Deciphering Seoul's Indo-Pacific Tilt
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Welcome to the Asia Chessboard, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia and takes an inside look at the making of grand strategy. I'm Andrew Schwartz at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This week, my host, Gina Kim, Dean of Language and Diplomacy Division at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, to discuss South Korea's foreign policy and strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

This episode was recorded in the week prior to South Korean President Yoon Suk-il's brief declaration of martial law on December 3rd, 2024. Welcome back to the Asia Chessboard. I'm Mike Green, and I'm joined today by Dr. Jina Kim of Hankuk University. We're going to talk about Korea, the role of South Korea in the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific, the domestic politics and arguments about Korea's role,

and especially the wild card of North Korea and what it means to the security of the Republic of Korea, the United States, but also this bizarre new world we're in where we have North Korean troops fighting in Ukraine, Ukrainian artillery firing South Korean rounds at them. What does this new, somewhat unprecedented chapter in the security of the Korean Peninsula entail?

as it's externalized to the whole world, what does it mean? So we could not have a better person to help us unpack that than Dr. Gina Kim. She's the Dean of Language and Diplomacy at Hanguk University in Seoul. Before that, she was the Chief of North Korea Military Analysis at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, KAIDA. She sought after for expertise, she served as an advisor

to the Ministry of Defense in Seoul, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other security organizations and NGOs, PhD from Fletcher. But let's start as we always do, Dr. Kim, with how did you get here? When you were a young girl growing up, did you think someday I want to be the top North Korean military analyst or a dean at a university? Probably both those careers never occurred to you when you were in school, but how did you get on the path that led you here? Dr. Kim

When I was a graduate school student, I studied North Korea, especially North Korean human rights issues and refugee issues. Then I moved to Kaida as a researcher. I conducted research on North Korean military studies. So then I did my PhD in the U.S., studying furthermore, especially about North Korea's nuclear program and related talks between the U.S. and the DPRK. Then

I became very deeply involved in all the policy-related issues regarding the Korean Peninsula. And I'm now expanding the scope of my research toward Indo-Pacific strategy and alliance network and partnerships, etc.

When you were at Fletcher, you did your PhD with Bob Foltzcraf? Yes. And what was the topic? He actually taught nonproliferation and disarmament issues, as well as IR theory. So it was a very tough course for me, actually. Yeah. And your dissertation topic?

It was on a U.S.-DPRK negotiation on nuclear program. So I used a constructive approach to analyze the whole process to deeply understand what was the problem and what was the missed opportunities.

So constructivism, so looking at how security frameworks were constructed based on identity, historical experience, culture. So not necessarily an objective reality, but really how each side came to the table. And what period did you write on? What period of U.S.-DPRK negotiations? About the first nuclear crisis and the second nuclear crisis. So the second one was the one I was in, the Bush administration, right? Yes.

Yeah. So you were taking a constructivist approach where you were, I assume, looking at how culture, identity, historical experience shaped the reality and the objectives of the different players in the negotiations. And I was in those negotiations with the North Koreans. And there was definitely something of an alternate reality. I remember in Pyongyang being asked to talk with Kim Gaegwan, the top North Korean negotiator over dinner, about geopolitics worldwide.

mainly because we were trying to fill time because we were going to confront them with our information about their hidden nuclear weapons program. So it was just a way to fill time in the dinner. And it was really quite remarkable because Kim Ki-Gwon quite enthusiastically described world dynamics and geopolitics from a complete Kim Il-sung-ism frame. And so there is definitely something to be said about how adversaries come into these negotiations with a very different context.

Yeah, maybe we should have had you come and brief us when we were doing the negotiations, but I'm sure a lot of people now are turning to you for briefings. So one of the things you've really focused on recently is South Korea's role in the broader geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. What's your take on President Yun's Indo-Pacific strategy, relations with Japan, Australia, Indonesia? Do you give him a positive grade or how do you assess the strategy so far?

Well, the Yoon Sung-yeol administration unveiled South Korea's first comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy. And this strategy includes initiatives such as rule-based order, cooperation for human rights promotion, and collaboration on advanced science and technology, etc. This strategy aligns with the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, obviously, providing a framework to deepen and broaden bilateral cooperation between the two sides.

Well, there's a difference between Yun administration and Moon administration. The Moon Jae-in administration's policy, the new Southern and new Northern policies, and the Yoon Sung-yeol administration's Indo-Pacific strategy are different. The later one emphasizes more on the Indo-Pacific related issues.

There are differences in focus and scope as well. The new southern policy under Moon Jae-in centered on strengthening economic cooperation and cultural exchanges with ASEAN. But the Indo-Pacific strategy seeks somewhat broader perspective and partnership.

Second, the approaches to China also is different. The Moon administration did not aim to counter China explicitly, whereas the Yun administration Indo-Pacific strategy expands partnerships to the Pacific region, aligning closely with the U.S. strategy to counterbalance China.

And the methods of policy implementation also vary. The Moon administration centers on establishing free trade agreement and economic exchanges with regional countries. In contrast, the Yunho administration emphasizes more comprehensive security cooperation under its new strategy and strengthening ties with Japan as well.

While the Moon administration's new southern and northern policy aim to foster cooperative relationships connecting North Korea, Russia, and Central Asia, the Yoon administration's Indo-Pacific strategy prioritizes multilateral cooperation primarily centered around the U.S. alliance. But I must tell you, this contrast actually reflects how South Korea's foreign policy has adapted

to shifting international dynamics. So the overall context is quite important to shape the overall framework of South Korea's foreign policy. Thank you for that. And the contrasts are interesting. And as you point out, part of the contrasts

reflect the changing geopolitical environment within which President Moon and then President Yoon were writing their strategies. I thought that the new Southern policy of the Moon administration was designed to avoid cooperating with Japan, basically. I mean, it was a unilateral Korean strategy

following Samsung and others expansion of supply chains and production into Southeast Asia, but studiously avoiding working with Japan, which was tough for the US because the Trump and Biden Indo-Pacific strategy was aligned and in very much shaped by

Abe Shinzo's Indo-Pacific, free and open Indo-Pacific strategy. So to me, the biggest, maybe most important difference is the Japan piece. Would you agree with that? I think the Yun approach to the region required a Japan component to Korea's regional strategy, which Moon didn't want to do, and neither did Park Geun-hye, really. But Yun now has made that central. That's my take on it. Do you think that's fair? Yeah.

Well, on surface, yes, certainly things are going on very fast. We had Camp David summit and we have frequent meetings between the two leaders in South Korea and Japan. But while trilateral activities such as South Korea, U.S.-Japan submarine and missile defense exercises are ongoing,

Actually, bilateral engagements like high-level visits or people-to-people exchanges and South Korea-Japan search and rescue drills have been suspended for some time. Despite appearance, institutionalization of military cooperation between South Korea and Japan has progressed much more slowly.

compared to other nations. For example, in July, South Korea's Minister of Defense visited Japan for the first time in 15 years. And around the same time, a trilateral defense minister's meeting between Korea, U.S., and Japan was held in Tokyo, resulting in the signing of Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework Memorandum. It was a very significant moment.

While not legally binding, the document is significant because it is the first time that outlined basic directions and policy guidelines for enhancing practical security cooperation among the three countries. So the three nations have agreed now to do activities like rotating regular high-level policy consultations and trial of defense ministers' meetings and joint chiefs of staff's meetings, etc.,

Well, there are several complex factors contributing to this kind of slow pace of South Korea-European military cooperation. Well, as historical disputes have not been resolved yet, historical grievances stemming from the old history, such as forced labor and comfort women issues, remain very deeply sensitive in South Korean society. And recently, diplomatic tensions reignited.

over the first memorial service for Korean forced labor victims at the Hadoh Mine during the Japanese occupation. Although South Korea agreed to support Japan's bid to lease the Hadoh Mines as a UNESCO World Heritage Site on the condition that Japan commemorates the victims' suffering,

However, one of the Japanese representatives visited to the Yakushin shrine and there was no official mentioning about the forced labor sufferings in the memorial speech, which led to South Korea to officially boycott and hold its own separate ceremony. So it's just a snapshot of diplomatic tension lingering between the two sides.

And also there are divergent security priorities between the two sides as well. South Korea primarily focuses on military threats from North Korea, while Japan is more concerned with the rise of Chinese military power. And we don't certainly share the same threat perception. And these different priorities actually result in divergent approaches to coordinated response to China.

And there's also operational issue. The South Korea and Japan operate distinct military systems, which creates very significant obstacles to interoperability during joint operations. This limits the effectiveness of collaboration and training and the development of joint operational plans.

So I also must point out that the U.S. influence is another variable here. The U.S. plays a very critical role as a mediator and catalyst in South Korea-Japan military cooperation. So changes in U.S. foreign policy can either accelerate or delay progress in bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan.

depending on the extent of U.S. involvement in fostering cooperation between the two sides. So all these factors collectively underscore the challenges in advancing military cooperation between South Korea and Japan. You're giving me PTSD. I spent 25 years in and out of the U.S. government trying to help build this trilateral relationship, and it really is two steps forward and then one step back and then sometimes three steps back.

And it's interesting how you describe Korea's Indo-Pacific debut, really. It's almost a donut, isn't it? You've got pretty active diplomacy now, or at least a vision for diplomacy on the outer ring across the Pacific islands now and much broader than the Moon administration. You have a

Pretty good, certainly the best in some time. Next in a ring, which is US, Japan, Korea, but it's mostly being pushed by the US, but it's a donut because at the center of the Japan, Korea piece you're describing is almost as difficult as it's always been. I take some comfort from the fact that both Japan and Korea in polls by Jungang Ilbo or Yomiuri or others have about a 90% positive view of the US alliance.

So, both Japan and Korea are very committed to the alliance with the US. And although the threat perception is different militarily, I've seen polls that show Koreans distrust China just as much as Japanese do. And then the trading patterns are changing. Korea's trade with the US is now rising above its trade dependence on China. So, we'll see where it goes. But as the French saying goes, plus que chance, plus que la même chose, the more it changes, the more it's the same problem.

I want to talk about the other parts of the Indo-Pacific. One of the things I've thought for some time is that these strategic policies change depending on the assessment that a government has about the distribution of power. Even if they never state it, you can see it. So for example, Japan very early on, but especially under Abe, viewed or Japanese government officials viewed a multipolar Asia.

where US power in relative terms may be waning, but the rising power of India and the importance of Australia compensate for that. The US came a bit later to that. Really, I think the consensus around multi-polarity emerged in the late Obama administration. Korea and Australia were two countries that were a bit late strategically to come to this. And Korea is the latest, to be honest. The Pak-Kun-Hye administration, the Moon Jae-in administration, they viewed US-China as the most important powerhouse

power dynamic in the region, and then figured out how Korea fit. It strikes me that the UN policy is based on more of a recognition that multipolarity helps Korea, that relations with Australia, relations with India, as difficult as they are, maybe even Japan, give Korea more agency, more purchase.

So in that context, how does the UN government think about these other important players in Asia, Indonesia, India, Australia? Is it a more ambitious view than you had under Moon? Or is it still just a kind of superficial Indo-Pacific strategy? Well, actually, South Korea has been closely working with Indonesia's

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Australia. South Korea and Australia are deepening their strategic partnership in defense and arms cooperation through discussions in many channels. In recent years, several significant milestones have been achieved to strengthen this kind of cooperation. In November last year, a memorandum of understanding on revitalizing joint military exercise was signed.

and it aimed to enhance interoperability between the two nations.

And also, we have joined maritime exercises, which have been intensified recently, focusing on anti-submarine warfare, air defense, maritime interdiction operations, and live fire drills. These activities certainly aim to improve combined operational capabilities between the two sides. And also, very notable progress has been made in defense industry cooperation. In July this year, a conference in California

Canberra brought together over 100 participants from the two sides, including government officials and defense industry leaders. And they actually explored avenues for bilateral defense and arms collaboration. So a landmark development was the establishment of Hanwha Aerospace's production facility in Australia. It was the first overseas production base for a South Korean defense company.

So this facility is set to manufacture many weaponry and ammunition, and it can probably provide some platform to deepen our security cooperation.

And with Indonesia, South Korea also is working closely with Indonesia. Defense and arms cooperation between the two sides has been strengthened through various initiatives. And this partnership is grounded in two nations' strategic relationship, and it encompasses joint development of military equipment, technology transfer, and military training. And there are also high-level military exercises

exchanges and mutual training programs that have further bolstered our cooperation. And we have also a memorandum of understanding with Indonesia, especially on peacekeeping activities. It actually reflects a shared commitment to global security efforts. And we also have comprehensive economic partnership agreement. It has provided a framework to enhance not only economic cooperation, but also defense industry cooperation.

And we are working on joint development of fighter jet programs, which aims to advance our defense industry technology sharings. And these initiatives certainly represent a very significant milestone in our defense cooperation. And with the Philippines, well, we have a history of cooperation as well. The defense cooperation agreement between South Korea and the Philippines was formalized this year.

During President Yoon's visit to the Philippines, we established a strategic partnership together

And South Korea will provide defense equipment and technological support throughout this process. And South Korea's defense companies will supply necessary equipment to the Philippines' armed forces, enhancing their operational capabilities. And we also have MOU with the Philippines, especially on maritime cooperation.

to strengthen maritime security through joint efforts to combat transnational maritime crimes. And we are working on information sharing and search and rescue operations. So we have lots of activities going on. And we are certainly, I think, South Koreans are certainly speeding up the speed of combining all the network of cooperation in the security area, I believe.

It's an excellent list and it's impressive. And it demonstrates the agency that Seoul has reinforcing the resilience and growth economically of key states like Indonesia, the Philippines and others besides Vietnam, for example, which we didn't discuss. I know Korea has a very deep economic relationship, but also active policy to support Vietnam with patrol craft and other capabilities.

And Australia, I think, is a particularly important hub for Korea because in addition to Hanwha, which really is looking at Australia as a production base, you now have regular participation by Korean forces in training exercises in the Northern Territories. And Australia is, I think, probably a lot easier to work with than Japan for a whole host of historical and policy reasons.

And that one is going to get more and more important. I think one of the differences, though, between Moon and then now the Yoon administration is the Korean companies, the Korean Weigyeobu Farm Industry was doing a lot of this in the Moon administration. And so I recall President Moon's last big trip within Asia was to Australia.

But the difference was that it wasn't coordinated with the US and it wasn't coordinated with Japan or Australia. So when Korea provided patrol boats to Vietnam, it came as a surprise to the US and Japan and Australia, which were already providing patrol boats and coordinating with each other. So one of the big things I'm interested in is does the UN government view this Indo-Pacific strategy not only as Korean agency, but as a way to build up coordination

with the US, with Australia, even Japan. Do you think there's a change in tone there? Because it was very much bilateral and very much what you might call parallel play, not really coordinated or part of the US-Japan-Australia strategy, but very much a Korean direct approach. But that seems to be changing a bit. What's your take?

Certainly, what we are seeing is company-to-company cooperation. For example, in November, Hana Ocean signed an MOU with the Australian Industry and Defence Network to collaborate on the Freegate project.

So this is a direct bilateral cooperation project. But gradually, South Korea is thinking about a latest-like network being part of this whole alliance system. But the thing is, we have U.S. election and the leadership change in Washington can change the whole dynamics. So we are just watching closely what can happen next year. So that will certainly change South Korea's policy as well.

Yeah, I mean, everyone's guessing what the Trump administration will do. I think it is worth remembering a couple things. Donald Trump said he wasn't interested in solving Japan career problems, so maybe he isn't. But the Trump administration adopted free and open Indo-Pacific strategy framework from Japan, and then the Biden administration kept it. And Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, the presumed Secretary of State and National Security Advisor,

From what I know about them, and I know Rubio a bit personally, we'll be very focused on collective security effort. And even the wild card of a Trump-Kim Jong-un summit seems unlikely. I want to ask you about that in a minute. But you're right. Countries are going to wait and see. My sense is in Australia and Japan, there's less...

waiting. They assume there's a lot more congressional and Pentagon and broad support for the strategy and it won't change much. But I can understand why Korea would be more hesitant because what President Trump did on the Korean Peninsula is a lot more dramatic than what happened with Japan or Australia. So I can understand that. I hope people are looking for upside opportunities, but I understand the hesitancy right now. Well, actually, while...

With low potential for conflict between the executive and legislative branches in the U.S. may proceed with legislative support and procedural streamlining and then consistency of bipartisan act, foreign policy framework is likely to remain unchanged.

But if the U.S. continues to reduce overseas involvement and adopt a selective and limited approach to international conflict, then it will create more room to focus on key issues such as countering China,

Consequently, the second Trump administration's strategic options are likely include selective engagement with capable allies in resolving international and regional issues. And South Korea will need to carefully consider how to accommodate U.S. requests for cooperation that align with U.S. interests while managing its relations with China, for example. So, well, certainly there are some areas of

of potential contention between the U.S. and South Korea. Yeah, I think you're right. There will be more asks of South Korea in the context of strategic competition with China. You know who's your friend in that? Australia and Japan. So I think there could be a new flourishing of mini-lateral cooperation among U.S. allies as everyone who wants to keep the alliance strong figures out how to navigate this.

Let me ask you, this strategy in Seoul could all just suddenly change in the next election. My sense of the opposition party, the Minjidang, is that while some of these elements you've described started when they were in charge, they have a kind of anything Yoon does is bad philosophy. And I wonder whether...

In the next presidential election, if it swings to the other side of politics, which happens so often in Korea, if this whole Indo-Pacific strategy is over, or if there's much more continuity in Korea as well around some of the things you described, what are the domestic politics like around the strategy you've described to us? Do you think most of it continues regardless of election outcomes, or could there be quite a bit of variation? Well...

When it comes to alliance issues, well, we have the same voice. Both the Democratic Party and the Conservative Party support strengthening alliance with the U.S. The difference comes when it comes to discussing our approach to China, actually.

Well, President Yoon pledged during his campaign to establish a very cooperative mechanism to manage bilateral issues and potential conflicts between Korea and China. He actually said that during the election period. He mentioned institutionalization and regularization of high-level strategic dialogue between the two countries and specifically proposed holding high-level strategic dialogue

And he actually promised to improve relations between China and South Korea. But what happened afterwards was, well, certainly South Korea had very intense relations with China.

China, diplomatic tensions between South Korea and China have persisted for an extended period after the election. And China's Chinese ambassador to South Korea, Xin Haiming, was summoned by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs due to his remarks criticizing the South Korean government. And the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that his comments is such an interference in domestic affairs.

So it was only recent months that high-level dialogues between the two countries have become more frequent and in-depth. And this year, in June, South Korea-China Foreign and Security Dialogue was held in Seoul, and we are working on improving relations right now.

Well, what I'm telling you is the interactions between South Korea and China matters in the coming months or coming years. And when I compare approaches between the two different parties, I must say, well, the Democratic Party recognizes that relations with China remain crucial due to economic and geopolitical reasons. And this party believes that we should improve our relations with China.

This perspective is based on the view that for South Korea's national interest, relations with China need to be managed in a more stable and cooperative manner.

Considering the inevitable specificity of the two countries as neighboring nations engaged in active exchanges of people and goods, the Democratic Party emphasizes the need to manage a relationship proactively to avoid vicious cycle of conflict that we had experienced before.

So, in particular, it views China's role in contributing to stability on the Korean Peninsula very positively. The Democratic Party sees considerable alignment between South Korea and China on goals such as resolving the North Korean nuclear issues and maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. So, based on this,

The Democratic Party argues that if China has that kind of potential, it should be encouraged to use that leverage effectively in dealing with North Korean issues.

By the way, the conservative parties highlight that China has traditionally favored maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and rejects and over-emphasizes on China's role in resolving North Korea's nuclear issue. They argue that over-reliance on China could lead to policy failures and advocate for enhancing South Korea's bargaining power and asserting an independent voice to strengthening

our position. So this perspective often leads to very strong anti-China sentiments when we have a diplomatic tension. So under the Biden administration, South Korea pursued diplomacy based on values and emphasis on alliance. That also affected South Korea and conservative communities' view on China as well.

This identity-driven diplomacy has pushed South Korea to view China as a very distinct country and to maintain a certain level of separation. But like I told you, all the external factors have influenced on South Korea's policy, foreign policy, including our policy towards China. So things may change. I think that's a similar debate in some ways to what you see in Australia, where

in Europe, but with the important difference that geographically, the Republic of Korea really is so close that the consequences of getting it wrong are enormous. And the fact that Korean politics was pretty polarized. I mean, it makes American politics look unpolarized sometimes. So it's going to be complicated. I think the common denominator is that Japan, Korea, Australia, others are not going to sign on for containment or complete decoupling. So the Trump administration is going to find

it has to navigate that because even Japan, which is the toughest, is not signing on for decoupling and how you de-risk or disentangle economic dependence, how you manage deterrence and countering Chinese boycotts. It's all going to be much more complicated in reality than the debate in the U.S. election suggests. Let's turn to North Korea. I think

the Democratic Party, the Minjidong, would have a very hard time convincing Washington, Republicans or Democrats, that China can play a positive role on the Korean Peninsula. The geopolitics have shifted. North Korea is engaging in repeated violations of Security Council resolutions. It hasn't done a nuclear test in some time, but it continues to build up its submarine-launched ballistic missiles and other inventories, obviously sending ammunition

and troops to Ukraine. And in the Security Council, the Chinese and Russians have given them complete protection. So I think it's going to be a hard argument to make that China's helpful. It doesn't mean they wouldn't be. It doesn't mean they don't have a big role in any crisis on the peninsula, but it will be a harder case. Do you think Kim Jong-un's recent statements, he's no longer interested in peaceful unification, he's not interested in negotiating with Trump, how do you read those? Do you think this reflects the geopolitics

that basically China and Russia are giving him kind of a free hand? Or do you think it's a negotiating ploy because he thinks he really will get into negotiations at some point with Trump or with the new South Korean government? How do you read North Korea's stubborn isolationism with respect to the South, the U.S., anyone other than Russia and China? What's happening in Pyongyang?

Well, Dirt Korea's recent statement about a two-query formula, well, that actually, for me, was predictable.

But to a certain degree, in 2020, North Korea escalated tension by blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office. The liaison office was designed for inter-Korean dialogue, right? And North Korea declared a new phase of treating South Korea as an adversary. This move reflects its demand to recognize North Korea and South Korea as separate nations, a position that North Korea itself historically opposed.

By the way, when South Korean President Park Chung-hee expressed support in 1973 for simultaneous UN membership for both Koreas, North Korea denounced the idea as a scam of separating Koreans. Pyongyang actually rejected the idea of two-state system. However, now North Korea is supporting this idea.

So the question is, can North Korea's assertion of the Korea formula truly be seen as a change to the status quo? Well, it depends, because when we look at the unification framework agreed upon by the two Koreas, these consist of three stages. First stage is reconciliation and cooperation. Second stage is confederation state. And the third stage is the completion of a unified state.

This was Kim Dae-jung's formula originally, right? Yeah, for a long time. And we have established this new way to unite after the Cold War. So the second stage, by the way, involves the two separate systems.

and governments and two different governments while fostering cooperation and exchanges. The final stage is the establishment of a unified state. So until the second stage, South Korea and North Korea would retain their distinct political systems

while cooperating. However, in the third stage, the value of democracy becomes crucial. So without North Korea's embracing democratic values and principles, the coexistence of two distinct political systems seems inevitable. So why North Korea is arguing about this? Well, North Korea is grappling with economic sanctions and internal economic challenges.

So the context is very important to understand. It appears to be employing a strategy of emphasizing external enemies to strengthen internal cohesion.

And the declaration of a two-Korea system can be seen as a result of several factors, such as dissatisfaction with South Korea's policies. North Korea has expressed a strong discontent with the South Korean government's policies toward the North, blaming South Korea for the deterioration of inter-Korean relations.

Also, internal regime stabilization can be one of the factors. This move can also be interpreted as a strategy to ensure regime stability.

By ordering a complete severance of inter-Korean ties and dismantling organizations related to unification policies, then North Korea might be aiming to highlight a distinction from the areas of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il era, emphasizing the identity and unique leadership of Kim Jong-un's regime.

And also, it has something to do with the rise of younger generation. This could be an effort to prevent cultural shifts among North Korea's younger generation. The rising admiration for South Korean pop culture, for example, including K-pop dramas and films, certainly have fostered a positive view of South Korea among these young generations.

while North Korean leadership may perceive this change as a threat to the regime. So by emphasizing the North Korea's narrative and clearly separating itself from South Korea, North Korea may be attempting to counteract any weakening of social cohesion.

So it's a defensive move, really. It's a recognition of the reality that most of us have known for some time, that the only scenario for unification is one where the DPRK regime collapses and a much weaker North Korea is absorbed by the South. And that, of course, has been true since the 90s at least, but Kim Jong-un is now making that reality doctrine. What then does a progressive government as a whole do?

The North has renounced denuclearization. They've renounced unification. They have complete, not complete, but they have backing from China and Russia they haven't had since the Cold War. What does a progressive government in future do from Seoul that's credible? Confidence building measures? I mean, what does that look like?

Well, actually, the South Korean government responded to North Korea's declaration of two-Korea formula by emphasizing the need to resolve issues through dialogue. However, North Korea's argument has become a contentious issue within South Korea. So the South Korean society seems to be slightly divided on this issue.

Because of such a concern that there can be some military escalation on the Korean Peninsula, because the Red Cross to Korea claim undermines South Korea's sovereignty and reduces the possibility of dialogue and cooperation for unification. And this has heightened polls within South Korea to focus on easing military tensions, mostly coming from the liberal side.

And deepening domestic division is what we are seeing right now. North Korea's assertion exacerbates ideological division between conservatives and progressives in South Korea. While conservatives strongly oppose the claim, viewing it as a direct threat, while progressives tend to emphasize dialogue and cooperation. And these

Diversion makes it challenging to form a united domestic stance on how to respond to North Korea. And reconsideration of unification is something that we are discussing on a daily basis.

While many South Koreans still desire unification, North Korea's stance may fuel growing skepticism about the feasibility of achieving it. So over time, these could have significant implications for public opinion in South Korea, necessitating very careful observation of its long-term effect on the South Korean society. Those divisions within the Republic of Korea...

are one of, if not the most important, you're not supposed to have more than one center of gravity in strategy, but it is definitely a center of gravity that the North must be thinking about. And I hope it's one the incoming Trump administration thinks about because the Korean Peninsula forever has been critical to peace and stability in the world, and of course, particularly in Asia. And locking in with the Republic of Korea

by the US is absolutely essential, but there's a big role here I think for Australia. Could be for Japan, although it's complicated.

for European allies. The world should be paying a lot more attention to the Korean Peninsula, not just because of the North Korean nuclear threat, not just because North Korean troops are in Ukraine, because it is, as they used to say in the 19th century, the cockpit of Asia. It's not where they fly Asia, it's where the roosters fight. It's where all the major conflicts have had their roots in that part of the world. So your writing and your thoughts today are really helpful for that. I think it gets people the larger geopolitical context. Really glad you could do it.

I know being a dean is a super busy job and everybody wants something from you. So I really appreciate it, Dr. Kim. You took some time with us today. Thank you. Thank you. For more on strategy and the Asia program's work, visit the CSIS website at csis.org and click on the Asia program page. And for more on the U.S. Studies Center in Sydney, please visit ussc.edu.au.