally nothing to contribute to Stalin's struggle against the U.S.,

And the bipolar confrontation at that time was also carried out in a highly charged ideological context. So these were the conditions for Kim Jong-un's adventurism. The similarity I identified in my article is that just as in 1950, when Kim Jong-un sort of schemed with Stalin for war without keeping Mao fully informed, so this year Kim Jong-un schemed with Putin without keeping Beijing in the loop.

I think China has been played twice by North Korea and Russia since 1950. And I think Kim Jong-un is playing his grandfather's game. So far, he has been successful, but it's a very risky game. And the longer term consequences are hard to tell yet.

And when it comes to North Korea adventurism, including armed conflict, we need to look at the historical context. And the contexts are different. Today, Northeast Asia has not yet been divided into a bipolar rivalry, although it is at the risk of descending to it. And there is no coherent bloc among China, North Korea, and Russia. Russia is not the leader among these three states. It's not in a position to support North Korea's

armed confrontation with South Korea. On the contrary, as we know, it needs North Korea's support in supplying weapons and troops for its war in Ukraine. China might look like a leader of these three countries, but here it's playing a very careful game. It doesn't want the relationship among the three states to cohere into a bloc. Still less does it want to be seen as a leader of such a bloc.

and it will certainly not encourage North Korean adventurism. As we discussed, the most basic Chinese interest on the Korean Peninsula is stability. That said, North Korea may commit adventurism through its own miscalculation. For example,

It might seek to take advantage of the current political chaos in South Korea. That would be a reckless move. South Korea has adopted a preemptive military doctrine. Any North Korean military probe would probably elicit a very strong South Korean response. I think China can play a helpful role here in keeping North Korean recklessness in check.

So two questions. The first is, you mentioned it again and again that China is most interested in stability and some of China's bottom lines for the Korean Peninsula. Do you think Russia shares the same bottom lines for the Korean Peninsula as China?

And the second question is, you mentioned the possibility that North Korea might take advantage of the political chaos in South Korea. And you noted that this might be disastrous. And you also said China could play a helpful role. What role could China play

On the first question, I don't think stability is the top concern of Russian foreign policy. Right now, I think what Putin wants is to have a good outcome in its war against Ukraine. And if there's going to be a settlement after that,

Trump takes office then to make sure that he gets a good deal out of it. And I don't think he has much concern for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. China is a very different matter. I truly believe that China takes stability and peace on the peninsula very carefully.

And North Korea is widely perceived in China as an agent of chaos. That's how many people frame the character of Russian foreign policy. So that's one. The second on China's role in restraining North Korean adventurism, I think in the past, the channel's communications between North Korea and China have been open and

Although how smooth those channels, I think, remain to doubt. But one of the main ways in which China can restrain North Korea is to preemptively warn Pyongyang that saying in the current moment when there was political chaos inside South Korea, that Pyongyang should be restrained, should not take risky actions that might elicit strong response from South Korea. I think the South Koreans...

They might also seek a channel of communication with China.

They might, if they perceive the situation as being serious enough, they might ask China to send messages to North Korea or even just ask China to warn North Korea against recklessness. We haven't touched on China's economic assistance or economic influence over North Korea. Is that something that you believe China could use

to shape North Korean behavior? Yes and no. I mean, China still has leverage, mainly in the economic domain. North Korea still remains deeply dependent on China economically. It relies on China for, I think, about 90% of its trade and the bulk of energy imports. And China can also employ a range of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic forces.

strategies to shape North Korea's behavior. The problem is that China doesn't want to use all the leverage it has got because it worries that, and I mentioned this earlier, because it worries that doing so would antagonize North Korea and turn it into an adversary rather than

Right now, it's a fictional client state. So in this sense, you may even say that China is self-deterred from employing the full range of tools it has to pressure North Korea.

And the effectiveness of these tools is also much reduced by North Korea's tighter relationship with Russia. North Korea can now simply turn to Russia for energy imports and advanced military technologies. So you will need much less of China's support in these areas than in the past.

So I think the strategic game in Northeast Asia is being transformed. We are in the beginning of a highly unsettling period.

Thank you. I want to turn also to what you've already mentioned earlier, which is what those in the United States call either axis of upheaval, axis of autocracy, or what some also call an axis of evil, which is the framing of China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran together. What is Beijing's view of this framing? And

How is it impacting China's calculus, particularly vis-a-vis North Korea? I think Beijing will regard this narrative as totally biased, unfair, and even hostile.

As I mentioned, it doesn't want to be associated with North Korea, Russia, and Iran in this way. At some level, this is a language game, but it can also be a lot more than that because narratives can have strategic consequences.

The best and also the most infamous example is the axis of evil narrative of the George W. Bush administration. And look at how that has contributed to America's loss of global leadership. So we must be very careful with narratives of this kind. They're dangerous because they construct an imagined world that will have

policy consequences. And they will reduce sophistication and empathy that are vital to good policymaking. I think Beijing will be trying hard to discredit this narrative. And recently, I've seen very good analysis of

from analysts and scholars in the United States trying to credit, discredit this kind of narrative. That's all very important. I guess, Professor Zhang, we could debate and discuss whether President Bush's use of the term axis of evil led to decline in U.S. leadership or not. But I guess my question is,

Has this characterization of China's relationship with these three other countries changed China's behavior at all vis-a-vis North Korea? So for example, is it making China more cautious vis-a-vis North Korea, or is it causing China to want to work with North Korea more? Or is it uncertain right now in terms of its impact based on your assessment on China's behavior towards North Korea?

I don't see a logic why this narrative would cause China to work more closely with any of those three countries, North Korea, Russia, and Iran. I think your first possibility, I think that's more plausible, namely it will cause China to be more cautious and more careful in its policies toward these three countries.

it's really embarrassing to be associated with them and to be seen as forming an axis of upheaval, an axis of chaos. And I mean, we don't have that kind of clear-cut evidence with Chinese policy is clearly being changed in response to this narrative. This narrative probably doesn't have that kind of

policy importance. But I think it's reasonable to assume that the narrative has encouraged China to be more cautious in its policies toward these countries. The last question I want to ask you to wrap up this podcast is your view on what might happen next.

particularly in a Trump administration. I know during the first Trump administration, we had a summit between Kim and President Trump. Obviously, not much happened after the summit. But do you think there is interest in North Korea to have another summit with President Trump? And how would China respond to that?

I don't know if there will be interest from Pingyang, nor do I know whether there will be high on the agenda of the second Trump administration. But I know that there are people inside China, especially concerned scholars and analysts, they would want to make a new push for a new round of multilateral dialogues on North Korea.

So I think they have been talking to, I think on track two or track 1.5 levels, talking to colleagues in South Korea, in Russia, in Japan, and also here in the United States, what could be done about North Korea during a second Trump presidency.

A lot of people in China are very concerned about the direction of North Korean foreign policy. They are certainly extremely concerned about Russia. So they want to do... The Russian and North Korean policy have very serious consequences for the future of the stability of the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia more broadly. So they...

really want to do something about it. So the hope is that President Trump will show an interest in high-level diplomacy with North Korea and that China might be able to play a helpful role in achieving some kind of diplomatic breakthrough with North Korea. If the goal can no longer be

complete denuclearization, then perhaps

some kind of control agreements, but there's a widespread sense that something has to be done and the sooner the better. Excellent, Professor Zhang. I think we're all waiting to see what can be done in the next administration. And I think most in the U.S. will probably agree with you. We do need to do more on North Korea. That includes curbing North Korea's, it seems to me, increasingly provocative behavior.

I really appreciate your insights today and thank you very much for joining my podcast. Thank you.