Deep Dive
Shownotes Transcript
Welcome to the Asia Chessboard, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia and takes an inside look at the making of grand strategy. I'm Andrew Schwartz at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Welcome to the Asia Chessboard. I'm Jude Blanchett, joined as always by my colleague Mike Green, the head of the U.S. Studies Center at the University of Sydney. And today we're delighted to be welcoming Benedetta Berti, the Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General at NATO. We're discussing a really important topic, which is NATO's evolving thinking about the Indo-Pacific and where it intersects with NATO's own security interests and
We're recording this on June 13th, but this is obviously coming out the day of the start of the NATO summit. Bernadette, thanks for your time and really glad you're able to join us. Well, pleasure to be here. Thank you for inviting me. We ask our guests a biographical question. You had a very accomplished career as an analyst, as an academic, working in think tanks, and
How did you get into that and how did you make the decision to jump over to defense policymaking? So I guess I've always been, since the beginning of my career, working in that space, in a security, broadly defined space, mostly for over a decade, working more on the impact of internal conflicts on civilians and
trying to understand how different armed groups affect protection of civilians' concerns in civil war. So I've always been working in the security space, but mostly, as you mentioned, in academia and in think tanks, so more from the outside looking in. And I guess that after...
10, 12 years of doing that, I became increasingly more curious in the question of how do things look when you are inside looking out and how does policymaking look when you're inside a more structured system? And that was my entry point into wanting to sometime at NATO. I also thought that the security environment, this was back, I joined back in 2017, that the security environment
in Europe was transforming in pretty impactful ways. And I thought it would be a fantastic opportunity to try and shape from within some of the policy choices that were going to be made in NATO, being that I think NATO is so instrumental to ensuring transatlantic and European security.
I did not anticipate, of course, all the very consequential changes that would occur after 2017. So in a way, I got even more than what I bargained for, especially since 2022 with the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. But I can say it's been really a fascinating experience to be able to observe. And from my small vantage point, I tried
to influence or shape in some ways the discussions about the future of European security in this more global and interconnected world. So that's in a short, in a very short way, why I decided from academia to jump ship and enter the world of policymaking at NATO now almost six years ago.
You mentioned you wanted to see the inside after being on the outside. Can I ask just what has surprised you the most now seven years inside? What's something you thought would be the case when you were at a think tank or academia that has surprised you the most? One thing is to know how policies are done and the importance of generating compromise, fostering consensus. I think
Everybody knows that's the way multilateral organizations work. But of course, it's very different when you are inside the organization trying to make that happen. And I think that has been a very, I think I've been on a steep learning curve in terms of understanding all the different nuances of the foreign and security policies of all the allied countries and how to find a way to, I think that from working at NATO, our point of view is always how do you get to a decision that
respects, reflects, and honors the national security interests of all the allies, and at the same time also strengthens transatlantic security in a way that makes the sum greater than all the individual parts. So how do you preserve national security interests and also not end up
at the lowest common denominator. And I think that has been really an interesting circle to square in practice. And that's the type of work that, of course, when you are outside in academia or in think tank, you do a bit less because you're a little bit less constrained by the reality of politics. So that has been quite interesting for me. I think it's something that I knew was...
I knew the way the sausage was made intuitively, but to be inside and try to foster compromise, of course, it's a different, requires a different skill set and understanding. And so I hope over the last six years I've developed some of that.
Yeah, no, just thinking in think tank world, every report on what to do about China has a generic recommendation of work with partners and allies, but we don't have to think about what that actually looks like. And you do. So appreciate all your work. Listeners can't see it, but behind you, there's a banner for the NATO 2022 strategic concept, which is actually the question I wanted to ask you next. You played a really key role in that very fundamental document.
And one line that I'd like to quote and ask you about what shaped the inclusion of that is the concept states, the Indo-Pacific is important for NATO and given the developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. So obviously for us who focus on China, Indo-Pacific, that was big language. I know Mike's going to ask a little bit about that interconnectedness between European security and Indo-Pacific, but can you just
use that as a jumping off point to talk about how NATO's thinking about the Indo-Pacific has evolved, let's say, over the last decade. You've been doing a lot with specific partners in the Indo-Pacific going back decades, but just in terms of thinking at the high level strategic elevation, what has been driving and shaping NATO's thinking about Indo-Pacific and that interconnectedness? Right. So I think that
Also for us, from a NATO perspective, that one sentence is quite important because really this is the first time in a NATO strategy, in a strategic concept, which is essentially is the one-stop shop, the expression of a light grand strategy, if you wish. This is the first time in a NATO strategic concept since 1949 that we address the People's Republic of
China, and then separately in a different section, the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific theater for Euro-Atlantic security. So I also think that it is quite important, even if it's just a brief reference, I think it is one definitely worth paying attention to. So I think behind it, there is essentially, it's a recognition of reality, right? Because, you know, worded, it's more global and interconnected, right?
The notion of geographical area of responsibility, which is how NATO works, remains important. But at the same time, I think there's been this understanding that what it takes to secure the core area of responsibility for NATO, which is the Euro-Atlantic area, requires a growing understanding of and engagement with the rest of the world.
And then once you recognize that reality, it's clear that there are parts of the world that are more strategically significant than others to Euro-Atlantic security. And in that sense, the Indo-Pacific really jumps out as particularly important. And I think this is true if you look at all indicators from the economic interconnectedness between allied countries in the Euro-Atlantic space and economies in the Indo-Pacific. So there's a very important trade and economic relations there.
Then, of course, if you look at dynamics of growing strategic competition, it is clear that the Indo-Pacific is a key theater for strategic competition to play out. If you look at future trends and look at the future, it seems to me that the Indo-Pacific will be increasingly the epicenter both of economic growth, of development, but also competition.
So the sheer, just because of its sheer importance in global affairs and to the global balance of power, I think the alliance recognizes that what happens in the Indo-Pacific matters, meaning instability, crisis and conflict.
over there, quote unquote, will have ripple effects that will be felt directly in the Euro-Atlantic. So I think that it's really a reflection of reality. It is also driven by, as you mentioned, the fact that NATO has developed partnership in the Indo-Pacific region, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and
New Zealand. And through that partnership, it really is evident that these countries may be geographically removed, but they are geopolitically very close in terms of interest, in terms of like-mindedness, in terms of understanding of global power dynamics and the shifts in the global balance of power. So I think there are a series of
practical reasons, and all those reasons are accelerated by growing strategic competition that make the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic closer strategically. And I think the concept, the strategic concept recognizes that reality.
And I think that reality is also recognized by our partners in the Indo-Pacific. I think that, for example, is one of the reasons why Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand have been very much key to our response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in terms of supporting sanctions, in terms of standing with Ukraine.
and its right to self-defense. So I think there is a recognition from both sides, from allies on both theaters, of that increasing interconnection between us.
Mike and I, when we invite guests on the podcast, have a bit of a selection bias problem where we invite people who basically agree with us. So I'd like to ask you to put maybe a skeptic's hat on for a minute. In either NATO member states or even within NATO, how much consensus is there behind that opening of the strategic aperture to the Indo-Pacific? I mean, are there legitimate and, you think, good cases to be made that
This is going to come at the cost of prioritization or focus on the very immediate threats. Just want to know how unified this view is. And if there is criticism or skepticism, what to you is the sort of best argument on behalf of that? I think it's always important to check our assumptions. So I welcome the opportunity to do that with your questions. I think the starting point is that there is consensus when it comes to recognizing that
the Indo-Pacific theater is strategically crucial.
And that any significant crisis, conflict, or destabilization in that region will have global ripple effects. And by default, if they're global, they also will have an impact on your Atlantic security. So I think that is not a controversial point. And in that sense, I don't think it's in any shape or form controversial to say that because of that sheer importance of that theater, NATO as an alliance needs to have
good intelligence about developments in the region, good situational awareness, the ability to consult among allies about how security developments in the Indo-Pacific region may affect your Atlantic security. I don't think that is controversial. I think the question would be,
how much, what would the role of the alliance be in the region? And I think that was a little bit the starting point for our reflection. And we always, and I think it's very important to say when NATO thinks about the impact of Indo-Pacific security on Euro-Atlantic, it does not mean that NATO is planning to revise its mandate, plan to have
military footprint in the Indo-Pacific. I'm mentioning some obvious facts, but I think it's worth stressing them. It means that we understand that we need to have good situational awareness, good intelligence. We need to cooperate closely with countries in the region that share our interest, that share some of our
security concerns and challenges, and that there's a number of issues that are really not, a number of security threats and challenges that are not so much bound by geography. Think of cyber threats, hybrid, foreign interference and manipulation. All of these threats are really not bound by geography in any significant way. And therefore, it makes complete sense for us to work with countries that may be geographically far, but geopolitically very much
see the world in a similar fashion and have similar concerns. So that is the entry point into why...
not just why we care, but also what is our approach to the Indo-Pacific. And then, of course, the question of prioritization remains incredibly important. And for NATO, it's very clear our core mandate is to ensure the security defense of allies. As a regional organization, the Euro-Atlantic is our area of responsibility. It would also be almost naive to
not to concede that developments outside of the area of responsibility can really have a deep effect on our defense and security. And of course, over the last two years, and I'll end here, but over the last two years, since the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, we are seeing this theater coming closer together every day. I mean, today in Ukraine, we know that the PRC's support for the Russian Federation through including through the provision of dual use goods is providing a
more and more essential lifeline that enables Russia's defense industrial base to reconstitute itself at a faster pace that enables Russia to continue its war of aggression. So the connection between the theaters are apparent. And the fact that they matter to our security, I think, is more and more apparent as well.
You very nicely anticipated my next and final question before I turn it over to Mike, which is about the China-Russia relationship. I mean, if ever we needed a connective tissue between the Indo-Pacific and Europe, it's happening in real time and it's
Strikes me, it's no accident that the strategic concept comes out in June 2022 after Russia's invasion and as China is already starting to diplomatically, narratively, financially support Russia. So with your strategist hat on, looking at this bilateral relationship between Russia and China, where do you and where does NATO see this relationship evolving? There's still a slightly frustrating debate here in the United States that is looking at divisions
fault lines between Russia and China, I think more than synergies. There's still a little bit of a too much of a backward look to the Sino-Soviet split, you know, the late 50s, early 60s, and somehow thinking that this is a strained marriage or, you know, there's an impending divorce. And I just am struck by year how close this relationship is becoming. More joint exercises, more sophistication of the, you know, economic technological energy relationship. But I
Where do you see the possible evolutions of this relationship? And are there things you think we might be underestimating or underappreciating about that bilateral relationship? So I think that's a really important question. And in the strategic concept,
I think puts forward a couple of notions that may be helpful, but I would argue that where we are today in 2024 exceeds, in a way, some of the predictions that we've made about the strength of the Russian-PRC relationship back then. But if I start with what allies had agreed in 2022, it already talked about
quite clearly about the fact that the defining feature of our current security environment is the rise of strategic competition.
And that as part of the rise of strategic competition, we see a deliberate authoritarian pushback against the rules-based international order. And that Russia and China are at the forefront of that deliberate and concerted pushback against the rules-based international order. So that's, I would argue, that remains very much the case today.
I think if we had to write the same strategy today, we would probably highlight how much of this trend
remains valid. And we probably would talk also about the growing strategic convergence and concerted action between both Russia and the PRC. But we also would add probably Iran and DPRK and really talk about how these four players in different ways, and we're not saying that they're all the same, but I think the evidence of today shows that there is growing concerted action and coordination. And again, Ukraine offers
a very dystopian example of how that can work out because you have the PRC, as I say, providing significant dual-use goods that essentially enable Russia to wage its war of aggression against Ukraine. You also see the DPRK providing ammunitions that are utilized on a daily basis by Russia to kill Ukrainians. And of course, Iran providing drone technology. And I'm just
choosing the most obvious examples, but it's clear that cooperation goes both ways. So it's not just Russia who's benefiting, it's also Iran and the DPRK, respectively. It's a sobering observation of where we are in the world. Now, I know there's a lot of discussions about what's the right way to
to talk about is increased adversary alignment. And I understand those who say, well, we need to be careful not to mirror image. Alliances are hard to combine. So there may be reasons why these countries are not always aligned or why there are strains. And I think that's all true. But at the same time, the reality as of spring 2024 is that we see increased cooperation
and increased concerted action. We see that with the mutually amplified each other's narratives, and we see also increased defense cooperation. And all of that essentially points out to a systemic challenge. And it very much, I think, reinforces this view of how it is important to build relationships
solidarity and more cooperation between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic theater. Because as I said before, we are seeing more of our potential adversaries and strategic competitors working together across theaters. So the response, I think, from our side has to be to do the same.
And of course, the PRC-Russia relationship is at the very heart of that adversary alignment. So I think that's something that we are observing. You can wonder how sustainable it is into the future. And I think that's what are the potential wedge points? What are the potential rifts? And I think that's a reasonable conversation to have.
But I think it needs to be grounded on the reality of today, which is one in which we see more cooperation and more convergence, not less. So that should lead us to think very carefully about cooperation.
how to, from our side, strengthen even more what is already there, and that is the cooperation and solidarity between allies and partners across the two theaters. At least that's the way I would personally interpret what I see today when it comes to Russian-China cooperation. Benedetta, it's great to have you on. My mother was a diplomat in Europe.
and served in Italy and I spent time there as a kid and my two brothers learned fluent Italian, but I took a wrong turn somewhere and ended up learning Korean and Japanese.
But thanks to Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, I get to work on NATO more and more. Exactly. Let's turn to the NATO summit, Washington, D.C., July 9 to 11. That, by the way, is the exact same timing as the Australia-America Leadership Dialogue, which is the signature U.S.-Australia alliance event for government, business, and academics. And I think NATO got all the good hotels.
Tell us a bit about the NATO summit in Washington. What, I mean, we're recording this and putting it out just as it's starting, but what can you say about it and in particular about the Indo-Pacific dimension of the strategic concept?
I'm going to be very brief because this is a summit where we have quite a bit of substance, but I'm going to try to very briefly give you some of the headlines and they will not surprise you in the slightest, I imagine. First of all, as you know, this is the 75th anniversary summit for NATO, which in itself is, I think, a very important achievement for the alliance being at this point, I think, the longest, the most durable and strongest alliance that
has emerged in the world. So of course, that's a good starting point. That said, it's not going to be a celebratory summit. It's going to be a very operational one because the security environment requires it. Needless to say, one of the really important action points for us is to continue to
move forward on the adaptation of our deterrence and defense posture. This is, I would say, a transformational effort for NATO that started in 2014 and really ramped up after 2022. It is essentially out to credibly
and sustainably resource ourselves for a deterrence and defense posture that is credible and effective and able to deal with the current security environment, which sees the rise of strategic competition and a long-term, potentially long-term, adversarial relation with Russia and really where the need to ensure the credible territorial defense of Europe is yet again at the center of our thinking. So practically speaking, that is
That means continuing to push on issues that range from increasing defense spending. Again, this is very important for us. It's one area we're getting to Washington in a much stronger place with projected 20 allies who are spending 2% of their GDP on defense and with the others with credible plans to get there as soon as possible. So, of course, defense spending is very important and will feature prominently in the summit.
Just as important is the re-energize of our defense industrial base. Of course, there's many lessons we are learning from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. One of them is how our defense industrial base needs to
to be boosted significantly, to have the capacity to produce the capabilities we need at scale, both for our own defense, but also to support Ukraine. Defense industrial cooperation and how to foster it, it's also going to play a very important role at the summit. There's a number of very important, but maybe more technical decisions about our deterrence and defense posture. So I will skip them, but say that we're, that there are
Quite essential, probably will not grab the headlines, but they are essentially how we are making sure that the plans that we have for the defense of Europe are fully executable in terms of forces, in terms of reinforcement, enablement, logistics, really key to the adaptation of our deterrence and defense posture. So that's going to be very important at the summit.
The second point that I will raise is, of course, support for Ukraine. I'm going to be very short and say that essentially what we're doing is putting support for Ukraine on a long-term, sustainable, multi-year footing, both financially, but also by looking at how NATO can take action.
a much more active role when it comes to the coordination of the training and the assistance to Ukraine. This is based on the assumption that this is based on the fact that 99% of the assistance to Ukraine comes from NATO allies. So there is a role for us to have a stronger coordinating function. And again, all of this, the political message, they're important both to Ukraine, but also to Russia is we are committed for the long haul.
to ensuring that Ukraine has what it needs in order to defend itself and to resist and counter aggression. That's going to be very important.
Last but not least, I'm just leaving the Indo-Pacific for last, not because it's the least important, but just to build a crescendo. Of course, we are also, for our summit, planning for the third year in a row to meet with our partners from the Indo-Pacific region. That is a signal in itself of how much more central that security cooperation and strategic dialogue has become over the years.
What we discuss here is, again, the interlinkages between our two different theaters. We talked last year at the Vilnius Summit about how to respond to a world of growing strategic competition and particularly zooming in on the China challenge and the systemic challenge it poses to your Atlantic security. So I expect more discussion on that front.
Part continuous conversation, including through the summit on how to continue to boost our practical cooperation on issues like cyber defense, countering hybrid threats, but also looking at issues connected to resilience, which again is really key to responding to a world of growing strategic competition. So these would be the three main, I would say, baskets. Support for Ukraine's deterrence and defense and partnership with a key focus on our Indo-Pacific cooperation.
partners and preparing for a world of growing strategic competition. That's the very summarized version of the summit main objectives. And can you tell us a bit about the role of the IP4, the leaders of Japan, Australia, Korea, New Zealand? Is their presence largely...
a demonstration of solidarity between the Euro-Atlantic and Pacific alliances? Do they actually get into the weeds discussing things like defense production or extended deterrence? Is it more of a political discussion? What can you tell us about the role of these leaders? It's a long way to go from New Zealand or Australia or Korea or Japan. What do they do? So it is long to go. And it is in itself the fact that this is the third year in a row in which you have those
political discussions at the summit. Again, I think it's important to note it because it really stresses the growing strategic importance of this partnership. It is partly about the sharing of the different strategic assessments and perspectives. So that's very crucial, again, to underline how security developments in both of these regions are interconnected. There is, of course, an element of solidarity that it's very important, I think, to underline. And as I said before,
The fact that our Indo-Pacific partners have been supporting Ukraine, supporting sanctions against Russia, is in itself something that reflects how we understand that what happens here matters to the Indo-Pacific and vice versa.
But it's not just about political dialogue. It's also about strengthening our practical cooperation. And that will happen at the summit, but it's also happening for a few years now. Each partner, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, separately have key priorities for practical cooperation with NATO.
There are also some issues where they all converge in wanting to work more with the alliance and vice versa, the alliance wants to work more with them. And I mentioned some of them already, but it's important to stress them again. Cybersecurity, countering hybrid threats, the impact of climate change on security, preparing for resilience, emerging and disruptive technologies, defense innovation. So these are very complex.
practical issues where we both have, I think, a lot to learn from each other, a lot to cooperate. And I can see in all of these areas, our cooperation has been growing in recent years, and I can see it continuing to grow quite robustly, driven again by the security environment and the shifts that we have been discussing.
over the last half hour or so. It is politically strategic. It's about recognition of the importance of these partners, but it's also about boosting the practical cooperation that happens at the summit, but most importantly, in our day-to-day work, right? And so that's in a nutshell what I would expect for the summit and beyond. What do you see happening in terms of areas like defense production? So
European companies like Thales or BAE in Britain have a pretty active presence in defense markets in Japan, Korea, Australia. But now Korean companies like Hanwha are looking to expand production in Poland and NATO and looking at that market. Japanese are keen to export.
Australia has got its guided weapons explosive ordnance initiative mainly to produce for the Indo-Pacific market, but potentially the US and NATO in future. Do you see discussions or the possibility of discussions about more of an integrated defense market and collaboration on munitions? That's part of the answer to the problem we found with Ukraine with our insufficient defense industrial bases. It is a very important issue. That's why I mentioned that
strengthening, energizing our defense industrial base is a key priority for NATO allies. It's a key priority for the summit. And it's, I believe, a key issue for the credibility of our deterrence and defense posture into the future. So the issue is absolutely vital. I share your assessment. And I think it's clear that, especially we see it with Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, there is a
a clear need on both sides of the Atlantic, maybe particularly in Europe, really, I would say a transatlantic need to invest in our defense industry, invest in spare capacity, and essentially move from what for decades was a just-in-time type of production model to one that enables us to produce a scale at speed.
and to meet the requirements, both for Ukraine, but also for deterrence and defense posture. That has been something that NATO has been looking at very attentively. For us, our role is, first of all, about a standard setting. That's something that NATO has been doing for the past 75 years, and it's an area where
I think it's very important for the Alliance to continue to lead in terms of setting the standards for allies. But again, partners can associate and do associate with themselves with those standards. And that's something that we do to increase our interoperability. So if you ask me areas of work for the future, I would say enhancing interoperability with key partners, including in the Indo-Pacific. It's certainly something that I would think is highly valuable and important.
Another area of work for NATO where I think partners can and are interested in learning more about is we work on
Setting a demand signal for industry to ramp up production, that's something incredibly important. If you want to have a long-term sustainable defense production line, you need to have multi-year contracts in place that allow to scale production. That's something NATO has been supporting, for example, by serving to aggregate demand so allies can do joint purchase and joint acquisition, joint development, which again is one
concrete ways to walk the walk when it comes to strengthening defense industrial base. In the future, is this an area where we can work more with partners, including from the Indo-Pacific? I think so. I think that there will be definitely value in doing so. So I'm more projecting into the future right now our
First step has been to send a credible demand signal to defense industry, use NATO to set standards, use NATO to aggregate demands between allies. But you can see how this opens up very interesting set of potential projects for future cooperation, including with Indo-Pacific partners, given that we have some shared interest in having a robust defense industrial base.
I think it's a growth area for the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific alliances. I mentioned some of the longstanding European defense contractors presence in US alliances in Asia, but the growing interest, but also for US firms, the F-16, F-35, mostly in Fort Worth, Texas, but in collaboration with them with huge input in constant real time from Italy and from Britain and from Japan and Korea. And what's lacking is what you call the demand signal.
And there would be huge strategic impacts in terms of the signal and send efficiencies. Defense industrial collaboration can be the lifeblood of alliances. NATO does a better job setting requirements.
than the U.S. alliance systems in Asia. But if we had a sort of Euro-Atlantic, Indo-Pacific set of requirements and interoperability standards and demand signals to industry, it could be powerful. There's a lot to be gained. Let me, before June solves the Russia-China problem or whatever at the end, let me ask a cheeky question. Some American political figures say
And analysts have made the argument that the U.S. has to focus, has to pivot to the Indo-Pacific and in particular focus on the huge China threat to Taiwan. And therefore, we shouldn't be supporting Ukraine. We should be pulling out of NATO. We should get NATO to pick up the burden for its own defense so we can do Asia. This is an old argument.
theme for the isolationist right in America, going back to the America First Movement, which also was at times an Asia First Movement and kind of anti-European. And the best antidote, frankly, is when Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan or Prime Minister Kishida in Japan gives a speech in Congress saying, no, no, we Asian allies need you to support Ukraine. It'd be disastrous. So in a way,
That's the answer. But let's just assume that Asian leaders themselves had not actually made the case. What, from a European perspective, is the argument about why support for Ukraine cannot be separated from security in the Indo-Pacific? It will not surprise you that I really strongly, it will not surprise you in the slightest that I really strongly believe that
The future outcome of the war in Ukraine will have an impact far beyond the Euro-Atlantic theater. So I think that is the starting point for my answer. It really depends how you judge the stakes in Ukraine.
And in my view, the stakes are incredibly high. It's not just about Ukraine's right to exist as a sovereign, independent country. It's not just about the future of the European security order. It's definitely about those things. But it's also about, at least in my view, what is the signal that we're sending with respect to the rules-based international order.
And even more importantly, the possibility of using force to achieve your strategic outcomes. And what I mean by that is very simply exactly what our Indo-Pacific partners are telling us. If Putin's war of aggression in Ukraine proves to be successful, what will other authoritarian assertive competitors beyond the Euro-Atlantic area learn about the
viability of the use of force. What will Xi Jinping learn about forcibly attempting to change the status quo with respect to Taiwan? So I think that linkage, as you rightly said, it's not even made by Europeans. It's made by our very own Indo-Pacific partners. And I think that's also why they are so committed to supporting Ukraine, because they understand that there is a strategic
interlink between aggression being rewarded in the Euro-Atlantic area and potentially that having a negative ripple effect in the Indo-Pacific. I think it is also about the credibility of our broader deterrence and defense posture globally. I don't think the theaters can be that clearly separated. So I think it's a catastrophic failure of deterrence and defense to
in the Euro-Atlantic area would have ripple effects in the Indo-Pacific in terms of the credibility of our alliance-based system, the credibility of assurance, of deterrence. And I think that could also be profoundly destabilizing. So if those are, I think, some practical reasons why what happens in Ukraine matters, then
And then I would also say, if you are dealing with the pacing challenge posed by the People's Republic of China, then you really need friends. It's a systemic challenge. It's an all-encompassing challenge. And it's one that requires, I think, to strengthen even more the allies and partnership that one has, especially when it comes to boosting resilience, ring-fencing our key industry technologies,
supply chain, and all of that I think requires more, I think, transatlantic cooperation and solidarity and not less. Of course, that also requires European allies to understand that we live in a world in which
Strategic competition and the interconnectedness of our theaters requires us to think very carefully about the resilience of our supply chains, of our industry, to take a real critical look at our vulnerabilities and strategic dependency and mitigate them. So it requires also Europeans, of course, to play their parts. But I would say if you look at it, if you look at the pacing challenge of the PRC through an integrated deterrence lens,
then you want more partners and allies working with you, not less, I would say. And that would be, at least that would be my entry point.
But then, and I will close with this, I would also recognize one important element of the argument you put forward in terms of rebalancing. And I think there is something important for European allies to do anyways, and that is to continue to spend more on defense, to continue to strengthen our forces and capabilities so that there is a more effective burden sharing and shifting, because if the Indo-Pacific theater is
is the primary theater of competition, that it does, that means that Europeans need to play a greater role when it comes to the deterrence and defense of the Euro-Atlantic area. But I would say this argument to me is not incompatible with having a very strong transatlantic alliance to the contrary.
To me, Europeans doing more is essential, is required, and is going to, if anything, reinforce the transatlantic alliance. So I don't see it. I think it's a false dichotomy that you need to decouple or weaken your bonds with Europe in order for Europe to do more. I think both things need to happen at the same time.
That's my best shot. And it was a great shot. I think you, as you say in American basketball, you think you sunk the basket. Bernadette, I just want to thank you so much. We're less than a month out from this Critical Natal Summit. I know you're busy. So I just want to thank you for your time today, for your just really fantastic insights. This is such a critical topic. And I think you ended on the right note, which is we're no longer in an environment of discreet
security challenges. We're now seeing an interconnectedness that we haven't seen in decades, at least since the Cold War. Your role in thinking about this, and obviously your fingerprints all over the strategic concept can already see that we're lucky to have individuals like you who are forward-looking and thinking about how we're going to create the architecture necessary for security in this incredibly challenging environment. So thank you for your time. It was a real pleasure. And thanks to everyone for listening.
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