As Ukraine Stumbles and Russia Advances, What Does it Mean?
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You are listening to the War on the Rocks podcast on strategy, defense, and foreign affairs. My name is Ryan Evans. I'm the founder of War on the Rocks, and I'm sitting here with Michael Kaufman, who is fresh back from his latest research trip to Ukraine. Thanks for joining the show, Mike. Thanks for having me back. So I want to get into some of your impressions from your trip later in the episode, but first, let's start with the state of the front, the state of the battlefield.

Russian forces have retaken maybe close to 40% of what Ukraine originally held in Kursk. Most recently, they've launched another set of attacks in the northwestern part of that pocket. Ukrainian forces have been anticipating the use of North Korean troops as light infantry in support or more accurately employed by Russian airborne and other units as expendable forces on that part of the front.

I think so far that the Ukrainian military is still holding that pocket, but it's a difficult fight. In Kursk, it's quite hard to entrench or consolidate the line of defense there. And there's only one main resupply road running from Ukrainian territory into the main town of Suzha that they hold. So logistically, it's also quite constrained.

They are holding still a pocket there, but I think it's very slowly likely to shrink. In Kharkiv, the front is stable. In Kupyansk, on the left side of the Oskil River, Ukrainian forces are slowly being pushed back, and I think there's a good chance in the coming months they're going to lose their positions on the left bank that is east of the Oskil River. Kupyansk itself is under artillery threat, but I wouldn't say that the situation there is particularly unstable. Looking at the

the most problematic part of the front, right, which is the southern part of Donetsk, and that includes at least three operational directions. I could talk a bit about what's happening in Starobilsk area and that OTU, but let's skip that because there isn't much happening in the Kremlin forest and Russian attacks there haven't made too much headway. The most interesting fights, I think, are Kshasev Yar. The Russian force have steadily

made progress both in the northern and southern part of that section of the front. Teretsk in New York, the progress on the Russian side has been very slow, and they've not prioritized that direction. And turning to the main part of the fight, I think it's the most problematic for the Ukrainian military. The Pokrovsk operational direction, or more accurately, everything south of Pokrovsk, Russian forces haven't made progress towards Pokrovsk. They're not really accepting a fight for the city. And what's happening instead is they've been advancing south of Pokrovsk

creating a big cauldron around this town of Kurokhova. Once they took Volhodar, which was an anchor point in Ukrainian defense, they pushed up pretty fast through the south and also north of Kurokhova. They pushed to a town called Selyudova. Now they're aiming to press Ukrainian forces out of the area south of Prokhorovsk.

And I think increasingly there, Ukrainian military challenging this part of the front is simply not stable. And Ukrainian armed forces, I think, are challenged to find an anchor in the defense in order to hold the Russian advance. It's not the case that the Russian military is sort of making big operational breakthroughs, but they're advancing much faster there in recent weeks than they have been before. And understandably, the real issue is that they're not trying to fight for Prokofiev. They're trying to press south and then go around Prokofiev, where

where the terrain is then much more hospitable and much more difficult to defend. And lastly, I think there's a lot of anticipation of another Russian attack in the south in Zaporizhia. And I think Ukrainian forces are getting prepared to try to repel an attack there. But they are badly stretched across this front, running from Kursk all the way across, you know, another 1,200 kilometers of the front line.

And the units around Pokrovsk are struggling to hold this territory, and they're quite thin. It seems like Russia is preparing to use North Korean troops in Kursk as a sort of laboratory.

as a way of testing out how they might use them in different ways. It doesn't seem like Ukraine can hold on to Kursk for too much longer. You know, it might take months, but this is certainly not something they're going to be able to hold over the long term. And then those North Korean troops are going to be used in other ways. That's where it seems like it's going for me.

When you were in Ukraine, did you hear much talk about the North Korean troops? Yeah, I think there was a lot of anticipation of their being used. And I think at this point, some people have even reported seeing them. Ukrainian units were in some ways actually excited to see who would be the first one to engage in killer capture North Koreans. But on the other hand, it's clear that they offer an additional expendable force to the Russian military to employ against the Kursk salient. It also frees up Russian forces to then continue advancing south of Donetsk.

And the big question is, how many North Korean troops will actually be engaged? I think the initial impression is that they are going to see maybe up to 3,000 of the supposed 12,000 as a country. But is that all they're going to see, or is that the beginning of a much larger number of North Korean troops that will ultimately be involved in this war? Mike, I'd like to play a quick clip from your most recent episode of the Russian Contingency, your members-only podcast, where you interviewed your friends and tripmates, Rob and Dara.

And so I think there's a concern in terms of morale that something needs to change. If things don't change, it's going to be, Ukraine is fighting a defensive war in which Russia has advantages and they have disadvantages.

important also once the countries think about how to support Ukraine, it's also to reflect on the morale situation, other situation. And keep in mind that some of these guys have been fighting for two and a half years, right? That's an extremely long term time to fight. It's an extremely intense war. They're fighting for Ukrainian territory. And I think these are the kind of things we need to keep in mind. As Mike said, with the new administration coming in, there really isn't time to do a kind of strategic review of how things are going and then make a decision next spring or summer. Really,

Changes need to happen, I think, sooner. If it's possible to make changes,

because the trajectory right now is not very positive. And look, there are risks. There are worst case scenario risk here. I don't know the probability of these things, but there are risks that Russia makes a real breakthrough. There are risks that something more significant occurs. And I don't think we should downplay those risks. I'm not saying it's most likely. I think most likely Ukraine will still give up some territory. It'll make those gains costly for Russia and so on, but worse things can happen as well.

And I think we have to keep that in mind. And I think it's really important to kind of inflection point to try and put the war back on a more positive trajectory. Really interesting conversation. People who want to listen to the rest of that, it's a two-part episode. Second part's coming out soon. You can subscribe at warontherocks.com slash membership. But back to our chat.

What do you say to those who insist that Russia using North Korean troops is a sign of weakness? No, Russia's force generation right now, I think, is actually quite improved compared to what it was maybe in the spring. And they are likely getting more than 25,000 personnel per month. At least that's a base estimate.

I don't think it's necessarily a sign of weakness. People are welcome to paint it that way. I think Ukraine would very much wish that there was a European army willing to contribute 10,000 to 12,000 troops to them right now. I think that for the Russian military, North Koreans don't decide anything. I mean, in terms of their base manpower needs, this might be 3% to 4% of their annual manpower requirement. And it's not like they need North Koreans to retake Kursk.

You can try to spin the story that way, but it's clear to everyone this isn't the case. And I do agree with you that Ukraine is very likely to lose the curse salient. It's just a question of time and how much effort Russian forces want to throw at it. The big question is, will they want to use North Korean troops? Will North Korea agree to the use of its troops outside of Russian territory in Ukraine proper? And I don't think anyone has the answer to that. I think the Russian military as a whole, we've talked about this before many times on the podcast, has a series of constraints from manpower to equipment to all these things. But

They have to some extent adapted in the way they've been conducting attacks and offensives over the past several months to extend and make this offensive more sustainable, right? And so they're steadily pushing out that timeline somewhat in 2025 for when those constraints are really going to bite. And I think the reality is that so far the Russian offensive has not been exhausted and isn't being exhausted. And that's the biggest issue that I see overall. And the North Korean forces are

are essentially contributing to freeing the Russian military to an extent so that they don't have to put more and more units up against Kursk. I'd like to hear your three or four big takeaways from this most recent research trip. This was your seventh trip? Yes. What are your big takeaways? Just briefly with a bit of context, last time I was in Ukraine was very end of June. I came back more positive about the situation for a simple reason that we had passed supplemental funding, we were sending ammunition, we were starting to send equipment.

Ukraine had passed reforms to mobilization laws and were showing initially very good numbers in terms of the people they were mobilizing in June. And so looking at manpower, fortification, munitions, the picture was looking much better and improving compared to what it had been this winter and spring. This is, I think, a very important background there so we don't start the conversation in a vacuum. And the way things looked...

was that Ukraine was likely to avoid the worst case scenario or collapse of a part of the front, you know, in the second half of this year and could stabilize the manpower situation come winter, exhaust the Russian offensive over the course of the winter as well. I've come back most recently, unfortunately, with a different view, a substantially corrected view based on where we are now. And I see the situation as trending much more negatively.

And I want to make it clear, the front is not imploding. Ukraine is not facing catastrophe. But it's clear that mobilization, the numbers were not sustained over the course of the last five months. That is, Ukraine is not mobilizing enough personnel.

The force management strategy hasn't worked. Ukraine's desire to funnel a lot of people to create new brigades, I think, is a mistake. The new brigades are not going to be combat effective. That was shown from summer of 2023. The West hasn't promised equipment for more than a handful of brigades to begin with. And meanwhile, Ukrainian experienced brigades on the front line have been depleted and the force is steadily fragmenting because they're forced to staple different types of units that have combat power available to hold the line.

Ukraine's fundamental problem is and remains manpower, a deficit of manpower, particularly infantry. Many people are willing to go into support roles, but not willing to go in infantry. And I don't think mobilization has substantially fixed the problem. And let's break down some of the details there. I mean, they passed a law not too long ago that reduced the age of mobilization from 27 to 25. And that itself was controversial in Ukraine. But they still haven't sent anyone under the age of 27 to the front. No.

Now they're debating a law that might extend the mobilization law even further down. But this debate and the policy changes in Ukraine have, and we've talked about this for a long time on the show now, have unfolded haltingly, uncertainly, slowly. And it seems like, correct me if I'm wrong, that we're in a position where, you know, obviously Donald Trump won the election. He's going to be president. He's a lot less friendly to supporting Ukraine, at least in his public statements. We can explore what might happen next later. But...

regardless of who won this election, the current way that Ukraine is able to sustain the war is in a lot of trouble. And it could be that it might not actually matter that much for Ukraine's ability to stay in the war who won the election because the most important developments are happening in Ukraine and the most important decisions are being made from Kiev. So first, my own view is that

The war, as it stands now from my perspective, is not sustainable for Russia or for Ukraine. And the biggest challenge is that Russia is simply on a longer timeline and Russia is doing things to try to extend that timeline to stay in the fight. And to some extent, we are not necessarily doing the right things on our side of the equation. But big picture wise, Ukraine is not addressing the fundamentals and the core of the problem that they really need to.

And to some extent, it's not for lack of trying. Just want to be clear. They've attempted to mobilize more personnel. They've attempted to attract recruits. Yeah, but the political decisions have been way too slow. Yeah, let me get to it. So I think first, the Ukrainian political leadership still refuses to mobilize younger men. Because of that, the numbers that they've posted for those mobilized are actually older personnel that are still not fit for combat duty. They go into support roles.

Second is what's actually being done with them, force management and the like, the choice to create new brigades as opposed to refilling and replenishing existing units. Third is, of course, force employment, how Ukrainian force are used on the front line. And there's a big challenge that Ukraine doesn't have functional commands I think are effective above the layer of the brigade. And brigades are largely running their own fight on some cases. In other cases, you know, in some parts of the fight, they are being micromanaged by senior leadership.

And I don't think either approach is necessarily especially conducive. The one thing that is working, because there are certain things that I saw, at least from this trip, that I thought were positive developments in the war with Highland, is that Ukraine is very effectively employing drones, particularly

particularly at the front line, to compensate for lack of manpower. But this approach by itself is not sustainable, I think, but it's a big force multiplier. Artillery is an interesting point because for the first time, I think, in all the times I've done this work in Ukraine, Ukrainian units are actually doing much better in ammunition and the fire's asymmetry vis-a-vis Russia is not that significant or decisive anymore. In fact, on some parts of the front, where Russian forces are advancing the most, like Prokhorovsk,

They don't have an artillery advantage. They're actually struggling to move their artillery up effectively. A lot of this fight is being done with infantry attacks, to some extent mechanized attacks and dispersed with them, in some cases quite large ones, and with effective employment by UAS. But let me talk at least about the positive. Ukraine is producing more drones, and I think has a numerical advantage in drone systems overall relative to Russia, and a qualitative advantage in how they're using them. And that's one of the biggest things that's keeping them in the fight right now.

to compensate for lack of manpower. While it's a big multiplier, it's important folks to also appreciate that eventually if the force available to hold the front line keeps shrinking and is not able to mount an echelon defense, that is, you only have a front line, you don't have a second line, you just have drone units behind your front line,

then the likelihood the Russian force will be able to punch through will significantly increase. And to be clear, in the last three months, the rate of gain of territory occupied by Russian forces has increased each month.

And it's increasing right now in a linear fashion. And the reason I raise, I do have concerns that the situation isn't stabilized, this offensive isn't exhausted. It may increase further. That said, while this does sound like the Ukrainian situation is precarious, to be clear, it is problematic, I think, in Kursk, and I think it is problematic in Donbass. Other parts of the front are not especially unstable. Quick break from my conversation with Mike to preview a trailer for a new podcast.

My name is Nicole Wiley. I'm the membership editor here at War on the Rocks, and I'm excited to tell you about Airman Pulse, the newest members-only podcast which is for and hosted by Airman.

I'm John Barrett, a serving Air Force officer and career logistician. I've served in a variety of roles from the Pentagon, combatant commands, and at the unit level. I'm Jennifer Cannon, a government relations strategist and retired F-15E weapons systems officer who spent 20 years in the Air Force training for and flying in combat operations before serving in Pentagon roles. Check out these clips from upcoming episodes.

The attitude, the culture of aviation and how it relates to the military is kind of persistent even until today. Airmen like to think that they have a different way of looking at the world and they have a different way of wanting to employ military force.

I just kind of had this mindset that if I wanted to be an officer, that I needed to be enlisted first. You know, I felt like I would have a better understanding of people in the Air Force and how to lead, and maybe I would have a little more credibility as an officer if I was enlisted. We got to look at these people right in their faces, and I'll never forget how many young families we carried out, how many little kids were on our jets.

You could see when they came onto our airplane and like sat down, you could just watch the tension leave their bodies, the relief they felt that they made it to freedom. I think sometimes we get so ingrained in the mission that we forget that we're all human. And so when it comes to just mentorship and leading my people, I try to be as authentic and transparent as I can. You can listen to Airman Pulse by becoming a member at warontherocks.com membership.

If you want to listen to Airman Pulse, subscribe at warontherocks.com slash membership. Back to my conversation with Mike. How much longer do you think Ukraine can keep this going on the current trajectory? It's a hard question. I often say like military analysis is not fortune telling, but, and to be clear, if you're listening to this podcast, you'll probably recall that folks like myself were wrong at the very beginning of the war about how that would play out. And I'm always chastened by that experience. But I would say that first,

It obviously depends on what happens in the next 70 days under this administration, what they do with the remaining funding. Second, of course, it will depend on what the Trump administration chooses to do, and we can't ignore those big factors. But increasingly, when you look beyond capabilities, restrictions on long-range strike, and things of that nature, much of this hinges on what the Ukrainian political and military leadership chooses to do as well, and how well they can address the challenges that they're dealing with.

My view is that Ukraine can sustain this fight into 2025. Can or can't? Can, but I am increasingly concerned that rather than avoiding the worst case outcomes that we've been discussing on this podcast that might happen this year, what has happened in practice is they've simply been delayed and pushed into next year, but we are still on an overall negative trajectory and

And that the focus of the efforts needs to be to stabilize the front line, without which long-range strike campaigns will not compel Russia to the negotiating table because Russian leadership is never going to, I think, settle for that if they think that they are decisively winning or if a part of the front is collapsing. And most importantly, you need to buy time for a long-range strike to work, right? And you need to be able to extend Ukraine's timeline in general in

in order to ramp up both Ukraine's production of drones, of their own long-range strike capabilities, and to make that an effective campaign. I'd like to close with some political speculation, which is neither of our core areas of expertise, but I think it's important to talk about how Donald Trump winning changes this.

We haven't had a chance to talk about this yet, but I think that there's a lot of people who just assume that Donald Trump is going to try to sell Ukraine out as soon as possible. I don't know if that's going to be the case. I can envision a world in which Trump actually accelerates

aid and lifts restrictions in kind of a burst at the beginning to set the stage for imposing a peace on both the belligerents. I'm not saying that's going to work, but I'm not as confident that it's just immediately day one. He's going to be like support to Ukraine's over. Yeah, I don't either. And I think most folks I met in Ukraine don't see it that way. If anything, Donald Trump to them at the very least presents an opportunity because with Biden administration and future Harris administration,

I think they had a good estimate of the path they were on. And to be frank, I don't think they were necessarily on a path to success or victory the way things were going. Yeah, we always criticize this administration, you and I, on these shows about the lack of a theory for victory from Washington's perspective. Yeah, but also, to some extent, insufficient involvement. Not being willing to pick winners to really figure out where our equipment should go. Not being willing to put advisors or trainers on the ground.

Not being willing to invest more in the war, not being willing to give security guarantees either. Sort of, kind of, I don't know, a very compromised approach, right? And with the Trump administration, yes, on the one hand, folks that come in might dictate certain things to Ukraine. On the other hand, to Ukraine, it presents opportunities and at the very least, yes, it's a gamble what they might get out of the Trump administration. But I didn't get a sense in Ukraine of sort of

And to be clear, I was there just before the election, but it was very clear to folks that there was a fair good chance that Trump might win. I didn't get a sense of dread or the belief that a Trump election automatically spells disaster for Ukraine. The one thing that worries me is that the situation in Ukraine is such that there isn't really time for a transition team then for folks to come in in January and to start noodling on Ukraine policy.

They need to come in with a plan or things are going to get rougher. Right. And the big question is, what will they be handed by the Biden administration? Because Biden administration intends to spend down the PDA, presidential drawdown authority. Not all that equipment will ship. A lot of it will still be en route. It will take months to ship it.

But when they come in, they're going to need a new supplemental from Congress, new funding, and they might come in without any significant cards, right? People imagine that they're going to come in having all the disabilities and things they can do. But in actuality, they might come into a situation where the front line has gotten a lot worse. They don't actually have any funding from Congress to spend or to use even as leverage. And they're going to have to quickly start thinking because between this and the situation in the Middle East, they're going to have to be debating which, you know, wolf is closest to the sled.

Thank you for listening to my conversation with Michael Kaufman. Don't forget to check out our membership program at war on the rocks.com. Stay safe and stay healthy.