Special Discussion with Secretary General Yongho Tae
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Next on The Impossible State, North Korea, human rights, current crisis, future scenarios, this and more. Everything North Korea today on The Impossible State. North Korea is the impossible state. It's a place that stumped leaders and policymakers for more than three decades. It has a complex history and it has become the United States top national security priority.

Each week on this show, we'll talk with the people who know the most about North Korea. Welcome, everybody, to The Impossible State. I'm Sid Seiler sitting in today for Dr. Victor Cha. We have a very, very special guest today. He served as the deputy ambassador in London for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, one of the most high visibility defections.

And since then has proven to be an expert commentator on all things North Korea. And we come to talk about all the things that are on the table here in his role as the Secretary General of the Peaceful Unification Advisory Council. And hopefully, hopefully,

Deputy Ambassador Tae Yong-ho, you can share some of your opinions on that and then share your opinions on what's going on in the peninsula. So many different lines of effort in terms of things we're focusing on. And so let me open up first of all by asking Peaceful Unification Advisory Council, what is it and what is your role as the Secretary General? Thank you for your invitation.

Now, as I am introduced, I'm the Secretary General of Peaceful Unification Advisory Council. This organization is a constitutional organization and it advises

the policy on reunification to the president. And I am the secretary general to support the management of this advisory council.

I was as I was introduced, I used to be the deputy ambassador of North Korea to United Kingdom. So far, this the post of secretary general was appointed by the president

all South Korean backgrounds. And I am the first one with North Korean background to be in that post. So the message the president and my organization wants to deliver to not only to South Korea, but also to North Korea is that the future policy on North Korea would not

It would not be the outcome of South Koreans alone, but it would also study and we would try to reflect the aspirations of North Korean people as well by inviting the North Korean defectors like me so that my government wants to present very balanced, pragmatic approach

on the policies on North Korea. It sounds like a big challenge. And when people hear unification, they think about how hard it must be. The unification of East and West Germany now is decades behind us. And it seemed to be a natural outcome of the collapse of the socialist bloc and the restoration of a single Germany

With the current North-South standoff and with Kim Jong-un declaring that reunification from the North's perspective no longer is on the table, where should our efforts be at this time? Where should our focus be? What are you seeking to promote other than preparing for the day that unification may come? What can we actively do today?

First of all, as you have said, that North Korea Kim Jong regime announced the hostile two state policy. So in such North Korea, Kim Jong Un carries out a lot of policies of two states, making two states to make Korean division permanent. But it is a long process.

the aspiration of Korean people, no matter whether you are in North or South, to be reunited in the future. So now is the time for South Korean government and South Korean public to raise the voice of

reunification so that the issue of reunification of Korean Peninsula must continue to be alive, not a kind of, you know, dead issue. And we want to deliver a continuation of the message to North Korean population that South Korea still wants to be

reunited with North Korea. And on that issues, I think my government and my organization can do a lot of the things. Is it inevitable to see unification

as one based upon liberal democracy, free market economy, respect for human rights, in many ways, unification by Seoul's model in a way that threatens the North Korean system and the North Korea regime. Is that inevitable or are there ways in which we can make

even the elite in North Korea more receptive to, more comfortable with the idea of a unification that is inclusive in terms of the North Korean people benefiting from the process not being marginalized or sidelined. Yes. Now, you know, if we compare the economic, the might between North and South,

the gap is too great. So now in such North Korea, most of North Korean people now know that South Korea is a rich country. They are very much developed nation. And this naturally put a question to North Korea, why North Korea is so poor and less developed?

since North and South were same nation, same culture, same language. So many North Korean people now have this kind of suspicions and questions inside North Korea. Another fact which I want to mention is that young generations of North Korea are now mad with South Korean cultural contents.

Because, you know, in the past 10 or 20 years, North Korea also was changed.

Now there are around 7 million cell phones in such North Korea. Now North Korean high schools introduced computer education. So after this compulsory computer education in such North Korea, all North Korean young generations asked their parents to buy either desktop or notebook or tablet, you know,

for their families. So now in North Korea, most of the families have the desktop. So this kind of new infrastructure of IT technology started to change the mentality of North Korea. For instance, in the past,

North Korean people were only able to listen to government-controlled radio or TVs or newspapers censorship by North Korean regime. But nowadays it's different because of the computer, anybody who can watch South Korean movies or dramas can copy it in the computer and deliver that USB to

his friends or family members. So now inside North Korea, the government now cannot control the vast movement of these informations among young generations. Now inside North Korea now, more than 53% of North Korean population have seen South Korean movies and dramas.

So that's why the aspiration of unification and aspiration to be in South Korea is ever growing. So that is one of the reasons why Kim Jong Un wants to put forward two hostile state policy. He wants to kill the dreams of young generations to go to South Korea or, you know,

one day living in South Korea, whatever. So I think two-state policy is a kind of, you know, concession of the failure of North Korean system. And also this is the kind of, you know, new policy try to kill the new dreams of young generations to be united with South Korea.

So you sound very optimistic that ultimately the efforts by the Kim Jong Un regime will fail in this regard, that trying to establish the Korean people as not one kin, but rather two separate countries in hostile enmity, irreconcilable enmity to each other, and

and somehow the South Korean culture and South Korea things being a threat to the North Korean system, the North Korean people aren't going to buy it. Is that your sense? Yes. So, for instance, you know, when Kim Jong Un developed its nuclear weapons, he said that he needed nuclear weapons to fight against

America and South Korea because America and South Korea is the main threat to North Korean system. But now Kim Jong Un learned that it is not America or South Korea are the main threat to North Korean system, but it is South Korean cultural contents which actually threatens North Korean system

and young generations of North Korea. So that's why Kim Jong-un should do something, you know, to stop this escalating, threatening, you know, the issues of North Korea. It is very funny in such North Korea that

after this kind of long division of North and South, physical division of North and South, now North Korean young generation all of sudden started to sing South Korean songs, start to imitate the South Korean dialect. For instance, there are great difference to say hello or good morning between North and South. But now young generations in North Korea

are saying "Annyeonghaseyo" in South Korean dialect, not "Annyeonghaseymnikka". Before they say "Annyeonghaseymnikka", "Gomapsumnida". But now, by the influence of South Korean cultural content, they are saying "Annyeonghaseyo"

So even they change the dialect and language of South Korea. And inside North Korea now, also a lot of cultural changes are taking place. Now North Korean girls start to wear the mini skirts because of the South Korean content.

many North Koreans sending the texts through their cell phones, copying the South Korean languages, whatever. So that is the reason why Kim Jong-un made a lot of laws to punish young generations watching South Korean cultural content and using South Korean language dialect.

So I don't think, you know, the Kim Jong-un could win this war against young generations. In human history, no government or no regime ever won a war against their own young generations or against cultural change. So if we could look at

U.S. and ROK shared policy interests in regard to North Korea. You know, three broad lines of effort come to mind. One is how we move towards denuclearization. And two, second, short of denuclearization, or while denuclearization is being pursued, threat reduction, tension reduction. So denuclearization, peace, and then finally, promotion of improvement of human rights, which

There's a lot of overlap with reunification, unification efforts to try to get information into the North Korean people, to try to lay the foundation for this day of reconciliation, which you describe. Traditionally, people have said,

what you described is it reinforces that the United States and the Republic of Korea have a hostile policy that we're seeking to overthrow the system of, if not seeking to overthrow Kim Jong-un, somehow we're seeking to change the system in a way that's perceived by North Korea as potentially bringing an end to the current regime. How do you reconcile the apparent incompatibility

of a robust unification policy seeking to improve human rights and our efforts to achieve denuclearization and tension reduction? If we push too hard here, do we undermine our objectives here or is there a way to reconcile those? Oh, a very good question.

I think now North Korea now possess nuclear weapons. And from time to time, Kim Jong-un threatens the possible use of nuclear weapons against America and South Korea. So

nobody now knows whether he could actually use or not. So it is very, I think, a practical matter for America and South Korea to prevent the possible outbreak of nuclear war in Korean Peninsula. Up to now, Kim Jong Un regime thinks that America could not use nuclear weapons of

against North Korea if North Korea proves that it has ability to strike America. So they continued that process for the past 10 years. So I think now is the time for American government to give a very strict and clear message to North Korea that if North Korea

use its nuclear weapons against South Korea or Japan or America, America would not hesitate to retaliate with nuclear weapons. There is no way that America withdraw from South Korea under the threat of North Korea. So that

Kim Jong-un must understand clearly that he should not use nuclear weapons. That is, I think, first thing. And not only the clear message, but America should show some kind of actions together with South Korea, something like, you know, joint military exercise,

whatever, introduce American nuclear assets to Korean peninsula so that America is always ready to use nuclear weapons if North Korea use nuclear weapons. So that is the only way to

shrink and give a right message to Kim Jong-un not to use nuclear weapons and buy the time and keep the peace as it is. Another thing is that human rights, because Kim Jong-un now invests all its available investments on the development of nuclear weapons at the cost of North Korean people's sacrifice. So

We should continue to tell Kim Jong-un that with nuclear weapons, he can't solve North Korea's difficult issues. And also, worldwide, America and South Korea could do a lot of things to improve North Korean human rights issues. Something like now, China now continues to repatriate North Korean defectors from China to North Korea. So maybe America and

South Korea continues to say through UN system that China should stop this forcible repatriation of North Korean defectors back to North Korea. And also,

The America and South Korea also continue to deliver a message that if Kim Jong-un actually gives up its nuclear weapons program, then America and South Korea is ready to give a lot of economic incentives to Kim Jong-un.

I think back on a foreign ministry statement that was issued in early July 2008, 2009, right before the inauguration of Barack Obama.

And it basically said the United States thinks that our weapons are up for negotiation, that we would sell our we would get rid of our weapons for normalization of relations with the United States. The truth is they're not up for bargaining. We've lived without relations with the United States. We can't live without nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Obama administration, of course, the Trump administration, even the Biden administration, all tried to engage

North Korea in dialogue that would, you know, give them some type of assurances that if they move down this path, good things would come, that the regime would not be threatened. Why hasn't that, and that's been a central point of our negotiations, frankly, going back to the agreed framework. Why has that not been persuasive? Is it because ultimately, kind of ontologically, they can't

trust the United States or as they look at the United States and somehow blame us for not living up to their expectations in terms of heavy fuel oil under the agreed framework or delivery of promises under the Six Party talks? Is there anything that you think we could have done differently? Or is North Korea from the very, very beginning been so committed to nuclear weapons they never really were on the table?

Oh, as long as Kim Jong Un regime is in place, I don't think the denuclearization of North Korea could be achieved because Kim Jong Un regime thinks that the regime and nuclear weapons are the same thing. Synonymous. Yes. So, uh...

they will stay on it no matter what kind of incentives America could provide. So I think the peaceful reunification of Korea could be the only practical way to fundamentally solve this nuclear... Yes, denuclearization and human rights issue of North Korea. Because with these nuclear weapons, Kim Jong-un can justify all his

policy failures. For instance, North Korean people are very poor. You know, they are very well, they are malnourished. But Kim Jong Un may justify this economic failure by saying that economy is not good, but North Korea has nuclear weapons, you know. So that's why

The nuclear weapon could serve many purposes for Kim Jong-un to justify his so-called failures in many policies.

Excellent point. So turning to kind of the hot topic of today, which is North Korea's intervention in Russia's war with Ukraine. You know, very briefly, what is Kim hoping to achieve? And strategically, we know there'll be payments. He'll get paid for troops going. He'll get paid for equipment going. He'll get paid for munitions being sent.

But what are the more bigger strategic objectives Kim Jong-un has in this alignment with Vladimir Putin and Russia? Kim Jong-un wants to achieve many things with just sending North Korean troops to Russia. First, you know, he wants to get as much as hard currency, you know, the possible from Russian side.

Now, Russia is rich, but Putin lacks human forces to stand the front. But on the meanwhile, Kim Jong-un's side is that economy is very bad in North Korea. He has great, you know, flood in North Korea a few months ago. So he needs a lot of, you know, hard currency. So now he may ask,

great payments by Putin for sending the troops. Another thing is that Kim Jong-un has made too much unrealistic military promises to North Korean people. For instance,

sending a spy satellite to the space before the end of this year. Maybe the building, nuclear submarine. It's like a grand plan, you know. But if we go back to North Korea's defense industry, it is really a very difficult and heavy burden on it, like a country, North Korea, to send, you know, good satellite to the space. So,

He made too many promises. But now, because of the Ukraine war, he sees a very, you know, a slight opportunity or a slight possibility to realize this ambition, because if Russia

North Korea this advanced spy satellite technologies or ICBM re-entry technologies, whatever, he can easily overcome the shortcomings. So we have to be very careful and conscious what kind of new technologies Russia would give if Kim Jong-un succeeds in a spy satellite or

or, you know, nuclear submarines or ICBM reentry, whatever. Kim Jong-un would not say to North Korean public that he achieved this

Thanks to Putin's help. No, he wouldn't say that. He said that because under his wise leadership, blah, blah, blah, he achieved this tremendous military development, you know. So that's why now I think Kim Jong-un's ambition and targets are very clear. Right. Yes.

You know, it's interesting because if you look at how North Korea has approached the relationship since it first came out a few years ago, two years ago now, almost to the date, that the two sides were in negotiations for possible provision of North Korean munitions and missiles in exchange for weapons.

other things from North Korea, from Russia, technologies, etc. And they've been very reluctant to be open about that in the media, of course, when eventually Russian officials began to visit Pyongyang and Kim Jong-un himself visited North Korea. The advances in the relationship were being more widely known.

Now we have people saying that perhaps a family of these soldiers will be isolated so that when they begin to come home in caskets, the people won't know about the sacrifices being made. But then there's also people saying that, like you noted, there are going to be people who know about this.

How do you expect the regime to portray this internally? Who will know the true nature? When something like this happens, there's obviously a national security and foreign policy elite who has access to Western media, etc. And then there will be people that don't know anything at all. How do you think the information, the messaging campaign will be managed by Pyongyang going forward?

Particularly if we see growing casualties, DPRK casualties on the battlefield. - Nowadays, all North Korean diplomats working abroad

know well that North Korean troops have been start to be deployed in the Russian front. But inside North Korea, this is still kept a secret. So maybe the families of those young soldiers are not aware of their sons being sent to Russia.

But how long these secrets could be kept, it could be dependent on how much casualties North Korea suffered. If thousands of North Korean soldiers died in

in the war, the Russian military to some extent, and they send a kind of, you know, death notice to the families. And when the families, you know, receive that, you know, the sacrifice notice from the military or from the government, I think they would be very much upset because inside North Korea now, even North Korea has a very low birth rate. Right. So there are only one or two

one child or two children in each family. So the parents cannot accept that their sons were killed not in defense of North Korea, but in defense of Russia. So this could be a great, you know, I think,

the things which actually North Korean regime is betting. So in the coming months could be a very decisive, you know, moments for North Korean regime. If North Korean troops

prevent large casualties, but played a kind of game changer in the front and actually advanced territory from Russian front, then all of sudden Kim Jong-un may use this kind of victory in the front as

way to consolidate his power over North Korea. For instance,

In April of 2018, when Kim Jong Un announced the accomplishment of nuclear development, he boasted that North Korea has now upgraded its level of status to the level of strategic state. So at that time, many people did not understand what does that mean.

Kim Jong Un, if he is successful in the Ukraine case, he may say to the leaders and of North Korean people domestically that because of these nuclear weapons,

North Korea can even take these troops out of North Korea and help the big country like Russia. Even big country like Russia come to ask for help to North Korea, like a small country like North Korea. Because of these nuclear weapons, he can send conventional weapons out

out of North Korea and even soldiers in return for huge, you know, hard currency. So he may do a lot of, you know, things to justify his nuclear development domestically. Would this also encourage Kim to believe he can be more aggressive, potentially even using force such as he did in 2010 with the sinking of the Cheonan?

or the shelling of Yonpingdo Island that now perhaps even with Russia's backing, either rhetorical/diplomatic or Russian military backing, he now has military options to establish dominance over South Korea on the Korean Peninsula? Or is that too far-fetched a scenario?

First of all, by sending the troops to Russia and receiving the hard currency and the other economic benefits, Kim Jong-un almost now succeeded in breaking UN sanction regime because now Russia does not support anymore UN sanction regime. That is the first achievement Kim Jong-un already got. The second thing is that

So far, North Korean military has never used new advanced technologies like missiles or multiple launches together with these forces. But now is the time for them to test these new technologies and equipments together with those armies in the real action of the field.

In the long run, it may increase a kind of confidence in Kim Jong-un using his conventional forces in relation with South Korea. So that's why I think it is the time not only for America, but also South Korea, try to join efforts to frustrate this Kim Jong-un's, this kind of strategic move in Ukraine war.

It seems like, though, you know, with Kim being thrown a lifeline essentially by Russia, that the the incentives he might have to engage the new U.S. administration following the inauguration next January or any incentives he may have had to engage the union administration are basically out the window. I mean, is it?

or even China, maybe Kim's perceptions of needing to rely in any way upon China, whether it be aid, assistance, investment, Chinese tourism, that now he can afford to ignore China as well. Do you believe that's the case? And for the near future, we might see North Korea that basically disengages from the United States and the ROK and ignores China?

I think as long as Kim Jong-un is paid by his soldiers and military cooperation with Russia, he would not open the dialogue with America or China because now the currencies keep on coming, you know? So that's why he may concentrate all on the relations with Russia. But if Ukraine war

is finished, then Kim Jong-un may come back to his relation with China or whatever. But so far, up to now, Kim Jong-un is just concentrating on the relations with the Russian

alone. And so I think in the future, the new American administration must make a very strategic move with North Korea. I think the new administration of America should continue to say to North Korea that

The denuclearization of North Korea is unchangeable goal of America. America would never compromise on this goal. That is, I think, very important. And also, I think America should try every possibility to invite China to

be on the front of America and South Korea side by convincing Chinese what they have seen by cooperation between Russia and North Korea. So we should try very hard, everything possible to bring China into a sanctioned regime against North Korea, I think. So

That is what the American administration should do in the near future. That's very encouraging because I think that comes from an assessment that you're making about Beijing's view that the relationship with South Korea is still important enough

to be responsive to possible approaches to cooperate on North Korea. I know many people have given up hope on China. You really believe that they could be a viable partner going forward? Yes, I think the American policy with China could be very important in the coming future.

So I think America should convince and also South Korean government as well that the future reunified Korean Peninsula could be beneficial to China, not threat to Chinese security. So that we should try to invite and bring in Chinese elements to our field.

Yeah, I think that's an important message. We face a month or so coming up where I think there'll be a lot of geopolitical changes on a global scale. What happens in the Middle East? What happens with the DPRK support to the Ukraine effort? What happens in terms of the U.S. election? And then, you know, what happens to, you know, China and China-U.S. relations? But the fact that, you know, you remind us we need to keep our eyes focused on

in particular on China, and to use the fact that right now Beijing is being ignored by both Moscow and Pyongyang in terms of being surprised at the intervention. Maybe China won't take the actions necessary to try to coerce North Korea to terminate or scale back its support.

But nevertheless, these are times for us to have more strategic discussions with China, whether it's the United States or the ROK, but certainly together to kind of lay out the possibility for a more peaceful future. Let me close with one question, and you can do with it what you want. You've been out for a number of years, and even before you defected, you had that unique opportunity to look at the DPRK from the outside.

And now you've dealt with and you've spoken with a number of US experts. Certainly, you've probably talked to everybody willing to call themselves a DPRK expert within the South.

What is it we most often get wrong that you think is so critical that we need to refocus on it and have a better understanding of the nature of North Korea, the North Korea system, the North Korea challenge? Oh, I think in the past, America...

the administration or some experts had a kind of illusion that if there is a proper incentives,

to convince North Korea or invite North Korea to reach a certain destination. I think that is really wrong. Whatever incentives America could deliver, North Korea would never give up its nuclear weapons. All those negotiations between North Korea and America are

From the point of North Korea. They always use those dialogues just to buy the time, you know to develop their nuclear or the weapons and

So if there is any new opportunity for American government to open again the dialogue with North Korea on nuclear issues, from first start of the dialogue, I think America should make it very clear that America's fundamental goal is denuclearization, not nuclear disarmament. I think that is the most important thing. And as long as there is Kim Jong-un regime in power,

there would be no denuclearization of North Korea. So that's why free reunification of Korean Peninsula is the only way to solve nuclear and human rights issues of North Korea. And America should support South Korea's unification policy.

Well, I think you raise some very good points about the nature of North Korea, its strategic goals going back. I think one of the powerful dimensions of the U.S. effort over the years is we've shared a lot of skepticism and cynical view of what would be possible, but it never stopped us.

from exploring negotiations when DPRK would activate the New York Channel or put something in KCNA or otherwise signal us. So I think remaining open to test that hypothesis has been, in particular over the past few years,

a good way for us to reassess that truth. And I think, you know, as we come into the next administrations here looking for how to approach this issue, a lot of what you spoke to us today about will be very helpful. And I thank you so very much, Secretary General Tay, for your time and for your efforts. I know in your heart,

even as you went from serving the DPRK and the diplomatic corps, you are now serving the people of the DPRK and trying to create a better future for them. And for that, too, I thank you. To our listeners, that's it. Thank you so very much for tuning in to this edition of The Impossible State. Look forward to seeing you next time. ♪