China and Africa: 2024 FOCAC Outcomes
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I'm Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Welcome to the China Global Podcast.

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, known as FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People's Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years, and it's the occasion to issue joint declarations as well as a three-year China-Africa program planned.

The 2024 Folk Act just took place in Beijing recently from September 4th to 6th. The theme this year was joining hands to advance modernization and build a high-level China-Africa community with a shared future. The heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, and that made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.

To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, I'm joined by Paul Nantouliou, who is a research associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, China-Afro-Asia engagements. We're just thrilled to have you at the China Global Podcast. Paul, thanks for joining us. Thank you very much, Bonnie.

So let's start with a little bit of background. Can you briefly describe why was FOCAC originally created now 24 years ago? What were the goals that it set out to achieve and have those goals changed in the past two plus decades? Well, FOCAC, as you rightly mentioned, is the mechanism for permanent coordination and collaboration between

between China and African countries. It was an African initiative. It actually wasn't a Chinese initiative. FOCAC was an African initiative. African countries were feeling marginalized after the Cold War and felt that they were essentially becoming irrelevant, you know, as far as the major powers were concerned.

So African delegations began to approach different capitals requesting for this type of engagement. They pushed very hard to get the Chinese on board. The Chinese were initially not too keen on it because they were focusing on a reform and opening up. But things began to change when China felt under pressure after the fallout over the Tiananmen crisis.

And so China began its pivot back to the global south, and Africa became an increasingly important region in that quest. So the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation needs to be understood within that general geopolitical frame.

It has evolved over time from a platform for essentially commercial engagement and trade expansion. It has now taken on other initiatives such as peace and security, military cooperation, military engagement, as well as law enforcement. So it's now a much more multifaceted, much more complex platform for engagement.

And it is effectively the fulcrum for engagement between China and African countries, as well as different African regional institutions. So can you describe generally what Chinese interests are in Africa today? And how does FOCAC advance those interests for China?

Fokak has advanced these interests in a number of ways. First, China is increasingly looking to the global south.

for diplomatic support, for political support in various international institutions, and basically integrated into China's grand plan to reestablish itself as a leading global power. So, FOCAC plays an extremely important role in that context. And we saw this in the recently concluded summit. The Chinese side

made it very clear that FOCAC is not just relevant for China-Africa relations, but it is absolutely important in as far as China's initiatives in the global south and China's global strategy are concerned. Secondly, FOCAC has served as a mechanism to expand significantly Chinese economic engagement on the continent.

When it started in 2000, China was not a major economic player in Africa, but currently China is now the largest trading partner of the African continent as a whole, but individually of many African countries. And it surpassed the United States in that regard in 2018.

FOCAC has also been an important avenue for expanding the Belt and Road Initiative, known in Chinese as Ida Ilu, which is a one belt, one road. When this program started, Africa was fairly marginal. The program mostly focused on Eurasia and Europe.

But now the African continent is the largest single block in terms of membership within that Belt and Road program. And much of that has been due to the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation.

Lastly, FOCAC has enabled China's military engagement. It's made it much more focused. China is currently training more African officers than any other industrialized country.

is training more police and law enforcement officers again than any other industrialized country. And China has been conducting counter piracy patrols since 2008. And those patrols have become increasingly sophisticated for longer durations of time and have afforded China the opportunity to conduct military exercises with African countries.

on a scale that China was not doing before FOCAC was established. - When would you say that Africa fits today in the hierarchy of Chinese priorities in its foreign policy? For years, the Chinese used to talk about this hierarchy of their relationships with the world. Major powers were at the top, and then they had neighboring countries. And the developing world, always important to China, but was last.

And as you say, the global south has become more important to China in recent years. Has Africa really been elevated in China's foreign policy priorities?

Africa has been elevated and this was confirmed at the 2024 FOCAC. At least 30 African countries enjoy strategic partnership relations with China at different levels of China's diplomatic ranking system. So that's the first indicator.

The second indicator is in terms of the institutionalization of Africa policy within the Chinese system. For the past 35 or 36 years, Africa has been the first country

continent that every incumbent Chinese foreign minister has visited as the opening visit on China's foreign policy calendar. Now, that sounds symbolic when you look at it, but when you examine it closely, every Chinese incumbent foreign minister serves 10 years

So that means that in the lifespan of a Chinese foreign ministry term, foreign minister's term, sorry, no less than 50 African visits will be conducted. No other foreign minister visits Africa that frequently. Secondly, if you look at the Chinese political system, if you look at the top six or the top seven,

This is the Politburo Standing Committee. Each of those individuals, each of those officers, supervises or engages with specific elements in China's foreign relations in Africa. So, for instance, the National People's Congress has relations with over 45 African parliaments. And these are institutional relations.

The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference has relationships with around 50 African political organizations and interest groups. Again, these are institutional relationships.

The Communist Party of China, its international department, has institutional relationships with 110 political parties in Africa, both ruling parties and opposition parties. Now, if you look at the individuals and the officers that are responsible for these relations, they are within the Politburo Standing Committee, which is China's highest leadership organ.

that is chaired by the incumbent president at any one time. So it's highly institutionalized. And as you mentioned, Bonnie, at the beginning of this discussion, Africa and the global south, generally what I like to call developing countries, are the foundation of China's foreign policy. So that is where Africa fits in to China's foreign policy hierarchy and prioritization.

How would you describe what Xi Jinping hopes to achieve by strengthening his relations with developing countries around the world? And is it mostly aimed at

strengthening China's position vis-a-vis the United States. We have certainly seen China try to undermine U.S. global leadership around the world. But is that the primary agenda or is it something else?

It's a critical part of the agenda because when you read Chinese official literature on foreign policy, this is stated quite clearly that China for a long time has believed that it is in a state of strategic competition with the United States in particular. So mobilizing and energizing and revitalizing Chinese engagement in the global south is a critically important piece of that strategy.

In addition to that, China is pursuing market access, right? China wants to increase its market access. State-owned enterprises are the engines of Chinese foreign policy. And ever since the era of Jiang Zemin, when China adopted this going out strategy, state-owned enterprises have been provided tremendous subsidies by the Chinese state to go out and capture markets in the global south, in infrastructure, in energy.

In mining in all sorts of sectors, right? China has become an increasingly important source of foreign direct investment in the larger global south and in many African countries. And China has also become an important lender increasingly, right? So the global south becomes extremely important.

And the other thing, Bonnie, that I wanted to mention is that, you know, whenever China, whenever the Chinese leadership more appropriately, whenever they confront international tension or whenever they perceive that they are under international pressure, the global south becomes extremely important. We saw this under Tiananmen. We saw this during the Cold War. And now we're basically seeing it in this current phase of international strategic competition where China has turned

again to the global South in an effort to increase its global influence, its global reach, and to compete effectively and position China as a competitor primarily against the United States. So the global South becomes extremely important and it becomes the heart

of everything that China is trying to do in order to show up its position and pursue its agenda to return itself as a global power. China sees itself as a global power. The global south is an extremely important part of that strategy.

The just-completed FOCAC Summit, what stood out to you as particularly important and significant if you compare it to prior FOCAC Summits? Do you see any new directions? Are the Chinese learning lessons from the past and modifying what they do at one summit to

to try and be more effective going forward? Are they setting an agenda very collaboratively with African countries? So if you could just sort of describe the outcomes compared to the past and give us some insights into what was achieved. Right. So FOCAC has been around for 24 years. So it is a work in development program.

It is a work in progress. It reacts to pressures, internal and external pressure. It adopts different programs as it moves along. So, you know, it's structured, but at the same time, it's very amorphous, right? If you look at the 2024 FOCAC, I think it confirms a number of strategic pivots.

by China. The first strategic pivot is away from direct bilateral lending to multilateral lending and involvement of, quote-unquote, the private sector and private sector lenders in China and involvement of, quote-unquote, the private sector. The reason China is doing this is because it is trying to mitigate risk

It is trying to spread its risk. And there is a concern in Beijing and in the Chinese political establishment about the inability of many of their borrowers to actually return their money. China was put in a situation back in 2022 when it had to reschedule debt for 17 African countries that were unable to pay. This has a political cost in China

The institutions that are lending this money are led by individuals that also hold positions in the Communist Party, right? So that can create a lot of problems for Xi Jinping. So that, I think, is the first strategic pivot. The second strategic pivot is around green energy, right, and renewables.

This is something that China has been pushing. It's a demand. African countries have sent very strong demand signals to China. So countries like Nigeria, countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Namibia,

at this Fokag Summit secured deals to establish solar plants in their countries, right? And there's also an overcapacity of solar equipment in China that China is basically seeking for ways to secure that market.

China is also in the game of EV batteries. It's the largest producer in the world. These electric vehicles are making inroads on the African continent. So that has also been critically important. And if you look at the FOCAC outcome documents, there's a whole section that's actually dedicated to this. The other major strategic pivot, Bonnie, which we have not seen in previous FOCACs,

is, you know, the switch towards what the Chinese are calling small and beautiful. Now, Chinese lenders have burnt their fingers in these mega infrastructure projects that we saw, you know, the sort of mega lending that we saw in 2012, 2013, 2014, when the Belt and Road was taking off.

We have seen that China has incrementally made a shift towards smaller projects that are more manageable. The Belt and Road Program has been reviewed a number of times in order to make it more nimble and much more focused. It's been really unwieldy. And a lot of African countries have also said that there have been problems of coordination on the Chinese side.

So I think this is what we're beginning to see. This is the new sort of recalibrated Chinese engagement on the African continent. But it doesn't mean that China is not in the infrastructure space. I mean, Tanzania and Zambia were able to sign a deal with Chinese lenders and Chinese construction companies to refurbish the Tazara Railway, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway.

which in the 1970s was China's biggest and most expensive overseas undertakings. So China is still in infrastructure, but we're going to see a continued tilt because China is also facing economic headwinds back home. So this FOCAC did confirm a number of strategic shifts on the Chinese side.

Well, you mentioned earlier some of China's military involvement with the continent. And there is an expanding military assistance program. We heard Xi Jinping at FOCAC say he would offer Africa 1 billion renminbi in grants and military assistance and provide training for more military personnel. Of course, we know that China's first base is in Djibouti.

And the Pentagon in the last China military power report did identify some other countries in Africa where they believe that China might be seeking to expand its presence and use as perhaps access points or resupply places, not necessarily fully bases like they have in Djibouti. I'm curious whether you think that this is likely

to develop? What do you think that China really seeks to establish in terms of expanding its military footprint on the continent? And is this something that the United States and other countries should be concerned about? Well, you know, let's look at it from the Chinese perspective. So when one listens carefully to the People's Liberation Army,

to think tanks that are close to the People's Liberation Army. And when one looks at the official and unofficial writings of influential serving or former retired officers, it becomes clear that the PLA has engaged in a lot of thought

and a lot of contingency planning around basing. Now, it is not clear from the Chinese side where the next military base will be.

There's been a lot of speculation around Pakistan, United Arab Emirates. On the African continent, there's been speculation in the Namibian press. There's been speculation in the Kenyan press. There's been a bit of speculation in Tanzania and other places. But without focusing on specific countries, if one looks at the larger macro perspective,

um China believes that it has arrived at a point in its development where it has become a great power with global interests and those interests are constantly challenged and threatened uh every month in the African press there will be incidents of attacks against Chinese assets

kidnappings, hijackings, killings, and things of that nature. In fact, Xi Jinping has talked about this after the very chaotic evacuation of Chinese oil workers in 2017 in South Sudan. So in the context of that, what is coming out of these PLA debates

is that state-owned enterprises are applying pressure for the People's Liberation Army to take on a more muscular role on the African continent. So that is clear, right? Nevertheless, there still seems to be an aversion within the Chinese military establishment to put boots on the ground in large numbers outside of a peacekeeping mandate.

So what emerges from that is a strategy that I call a blended security approach, where China is incrementally experimenting and testing its power projection capabilities, because power projection and foreign basing go together. Now, if you look at the recent exercise that the People's Liberation Army conducted with Tanzania,

before or right on the eve of the Fokak summit, that was by far the largest exercise of its kind, the most demanding exercise. And it was the first exercise of its kind where we saw the PLA bring in equipment, heavy equipment, as well as troops from the Chinese mainland, right? Because usually in these exercises,

the Chinese side will basically reroute or use equipment and troops that are already conducting anti-piracy patrols in Africa. And some of these will come from the base in Djibouti. But this is the first time that China demonstrated its ability and its capacity and its political will to move equipment and troops all the way from mainland China into Tanzania. And the nature of the exercise itself

if you look at the Chinese military press, was describing it as a true demonstration of China's power projection capabilities. So from that perspective, one can deduce, perhaps intelligently,

that over the next maybe five to 10 years, we will definitely see another military, overseas military facility. You know, the Chinese like to call them military facilities. They don't like to call them bases in different parts of the world and certainly on the African continent.

As to whether it will happen tomorrow or next year or what country, that is really up to debate and analysis. But it is quite clear that China is going to move in that direction. The BOKAC process, as I understand it, has been primarily government to government. But I understand there's also a component of interaction with non-governmental entities. So could you talk about that?

Well, Bonnie, I'm really glad you asked that question because we have seen this since the 2015 FOCAC, right, that took place in South Africa. South Africa as co-chair of FOCAC, because, you know, previously every co-chair of FOCAC co-chaired it for six years. So during South Africa's tenure as the FOCAC co-chair, we saw a growth, right?

of civil society engagement in the FOCAC process. And this is because South Africa as a government is amenable

and even encourages civil society involvement. The South African government consults think tanks, it consults non-governmental organizations, it consults independent experts on foreign policy matters. So we saw this and we saw that the growing networks, independent networks on China-Africa relations used that and leveraged that to make some headway in engaging formally and informally with the FOCAC process.

Fortunately, that continued with Senegal. Senegal is another country that has been very amenable, you know, to consulting civil society organizations, to bringing them on board and to introducing a, you know, the idea of observers.

In the meetings, this was not the case before, but we saw it develop under South African and Senegalese co chairmanship of the process. So what we have seen, what we saw in Johannesburg, what we saw in Dakar and what we saw in Beijing.

was a significantly higher rate of civil society engagement than we have seen before. There was private sector leaders there. There was independent institutions that assembled. Even African diplomats interacted with the African Union. And I think this is going to become the new normal for FOCAC.

When you talk to African diplomats, they will say, at least some of them, have said that there is a realization that FOCAC is not just a project for governments.

you know, African governments and the Chinese government are in a situation where you have bottom-up engagement, you have bottom-up pressure, and you have analysis, right, that is being done, that is reviewing FOCAC, that is evaluating it. This is not being done on the government side. This is being done by non-governmental institutions. I think it's a good thing because it's important for independent African voices to seek solutions

you know, accountability on how this relationship is managed. And it doesn't only apply to China, but it should apply to all Africa's engagements with foreign partners. It's a healthy thing, and I think it should be encouraged. Yes, absolutely. That's great. That's a really good trend, and I certainly hope that it continues. I also wanted to ask you about

how African countries perceive the general efficacy of the FOCAC process. What are the kinds of requests that some of the African countries are making of Beijing? And is Beijing delivering? Is there a sense that the FOCAC process is really bringing to Africa the development, the economic interests and other things that they want from China?

Well, FOCAC is highly valued strategically by African countries. No question about that. More African presidents attend FOCAC summits than the UN General Assembly, which is the world's largest gathering of heads of state. At this FOCAC, you know, you had 51, 53 African presidents.

less than half of those are going to show up at the General Assembly. This has been the trend since 2015, right? So there's definitely something that African countries value in the FOCAC mechanism. If one looks at the 2024 FOCAC, you know, just to give an example, right? There were a myriad interests that different African countries pursued. You know, there's no uniformity in what African countries pursue within FOCAC. Kenya went to FOCAC laser-focused

on getting finance to jumpstart stalled infrastructure projects in 15 counties in the country. President Ruto is facing a lot of domestic pressure over the issue of debt and over the delivery of infrastructure and the creation of employment. They were able to secure that. So they went to China with that single-minded focus, and they also tried to persuade China

to put back on the table the extension of the standard gauge railway from Naivasha to the Ugandan border. So these are the two primary objectives and Kenyan diplomats were instructed to pursue that and have been working to try and persuade their Chinese partners to get on board. Cabo Verde's interests were completely different. Cabo Verde was looking for grants and Cabo Verde has a strategy

of securing Grant Finance not loan Finance from China and uh was quite successful and was able to get a number of commitments including refurbishing the National University of Cabo Verde right Namibia was very different Namibia has been trying

to secure technical assistance to establish its largest solar plant in the country right and a deal was successfully concluded those negotiations were successful Namibia has been pursuing this diligently for the past two years and was able to secure that at the Fokak meeting Tanzania and China were interested in the revival of the Tazara railway right

They have been focused on that for the past two to three years over different administrations. They have tried to get some kind of agreement with their Chinese partners. It has been a back and forth process. Sometimes it's been on, sometimes it's been off.

But finally, under this FOCAC, during this FOCAC, they were able to get that agreement done. But notably, this time around, it is not going to be done through sovereign lending. It's going to be done through a private-public partnership. So it shows that some African countries are aware

of the risks of taking on more sovereign loans and are now more interested in securing PPPs with their Chinese counterparts. So, Bonnie, this is just a taste of the different interests that different African countries pursued at this FOCAC summit.

Well, fantastic to talk with you today, Paul. Once again, Paul Nantoulia is a research associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. And thanks for joining us. Thank you very much, Bonnie. And thanks for having me.