The main objectives of China’s GSI include resetting the terms of the international system to be more favorable to China’s national interests, creating a more justifiable atmosphere for China to expand its security role, especially in the developing world, and establishing a bureaucratic and financial channel for concrete security cooperation with other countries.
The GSI is being used to relabel and integrate pre-existing security activities, such as border guard training and low-profile security force presence, into a new framework. It also creates a pipeline for new security-related activities, including police training, smart city technologies, and law enforcement cooperation.
China's key security interests in these regions include addressing non-traditional, transnational security challenges like cybercrime, trafficking, and terrorism. The GSI is being used to assist neighboring governments in mitigating these issues to prevent them from spilling over into China.
Concerns include historical tensions, territorial disputes, fear of excessive Chinese influence, and potential backsliding in civil society development and political reform. Despite these concerns, most countries are open to cooperation with China to address internal security challenges.
The GSI is funded through a budget managed by the Chinese foreign ministry. Local governments can apply for funding to undertake small projects like police training and technology exchanges. There are also larger initiatives, such as training 3,000 to 5,000 law enforcement personnel, which are more centrally controlled by China.
The GSI was not mentioned in the SCO joint statement possibly due to protocol reasons, internal decision-making processes, or lack of consensus, particularly from India. China may also be shifting focus to other multilateral platforms like the China-Central Asia Summit for GSI implementation.
Russia does not see the GSI as a significant threat to its dominant security role in Central Asia. Regional governments still look to Moscow for security, and China is cautious not to alienate Russia. China’s security cooperation in the region is more focused on softer forms like police training and technology sales.
The GSI challenges U.S.-led norms and approaches to international security, promoting a narrative that criticizes U.S. alliances and policies. It also helps authoritarian governments strengthen internal control, which runs counter to U.S. interests in promoting political reform and civil society development.
The U.S. should engage more actively in addressing the security needs of countries in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, such as cybercrime and trafficking, through capacity building and high-level strategic dialogues. The U.S. should also work with allies to ensure that these regions do not become solely dependent on China for security cooperation.
China’s push to revise the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022. A few months after Xi Jinping proposed GSI, host Bonnie Glaser did a podcast episode with Manoj Kewalramani to discuss the drivers behind GSI and analyze the initial statements outlining its content.
More than 2 ½ years have elapsed since then, and scholars have begun to investigate how China is implementing GSI in various regions around the world. A new report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines how GSI is being operationalized and received in two priority regions of Chinese foreign policy: mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The study draws on field research in both regions. The report is titled “China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia.” The report has three authors: Bates Gill, Carla Freeman and Alison McFarland. Bonnie Glaser is joined by Bates Gill for this episode to discuss the report’s findings.
Bates is a senior fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research, a Senior Associate Fellow with the Royal United Services Institute, and associated with USIP.
Timestamps
[00:00] Start
[01:53] Objectives of China’s Global Security Initiative
[04:22] GSI as an Additive or a Replacement
[07:21] Fieldwork in Southeast and Central Asia
[12:06] Concerns about China’s Intentions and Influence
[15:24] GSI Initiatives and Sources of Funding
[19:58] GSI and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
[23:55] Moscow’s View of GSI
[29:27] Implications of GSI for the United States