China’s Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations
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China has emerged as one of the 21st century's most consequential nations, making it more important than ever to understand how the country is governed. Welcome to Pekingology, the podcast that unpacks China's evolving political system. I'm Jude Blanchett, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and this week I'm joined by Courtney Fung, Associate Professor with the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University. She is also a non-resident fellow at Asia Society Australia and at the Lowy Institute.

Courtney, thanks for joining us. Thank you so much for the invitation, Jude. First question is just about your own intellectual biography. I just learned just before we recorded that you did your PhD under the great Alan Walkman. How did you get interested in China and Asia? And as you answer that, I'd love to hear how you got interested in this very important but narrow question of China and the United Nations. Thanks.

Thanks. So I grew up in Hong Kong, so conversations about sovereignty have never been far from the news and never far from the dining room table. And so I think after...

That really, in many ways, foundational experience because you don't quite really know what the word sovereignty means. After all of these years of study, I'm not quite sure I still know. But I think that really set me up to go study international politics basically all the way through all my degrees. And obviously, if you're living in Hong Kong, questions of understanding China and transnationalism

China's relationship with the world are not far away from your mind either. So by the time I returned for my PhD studies, I was very interested in the news reporting at the time. If we remember where we were in sort of 2006, 2007, the international community

The international press was gearing up to really try and explain what was going to be the response for what was then termed to be genocidal acts, genocide, mass killing, crimes against humanity in the Darfur, Sudan region. And I was very interested by the initial responses by Chinese officials at the time, where they kept pointing out that Sudan is its own sovereign state. So why are people asking Beijing for what it can do in this particular set of circumstances?

And I was very interested to track over the course of about a year or two how the Chinese language shifted very quickly and moved to now really talk about the fact that there needed to be some type of international response. And China was very proud to have been recognized to have led that.

The UN response eventually, with a type of peacekeeping mission, the UNAMID mission into Darfur. So really tracking the way that Chinese officials engaged with thinking about a sovereignty problem as they kept pointing out Sudan is a sovereign state. Why is everyone blaming China for what is going on in Darfur? And I think that really crystallized my study to try and focus on China's foreign policy in the United Nations space.

We're going to talk today about an article you wrote about Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping. But I wonder if I could just zoom out for a bit and ask you how you think about or how you would explain to a layperson such as myself China's role in the United Nations more broadly. This is one where occasionally news articles, Wall Street Journal, FT about China.

Or I should say, U.S. concerns about China playing a larger role in the United Nations in ways that are concerning, whether that's on human rights or international standards. What is your general description of where and how China plays in the United Nations? And I think more importantly, what's really driving China?

China's concerted effort to take leadership positions and really drive the agenda at the UN? So I think it's important to note that over the last couple of decades, Chinese officials have become clearer, and they are actually quite consistent now rhetorically about the importance of the United Nations as a fundamental institution for understanding international order. There are lots of problems with world order. Those are US-produced problems.

But international order must have a role for the United Nations, its institutions and the principles of international law. And again, Chinese elites are becoming clearer over the last couple of years that not only are they looking to reform the United Nations from within, so they are very engaged on making sure that they have an institution that matches today's

global governance conditions, what they see as a multipolar world, what they see should reflect greater save for China within that system. But they're also very clear now that China is looking to produce and export these global public goods. So China actually is the second largest budget contributor to the regular budget. They're very consistent as they criticize the Americans as the world's largest debtor on the regular budget, right? The U.S.,

has carried a large burden, right, in terms of leading the budget payments. And the Chinese are very keen to point out whenever U.S. payments are late, again, to sort of frame China as being the leading state that is upholding global governance and helping the U.N. run.

We have to also remember, too, that I think unlike other states that can find partners elsewhere, they have alternate platforms. So, for example, the U.S. can turn to NATO. We've also seen the U.S. willing to go it alone. China doesn't have that alternate type of space with the same type of prestige or legitimacy offered to it by its permanent seat at the U.N. Security Council and therefore its veto.

So when you think about things that Chinese officials are working on and why they're engaged in this UN system, it is in part, as you say, very practical. This is a network of agencies that help design and implement global governance. If you can help inject what they call Chinese wisdom into the system, you can help manage and project these solutions now as having legitimacy and prestige, the authority of the UN.

At the same time, there is also some very hard-knuckle parochial interests that China's looking to pursue, as we've seen the recent lineup at the Universal Periodic Review for questions of China and Hong Kong. We can also see the pursuit and their revisionism of Resolution 2758 that they say has determined Taiwan's international status.

But the resolution only assigns the China seat from the ROC to the PRC. So again, very particular parochial interests, but also a much larger sense of sort of helping to manage U.S.-China relations. This is a space where they can go toe-to-toe with the Americans. They can also help manage their global relations elsewhere. So different pockets of states that make up the G77 plus China, the global south, and

and also a space in which they can help project influence and interest into the system. Now, again, bottom line up front, I don't want to make the claim that the Chinese are 10 foot tall in all environments. But I think as a student of Chinese foreign policy, it's a very interesting space to see the interaction of Chinese principles and Chinese pragmatism.

This is actually a comment disguised as a question, but I'll be transparent about that. What do you think of the following argument? Now it's a question. When I hear about the Chinese at a conceptual level talking about this new multipolar order and the United Nations is at the center of this, adding to that new initiatives that I'm going to ask you about in a minute that China is unveiling, like the Global Security Initiative,

that don't have the GSI, Global Civilization Initiative, as of yet, don't have a lot of substance to them. But that strikes me as of secondary importance because part of this seems to be about writing a new metanarrative story that 1945, that post-World War II economic security architecture that the United States built and led is crumbling and a new order is emerging.

and that we, China, are going to play a central role in shaping what this new order looks like. So that's where things like the GSI, whatever comes out of it in concrete terms is not necessarily the point at this phase. It's just to show one order is collapsing, and you can see its last gasps in its inability to manage crisis in Europe, for example, and a new one is taking form. Does that resonate? Is that giving the Chinese too much credit, or do you think that sort of narrative...

storytelling part of this is important as well. I think the narrative part is very, very important. I mean, this real fascination in trying to understand, as they keep talking about it, their lack of discourse power, the way that we just assume that Western ideas are the central way that we should organize and understand the world around us. And I cite this example repeatedly. I think it's a fascinating case. For example, to talk about this, Chinese perspectives on the Ukraine war, I think,

are well understood at this point. Many abstention votes in the UN system, a lot of caution in terms of supporting any type of discussion that expands Russian responsibility. So war registers at the UN General Assembly, for example, questions of accountability. The Chinese are incredibly cautious.

But I think it's very telling that a senior Chinese official is now heading the Food and Agricultural Organization. And you can read the public reporting on this. There's been a push at his agency to try and get him as the head of the Food and Agricultural Organization to talk about the Ukraine war. He is very much focused on talking about the effects of sanctions.

and how sanctions are manipulating and slowing the ability to send out global food aid. Now, this is a second-order problem that he is very keen to talk about and not talk about the first-order problem of the actual invasion. And I think in many ways, this sort of encapsulates what you're talking about, this sort of

early days rhetorical framing, but I think it's very important because in the way that that agency engages and explains itself and tries to frame its actions, it is also helping us re-understand what it believes the problem to be about global food aid, right?

And there is a lot of appeal for states that I think are also fed up with the version of the 1945, post-1945 order that they think no longer reflects the problems, the iniquities within the international system, within the UN itself specifically.

I think the only rejoinder I would say to that is that this is very much early days and we are looking at the opening plays now of the way in which Chinese officials are trying to make, for example, the Global Civilization Initiative look more real. These initiatives, for example, aren't coming out of nowhere. There's a long tail of the way that Chinese elites have discussed relativism, the uniqueness of social, historical, cultural, economic conditions,

the movement away from there being a universal standard of universal human rights that you can be held legally accountable.

There's a movement away from that type of language, and this is where this GCI comes from. But I would just like to remind listeners, though, that we can follow the reporting again and the real cut and thrust of these efforts to sort of revive this global civilizational dialogue day. I may have butchered the title, so please forgive me if I have. But again, this is sort of China's GCI-related effort to say that, well, civilizations need to be in dialogue because all civilizations are unique and different.

We should remain in discussion and keep talking and keep conversing about our differences in the way that we understand our civilizations in the world. This is a very different perspective and gives space, I think, to state players that also would like to see less robust understandings of universal human rights. So while it's early days, I think certainly this rhetorical space is important, but I don't think it's going to be the final play.

Sticking on these initiatives for a minute, Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative, how are you seeing these crop up in UN discussions? Is China formally trying to push these onto agendas? Is it just trying to launder these initiatives in other ways through the UN? And I guess, are you noticing any demand signal on these initiatives in particular from member states? Okay, so two great questions. I think the first thing

I would probably flag is that I think when it comes to these three global initiatives that are often paired together in Ministry of Foreign Affairs speeches, it's important to note that they're not the only three global initiatives. So there's also the Global Initiative on Data Security, AI Governance, for example. So there's two more. But the interesting thing about the pairing of these three, either alone or three plus BRI, is that I think they are understood to be matching the UN pillars of development,

peace and security and human rights as being the three pillars that will help secure individual and eventually state security. So they are Chinese official responses to what they believe should be the content in these particular pillars, right? The interesting part then is that I think there is demand and I think Chinese officials were aware, for example, with the Global Development Initiative, they were able to say that our attention post-COVID has not been on the Sustainable Development Goals.

The majority of these goals aren't going to be met out of these 17 goals. 15 are not on track. And the deadline for these SDGs is 2030. By talking about a global development initiative, we are refocusing all of our international efforts back on the SDGs. Now, we also have to remember that at the end of the day, the UN is an organization that needs funding and it needs manpower. And it also needs that type of rhetorical focus back on the United Nations.

So there certainly is demand side interest in sort of engaging with Chinese officials, right? I think the interesting thing, though, is to think about the way that these initiatives are taking root. And I think we are witnessing now the start of different plays.

So, for example, GCI has the potential to go into many human rights-related spaces, spaces dealing with education. So you could think about the Office of the High Commissioner engagement, Universal Periodic Review engagement, UNESCO, the third committee within the UN Secretariat.

But we really have seen so far the biggest move has been to revive that World Civilization Dialogue Day. GDI, the Global Development Initiative, can very much follow much of China's UN BRI playbook. And there's excellent work done by Sebastian Holg on this.

where they can find senior UN officials to come and speak at GDI, GCI-related events. They can talk about a subfund that they have rehatted as part of GDI. They're very keen to sort of point out their ability to help move forward a SDG task force now. Again, task forces refocus and re-energize everyone back on these SDG goals. So it appears to be a lot more real, right? A lot more fixed.

I think the interesting one for me to try and understand is where China's going with this global security initiative, because of course we've all seen the working paper that's come out of that. But actually, GSI has been surprisingly low profile within the UN system, despite many of the GSI working paper concept paper items actually being multilateral UN focused.

And I think, again, that highlights sort of the sensitivities around specifically security issues. But I think, again, also sensitivities about the way that China is explaining itself regarding Ukraine, regarding Gaza, regarding chokehold and problems dealing with Myanmar at the Council. So I think watching these different movements and how these initiatives take root, I think, is going to be really something to see over the next five to 10 years. You've been looking at this question of China and the UN for a long time. So I'm curious if you

Sihi, any noticeable shift in Chinese strategy or thinking about the UN post-February 2022? Has the war in Ukraine galvanized any new types of initiatives or behavior? Has it significantly strengthened existing pillars of Chinese strategy? Or is it just too early to tell? Maybe there's nothing noticeable yet. Just curious. I do think there is a lot of consistency in terms of managing criticism of China, in terms of making sure that

that China has helped water down resolutions in the UN General Assembly that might condemn Russia too much, helping to manage the margins of resolution votes in the UNGA, also the UN Security Council. I think the typical move towards an abstention vote would be unsurprising for sort of China multilateral foreign policy students. I do think the interesting point, though, is China's ability to try and sort of deflect criticism,

and also try and maintain this consistent view that they respect and call for sovereignty as a fundamental norm, fundamental principle underlying international politics, the UN system, and then to not be able to explain how common security reflects back on sovereignty claims or how this reflects back on understandings of collective security.

And I think this is where I'm kind of waiting for there to be greater, I think, articulation. And I think maybe it's still too early to see that.

I'd also note, I think just the last thing that I am very interested in is how they are trying to position China again as having solutions for this particular crisis. So it was 12-point plan, now it's a six-point plan, non-participation in Swiss-led efforts, but willing to discuss, come back again and sort of discuss efforts co-led between China and Brazil. But again, trying to get to the specifics, what we're really seeing, it's been one phone call with Zelensky, right? Yeah.

So I think, again, trying to understand what would mediation with Chinese characteristics look like, I think, again, we still have got a long way to go. What role, if any, do you think domestic politics plays in this? I could imagine a world in which, for all the instrumental and strategic reasons you just mentioned, which are undisputed,

undeniable, also an element to which the larger role China visibly plays at the United Nations. That's a narrative to trumpet back home that China is a power that is internationally recognized, but shaping the future. Does that resonate with you? And have you done or has anyone else done any work to validate that thesis?

I think it is very important. I mean, as you note, right, that a lot of the Chinese government produced narratives about China's role in the UN system is very much a story of celebration. Recognition by senior UN officials, this is the type of thing that makes it to the front page of the People's Daily. Recognition by the senior UN officials that China is doing things that no other state can or is doing.

Again, they're very keen to point out that UN officials have recognized that China has done amazing achievements in development. The ability for China to sort of reframe and link South-South human rights dialogues into universal periodic review processes or into the UN human rights space, again, is something where they cite, look at our ability to help project the way that China is being understood and correcting mistakes.

So I think bringing a lot of sense of sort of national pride. But I think, again, we have to be very careful. As far as I know, there's been very limited public opinion polling on what the average Chinese person on the street might be thinking about the UN. I think

There's been some fascinating work done on foreign policy experiments about the way that Chinese, the average Chinese person understands China's role in peacekeeping. And again, this has been one of those really complicated areas for Chinese officials to manage because China does have a very particular position. It deploys the most troops out of all of the permanent members combined.

It is an overall top 10 troop contributor most months in the UN system. It's the second largest contributor to that particular peacekeeping budget. But at the same time, China has had unfortunately experienced actual combat deaths by malicious acts, so i.e. its peacekeepers have been targeted in the field themselves.

And so this has been a very complicated story to have to explain back at home if you've been having a narrative that largely has been focusing on all of the great achievements, the roads that you've paved, the thousands of kilometers of roads that you've paved, all of the medical treatments that you've offered, all of the wells that you've drilled, and the fact that everyone is meant to be welcoming of a Chinese peacekeeper. That is the type of narrative that is sold at home. So I think the very interesting foreign policy experiments that have been done show that there is a lot of support for

for Chinese peacekeepers, but that support is contingent on these peacekeepers actually being safe. And this is where it starts to get complicated if you're a Chinese official. What a seamless transition. Why, thank you. To talk about your article, which came out last year in Contemporary Security Policy called Peace by Peace, China's Policy Leadership on Peacekeeping Fatalities. I will have to note that the

Peace by Peace is both peace is in absence of violence and peace is in a section of something. So it's a pun in the title. So this looks at really what you were just talking about, which is peacekeeper fatalities and how different regime types process these. But really looking here at authoritarian systems in the lens of China, which we'll get into. I wonder if I can start by asking you for just a historical overview. You just mentioned China.

which I'll have to flip so I can read it to remind. I'm quoting now, China is a key UN peacekeeping contributor, deploying the most troops out of the permanent members, second largest financer of peacekeeping budget, et cetera, et cetera. You just mentioned. That's not where they have always been. So can we get into a time machine and go back to the 1980s? Can you talk a bit about how then the leadership was thinking about

involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and then we'll move through time, but just start then what underpinned the reluctance? And then I'll ask a follow on in a minute.

Great. Thanks, Jude. So it's a very interesting thing to study because I think in this sense, the PRC assumed the China seat in 1971, and they essentially spent the first decade really railing against Western hegemony, right? And could be utterly principled in their no voting stance at the UN Security Council, no voting, no funding, non-participation in peacekeeping, in many ways because the Chinese interests at the time were sort of third worldism and again, very limited strategic interests elsewhere.

By the time we get to sort of the 1980s and sort of the preparation for reform and opening, there is an awareness that actually voting for UN peacekeeping in its most traditional restrictive form, i.e. with host state consent, so you're invited in as a UN mission, the missions do not use force, only in self-defense. And again, with the full understanding of impartiality.

that actually these missions are fine for China to try and vote for. So you sort of see the movement towards abstention votes, yes votes, support and funding going into the system, and sort of the early deployments by the time we get to the end of the 1980s going off into these traditional peacekeeping missions.

And so you sort of see this movement to vote for and deploy to and fund UN peacekeeping sort of really taking off in the 80s and the 90s. And then it does get complicated because China's interests are starting to go global in the sense that you see a very interesting sense of exceptionalism. So China can justify deployments to Haiti even when Haiti did not recognize the PRC under exceptional circumstances of need.

China could understand a very small sense of consent offered for the East Timorese missions in the 1990s offered by Indonesia, but that consent was enough for China to say that there was now host state consent and we can support these types of missions. And again, this very sort of

pragmatic sense of being a principled but pragmatic player. But I should note, we sort of hang around in this sort of profile in the 90s, the 2000s, the 2010s, until about 2013, because up until that point, China was really in this helpful fixer role. So deploying the engineers, the logisticians, the

the medical teams that provide the backbone for a UN peacekeeping mission to run. So they are more tail than they are tooth, as sometimes Americans will say. And then by the time we get to 2013, Chinese are now starting to move into deploying actual combat troops. So now they're moving into a new type of peacekeeping space, as much as the mandates have also updated for the new type of peacekeeping environment, where perhaps consent is very contested.

And potentially the need to protect civilians, for example, might require the use of force. And this is where post-2013 Chinese PLA assets are now sort of doing the full suite of enabler troop work and also now combat troop work. And this is where I think the push come to shove of trying to understand how one operates in the field. And this is the type of thing that we're now able to study. Do you know anything about why 2013 was the year where they began fighting?

deploying combat troops? I mean, I think I could draw the inference that they've been talking about the potential of combat troops for a much longer period than 2013. I mean, you can go back to public sessions in 2010, where PLA officials talk about things that they have to be concerned with, consent from the host state, the ability to actually find the troops, and then actually the troop performance. So I think that type of comment sort of hints at pretty

potentially bureaucratic discussion between a set of players. I can see why a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official can understand the potential for China to deploy this type of much-needed asset. Remember, in the early 2000s, the UN starts massive deployment, large footprint missions going into Cote d'Ivoire, going into the DRC, going into Sudan.

And so there is demand for not just the very expensive, very hard to source enabler troops and very hard to find because typically most large peacekeeping states don't have these types of very, to put it bluntly, expensive personnel, the medical teams, logisticians, engineers, etc.,

For example, MOFO officials will understand the UN demand for combat troops to start joining these large missions that are taking off in the early 2000s into the DRC Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan.

But I think that type of discussion, as we already saw published in 2010, highlights the trade-offs and the costs borne by different Chinese agencies. Yes, a MOFA official may have to engage and have to explain why China has been doing X, Y, and Z on mission, but the actual literal cost that one bears if

God forbid a Chinese peacekeeper is killed, if God forbid there's an after-action report that calls out the performance of Chinese troops, that type of cost is borne by the Ministry of National Defense and ultimately the PLA. So I think there has certainly been a long discussion and a lot of interest by UN officials to try and engage that type of troop profile.

But I think there has been certainly a debate within the system about why they should engage. And I think 2013 provided the new type of opportunity after sort of 30 years of enabler troop participation, that maybe that was deemed to be the right time. Just to note that MOFA is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Have you picked up any discussions on the PLA side of this that

The deployment of combat troops might be a limited but nonetheless helpful way that they can start getting military force, which hasn't seen real combat in decades, into some conflict zones so that they can start fighting.

As you write here, states also secure operational benefits through deploying as UN peacekeeping as an internationally accepted means of conflict-related operational exposure, troops gaining field experience, adapting to new conditions, skills, and tasking. Deployment as a means of military-to-military cooperation with the host state, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. How much did, or did it, did that factor play into a decision, or to what extent does that underpin today China's continuing involvement in peacekeeping operations?

So I think there is definitely great status benefit, great prestige, a great ability to have the sort of rhetorical one up on the rest of the P5 that sit and vote and write mandates. But I think, again, there is a real practical benefit. There's a whole cottage industry of these retired Chinese peacekeepers that write their sort of reflections on their deployments. And they talk about very practical benefits, like they got to learn the use of this

It's not quite the same as the system we had. They talk about the benefits of deploying to new types of environments, terrains that they've never trained in, the ability to sort of test brand new Chinese kit. And again, if we think back to the combat troop deployments, one of the ways in which the mainland media reported this was to talk all about the brand new kit that had been sent out.

So I think, again, there is this sort of really hard benefit. And I think they're very aware of this, that they've had less operational exposure on land-based conflict since 1979. And so this is a very beneficial way to try and engage. Now, I think at the same time, though, I would just like to point out, I think it's been consistently reported that there is very limited participation of Chinese peacekeepers engaging with their counterparts on mission. So they're known to be a little bit more keeping to themselves, but

And again, I think of you that they have been relatively careful about their engagement with local communities, too. So I don't want this to sound like they're going off on the other extreme, sort of deploying at all hours in all environments. But I think this very practical sense of trying to learn actual military experiences, I think, is something that's of real interest.

What if I can talk about an event from July 2016 that you write about in the paper? And I think might be the only thing I had heard about this prior to reading your article, which is on events in South Sudan in July 2016. For listeners, can you just sketch out what happened? And then I have a follow-up about how that reverberated through the system. But could you just describe broadly the events?

Sure. So as you know, in 2013, the Chinese had started deploying combat troops. And this was a very serious decision, very well reported when this had finally occurred. But by the time we fast forward a couple of years, we get to July of 2016, and Chinese combat troops are deployed as part of a 700-strong troop battalion.

into the UNMISS, with two S's, the UNMISS peace operation in South Sudan. This is a multidimensional mission, meaning that there are many, many things that this peacekeeping operation is trying to achieve. Protection of civilians, the ability to try and improve human rights, the ability to also try and do some type of military-to-military management of the problems on the ground. So it's a very ambitious mandate.

During that time, there's been very difficult relationships between the government of South Sudan and the UN mission. So the actual host state consent is very contested by the time we get to July of 2016. And then what happens is that there was an artillery attack on UN peacekeepers, and one Chinese peacekeeper was killed instantaneously, and then a second Chinese peacekeeper bled out.

Now, the reason why this event has been so well reported is because unlike the vast majority of UN peacekeeper deaths that occur by accident or illness, these were designated as deaths by malicious act, i.e. purposely targeting UN peacekeepers with violence.

Now, there is a whole second level issue that comes out of this, which is the way that the UN system responded to study what had happened and publicize and report back in some version of accountability and transparency about these events. And can you just take...

Get back to the primary thesis of this article, which is looking at how peacekeeping fatalities reverberate through different types of regime types. This has obviously been a shock. This is the first combat deaths for China since the sign of Vietnam War of 1979. What were the reverberations through the system? Did this cause China to rethink? Did they pull back? Did they recalibrate? No, it's a fascinating question. I think we have to think about this on a couple of fronts. So

There was a number of studies done by either NGOs or UN bodies that Chinese officials worked very hard to manage because, again, some version of the executive summary, some version of these reports get published and they will call into account the performance of Chinese troops. And this is not the type of press that Chinese officials look for. So I think they're sort of managing that engagement in the accountability transparency after action review processes.

There was also a very well-reported debate on whether or not, quote unquote, it's worth it to actually engage in this type of peacekeeping. And I think this is well understood that the Ministry of National Defense and its Peacekeeping Affairs Office that now has become a center, a lot of discussion going back and forth about how can China perform as a

combat role in UN peacekeeping. Also, a lot of reporting written by Chinese academics that also help pad out and help us understand the way that Chinese elites are thinking through issues of the day, where they note that they couldn't, quote, take a beating. They cannot be seen. You are a world superpower. And now you are having these very publicly reported hits, front page of the Wall Street Journal reporting at the time. I think the thing that was very interesting to me was that you were able to see

access for Western journalists to actually go interview the mothers of these now martyred UN peacekeepers, right? They've become martyr status within the way that Chinese officials have discussed them now, in a way that I would have thought had the system changed.

been better prepared, they might have tried to head off that type of access. And the Wall Street Journal reporting is fascinating and very, very detailed on these cases. I think the last sort of space to really think about this, and this is where sort of the research projects are moving for at least on my part,

is to think about this sort of sense of a feedback loop, a formal feedback mechanism, in the way that these experiences have helped inform the way that Chinese officials now engage in UN peacekeeping policy work. So it's very rare, for example, for PRC, MOFA, to actually hold the pen and draft UN Security Council resolution language. This is just not something that Chinese officials have done.

But they did move out and they did actually write the first resolution 2518 on peacekeeper safety and security. They drove this issue very, it was top of their agenda for the times that they've had the UN Security Council rotating presidency. So it goes through each of the UNSC members, takes a month. And they've talked about this very consistently. They've revived a group of friends. So this is an informal mechanism that helps keep focus on various issues of the day in the UN system.

They've helped revive a UN group of friends on peacekeeper safety and security and purposely look to engage over 40 major troop contributors, right? If we look at their Peace and Development Trust Fund, so this was the 2015 announcement at $1 billion by Xi Jinping himself at the UN General Assembly opening. It has since been scaled down to $200 million per decade. So we're now going to move into the second decade of it.

There's two sub-funds. There's one on development and one on peace. The peace sub-fund has funded a number of very interesting projects about telemedicine, so the way in which you can actually receive medical care if you cannot physically get to a medical outpost. They also helped fund the Cruise Report, which was a major study into how the UN can understand when UN peacekeepers are attacked, should it be meeting force with force? And the finding of the Cruise Report was yes.

But the last thing I'll say on this that I think is fascinating is the way that the Chinese are thinking about peacekeeper safety and security is not about meeting force with force. It is talking about greater capability and capacity. So we're talking about training, medical needs in the field, because again, the vast majority of deaths occur by accident and illness. That's what the statistics have told us.

And they're also very focused now on maintaining host state support for medical evacuation. If we remember what has happened in July of 2016, that second peacekeeper bled out only about 15 kilometers away from the nearest medical facility. So I think, again, this really highlights a very practical sense that China does deploy

into dangerous conditions and is learning. I would make the case it is learning and therefore wants the system to do its job better. And one way that China thinks about this is very practical medical benefits, telemedicine, for example, but also now in terms of how can the UN help engage host states, even when consent is contested, that the host state also has a responsibility to help support actual peacekeepers there. And I think that is something quite fascinating.

As we look at, again, the long-going rumors about China's interest in potentially one day heading the Department of Peace Ops, I think this is one of these sort of turning points to try and understand how they think about policy leadership.

Courtney, that was great. A lot more to this that we didn't get a chance to dig into. And I'll also say China and the UN is something that you're thinking about from a number of different angles. So I also recommend people go check out Courtney's other work, including her book on this. So thank you. Great to see you in person. Thank you for your time. And as always, really appreciate your scholarship on this very important issue. Thanks so much for having me join you, Jude.

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