Deep Dive
Shownotes Transcript
Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, director of the Stuart Center and Europe-Russia-Eurasia program at CSIS. And I'm Maria Snegovaya, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia. And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the Center for Strategic International Studies.
Hello, everyone, and welcome back. Today, Maria and I are thrilled to be joined by our friend and colleague and arch nemesis as well, a podcast rival, Dr. Andrea Kendall-Taylor. Andrea is a senior fellow and director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, CNAS. Before joining CNAS, Andrea worked
on Russia and Eurasia at the CIA and from 2015 to 2018 served as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council in the office of the Director of National Intelligence, the DNI.
Andrea, thank you so much for joining us today. It's great to be here. Never rival or nemesis, but fellow traveler, Max. Fellow traveler. The Think Tank world, it's very cutthroat, but yet we're all actually quite friendly to each other. I think we'll have a fairly wide-ranging conversation about the state of play, of where things stand, I think, in the U.S.-Russia relationship vis-a-vis the war in Ukraine. And I think we'll have a fairly wide-ranging conversation about the state of play, of where
And it struck me that there's a lot in the news over the last few days, last few weeks, uh,
When it comes to Russia's relationship with countries like North Korea, Iran, China, Iran is providing, it looks like they're providing ballistic missiles to the Russians. Deputy Secretary of State Kirk Campbell recently had some very strong language about Chinese support for Russia, saying that they were sort of going beyond just providing non-lethal tech transfer to support the Russian defense industry. But we're sort of moving into maybe even the lethal sphere. There was...
It was a little unclear, but hinted at some of that. And you've done a lot of work in thinking about what you call an axis of upheaval. And I wonder how you think of the kind of latest news and maybe you could describe what you see happening when it comes to Russia in these various relationships.
Yeah, that's a great question. Thanks, of course, for having me. And I think the latest announcements to me really illustrate the dynamic that we've talked about in the Axis of Upheaval article, which is that cooperation between all of these countries are deepening really across all dimensions of the relationship. So clearly there's the military piece, which we can dig into, but it's across the economic sphere, the diplomatic sphere, right?
And as we've seen in the war in Ukraine, the aid that Russia is getting, especially from Iran, North Korea and China has been especially and critically consequential to Russia's ability to continue to sustain the war. And I think it's quite interesting to see the comments from Kurt Campbell come out because I think it's a real change in rhetoric coming from the administration. For
For a long while now, they've been very vocal and forward leaning in warning about what China is doing for Russia. They have rattled off a whole host of the non-lethal, as you said, max aid that they've been giving. And it's been creeping up to this lethal line. But up to this point, they've given all sorts of things. It's machine tools for tanks. It's propellants for missiles.
all sorts of intermediate goods that Russia could use in producing gunpowder and explosives. They've given turbojet engines. And even recently, they've talked about them giving geospatial intelligence that Russia can use to actually hit targets in Ukraine. So those are things the administration has been talking about. They've declassified that information to try to make European allies aware of this extent of cooperation. But
But then this last week, Kirk Campbell comes out with, I think, a somewhat cryptic announcement saying that it's not non-lethal. He stopped short of calling it lethal aid, which we can talk about why that is. And it probably has to do with the fact that the Biden administration had really drawn a so-called red line for China about what happens if they provide lethal aid.
But it is notable to me that Kurt has come out with this new line about how consequential the aid is. But just to get at the axis of a people point, because part of what we highlight in that piece is clearly it's very consequential what Russia is getting from China, but it is just as important of what Russia is having to give away in return.
And at the same time, in the same briefings that Kurt did, he also stated that Moscow is now helping China by giving them submarine, missile, and aeronautic technology. And I just want to note the significance of that as well, because I've been watching the military relationship between these two countries for a long time. And we've kind of constantly been warning about what
Russia might be willing to give away. But the submarine technology and the submarine quieting was really at the outer bounds of what I ever thought Russia would be willing to give. And in a few short years, now we're here. So to me, it just really speaks volumes about how rapidly the relationships have deepened.
May I just maybe jump in here, Andrea? Thank you for a great description. So what does it mean? In some sense, the war has deepened the alliance between these countries. And are we really witnessing a new axis of upheaval emerging? What does it mean in the long term, given that, based on your analysis, the mutual interconnectedness, mutual assistance, alignment between these countries is much deeper than what we originally expected?
Where do you think this is headed? Are we really witnessing an alternative bloc of powers emerging? I would argue that this is the nascent stages of their efforts to create a viable alternative order to the West. And in the most practical, immediate sense, their deepening relationship is quite clearly increasing the military capabilities of all of America's adversaries.
while at the same time diluting the foreign policy tools that the United States and its allies use to confront them. So there's the economic component of this. It's making our sanctions and our export controls less effective. They're working to de-dollarize and put more payments out of the reach of U.S. economic financial tools.
I think they're making it harder for the United States and Europe to rally coalitions of countries that are willing to impose costs on them for their actions.
They're increasingly coordinating or at the very least rowing in the same direction in the information domain, undermining the credibility of the United States and its allies. So I think most immediately they are really generating much stiffer headwinds to the United States and its allies and ability for us to protect our interests and our values.
But in the longer term, the thing that we noted in the piece is if this really is a viable alternative order, that's going to portend much higher
higher global instability. And there is a lot of good international relations research that has talked about what it means when there's a singular versus multipolar world order. And when you have a competing order, levels of interstate war return. So we've had the great benefit of being in this kind of unipolar moment for a while, although obviously people have talked about how that's fraying.
And during that time, then interstate war has kind of gone away. We thought we'd been in this long piece where focused on civil wars and other things, but interstate war, that wasn't something that's happened over the last 30 years.
And now with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and I think the catalyzing of this alternative order, think of all of the instability that we've seen. You had the Azerbaijan conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. There was a really significant flare up between Serbia and Kosovo. You've seen Venezuela threatening to take parts of Guyana by force. And there's the return of coups, which I also think speaks to this
the nature or the structure of this evolving international order. So when I think about what is the biggest challenge facing U.S. national security, I think it's this convergence of America's adversaries.
And, Andrea, in your opinion, how stable is this alignment between these countries that seemingly are very different, right? Conventional wisdom, for example, would say that China is a beneficiary of the international liberal order as opposed to Russia, which is a very visionary and even a very righteous power. So it wouldn't...
It's obvious that these countries have a long-term similar interest together. Same goes for maybe Iran and Russia. Iran is a highly religious society, Russia not so much. Even it does claim it's a defender of traditional values and whatnot. So I'm just curious as to how viable you see this alternative axis and how much interest in common these powers really have.
Yeah, it's such a great question. I agree with everything that you just said. And they're just all so different. So how much can they actually have in common? And we understand what they oppose. They oppose U.S. power and influence. They want to rewrite the global order in a way that they feel would give them the respect and the influence that they think that they deserve. But do they actually have a common vision of this future?
And it's not clear necessarily that they do, but I'll make two points. And one is that when in past periods of history, you've had these convergence of adversaries that even if fleeting, cause very significant damage to the United States and its allies. So to me, it's like, yes, even if they might all part and go their own separate ways 10, 15 years from now, they have the capacity to,
create a lot of destruction, generate a lot of threats, create a lot of problems to the United States and its allies in that intervening period. And so we have to take it very seriously and think about how to manage the problem.
But my second point, and this is more uncertain to me, like lower confidence in this idea, but I think that I'm starting to see more of a convergence, at least in terms of Russia and China, in how they might envision a future world order. So they do share a common vision of multipolarity. You see both countries talking about this idea of indivisible security,
or the idea that one country can't take a defensive action that threatens another country. That's the idea that Putin has used to justify his invasion of Ukraine. And now it's an idea that I think is featured really heavily in China's global security initiative. They parrot the same kind of points and ideas.
Russia talks a lot about this idea of the world majority, which has a lot of overlap and similarities with the way that China talks about a community with a shared future for mankind. So again, they're very different. But if you had asked me this question a couple of years ago, it would have been hard for me to articulate what a future vision looks like.
But increasingly, there's more convergence and I do see them working together in international institutions. So the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS, they're working hard to grow and expand participation in those organizations.
bringing Iran into the SEO, for example, and into the BRICS. And we know that international organizations facilitate the diffusion of norms. And so if there is greater convergence between what their vision is, they're now working through international institutions in ways that over time, I'm not saying it's happening now, but over time, I think could help mold some future vision for the order. So I guess I wouldn't just, I don't dismiss it yet.
Yeah. And I also think if we reflect back on the evolution of the modern Russia-China relationship, I mean, there's a ton of skepticism a decade ago about whether Russia and China could cooperate on anything, historic rivals, etc.
And I think when there's international pressure, relationships can build in some ways very quickly, especially in more autocratic societies. And maybe us as democracies sometimes we're like, well, they don't necessarily share the same values. But when we think back in history, European history pre-World War I was all about tactical alliances between states that sort of moved around. So I think what you're hitting at is –
Something that was now played out over the last 10 years of this alliance, alliances sort of emerging. And maybe a question for you about how the war has changed Russia, because Russia for more than half a century has been a major pillar, actually, of the nonproliferation regime, especially vis-a-vis North Korea, Iran. And now we see Russia just completely throw that overboard. Right.
And in some ways, it seems providing the crown jewels to China and North Korea. Does this demonstrate actually a degree of desperation on Russia's part? How do you see the war impacting broader Russian foreign policy decision making here and their willingness to forego perhaps longstanding principles and approaches?
Yeah, I think at least in terms of the relationship or the cooperation with Iran and North Korea and to some extent China, although that relationship has been deepening for some time, especially with
The first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, when we look back, that was a really an important catalyst. And so one could argue that from Russia's perspective, deepening relationships with these countries has been out of necessity, that they because they understood that they didn't really have a future in the West, that they had to turn to these other countries first.
in order to help them advance their objectives. And that's to some extent true. But I also think that for Putin, this is the question about like how Russia is changed. I think that Putin also sees his relationships with these countries as better positioning
and preparing and equipping Russia to engage in a long-term confrontation with the West. He understands that Russia will be less isolated and less vulnerable when he works with these other like-minded partners.
So how has Russia been changed? I use this idea that his invasion of Ukraine was his point of no return in his longstanding crusade against the West, that his options are narrowed. He's only grown more dogmatic and committed to taking on the West. And
And so in addition to reorienting Russian foreign policy, he's also taken similar steps at home on the domestic front. He's basically reorienting Russia's public and economy around the concept of confrontation. It's become the organizing principle of the Putin regime and the only way that he can now legitimate his regime and its actions. And so...
Putin has always encouraged, I think, passivity, apathy. But there has been at least a greater attempt to try to build out more of an ideological pillar of his regime. We can talk about and Maria has written on like, what is that ideology? She has a great piece in Foreign Affairs talking about what that is.
So he's convincing Russians that they are at war with the wider West. And then he's reorienting Russia's economy around the war in Ukraine and the broader confrontation shifting to a wartime footing. All the things that we know, defense spending will probably reach somewhere around 8% of GDP globally.
People are shifting from civilian sectors to military sectors. So I guess the whole point is that confrontation with the West has become the whole organizing principle for Putin and his regime. And it's because he believes that he's going to have to sustain this confrontation for the foreseeable future. And these things better position Russia to be able to do that.
So, Andrea, thank you very much for referring to our work here at CSS as well. Would you say then that we essentially are witnessing some sort of re-emergence of a Cold War with competing blocs?
military alliances between two groups in the world, two groups of states, and even like some ideologies that they're juggling around, like forming one of them, obviously liberal Western type and the other one, whatever it is, this alternative that's currently being shaped end up being. Would that be a right description?
I don't think we're there yet because I think the world is still far more fluid and there's a lot of important countries, these so-called swing states that sit in the middle. So there's the Indonesias and the Indias and the Turkeys and the South Africans and the Saudi Arabias. And these are countries that
that have very purposefully avoided taking either side and in fact quite appreciate the opportunity to play both sides off each other. It actually gives them much a wider scope, a wider latitude to pursue their own parochial and their own national interests. So I don't think we're there yet because there's so much of the world's population and power that sits not in either bloc.
But I guess the bigger question will be over time, like what happens to these swing states and will countries be ever more inclined to side with a Russia, China, Iran, North Korea? And so that's what we have to be watching for. And I think that's why like things like supporting Ukraine in this war are so consequential because it helps us push back against this axis of upheaval. So it would obviously impact
convince China, for example, that you can't take another territory by force. It would help isolate Iran. I mean, there are things that the United States and its allies can do today, I think, that would help
ensure that momentum doesn't seem to be sitting with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, that people see the momentum and the more attractive model as being on our side. I know that's like a little bit of a simplistic way to describe it, but there's all sorts of things that the United States and Europe will need to do to prevent these swing states from more decisively choosing that their future sits with this so-called axis of upheaval.
Andrea, I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the European reaction, both to your piece and maybe this concept. Because to me, this is, I think, one of where there's sort of a divide, I would say, I think, between the US and Europe, where I think your points, I think you get a lot of Americans nodding their head. And I think in Europe...
There's a bit more of like, do we really need to lump China into this? And I see the Biden administration working very hard to try to message to the Europeans that China is now basically a player in this war and is doing a ton of stuff to back Russia. And we need to do something about it.
At the same time, we see that Europeans hemming and hawing about EV tariffs and the Germans not wanting to do EV tariffs and kind of not wanting to put your China relationship in doubt. And I think we in the US, I think folks in the Biden administration have heard this.
I've thought, well, the Europeans actually have leverage here vis-a-vis China and that China feels like it's sort of operating beneath Europe's red lines. And what we need Europe to do now is to sort of move its red lines. And we felt with the NATO summit, we kind of did that where I forget the exact language, but it was it was quite strong on China.
But NATO is one thing. The EU is really where it matters, I think, on the economic side in sending a message to China. So anyway, that's a long chapeau to what should be a typical think tank question. But I'm curious for how the Europeans have reacted and how you see Europe's role here in pushing back perhaps in the China-Russia access.
Yeah, it's been interesting to see how the piece is received. And I think there's not so much of a divide between the US and Europe. And actually, there's quite a, we've heard very positive feedback from many European colleagues and interlocutors.
But there seems to be a divide for people who are willing to kind of get behind the concept and appreciate and understand and can see what's happening. And as you said, people who are still quite skeptical or maybe are intentionally like ignoring what's happening, given the costs that it would take to stand up to China in particular. I think one reaction that we get quite a lot is really pushback at the title, the axis of upheaval. So many Europeans, I think it puts
them back into the world of axis of evil, which no one likes and no one really wants to conjure up that. But once you get past the name or once you get past the branding of the idea that people can more or less get behind the concept and what's happening to me, the axis of upheaval is an appropriate way to think about it. It obviously simply summarizes what's happening, which is that
This constellation of actors is trying to overturn the rules and norms of the international order. So I think it's an appropriate way to frame the situation. So once I think you can get people over the, I don't know, PTSD of axis of evil situation,
then we get a much more positive reception. And I think that's in part because the U.S. and the Biden administration has been so forward-leaning in their willingness to declassify and share intelligence about what
these countries are doing. I mean, it's pretty phenomenal to hear these regular reports of the 2.5, now probably much higher than that, million rounds of ammunition that the North Koreans are giving, that the ballistic missiles are arriving and have been put in use on the battlefield, all of the things that China is doing. I think it's been an effective way to try to forge a common picture between the United States and Europe about what's happening.
The question that you're getting at, Max, is like in part whether or not Europe has the political will to use the leverage that it has to try to change behavior in Beijing. But then the second question is whether or not that leverage would actually be effective in changing Beijing's approach to the problem. I mean, in the earliest days of the invasion, I think there were a lot of people here in
the Biden administration, look, Europeans will have a lot of leverage over. We don't have the leverage, but the Europeans have leverage over how China may or may not choose to engage in this conflict. So they got to work, as you said, in trying to get the Europeans on board.
Even though I think Europe has been communicating to Beijing that there would be costs associated with their continued and escalating support, Beijing nonetheless, at least it appears, continues to walk right up to this line and now perhaps even have crossed over into the provision of lethal aid. What it reflects to me is a willingness in Beijing to incur real costs
in order to continue to support its most important partner in Moscow. I might just quibble a bit. I also think that it demonstrates that Beijing may not be taking the Europeans very seriously. I agree with that. And so I think it's what are they willing to do? Yeah. Yeah, it's both. It's sort of both that Beijing thinks it can keep going and it's willing to do it. And look, the Russians are giving it some good stuff.
And what are the Europeans really going to do? Volkswagen really needs to sell cars in China. And so I think this is where I think the next few months in Europe will be quite interesting, especially how it plays out vis-a-vis China. Yeah, point taken. Maria? Yeah.
So maybe we can ask about the policy implications of that. Great description, Andrea, but given that China is not taking Europe seriously enough, maybe it takes the United States seriously enough, are there any prescriptions, anything for us to do to be on alert and maybe perhaps more efficient, hopefully going forward, in preventing this access of upheaval from shaping China?
hopefully eventually winning this battle of ideas and more than ideas. It's very much now a proxy war, perhaps.
Solving this problem will be, I think, among the top national security requirements looking forward and any future national security strategy, I think, will have to take this convergence of allies really seriously. So I think there's a couple of things that at least to get the conversation started that Richard Fontaine and I had highlighted in the foreign affairs piece.
And one was the role of the swing states and really viewing it as very important about what their future approach to politics
picking sides or not will be. And so greater outreach to a lot of these swing states in a very pragmatic and practical way, being very clear about what we need them to do, that to ensure that they're making choices and decisions that uphold the global rules. So preventing Russia, but also especially China,
from basing in their countries to trying to prevent Russia and China from accessing critical technologies. I think there's a whole list of things that we could come up with very concretely that we would like these countries to do, and then almost transactionally be prepared to offer what it is that we're willing to do to support those countries and their interests
in exchange for those decisions. And then I think my hobby horse at the moment is...
the risk of a two-front war or Russian opportunistic aggression in Europe. This is something that I've been thinking quite a lot about. And so as cooperation between these countries grow, I think there is a future risk that should China do anything in the South China Sea against Taiwan, or it might not be that scenario, but multiple crises at the same time. So what if the Middle East were to ignite in a more significant way at the same time as North Korea ignites
grows far more belligerent and aggressive on the Korean Peninsula. Would there be a moment that Putin is tempted to test NATO directly? It's not now while the war is ongoing. I understand that. But in a future, they're regenerating their military. It's a question of when, not if. And at some future time, might Putin be tempted if he judges that the United States is
distracted and deploying capabilities in a different direction. And so that's a discussion for the United States and Europe to have because it simply requires Europeans to start investing in the capabilities that would not be made available to Europe to reinforce if the United States is engaged elsewhere. So as Europeans are
increasing defense spending, they should also be thinking about investing those capabilities that would not be made available to them so that we can be sure that we're maintaining the credibility of our conventional deterrence in that realm. So a lot of it is trying to create headwinds to what they're doing, but a lot of it is preparing for the consequences and the implications.
And I think the important takeaway is like the things we do today, I think will shape the nature of the threat that we face tomorrow and
And I guess I was actually remiss not to put Ukraine at the top of the list of what we do. I mean, I really do see supporting Ukraine as the most important thing we can do to mitigate the threat of this axis of upheaval. As I said earlier, it will help deter China. It will isolate Iran. It helps deal with the threat from Russia. So first and foremost is really the choices that we make today will shape the nature of the threat that we face tomorrow. A very important thank you. And I'll just flag that
Swing states these days are not only deciding the future of the United States, but also the future of the world, it seems.
One last question, perhaps if I may, on my side. There appears to be a lot of tangents between, obviously, the previous orientation towards more globalized, open, interdependent world and the world you're picturing now. It's a world that pretty much self-selects into these blocks, and a lot of the trends are opposite to what we've seen before. The rise of tariffs, for example, trying to bring back sensitive industries back to where
they originated and whatnot. To what extent do you see a conflict there and whether we are efficient in addressing these challenges, right? My perception is that there's no clear vision as to how this is going to proceed because there's still no alternative to globalization, it seems, right? How are you going to treat the national security risks in this globalized world?
Jeez, that's a simple question to end on. I actually am a fan of the European approach of de-risking. There isn't an alternative to the globalization, but figuring out those areas where we can mitigate the risk seems like an eminently sensible approach to figuring out how we can move forward. And clearly our dependencies and our relationships with allies are among the most important things that we can do. So making sure that
our alliances are strong, that we are increasing cooperation between allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, very much in line with what NATO is already doing. That kind of interdependence obviously works to our great advantage, and it helps us to generate greater headwinds to what these countries are doing. But
You're right, especially with China. I think our levels of trade with China have only grown over the last year or two. And so that's not the direction that is feasible for us to move in at the moment. But making sure with outbound investment, export controls, like that we're making sure that these interrelationships are generating as little risk and as fueling as few of the capabilities that we want to prevent as possible.
Well, Andrea, it's been a fantastic conversation. Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there. Thank you for coming on the pod. There's a lot more we wanted to talk about, but it was too good to try to pivot to other things. And thank you, as always, to our listeners for tuning in. If you haven't already, please don't forget to subscribe to our podcast and give us a five-star rating. Additionally, be sure to check out our sister podcast, The Europhile, and the arch rival to Andrea's excellent podcast, Brussels Sprouts.
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