The View from INDOPACOM
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Welcome to the Asia Chessboard, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia and takes an inside look at the making of grand strategy. I'm Andrew Schwartz at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Welcome back to the Asia Chessboard. I'm Mike Green, joined as always by Jude Blanchett. And today our guest is Lieutenant General Stephen Sklenka, U.S. Marine Corps, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Indo-PACOM.

Thank you for joining us. Now, we always ask the bio question first, so I got to ask.

How did a nice kid from Georgia give up Mountain Dew for MREs? What's the story? How'd you get into the Marine Corps? How'd you get focused on the Pacific? First, Mike and Jude, thanks so much for this opportunity. I'm a big fan of the podcast and it's great to be able to be with you all today. And to let you know, I did not have to give up Mountain Dew for MREs. Sometimes the Mountain Dew supplements the MREs. The beauty of the Corps, so much of us are Southerners anyway, so it's in the blood.

So for those who've had the opportunity to hear General Sklenka speak at a conference or on a Zoom, there is always a pretty considerable Mountain Dew at his side. There it is right now. So why the Marine Corps? How'd you become a Pacific-aligned Marine? What's the journey? No, it's a great question. I don't have one of those long family heritages. I had a great uncle who fought in World War II. I didn't know him all that well.

I've been asked the question why the Marines in the past, and frankly, it may sound corny, but I mean, no kidding. It was a calling. I felt pulled into the Marine Corps or something about the allure of the Corps, the toughness of the Corps, all that it symbolizes. A lot of it probably was, I remember as a kid seeing the statue of the Iwo Jima. And that to me, if there is one symbol that to me encapsulates the United States of America, it's the Iwo Jima Memorial.

And the fact that you've got Marines and corpsmen on that is something that just stuck with me. I had the great opportunity to meet the actual sculptor of the, when I was at the Naval Academy, he came through and I got to escort him. Felix de Velden, I believe is his name. And it was, you talk about a thrill, some kid from Georgia escorting the guy who sculpted the statue that inspired me to come in the Corps. Now, has most of your career been as a West Coast Pacific pilot?

Facing Marine? Right, from the operational side. But I think most Marines after 2001, we spent a considerable amount of our time in the Central Command Theater. But when I was a battalion commander, I did a deployment. We ended up doing a deployment to the Middle East, but we flowed through the Pacific Theater. So most of my operational time has been spent out of Camp Pendleton or 29 Palms. How do you find the ethos within the Marines post-Iraq-Afghanistan situation?

General Berger has, as Kalamadon, definitely tried to create a focus on the peer competitor in the Indo-Pacific. You find when you talk to captains, lieutenants, senior NCOs, is that Pacific orientation after 20 years in CENTCOM sinking in, do you think? Oh, absolutely. There's no doubt in my mind. And it is because...

The most significant and compelling threat that the United States has emanates from this theater. And you know, Marines, we go to the sound of the guns. - Two quick ones for you. When I interviewed George Shultz for my book, "The History of the US and the Pacific,"

I asked him why he joined the Marines, and he said because when he was a senior at Princeton, he knew there was going to be a war, World War II, and he knew the Marines would be doing the Pacific. And you've probably seen that HBO series, The Pacific. Absolutely. I'd be surprised if you haven't. There's that great scene when Chesty Puller's talking to all the sergeants, says the Army can have Europe, the Marines are going to be in the Pacific. Although, to be fair, there were more Army divisions in the Pacific than Marines by the end of the war, but early on, yeah. Yeah.

Of course, okay, we'll get back to the Marine Corps maybe, but you have a joint job, one of the most important ones right now in the entire U.S. military. And you probably go to bed every night, wake up every morning thinking about the state of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. That's your main job, I would expect. How would you describe it? Where do you think the U.S. with allies and partners are doing well in maintaining deterrence and therefore stability? And what areas are we...

Mike, that is a great question, especially the point you made about the focus on deterrence, because I think it is important that people understand that InnoPay.com's primary mission is deterrence. We are doing everything that we can to prevent conflict and to prevent a fight. But of course, as you know better than anyone, is deterrence is fundamentally, it's a psychological effect that you're generating upon your adversary. And I think that's a great question.

And it's one that in the end, the adversary, the old saying, the enemy has a vote. In the event that deterrence fails, mission one alpha then for us is to prevail in any potential fight. So the question that I have been asked pretty regularly is, do you think deterrence is working? I normally turn that question on its head and ask the question, well, deterrence of what?

I ask it that way because when you think about it, what is the objective that I'm trying to deter? If the objective is to sustain the status quo out here, no doubt in my mind, deterrence is working. It is for the most part. If the objective is to prevent conflict in the region, I think clearly we've been successful in deterrence in that regard as well. But we're seeing increasingly isolated incidents of dangerous and aggressive behavior against allies, against our partners, against friends.

I mean, most notably is before this podcast kicked off and we were talking a little bit about what the Philippines are currently enduring vis-a-vis Second Thomas Shoal. There are areas where we need to continue to provide that reassurance to our friends and allies and provide that combat credible force as a deterrent against aggressive actions.

You're asking about the missing pieces of effective deterrence. I think there's a couple of things I'd say is I'm not, I don't think we're necessarily missing anything out here. What I would say is, and I've been reminded this in the past, I'm a Marine. And so there's no way that I'm going to be satisfied with status quo in terms of our capabilities and readiness. So we don't want to be stagnant. We're continually looking to improve. And we believe that that commitment is critical to our effective deterrence.

Continued integration with allies and partners, improving technological capabilities, improving the infrastructure. I think all these things can wrap together. And then also understanding that the military is really just a supporting arm to the overarching whole of government approach to deterrence. So you flagged this, the increasing incidence of dangerous maneuvers, the attack on the Sierra Madre supply ships, things in the Himalayas. We see it a lot.

Is it right to understand this is not just a binary thing? Deterrence is not just about preventing war. Is there a scenario that worries you where there's no war at all, but the accumulation of these unsafe incidents, gray zone pressures, achieves Beijing's strategic effects without war and we are in a dangerous position? And if so, how do you think about that gray zone piece where

Of course, the military instrument is just one of the tools we need. But short of war, is it possible to lose strategic competition through the growing accumulation of these dangerous maneuvers and gray zones? And is there a way to think about that? Yeah, well, first of all, I think it's funny. In the past few months, I've stopped using the term gray zone. And the reason I've stopped using that term is because I think it's lost its meaning and it's lost its impact.

In the beginning, to me, gray zone actions represented illegal actions that fallen short of conflict, actually short of conflict. The problem is, I think, over the past few years, we've allowed that term to lose the first half of that equation, the illegal piece. And all we focus on is, well, it's not quite conflict, so we don't have to worry about it. The problem with that is that we are allowing these illegal activities without real evidence

consequences associated to them. So I go back to Admiral Fafaro and General Bronner have coined this phrase ICAT. It's an acronym. It stands for illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive. And that to me really is a much more accurate depiction of the activities that are occurring out here. And you asked a great question, Mike, in terms of the dangers associated with that.

To me, the real danger is when nations become lulled into a sense of complacency that allow these illegal activities to continue to occur because they not only embolden the adversaries that are taking those actions, but they also create cynicism among especially among smaller nations or less.

or nations with less capacity, who view the current rules-based international order as an effective mechanism to help level the playing field that enables all nations, regardless of size, regardless of capability, it gives them all equal opportunity to pursue prosperity, security, stability, and the health of their populace.

That's really interesting. And I think the ICAD acronym, we'll see if it sticks beyond, you know, PACOM, including with allies and partners who don't always go for acronyms. But the concept is right. And I think I'm right about this. And people will email me and Jude if I'm wrong, but I'm pretty sure the concept Grazom came out of Japan, you know, 10, 15 years ago or longer even as ICAD.

the Chinese Coast Guard and PLA were pushing at the seams between Japan's Coast Guard and Navy. They had this legal gray zone where they couldn't authorize national security instruments. It was law enforcement. The Chinese were sort of playing that seam to establish de facto control, if they could, over the Senkakus. So that's where gray zone came from. And I think for the Japanese, it was very much about intent.

And strategic effects. But you're right, as we've used it over the last decade or two, it's lost. It's like the boiling frog. We've kind of lost the urgency of it.

So ICAT it is. I'll try to use that from now on as well. Last one for me, and then I'll turn it over to Jude. You made a bit of news when you said, in effect, your life would be easier if you could have a NATO, but that's not happening. To me, that's pretty obvious, pretty logical. And you certainly weren't calling for NATO. But instead, we have what some people call the latticework that connects our very strong bilateral alliances. How do you get strategic effects? How do you get the virtues of jointness?

All the things that you get with a NATO without a NATO. Is it in exercises, command and control, exchanges? I mean, what actually makes up the lattices in the latticework so that you get, if not a NATO, greater joint effort? Mike, it's another great question. I'll tell you that in my view, it's everything that you just said there. It's the interconnectedness of the

bilateral, minilateral, multilateral actions. We do over 120 overall exercises out here annually. It's not just the exercises, though. It's the relationships that are built and developed. It's the sense of interoperability that the nations are having with each other, not just us and somebody, but also others. I go back to just a couple weeks ago, the maritime cooperative actions that we were doing with

the United States, Japan, Philippines, and Canada. Just operating together, it's more than just making our respective militaries better, which, by the way, is a fundamental objective of these exercises, but it's also the message that's conveyed, the message of unity, of partnership. I'll offer this. I frequently hear from Chinese pundits and some of their political leaders condemnation of the alliance systems and the arrangements that we have out here.

Talking about harkening back to Cold War block or block alliance relationships and their anachronisms and blah, blah, blah.

My response is normally to them, you may want to take a look in the mirror and ask yourself, why are these arrangements occurring? These nations are getting together and they're coming to the United States. They're not coming to you, China. They're coming to us in many cases. In many cases also, they're not doing with us. They're doing it with themselves. I go back to a couple months ago when the Philippines, Japan, and Australia did a maritime action together in the South China Sea. These countries are coming to us.

and are forging, if not formal relationships, relationships nonetheless that are evolving because of a concern about this increasingly aggressive behavior that the have been conducting. I'll tell you, you brought up this, the second time a show, but in my view, second time a show, Senkakus, the harassment that the Japanese get in the Senkakus, the harassment that the Indians are getting in the fighting that's going on on the, that the Indians have with the Chinese on the Himalayan border. The,

the prevention of Phil Fisherman from fishing in Scarborough Shoal, all of those activities, in my view, are linked together in an overarching campaign of a revisionist view of history that the Chinese have of trying to reclaim territory that was never theirs to begin with. And yet they're using these illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive tactics to try to create a false and counter-narrative that is

in the end impinges on sovereign rights of other nations. And so the nations out here are concerned. And that's where this lattice work of arrangements and partnerships really comes into play. And I'll end it with this.

The biggest contributor and driver to the effectiveness of this last work framework is the CCP themselves, in my view. General Sklenka, I was just making a list of all the issues that you and your colleagues at InnoPaycom are having to manage right now. Your area of responsibility is never boring, but it is right now...

acutely dangerous. I want to ask you about Second Thomas Shoal, but just we also have today North Koreans fired some sort of ballistic missile. I think there's reports that it failed, but we feel like we're living on borrowed time with Pyongyang, which has gotten much more aggressive over the last year. You've got now this new

axis of North Korea and Vladimir Putin's Russia, and of course, the ongoing low-level tensions in the Taiwan Strait. And any one of these feels like they could erupt and have extraordinary consequences for the United States and our allies and partners. I wonder if I could just go through each three of those and just get your assessment on these, only because it's the one that to me is the most

strategically surprising and potentially significant, which is Vladimir Putin's trip to North Korea. Tell me if this is hyperbole, but when we're writing a book 20 years hence, or when Mike is writing his next History of U.S. and Indo-Pacific, I feel like that meeting, that summit last week, is going to deserve special attention as being an indication of a pretty significant shift

step change in the region, one that the implications of this we're going to be figuring out and dealing with for a very long time, and also one which absolutely collapsed the European security theater and the Indo-Pacific by having now this direct and significant relationship directly related to the war in Ukraine with Putin's trip to North Korea. So how do you look at this? Was I just far too hyperbolic in

And what do you think the immediate and near-term implications are for us after this summit? Thanks, Jude. And I'll tell you, one, I would never accuse you of being hyperbolic. You've always been, I think, very – provided very sobering and thoughtful analysis and assessments.

Out here, I think, at least in OPECOM, we were not surprised, I don't think, by the two leaders getting together. We've been, I think that there's probably been comments in the past from previous Pacific commanders about, I don't want to say warning, but, you know, addressing the deepening cooperation between the two nations. Look, there's, we've seen what we believe is North Korean support to Russia in their fight with Ukraine. Should we be concerned? I would say yes, and I'd say primarily because you've got two countries

nuclear-powered states who have a fundamentally diametrically different view of what we view in terms of proper direction of the world and the desire to sustain what we believe has been a pretty good thing over the past 80 years or so. I do believe the fact that Putin had to go to North Korea,

I am an optimistic realist. I'll use my optimistic realism here and tell you that I think that it really was a sign of some desperation from Russia. If you're running to North Korea to help pull you out of a situation that you're in in Western Europe, that should tell a lot because it's not like North Korea is the most stable of environments. It's not like they have the strongest of economies.

They clearly have their issues. And you can't tell me that if he had other choices, he would have jumped on those other choices. I'll take one last run at this and then I'll drop it. I take your point for sure. First trip out there in 24 years, wouldn't have done it if he had other options. But we still have the case that you've got to imagine the North Korean ask on their part of this is something fairly pretty nefarious and

whether that's nuclear propulsion technology. I mean, there's just a whole bunch of things which the North Koreans want, which Russia is in a position to offer. The other thing I find significant about the trip was the Vietnam leg of it, which got a little bit less attention. But I am surprised that Putin wanted to throw some sand in Xi Jinping's eyes. And going out to Vietnam and also making comments that

We, the Russians and the Vietnamese, are going to be creating new sustainable security architecture in Asia. That's China's job, right? China feels like it has a monopoly on that space. I also imagine China, with its friends, prefers to do the same as it does with our allies and partners, which is divide and conquer. It doesn't want to have to manage a Russia-North Korea conflict.

relationship. It wants to manage a Russia and a North Korea relationship. So it now has this unique dynamic to manage. So that's why the implications of this feel like we're going to be figuring this out for some amount of time. Part of this depends on what China's next move is. I don't think China wants to rush in and embrace this concept of a northern triangle of Russia, North Korea, and China.

I don't think they're going to want to publicly distance themselves from it either, because I think they see downside of that. So I don't know what their move is going to be on this, but I think it's going to be interesting. This isn't a new Sino-Soviet split of 58-59. I wish it was. But it does show that Putin is playing a different game than I thought he was. And I think both him and Kim are trying to say to Xi Jinping, look, we've got some other options here. No, that's really interesting because I...

The thing I was thinking about is it is concerning to us, but I'm pretty sure it's concerning to the PRC as well. I would imagine that Xi Jinping has, he's a little concerned about the idea that his ability to influence both of those countries on a one-on-one is waning or is it reduced? And I would not be surprised if down the line, both Russian and DPRK leadership received a pretty direct message from,

from Beijing. Yeah, that's the hope. I'll end on this thought, which is I think the other worrying possibility is China thinks its best move here is not sticks, but carrots. And in the case of Russia, the quid pro quo is you don't provide any of the high-end stuff to the North Koreans, and we're going to step up our economic support for you in your war effort. That's what I worry is going to be the choice that China's going to make on this.

John Skalinka, let me just turn to another significant challenge that you and your colleagues are facing, which is Taiwan Strait. We had in the wake of President Lai's inauguration three days later, another significant round of Chinese military exercises, but including some new novel elements with Coast Guard encirclement of some of the outer islands. When you think about the challenge that we face there, obviously concerned about a direct amphibious assault on Taiwan and

is a direct invasion is something that we're thinking about as a possibility to upend peace and stability. But I've noticed the conversation moving a little bit, not to get back into the gray zone discussion we had earlier, but sort of moving a little bit to the left.

and starting now to think of quarantines, blockades. I know you're planning for anything that could disrupt peace and stability in those waters, but what do you see as the most frontal facing challenges for Indo-PACOM? I mean, what are you planning for and how do you think about some of these left of invasion scenarios? Well, Jude, I'll tell you, we plan for it all.

But in the near term, I agree. I go back into the illegal coercive, aggressive, deceptive, the ICAD type stuff. Because in the end, look, she is not a foolish person.

He understands that conflict is costly. It's costly not just in manpower. It's costly in resources. And he's got – they have their own domestic economic issues with which they're dealing. And so I'm not trying to tout any administration line or anything when I say that I don't believe that a conflict in the Taiwan Straits is a foregone conclusion or that it's some kind of an inevitability. I certainly don't believe that that's the case.

There are all kinds of other ways that I believe that in the end she is looking to try to, I mean, he has stated upfront that, and it's not just him, all the recent CCP leadership have identified the desire to what they say, solve that unification issue peacefully. And it would make sense on many, for many reasons, not the least of which is why would anybody want to destroy the object of their affection when they're coming in there in a conflict where

Especially when you can't tell me that the CCP would not want to have access to that Taiwan economy, and they certainly don't want to have to rebuild that. So I do believe that it's those illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive actions that are concerning. Now, it's funny that.

The world reported heavily about the increased military presence on the heels of the inauguration. But shortly thereafter, we had a big exercise out here that had much more incapacity comparatively than

Didn't get a lot of play. Whereas what the PLA did was something unique and special for them. It was an everyday occurrence for us. That's how we roll every day. And not just us, but we were doing it with our friends, multiple nations. When the PLA conducted their, their actions right after the inauguration, it was, they were by themselves, uh,

We were with a bunch of folks. And you can't tell me that even though the Western media didn't necessarily report about it, because we do those things pretty regularly, you can't tell me that the CCP weren't watching that as well. So...

In my mind, a big deterrent piece is the persistent presence of combat credible forces that do both deterrence against a potential adversary, but also assurance of friends and partners in the region to just reassure them that we are there. We have skin in the game alongside of them. You both have heard me say in the past that

We are a part of the Pacific neighborhood. The United States is a part of the Pacific neighborhood. We just live on the east side of town. But it's true in my view. I think your exercises don't get as much press coverage because no one's worried that you're going to launch an amphibious invasion against a neighboring democracy. So take it as a good thing that you don't get as much coverage.

It's kind of like a final question for me. It's come up a number of times in this conversation, but just to put the question more directly to you about your assessment of events on 2nd Thomas Shoal. The video footage that came out earlier this week of the Chinese with knives and clubs attempting to stab fishermen, stab boats is incredible.

Shocking. It is just sub point A. It is a good example of how I wish we had much more of a radical transparency initiative on China.

Thankfully, we have, whether it's coincidentally or reporters on some of these Philippine vessels, but if we had more eyes, more satellite imagery, much more exposure of what the Chinese were doing, I think it'd go a long way to making the arguments that you are all doing much more effectively and I think remove a lot of doubts on this.

But this looks like to be an extraordinarily incendiary situation right now. And I think a lot of folks out here at least are much more worried that this might be a flashpoint than, let's say, Taiwan Strait. I know they all have the possibility of danger. Philippine ambassador to the US gave an interview to the FT today saying that he thought this was one of the most dangerous situations that the West has faced in a very long time. What's your assessment of this situation?

I know there's a lot you can't say, but would love to get your sense on how dangerous in this. And I know ultimately this is a political decision for the White House about when we intervene and

You'll go when you're told to go, but just how advanced is this? And what is an off-ramp given that it seems like the Chinese play is to, in some sense, try to play for time to where a storm knocks this thing off of a reef or the hull gives out and that's when the Chinese move in to try to block a resupply? Well, Jude, a couple of things with this. I definitely agree with your assessment that in the near term, this could be quite volatile and it could be quite volatile because of miscalculation. And this gets back to

My points in previous conversations we've had that the CCP uses dialogue almost in a carrot stick approach of reward. And when they like what you're doing and when they don't like what you're doing, they don't talk to you. In my view, if you're going to be a great power, be a great power. Great powers talk. Great powers talk to each other. And even more so when they have disagreements, because that prevents miscalculations. I'm still waiting for the...

theater commanders to have their conversations with our combatant commander. I've had the great privilege of serving under three different combatant commanders out here, PACOM commanders, and none of the three have been able to speak to any of the theater counterparts. That's point one.

Point two is in the end, I'm not trying to be pedantic with you at all here, but I mean, you said that a lot of it depends on Washington policy. Ultimately, this depends on what the Philz want. What is it that they want from us? I can tell you that we are an ally, a treaty ally with the Philippines. We have a mutual defense treaty with them. I think that mutual defense treaty is one of the big reasons why you saw clubs and spears and not bullets, for one.

I think that the PLA, because of the mutual defense treaty, have taken actions that have not resulted in kinetic effects that have caused loss of life. That's a significant piece to me as well. I think that in the end, you asked me about an off-ramp. When the United States makes proclamations against and demarches against PRC actions, Aberrant actions,

egregious actions. Frequently, others, I think, chalk that up as great power

dialogue and great power jockeying. What's going to make it truly effective, I think, is when other countries in this region step up also and publicly condemn Chinese actions. That's a lot harder to do than it sounds, though, because we understand the significant economic ties that every nation has out there. But imagine what would happen if Indonesia, if Vietnam, if Malaysia, South

stood up and publicly proclaimed it, if ASEAN as an organization publicly went against or condemned the Chinese actions, that would be pretty significant. Because in my view, one of the aspects that I think the CCP value more than just about anything is their international prestige. And if they view themselves as

as losing that prestige, especially within the region that they're trying desperately to secure leadership of, I think that that would cause them to rethink their actions. In the end, I go back to what I had said earlier, that one of the people I believe who should get the most credit for the success of our strategy in this region is Chairman Xi himself. Their actions have caused others

to see what really socialism with Chinese characteristics looks like. And too many are to see that, and they don't want anything to do with it. I can tell you the pirate ship...

tactics against the Philippine Navy shook Australia where I am. And it came as Premier Lee Chung was visiting. And diplomatically, it was not a convenient time to be criticizing the PRC. But the Australian system, with very little hesitation, did. It was a step change. It was a different level of violence. And it got people's attention. I want to ask you about logistics. You know, that famous saying that amateurs do strategy, which would be me and Jude. Professionals do logistics, which I think is you. You're a logistician.

What can you tell us about those challenges and opportunities now? If you think about asymmetrical advantages, people often forget to add that the American asymmetrical advantage has often been logistics.

More than a million personnel through Australia in World War II and just the massive logistics there. Even in Vietnam, the U.S. sustained over half a million personnel in Indochina from crowded bases in Guam and Okinawa and the rest. Big asymmetrical advantage now under pressure. What do you think? We've got some alarming things like the state of our defense industrial base.

But then we've got some incredible opportunities when you look at companies like Amazon. So this is a big area for you, I know, and particularly important in this theater. What are you thinking about in terms of attacking it to sustain our asymmetrical advantage in logistics, which has been critical for a century? All you got to do is look at a map. Look at a map of this region and you see just the massive distances and all that's involved here. I offer this...

Not just as the guy who's done logistics in the Marine Corps for most of my career, but the last several years, I was the J-5, which is the director of strategy and planning and policy out here for two years. And then the last three years as the deputy commander. And so I'm saying this not as a logistician. I'm saying this as a joint force officer from a warfighting perspective.

The reality is this, and it may sound like a bumper sticker or whatever, but the truth is logistics breathes life into strategic vision. It's what enables that vision to be attained. And anybody who has had to conduct either an operation or an exercise, especially if they've had the privilege of commanding it, knows that what I just said is true. Logistics is the actual, it's what breathes life into that strategic vision.

The challenges are clear. It's a cliche, a trite phrase, but it's true. The tyranny of distance, it's massive out here. Anybody who's traveled out here knows aircraft distances that you're traveling and time that you're in an aircraft are comparable to in other theaters. How much time if you did that trip via surface, via either a train or a ship traveling out here on ship, it takes a considerable amount of time.

To be a relevant force out here, you need to be a timely force. And so the question now is in the distribution areas, for example, do we have assets that operate at the necessary speed in order to sustain and be relevant in the fight? You look at food, fuel, and ammunition, critical areas that are the lifeblood of a fighting force.

And all of them have their own respective challenges associated with them. The food is one piece. That's probably the easiest of the three. The fuel, with the increase in technology and the increasingly complex machinery that we've got, it requires a much higher grade of fuel, for example. It used to be that wherever you went with the old Jeep that we had, you could take any type of fuel and all you had to do is switch off some fuel filters immediately.

in the worst cases. Now it's, that's a challenge. And then ammunition, particularly in the West, there is a significant demand for precision in the delivery of kinetic fires. By that, I mean these area weapons are,

I'll go back to the old-fashioned artillery rounds and all. The casualties, particularly when we're talking about in an urban environment, are not acceptable, not in the Western mind. And so the idea of having precision-guided munitions, it's a demand. It's become something that's become not just a demand, but it's an expectation of the Western force. Precision-guided munitions, however, though, are complicated to make. They're complex and complicated to make. There's a lot of moving parts to it, and they're challenging to do. And to be able to have

construction lines that are delivering those at capacity that you need, at the scale and capacity that are required, those are the challenges that are involved here. So,

To that end, I'd offer this that I think about with logistics, and that's fundamental responsibility of any strategist is to understand and acknowledge that you have limited resources. So you have to apply those limited resources against the ends that your national leadership have prioritized. We don't have a limitless pool of resources. That's why understanding also what your friends have out there, your allies, your partners out there, what they can contribute matters. And fundamentally,

figuring out how to, and I say this, no matter what size the country is, every country has something that is a strength that they can offer to the relationship that will enable the strategist, I think, to enable their vision. And that's what I think logistics comes into play. And I'll leave this, this is access-based and overflight that matters. Yeah. So when you talk about a lattice work of allies and partners, what,

What I'm hearing is you got exercises, you have leadership exchanges, you have Intel sharing, but logistics is going to be a really, really key part of that.

set of relationships. Oh, there's no doubt. For the allies and for us. Absolutely. And it goes to not just the exercises, but also everything from pre-positioning supplies, whether it's pre-position for humanitarian assistance, which when we talk about the threats in the Indo-Pacific region, I mean, this is where the ring of fire is also. We have significant, as a matter of fact, the preponderance of the world's volcanoes are out here. Storms out here are devastating. And so to have humanitarian assistance, that also is,

our areas where we can help reduce some of the logistics strains and stressors on our overall systems out here.

The mutual munitions development actions that we may do, for example, some of the stuff that we're looking to do potentially with Australia, I think is a great example. You know that stuff even far better than I do, Mike, regarding what the working together to create that scale and scope of munitions production line that we're looking for from both nations. In the end, though, what I would also tell folks is we in OPEC, we don't take for granted that the relationships between

imply an automatic association with us in conflict because conflict is inherently a sovereign decision that every nation has to make on their own. And so we not only understand that, we respect that, acknowledge it, and learn to work within that framework. John Henry coined, the head of CSIS coined a phrase we all use,

About 10 years ago, federated defense. It's not a NATO, but it's a federation of all the capabilities you're talking about. We're often our own worst enemies when it comes to the bureaucracy and export controls, but it's going to be a growing area. Any grad students listening to this, don't just study operations, study logistics. I can't let you go without a quick question on one of our favorite Marines, Pete Ellis.

Iconoclastic officer in the interwar years, died under mysterious circumstances after drinking with Japanese officers in 1923 on Palau. Really the Alfred Thayer Mahan of the Marine Corps, the grandfather of modern amphibious officers.

operations and logistics and strategy. And I know you're a big, you have your Pete Ellis manual right there, but what would Pete Ellis do? Channeling your inner Pete Ellis, looking back at history, almost exactly a hundred years ago, if he were here, he'd be impressed with the Marine Corps. I mean, in his day, it was a bunch of guys serving guns and operating out of long boats. It's now its own mini military, but what do you, channeling your inner Pete Ellis, what would Pete Ellis do looking at all these problems?

Yeah, yeah, that's a great question. Sometimes you ask yourself, where's Pete Ellis? Look, I think, one, I do think that there are a lot of officers out there who have that intellectual curiosity and commitment to figuring out what the problems are. It's funny, there's a book that's out there, War Plan Orange. It's about essentially what the Naval War College is putting together and Pete Ellis's contributions to that, where he effectively, you know, you think about it,

He all but predicted the path of the Pacific island hopping campaign. And had, had there not been political considerations associated with general MacArthur having to get back to the Philippines, he essentially predicted the route that would have been almost exactly taken. I think one of the, one of the things he would be looking at is one, what is the enemy going to be focusing on in terms of their defense and what are they going to be going after from us? Where are those specific locations? And,

He did this, you're right, over 100 years ago or about 100. Well, yeah, over 100 years ago now. And while times may have changed and technology has changed, geography hasn't changed all that much. And so the challenges still exist. And so I went back and I read War Plan Orange when I was the J5 here.

And it was interesting. You could make a lot of parallels with what was going on back in the 19-teens and the 1920s in terms of thinking about potential World War II issues and what could potentially be happening out here. What I found interesting is

Pete Ellis, he wrote what is, in my view, there are two seminal books that the Marine Corps has. His was the first, Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia. That is what defined us in terms of the Corps for Amphibious Operations. The second seminal book, I believe, is the Small Wars Manual that came out. That's the two significant missions that the Marine Corps, I believe, has been known for. But his Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia book,

was a tremendous reference manual that was not necessarily embraced by a lot of senior Marine officers at the time. There were a lot of senior Marine officers who had, they had experience from World War II. They thought we're going to go back into the trench warfare type piece. And they, they were not necessarily, and they also saw the failure of Gallipoli because of Gallipoli. They thought there's no way that you could have a,

offensive amphibious operations. Pete Ellis turned that on its head and he created all kinds of things, shore parties, distribution methods, visions for landing craft. I mean, he was a true visionary that understood, in my view, if you want to compete in a modern conflict, you better have a modern force design and you better have modern capabilities. You can't fall back on what you had in the past.

I think for today's core, I think that that's where our force design is heading. That's the idea behind force design is to keep it modern and relevant to the demands of modern conflict. And the thing about Ellis is he was an innovator. You're right. A lot of flag rank officers thought he was a pain in the rear end, but he was innovating because he saw that the odds were going against the U S and the Marines because of the Washington Naval treaties, because of Japan's Imperial Navy expansion and,

because of the tyranny of distance. It was not a hobby. It was out of, I think, some desperation. It was. And that's where you get real innovation. Yeah. He may have been a pain to some senior officers, but he had the ear and the confidence of the one that mattered, the commandant. Yeah, that's right. This has been excellent. Thanks so much for joining us. I really appreciate it. It's great to see both of y'all. For more on strategy and the Asia program's work, visit the CSIS website at csis.org and click on the Asia program page.

And for more on the U.S. Studies Center in Sydney, please visit ussc.edu.au.