The BRICS Dilemma, China and India’s New Border, and Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of Battle of Guningtou
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Welcome to China Insider, a podcast from the Hudson Institute's China Center. I'm Myles Yu, Senior Fellow and Director of the China Center. Join me each week for our analysis of the major events concerning China, China threat, and their implications to the U.S. and beyond. It's Tuesday, October 29th, and I'm Phil Higgseth, alongside Hudson Institute's esteemed expert, Myles Yu.

We open today with the BRICS summit held last week in Kazan, Russia, and whether it accomplished anything other than moral victory for Vladimir Putin's international legitimization campaign. Second, we focus in on two founding members of BRICS, India and China, who signed a new agreement just days ahead of the summit, which saw Xi Jinping ceding previously disputed territory to India. Miles explains why the agreement is circumstantial on the part of China, and why only time will tell if the dispute is truly settled rather than paused.

And lastly, we cover Taiwanese President Lai Ching-tse's visit to the island of Kimoy to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Guningtou, which Miles likens to both the Battle of Saratoga and the Battle of Midway in terms of significance in shaping Taiwan's history and why the legacy of an island just six miles off the coast of mainland China is so important for understanding the future of Taiwan's struggle against the CCP. Good morning, Miles. Good morning, Phil.

Good as always to see you. I'm excited about this week. I like these three topics that we got ahead, so we're going to jump in. The first is last week, the BRICS summit that was held in Russia. This was lauded as a diplomatic or diplomatic

at least symbolic victory for Putin and Russia and just their international recognition. But why don't you give us kind of your general reaction to the success of BRICS leading up to this summit that took place last week? Well, BRICS is a very odd phenomenon because it is a loosely organized international event.

you know coalition or some sort i mean i says coalition is is a would-be coalition even only international groupings you must have common values i don't see common value uh among the five countries the core countries uh brazil russia china india and south africa i mean of course now it's expanded uh its membership to include the iran

and several other countries. Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, that's who was added this year. So it's very hard to say what it is. I think the founding members, China and Russia in particular, had in mind that this is going to be either or international organization. Basically, it's basically anti-West in its intention. But most of the countries in this BRICS group does not want to

declare either or. Rather, most of them are sitting on the fence. So they want to benefit from both the Western alliance and also the Brexit alliance. That's why it's a loosely organized coalition without common value to defend. So it's very hard to say it's really a security alliance. It's far, far away from the likes of NATO. But you say, well, there may be common interest.

Not really. I mean, what's the common interest? And from Russia and China's point of view, they want to upend the international order. But if the international order as it is, is over, would that really benefit countries like Brazil?

India or even South Africa. So there even China I would say, you know, because China benefited tremendously from the existing international order. The only difference is that China wants to replace its own communist combined economy as its own model of governance with the international order as it is. So I don't know whether China is going to succeed in that way or even benefit from that. So it's hard to say they have common interests.

Well, you'd say, is this a trade bloc or is it based upon economic interest? It's hard to say because the preponderance of the power of market and technology is in the West.

It's not within the bricks. So that's why it's not necessarily a trading block. And then maybe say, well, maybe they want to create a common currency. Yes, China tried to use yuan to replace the US dollar as the ultimate international settlement currency, a reserve currency. The problem with that is, yuan is not convertible because it's controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. It's not a market floating.

So what do you do with the money that cannot can only be used in China? So Nobody really wants it. I mean countries like Saudi Arabia Brazil they get the Chinese money. Do you know what they do? They go to Hong Kong exchange to US dollars immediately or buy gold from Shanghai gold market Don't get rid of it as quick as possible interesting thing is Brazil

has a very robust trade with China. China wants Brazil to use Yuan. Brazilians say, you know, not really. Let's just do the most primitive way of trading, barter. In other words, I buy your stuff, you buy my stuff. So what Brazil wants? Well, to get a lot of Huawei stuff, the electronics, infrastructure. So Huawei ended up having a lot of Brazilian beef.

Huawei, you know, the electronics giant in China is now the biggest Brazilian beef merchant in China because they have the sales. So it's a very weird. And it's a bricks is a mystery to a lot of people. I don't see any.

bright future in the near term. It feels very symbolic at best. I do think one of the interesting photo ops was the, when you talk about replacement currency, they did roll out an example banknote, a BRICS banknote, which I did like the design of, but didn't love the concept. But did anything actually come out of this meeting? No.

Very little. I mean, it looks like a kumbaya. It looks like a big powwow of a new G7 or something, what do you call it, grouping. Basically, Briggs is designed as a counterweight against the G7. Yeah. But it's not really necessarily a big victory despite all the pageantry and pomposity in Kazan and Russia. On the other hand, what this big...

power in Russia really is is a sign of a Brexit in crisis because Putin cannot go to a lot of countries because he's wanted the international war criminal. So that's why in the previous Brexit summit Putin couldn't go to South Africa Putin couldn't go to India for the Brexit summit and

And South Africa summit, because Putin's absence, Xi Jinping was not very happy. So basically he stayed there halfway and then left. And the next summit was somewhere hosted by India. I believe that's not necessarily Brexit. G20, I think, Xi Jinping refused to go because Putin couldn't go. So the reason why there's so much noise, so much fanned joys in Kazan, Russia last week,

was because everyone is happy to go to Russia to avoid the embarrassment of their home country becoming global pariah for hosting Putin without arresting him. On the other hand, it does sound like a victory for Putin, at least in terms of reputational gain. Because it does serve to legitimize Putin. I mean, I think what's really, really most bizarre is not all the member countries' leaders win.

It's the head of the UN. Secretary General Gutierrez showed up for the hoopla. That was basically, I think, a disgrace. This is an international war criminal, the biggest destroyer of global peace. And the head of the UN showed up to congratulate, to add his own prestige to this bizarre and absurd situation.

summit, the UN should be ashamed of itself. Outside of Russia, who obviously has a vested interest in the success of this particular BRICS summit,

What about countries like China, obviously, who's the focus of the show? But India, I think, is an interesting member in BRICS. They've kind of got one toe over here in the West, and they've got one toe in BRICS. So what are China and India looking to get out of a meeting like this, and maybe BRICS in general? Okay, there are two major issues at this summit that were discussed. Number one is the expansion of membership. Another one is war in Ukraine.

So you kind of go to Russia, we are talking about the war in Ukraine. So let's talk about the expanding membership. India is a very curious member in that grouping because India has a lot of...

self-interest, its own very quirky perspective on global security. And one of the most earnest applicants for the new BRICS membership is Turkey. And Turkey is very close to Pakistan. So India really hates the idea of Turkey becoming a member of the BRICS. So India basically blocked Turkey's application for joining the BRICS. And this basically didn't go anywhere.

Now, on war in Ukraine, it's very interesting, also kind of a fake, because China, Brazil, had some kind of proposal for peace in Ukraine. India also urged Vladimir Putin to consider peace, but then

All these BRICS countries, they have no backbone because they all say they want peace without condemning the aggression, without condemning the destroyer of peace, that is Vladimir Putin. So this all looks very hypocritical to me. That's why the discussion of war in Ukraine and particularly urging an appeal for peace in Ukraine sounds very surreal, a little bit Kafkaesque. I like how you're...

Highlighting Turkey's membership there, I think there's a couple dichotomies there. Not just their opposition to India, but also that they're a NATO member would be joining BRICS. So there's a lot of crisscrossing ideas and values here that when you talk about finding a central value system to unite all of BRICS, it just gets more complicated the more they bring people in. I think if Turkey joins the BRICS or any other international security alliances,

even though BRICS is not one, but it has the potential to become one. And then if Turkey does that, you run the risk of Turkey being kicked out of NATO because you must have weapons integration. You must have critical infrastructure communication. Unity of defense infrastructure is a requirement for membership in NATO. And I think if Turkey...

joins the other security alliances with NATO as its primary enemy. And that will basically make Turkey's membership in great question. Yeah. All right. Well, shifting back to China and India, last week they settled on an agreement on their border dispute in the Himalayas.

I'd like you to give us some more details on this, Miles. Is this an agreement on the actual borders, or is this an agreement on patrols around the border? I think China wants to say this is basically a joint peaceful patrol of the borderline. But in reality, China basically ceded the disputed territory to India, something like two and a half times bigger than the size of Taiwan. So China...

China basically treated all the territorial disputes as a geopolitical bargaining game.

It has nothing to do with China's vowed determination to uphold territorial integrity. If that's the case, they would basically not have dealt issues like this with such a cavalier attitude. I mean, today, I'm your enemy. Tomorrow, I'll give you whatever you want. So that's basically, it shows China's hypocritical nature of demanding annexation of Taiwan.

China always said this has everything to do with upholding motherland's territorial integrity. That's pure nonsense. Look at this. This is basically another thing. And India immediately declared the establishment of a new administrative body.

infrastructure over that territory that China just ceded. So it's pretty much like that. Now, this is actually very interesting. This is not the first time China has done this. China has ceded its territories, what's supposed to be Chinese territory, to many countries that China considered as ideological allies, to the former Soviet Union, to former communist Mongolia, even to today's North Korea. They had the border...

agreement in 1962, which is still, you know, well, is in effect. India and China did not have a border dispute of any kind for 10 years between 1949 and 1959. There's some kind of different understanding of the previous border agreement signed by

between British India and the Chinese government as well as the Tibetan government at the time. But nevertheless, it was not remounting to a crisis until 1959 when Dalai Lama went to India and the Indian government granted Dalai Lama a sanctuary. That has been the problem. And also particularly since India clearly took the side with the Soviet Union in this very nasty international conflict

communist fight for global leadership between the Soviet Union and China in the 1920s.

late 1950s and early 1960s. So that's why China used this border issue as an excuse. Manufacturing created a problem and so went to war with India in 1962, in which China crushed Indian defenders. But that sort of memory has never faded in the minds of the Indian high command and also in general population. And then

In recent years, India has risen quite dramatically economically, technologically, and militarily. So China views India as a destabilizing factor, particularly because of its connection with the Tibetans. So China and India have gone

pretty much like nuts over the border issue. And they're very tense and leading to the tragic incident in June 2020 where Chinese border guards...

bludgeoning to death something like 24 Indian soldiers. So that's why the two countries were in bad blood for a while. And now Xi Jinping needed India for the sake of the BRICS, Anti-West Alliance. And so that's why he basically conceded. I was going to say that the timing is no coincidence here. The agreement was settled I think a day or two before this BRICS summit was held. So what ultimately led to

I think that kind of answers to why now. But there's a lot of history here. Why would Xi Jinping just cede that much territory? Well, because India is a big country, as I say. India has a growing relationship with the West, particularly with the United States. So for purely geopolitical expediency, China needs India's good grace. Because India is playing a very decisive role in many international arenas.

Chinese Communist Party is partly influenced by the communist ideology and comes to the shape is a grand strategy but also is influenced deeply by Chinese sort of traditional historical strategic wisdom that is has come from the warring states age I mean basically is emphasized on

opportunistic expediency and deception. In this case, China and India may be on good terms right now, but China has never given up its own containment policy against India that has been going on for decades. China remains the biggest backer of Pakistan government. Pakistan and India have never get along since 1948.

And China has robustly beefed up India's adversaries along its periphery. I mean, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, you name it. China has spent a lot of money in those countries, basically to what China called containment against India. So I would not say this is the ultimate detente.

I think it's just a no. It's opportunistic. Oh, absolutely. It's temporary. Any moment, there's kind of a tension. So they shift focus back and the borders get fluid again. That's right. Your argument is probably that this is not going to last or is going to last until it doesn't need to anymore. Listen, this border issue between China and India has been going on since 1962.

That's over 60-some years ago. And they have so many rounds of border negotiations to no avail. Every time there is a negotiation, China always tries to create some kind of tension. This is China's grand strategy, which is summed up by the former Chinese Communist Party chief, Jiang Zemin, as 以对抗求合作, to use confrontation,

to coerce cooperation. That's why China is such a destabilizing factor, not just the Indian-China border. In the whole global security environment, China's approach is always try to make trouble to become a big jerk, as big as possible, so that other people will be scared of it and to make some concession to it. This is basically Hitler logic. Well, there's an agreement, but only history will tell if the border is actually settled.

So that brings us to our final topic, and that is Taiwanese President Lai paying a visit to the island of Kimoy to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Guninto. Could you just give us a brief history of the battle, why it's such a big deal, what it represents for the Taiwanese legacy now, and why it's such a big deal that President Lai went there and

visited in this moment? Well, the Battle of Guninto, also known as the Battle of Kamui, took place between October 25th and October 27th or 28th, depends on how you count that. So for a matter of several days, the battle was very intense. It was over the Chinese invasion of

of the little tiny island of Kimoi, also known as Jinmen, which was several kilometers away from the Chinese mainland coast. This took place in the backdrop of this massive retreat or defeat of the KMT, the Chinese nationalist government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, in the hands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. And that battle of Kimoi was an amphibious battle.

There was the largest offensive amphibious battle the people's liberation has ever fought since then but the Battle was won by the KMT by the defenders decisively three regiments up to 10,000 Chinese troops were annihilated and this was a brilliant battle and it was a very pivotal battle because it stopped the momentum and

of the Chinese Communist military advance toward Taiwan. So they existed- Just quickly, you sent me a report by the Naval War College, and I love how they put it. They said, "This was the battle that saved the Republic of China. It was Chiang Kai-shek's Battle of Midway turning the tide of history." I really like that. That was so well phrased, and I fully endorse that because I wrote that article.

Of course you did. I'm surprised that you didn't see the author. I didn't even see it. That's wonderful. This is a little short article I wrote for the U.S. Naval War College Review a few years back. It's just a battle analysis of why the Chinese Communist Party lost this battle. It's pretty pivotal because this settled

The current pattern of balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, it stopped the communist advance, and it preserved the offshore islands of Kimmo and Matsu from being taken by the Chinese communists. And then, most importantly, it prevented the Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan. Mm-hmm.

Most importantly as matter of fact if you look at the archive with evidence of the US military It actually was the battle that convinced American Joint Chief of Staff that the Nationalist Party actually could win battle on such a such critical moment it changed American militaries

Outlook and their assessment about capability of KMT. So which is really important if you want to be really a little bit as sort of a Dramatic you might say this is actually a battle of Saratoga For the Taiwanese, you know in October 1777 Georgia Washington's ragtag army defeated the British

Army the strongest the military force in the world in Saratoga, New York that single battle Convinced the French and the Spanish who hated the British to finally sort of jump the ship and jump and sign an official alliance with them with George Washington and a Continental Congress so I mentioned about midway turning the point but as probably more appropriate to use this as the battle of

of the Saratoga that convinced America, hey listen, you know, the KMT, they actually could hold on. And that has become a pivotal battle for the survival of Taiwan as we know it. And then of course it's called Republic of China under the KMT leadership. And the most fascinating part of this is that President William Lai, Lai Ching-De,

paid a visit to that island to specifically commemorate the 70th anniversary of the battle at Guninto. This is so important politically for Taiwan because Lai Ching-te has come from exactly the opposite of the KMT.

So he went there to pay tribute to the sacrifice of the KMT soldiers for the survival of Taiwan. He said, listen, you know, even though politically we disagree on the issue of unification, on the issue of whether Taiwan is a part of China or Taiwan is a part of China, but

You have all come such a hard way and now you're the citizens of the Republic of China, that is Taiwan. So he goes there, I think, as a gesture to unite the nation. And I think that really is the most important. And I think he's done a wonderful job. Well, and while he was there, he stated that no external force

change the future of Taiwan. Those are not small words and very symbolic for where he gave them, where he was commemorating them, and

and what they mean in a very hot time between China and Taiwan. Could we see a second battle of Guning To in the near future? Well, I think Guning To obviously will be regarded as a precursor to the invasion of Taiwan. Now, this Kimoy Island, as I say, is just a few kilometers. At the closest one, I think two miles away. It's six miles from China. Yeah, well, at the closest one, it's very close. You can swim there.

Hey, now you're using kilometers. Look at you. I know. I used them the other week and you were ripping me for it. Now you're using kilometers. I just want to be intercontinental as you are. Oh, yeah. Now you can. Okay.

So I think, you know, it's, let me put it this way. Chinese military strength obviously has grown so much. Chinese People's Liberation Army is not the one that is 74 years ago. So their amphibious capability has grown. But I think this also provides, give us some lessons.

to learn from. The Chinese amphibious warfare capability have increased, but also they have some weaknesses and vulnerabilities in that kind of area. There could be another Battle of Guolinto. I think if we do it right, if we learn the right lessons from the October 1949 Battle of Kamui, and I think we could prevail again. - Well, just from a logistical perspective, that being the precursor for the invasion,

what do the defenses look like right now in the island of Kimoy? What is the defense presence of Taiwan on that island right now? I don't think there is any dramatic increase, but there is no dramatic decrease either because it's very sensitive there. You don't want to be unnecessarily provocative. You know, Kimoy is known for a lot of things, for its geographic location.

sensitivity. In a certain way, Kim O is very much like West Berlin in Asia, because that was the place where the Chinese communist Mao Zedong launched the Breeze Creek on October 23, 1958. He shelled that place to no end. Millions of shells were fired in the subsequent months and years against that tiny island held by Taiwan.

So it was basically a hot spot of the Cold War. Almost brought the United States into a nuclear confrontation with China at the time because it was during the Eisenhower administration. The US Joint Chief of Staff actually had a pretty specific plan

to respond to that. You know, which had the battle of Kimoi, actually the Kimoi crisis, which is known as the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, exerted enormous impact upon American politics as well. Two years later, in 1960, during the presidential election between Richard Nixon and Kennedy, you know, they had the famous TV debates. There were four of them. The last debate was devoted to security issue.

The number one issue, the most contested issue was about the defense of Kimoi Islands, Kimo and Matsu. And so this is really a big deal. Of course, people who watch those debates do not remember the contents of that, substance of that. They care about the Kennedy's hair and Nixon's facial expression.

So what I'm saying is the Kimoi is very important. So it's not really that heavily defended. But as I say, go back to my earlier point, Kimoi is known for two things. One is Kimoi has this very internationally renowned kitchen knife, which is their cleaver, almost like. The Chinese chopping board use that. That's mostly made of the Chinese shells.

you know, all the heads. Really? Yeah, warheads that didn't really explode. So they used the steel to forge the kitchen cleaver, which is a very famous thing in Taiwan. Oh, yeah, yeah, I'm looking at them. Artillery steel Chinese cleavers, wow. That's exactly right. And a lot of them, a lot of them. Another thing that Kimochi is famous for, because a lot of soldiers were stationed there, they're kind of, you know, away for so long, you know, what's the best way to...

to wash out your, wash away your woes, your melancholy, alcohol. So they made this really potent lighter fluid called Jinmen Gaoliang, which is basically, it's like a vodka-like hot liquor from Kimoi. So I hope if you go to Kimoi someday, hopefully with me, and we'll get something back.

Yeah, maybe some days we can cheers to it. That'd be awesome. Great. I would love it. Well, that's a great place to end. Let's hope we can make it happen. Thanks, Miles. This was a fun one. I look forward to it again next week. All right. See you next week. Thank you for listening to this episode of China Insider. I'd also like to thank our executive producer, Philip Hegseth.

who works tirelessly and professionally behind the scenes for every episode to make sure we deliver the best quality podcast to you, the listeners. If you enjoy the show, please spread the word. For Chinese listeners, please check our monthly review and analysis episode in Chinese. We'll see you next time.