South Korea's Political Crisis
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North Korea is the impossible state. It's a place that stumped leaders and policymakers for more than three decades. It has a complex history, and it has become the United States' top national security priority. Each week on this show, we'll talk with the people who know the most about North Korea.

Welcome everyone to another episode of The Impossible State. My name is Victor Cha, President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at CSIS as well as Korea Chair and also Professor at Georgetown University.

Today we'll be talking not about North Korea, but about the political crisis in South Korea. And we're doing so with two good friends and Korea watchers here in Washington, DC, who won't be a stranger to any of you, but one of whom we're welcoming for the first time on The Impossible State. That's Dr. Darcy Draht-Viharis. She is a fellow for Korean Studies in the Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace just down the road from us here.

She has held a number of positions before then, but I think I first met you when you were at Council on Foreign Relations. I think so. Working for Scott. Working for Scott Snyder. Since then, you've gone on to really have a wonderful and illustrious career. You finished your PhD in political science at Johns Hopkins, as well as an MA in Korean Studies at Yonsei University GSIS.

and then a BA or AB in honors in anthropology from Davidson College. You've held postdocs at Princeton as well as at the Elliott School and like I said you were at the Council on Foreign Relations as well as a number of other places. Sort of really the pedigree of somebody who is becoming an expert on Korea here in the DC area. So Darcy, it's great to have you on the show. Thanks for having me.

And then of course we're welcoming back Bruce Klinger, an old friend and veteran of the show. As many of you know, Bruce is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation. He comes from 20 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he was once the CIA's Deputy Division Chief for Korea.

He's a graduate of the National War College where he got his MA in National Security Strategy, also a graduate of Middlebury. You're also practiced in many martial arts. I can't remember which ones, but many martial arts. We're not doing martial arts today. We're doing martial law, but it's close. I have slipped a couple times in interviews and talked about martial arts.

Well, yeah, well, Korean politics is kind of like martial arts. It's a sort of a blood sport. Right. Okay. So just to get us started, why don't we sort of review the state of affairs? I know we were just talking before we went on the air about how this is moving at such a, it's moving at like 100 miles an hour. And you can say one thing that

an hour ago and it could change an hour later but um darcy maybe just to sort of get us started you can tell us let's just start from what happened over the weekend and then uh talk about sort of where we are now that would be great yeah sure i mean it's been a tumultuous couple of weeks in south korean politics and for people that look at maybe court politics north of the dmz it's

It's a different game going on. It's different laws. It's different institutions. And for people who study, I think, democracy or democratic institutions, this has also been an interesting wake up in America and see what happened overnight in South Korea because there's been a lot going on. So on December 3rd, President Yoon declared martial law, and we've had a couple of conversations

here and there over the week, over that week. But over the weekend, this weekend, on Saturday, the National Assembly did pass a vote to impeach the president. And that was on the backs of not only the opposition parties,

in South Korea, but also now there were several members of South Korea's, the PPP, Yoon's own party who voted for impeachment. Yeah, yeah. And so the impeachment failed the first time they did it right after the martial law declaration that succeeded this past weekend. And so what happened after that, Bruce? Like, where do we go from here? Like, what?

Well, with the impeachment motion passed by the National Assembly by at least two-thirds, which it did, Yun's powers were immediately suspended, and they were transferred to the Prime Minister, Han Dexu, a very capable politician and someone who's been in the government in various aspects for 40 years, I think. In both parties, too, on both sides, both progressive and conservative. A very, very capable politician.

person to fill in for the presidency. So now the case goes to the Constitutional Court where they will either dismiss the motion, which then President Eulog would go back to being the president, but if he did that, I think it would just generate massive demonstrations calling for another impeachment.

or for him to resign. If the motion is upheld by six of the nine judges, then he is impeached and permanently removed from office. There are three vacancies right now on the nine-panel process.

And normally it takes seven judges voting on an issue, but they sort of changed the rules in October before all this happened, saying they can accomplish things with just six. But there have been nominations made, and those vacancies may be filled before the end of the month. Okay.

Okay, I want to talk more about that in a minute, but I want to still going back to the events over that we were all watching them very closely Darcy like what was your sense of like So what was sort of the political mood and clear career clearly people were upset with the declaration of martial law? It was just I mean the best word describe it is he was just stunning or inexplicable in many ways

But what was your sense when you were sort of following this and talking to people about what the public's reaction was? What was sort of the climate in Korea at this particular time? Yeah, I mean, I should start by saying I haven't been to Korea in the past couple weeks. And I wish I could to talk to people on the ground. But I've been talking to colleagues, experts and journalists that are on the ground in Korea.

And like you said, everybody was really shocked by the, it was not on, as the common saying around town is, it's not on the 2024 bingo card that the South Korean president would declare martial law. I mean, we,

We in Washington, I think, are well aware that President Yun has suffered from very low approval ratings and that he's been very frustrated with the political deadlock in the National Assembly to get some of his agenda items done before the end of the year, especially the budget a couple weeks ago. But this really was a shock. And the people that I talked to in Seoul were devastated, I think, in a lot of ways that this could happen.

I think there was a lot of the day after the martial law when it was rescinded by President Yoon, a feeling of comfort in that it could be resolved non-violently, certainly number one, but also in such a rapid manner. And then I think the third thing is that it's really says something about South Korea political society that did mobilize such a rapid response so quickly from civil society, from politicians across the board,

that this is something that is no stranger to South Koreans, particularly, I mean, in its whole modern history, certainly, but certainly in the past decade, there have been a number of mostly issue-based agenda items, things like the candlelight protests, trade agreements, these sorts of things, where civil society was a watchdog, I think, on a lot of areas of corruption. And whether what this counts as, I think, is another thing to be said, but

the mood, I think, is really one of readiness in Seoul. Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think on the one hand, you know, a democratic president declaring martial law makes it look like democracy is not that resilient in South Korea. But then the way the system responds, like the people, the opposition party, the legislature responds, makes you have some confidence that there's resilience. I mean, there's

People are trying to play by the rules to an extent I mean there was this like one period of time when There was a little bit of concern that he might declare martial law a second time and that I think got people very very concerned I think people here in Washington DC obviously there as well quite concerned and thankfully he was very clear that he wasn't gonna do that

Yeah, Bruce, you were going to add something. Yeah, certainly surprise and shock, I think, was the initial reaction by those in Seoul as well as here. And then anger. So not only the...

Why would the president do this? And when you see his justification, it doesn't hold water. It's a frustration with the political gridlock, which democracy is messy. And if the opposition has a majority, they make your life miserable if you're the president. So he complained about not being able to accomplish his agenda properly.

and having many of his cabinet members impeached or threatened to be impeached. But I think collectively, old and young, conservative and progressive in South Korea were angered because this was bringing back the history that they had worked so hard to overcome. With democratization in 1987, Korea, both parties, the populists, et cetera, have worked very hard to instill democratization

And I think there's still perhaps a sense of embarrassment of its dark past, of military coups, assassinations, impeachments or attempts at impeachment. Being a president or former president in Korea doesn't have a long history.

life expectancy. If you look at what's happened to presidents over the years, I think only one of them has sort of emerged unscathed, Moon Jae-in. So I think for the populace, it was, this is not us anymore. This was our past. You were reopening that door. You're sort of indirectly besmirching the reputation of South Korea. So I think that's why you saw so many people out in the streets

I don't think it was a partisan demonstration. It was collectively across the board. And when you saw either 70% or 90%, depending on the poll, of people who thought he should be impeached, that clearly is not a partisan polling. Right, right. Yeah, no, I think that's...

I think that's right. And the demonstrations were quite, it's hard to tell because we weren't there. I mean, I got a lot of call from business friends who had plans to go to Korea and they were like, should I go? Should I go? And I said, you know, what I told them was like, there are political protests in Korea, but

This is not chaos, if you will, right? As we all know, they protest. They were at Yoido, right? They were in front of the, in Gwanghwamun. They were large and everything. And then when the protests end, they clean up everything. Like it's really, when people see that, they're just amazed. It's sort of that aspect of it. And business goes on, right? So I actually told all of them they should go. And it was a very interesting time for them to be there.

Maybe we can talk a little bit more about sort of where we go from here. All the action now moves to the Constitutional Court. We've actually got a piece coming out on the Constitutional Court today or tomorrow at CSIS. But like you said, Bruce, so there normally are nine judges, right? Now we only have six. The six appear like they're going to be the ones who are going to deliberate on this case.

Historically, the court matters, right? Because

They affirmed the judgment against Park Geun-hye, right? And she was impeached. They did not affirm the judgment on Noh Mi-hyun in 2004. And he went back to work. He went back to office, you know, for, you know, and served out the rest of his term. So, Darcy, maybe we can start with you and just give us your thoughts on what this constitutional court process is going to look like and any thoughts you have on sort of

what's going to happen, how long they're going to deliberate, those sorts of things. Yeah, I mean, obviously the stakes are really high and not only is the issue area particularly tricky, but also the fact that they only have nine sitting justices right now does put some added pressure on the deliberation process. Now, as Bruce mentioned, there's precedent that

just this past fall, in another impeachment process for a different official that said that six justices can rule in this case. So that area seems to be settled in a certain amount. But I think the bigger thing to be looking at right now, and I'm not a scholar of Korean constitutional law, so I've been trying to read up as much as I can on the relevant precedents or the institution of the court itself. But it seems to me that

right now there's enough ambiguity in some of these that it could become politicized in a certain way. So that's why I think it's important for us to note that a lot of these-- there isn't a clear cut. And so there's a lot of analysis out there that says, no, this doesn't fall under this--

decree doesn't fall under this for x and y reasons but a lot of this doesn't necessarily have direct precedent or there's ambiguities in the court so there is going to be care but at the same time because of the immense popular pressure as brut outlined um there is a lot of pressure from the public to reconcile this quickly especially you know if if we're in this

with the prime minister serving as acting president and his questions about his longevity also up in the air, the public wants an executive that has some staying power. So that does put extra pressure on the court to make a decision quickly. - Yeah, yeah. I mean, there was that previous case that you just mentioned that the court ruled on

Bruce, we were talking earlier about how the court breaks down in terms of these folks. You want to talk a little bit about that? Right. So of the nine judges, three are appointed by the president, three are appointed by the National Assembly.

and three appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, which is a separate court. So there were some retirements in October, and what I just saw recently is that the court has announced it may start deliberations or start the process on December 27th, and that they may try to seat three more judges.

and it would be because of the breakdown in the parties in the National Assembly, two would be proposed by the opposition party, one would be proposed by the ruling party, which is a minority. Given the high stakes and given the politicization and the gridlock,

you wonder if those would be approved. But they can do it with six, but by only having six out of nine, even one judge voting against upholding the impeachment motion means that it's dismissed. And then you can get into, you know,

if a judge is appointed by the president or by a particular political party, is he or she totally impartial or not? And you have that same argument in the United States as well as in South Korea. And what's interesting on the impeachment motion is they're not only talking about

sort of issues that a president would have immunity from but they're bringing up insurrection or in some translations treason uh so there's no presidential immunity for that and it could go to jail or even a death sentence but um

uh... so is again it's very high stakes because they're now saying the opposition party is saying it's insurrection uh... you know you the use of armed forces to impede the constitutional process of south korea you had the the president is very kind of long-winded justification speech uh... after he rescinded the impeachment burden the martial law that he was that he was blaming the opposition

not only for obstructionism, but even for the large number of protests calling for Jens Ouster that have occurred out on the streets, and that he blamed them for being a threat to democracy. So certainly two very different views as to his justification. So in addition to the impeachment, there's a parallel criminal case that's been opened up now where he's actually been summoned.

And he's refused to answer the summons. So they could even arrest him at this point, too, although that would be...

That would be unprecedented. And the prime minister is under investigation for his role because he was in the government. But the opposition said, well, we're going to stand down on trying to impeach him or have him arrested because we want the process to go forward and also we want someone to be at the helm of the ship of state. Do we have any sense, I mean, both of you, do we have any sense of whether what Bruce, you said earlier, was in fact the case that

these justices are kind of, depending on who, how they're appointed, they are kind of leaning in one direction or another. Do we have any sense of that? Well, I think during the Pakene impeachment, there were accusations that some of the judges were

either more political than the others. And I'm sure it's a case of if the judge rules in favor of what you want, they're not political. And, you know, they're political if they vote against what you would like. But I think they were also strongly influenced by the very large demonstrations going on for weeks or months against Park Geun-hye. And some Koreans would say, well, yeah, they should be influenced by public opinion that if a large number of the people want something, then

they should take that into account. Others would say, no, you go strictly by the legal book. Darcy, any thoughts on that? Yeah, so in the Pagane case, the judges and their deliberation and how they actually ruled were public or made public.

which is not the norm for the Constitutional Court, but because of the very strong political pressure they were. I think even naming the presiding judge was unusual in the Pakene impeachment. So I think it was just trying to be as transparent as they could. So, you know, I'm sure we'll get into it later, but sort of the policy implications of having a caretaker government, which, you know, you wonder how much they can actually

implement policy or even determine it, but the timing is not good given the

the growing North Korean and China threats as well as the presidential transition in the US as well as kind of a newly weak leadership in Japan. Yeah, well, let's talk about that. But I mean, let's talk about that. Because meanwhile, while all of this is going on inside of South Korea, it's like a vortex of things going on inside of South Korea, legal, political,

Criminal like all these sorts of things. Meanwhile, the world is going on right and here in the United States We have a political transition. We're in the midst of a political transition Donald Trump will take office January 21st And as some former Trump officials described to me It's not going to be the first hundred days It's going to be the first hundred hours where they will be all sorts of things that he's gonna do EOS and all these sorts of things and

So how does this current situation in Korea sort of affect policy, affect the alliance, foreign policy, especially with a new administration coming in in the United States? So Darcy, why don't you go first on this? Yeah, there's a lot of, I think, burden placed on the South Koreans right now. And given the political turmoil, it's going to be really difficult. I mean, all of us sitting in Washington have been meeting with a lot of Koreans the past few months.

both leading up to the election and right after the US election, and talking through what does it mean for our political transition here in Washington for the state of the alliance, especially given potentially different agenda items when it comes to foreign policy. Now I think that there is, we could talk about this a little bit, but not to get too far off track, I will say I think in Washington there's broad consensus about what the Indo-Pacific policy is and how the US-South Korea alliance in particular fits into that.

But that's not necessarily the case in South Korea. And in fact, you know, foreign policy issue areas that Yoon did make some progress on during his years so far in office were, have been politicized in South Korea. And so that makes it very difficult, I think, for South Korea, the South Korean side to do the sort of behind the scenes alliance management work that are going to be needed in the next coming, well, apparently 100 hours when it comes to,

strengthening the United States, making sure that we still have the robust alliance centered on common issue areas in the next few months, if not the next few years. Yeah, yeah. I mean, do you think, like, do you think

President Trump would meet with somebody like conduct sue. I mean not there's nothing wrong with on that suit Like we all think he's great. I mean, you know, he was ambassador here Under you know, he served under the previous progressive governments conservative governments. He's a technocrat through and through But in you know with a new president with a new president like Donald Trump coming in and

Do you think an acting president in Korea can be effective? Can you still manage the alliance largely through the foreign minister and Marco Rubio? I mean, is this all possible or is this just wishful thinking?

I'd say yes and no. I mean, the underlying structure is there. Clearly, the alliance, the military officials and policymakers are in place. They and the intelligence communities of both countries are very vigilant, identifying any indications that North Korea is doing something militarily or preparing to do so. The foreign policy establishments will be there.

both the residual foreign policy establishment under the administration and then the incoming Trump administration. So the systems will work. You know, whether Hunduk Suh meets with President Trump, it may depend on how long sort of the trial takes and then

After that, if the Constitutional Court upholds the impeachment motion, then within 60 days, South Korea has to have a new election for president. So I might think that if Han Duk-soo and Trump are attending a multilateral meeting,

Then they might get together, but I think it's less likely that that Trump would go to Korea Specifically to meet with the Prime Minister acting president or vice versa so they may meet but it all I think depends on the existing schedule multilateral meetings But you know if we had had this broadcast, you know in early September the story would have been You know beyond we don't know who would win the election, but you know if mr. President if

Mr. Trump is elected president, we don't know what his policies will be. He likes to be unpredictable. We can try to extrapolate from his first term. But there are different views, both amongst experts as well as those who would likely go into government.

on is Taiwan the only real priority issue, or do we also need to maintain our adherence to commitments made to our treaty allies in Europe and Asia? All of us have gotten many visits from Koreans and Japanese of reassure me. We are uncertain, and that breeds stress and a sense of crisis.

You know, now, after late September and then October, when Ishiba came in as the new prime minister in Japan, called a snap election, which went the opposite of what he wanted. He thought he'd get a popular mandate. And instead, he lost the party's majority for the first time in 15 years. So now Japan...

is sort of inward looking. The ship estate is still going in the same direction, but the sails are luffing. So it's going to be more inefficient, more uncertain as to what they can do to deliver on their security promises. And now with South Korea really in political turmoil and

a constitutional crisis. So early September would have been uncertain US policy of a new administration, but two strong stalwart allies in lockstep with US priorities. That's no longer the case. With Japan, it's in the same direction, but more weakly. With Korea, if the opposition wins, they're going to implement very different policies out of alignment with what the US wants. So let's pick up on that last point.

Well, we don't know when the election will be and we don't know who will be running in that election because who knows a few months from now.

the leader of the PPV just resigned, right? He just resigned and they're still waiting for the appeals court decision on E.J. Myung's case, on his sentence. So like, who knows who's going to be left standing. But so Darcy, you can pick up on either of these threats. One is sort of, you know, what are the potential changes in policy as if we transition from a UN administration forward?

or the other question of like, who is left standing? Who's going to be left standing after all of this, all of this is said and done that could actually lead the country. Yeah. I mean, I think we, I want to talk about both of those, but I do want to hit on the second one first, at least maybe Bruce can weigh in on it too, is that this is, as I was watching this unfold the week that Yoon declared martial law and then rescinded it, this reminded me of a,

earlier instances in South Korean politics where there were critical junctures that made the major democratic and conservative parties rebrand. And I think that this is, I saw this as potentially a good opportunity for both parties suffering from lack of public trust in many instances, just across the board, but also

the specific leaders that you mentioned being embroiled in different sorts of scandals, whether legal or issues of political overreach or misuse of power or otherwise, that this was actually a good moment for both parties to step back and potentially rebound. And this is something that, as people who follow South Korea politics closely know, this happens quite regularly. And you can chalk this up to potentially the fact that South Korean parties are relatively weak compared to other similar democracies, but

I saw it as potentially a good moment for South Korea, particularly because it has demonstrated such widespread democratic resilience on the popular front and a crucial re-examining of what are political issues for both the Democratic and the Conservative parties, what is making the platform, both domestic and foreign policy, as a good moment. So that's why I was a little bit disheartened when the PPP initially stood by Yoon because I thought that this is just kind of

they're missing a potential opportunity to do that sort of rebranding, whether it's under a new leader, name change, which is probably going to happen, as is wont to do in South Korean politics. But this being the case, that the party leader did resign, that potentially is signaling that the conservatives will go in that direction. And if Yoon is, in fact-- if his impeachment is uphold by the court, then that could happen. And I think the same could be said for the Democrats.

Their landscape is a little bit different right now, especially like you said, the leading politician and potential candidate, Lee Jae-myung, also has some scandals that would, as of now, prevent him from running in the next election. But I think both parties...

are at a moment where they could potentially regroup and also realign themselves with what the majority, like what Korean citizenry is wanting of their political parties. Okay. Yeah, I mean, kind of creative destruction, right? I mean, they need to, both of them, I do.

I agree, and often when we have political crises like this, we do see a complete change in parties. I mean, as you said, they still tend to be based on personalities rather than having sort of deep, deep ideologies.

or deep grassroots roots to them. So we'll see. What about on foreign policy going forward? What are your thoughts on that? Again, I mean, those comments notwithstanding, as it looks now, there are differences in foreign policy. I think Bruce also has a lot to say about this. But, you know, the conservative establishment right now would...

be very activist in courting or recording a Trump administration coming in, particularly when it comes to North Korea issues, China and the Taiwan issue. I'll leave it to Bruce to talk a little bit more about that. On the Democrat side right now in South Korea, there is

In the establishment, in the kind of elder statesmen of South Korean democratic side, there's a greater desire to reengage with North Korea, which is certainly not on the Trump administration's agenda right now for a variety of reasons. Lee Jae-myung has made some comments about a more conciliatory policy toward China, which

What that means, I think, is still a little bit unclear. In my reading of it, others disagree. But I do think, and this is what is important, and I'm trying to disentangle in my own research, is what's the future of a progressive foreign policy in South Korea? I'm under the impression that, as it stands right now, the South Korean progressives wouldn't be able to, for a variety of structural reasons. I mean, China, USA,

rivalry as it is right now, number one, and then probably more importantly, number two, North Korea has really retrenched into a more isolationist policy, especially this past year, first with the change of its constitution, no longer seeking reunification, its more active alliance with Russia right now.

It goes against a lot of what the Democrats in South Korea would like to achieve with North Korea, and it makes it pretty much impossible right now to a sort of more activist engagement policy with North Korea. So that being the case, I think that there is going to be some necessary foreclosures

forced rethinking on the part of Democrats in South Korea, number one. And then number two, I think that there is a brewing generational divide when it comes to Democrats in South Korea. And we can see this, you know, things like public opinion as it pertains to who are enemies and who are our allies. I think younger Koreans

across the board, Democrats and conservatives alike, are much more favorable to the United States and the alliance. And I think that's really important for us to consider going forward because it means that the future of a Democratic leadership, maybe not this particular incoming, if the Democrats win this coming election, but in the next 10 years, there will be a kind of sea change going on to how South Koreans across the board see their role in the region. And by extension, the

the role of their alliance with the United States. Yeah. So based on that, what Darcy just said, Bruce, if I pick sort of three issues that you could consider sort of signature issues of UN's foreign policy, right? Camp David, support in Ukraine, and then South Korea's active participation in G7, right?

What are the future of those things in a new South Korean government? Well, there's a lot on the table here. You know, I was just thinking on the sort of on the election. You know, I think if you fast forward, it's the opposition is going to win. I mean, there always tends to be a pendulum effect in any country's, you know, elections. You know, but then the voter in Korea will be like,

Do I want to vote for the party whose president implemented martial law, or do I want to vote for the party whose head is under indictment for four or more crimes? It's not necessarily a great choice. But there was a poll that said I think 54% of respondents were in favor of E.J. Hmong and 10% in favor of whoever the top conservative is.

So I think the Democratic Party is going to win the election, sort of whoever's at the helm. And, you know, E.J. Mung may want a very quick election because then it may give him immunity from these indictments. That doesn't sound familiar at all. Yeah. And, you know, but when you think of

what will the Trump policies be? What will a DP policy be? It's a lot of uncertainty. Several of us have made a career out of saying, I don't know, for several decades. But we say it with great authority and great conviction. And they still come back to us, which always puzzles my wife. Why do they keep

talking to you when you say I don't know. But I think with the DP, clearly, there would be very different policies. I really liked President Yun's foreign and security policies. I think the United States government did. As you pointed out, you know, he strengthened the alliance to serve as the foundation for Korea's outreach to Japan and North Korea and China. Trump or

I'm sorry, Yun criticized his predecessors for having strategic ambiguity and trying to sit on the fence between China as their biggest trading partner, the US as their security guarantor. And Yun said, look, no, we're coming down in favor of the United States. Now, that said, China remains their biggest trading partner.

The outreach to Japan was very bold, very politically risky, but was reciprocated by Japan so that now we have stronger bilateral relations between our two important allies and then trilateral military exercises, etc.

As I've said, in the past couple of years under Yun, we should be drinking heavily in celebration because at some point we're going to be drinking heavily in commiseration. And it's just now it's maybe coming two years early. So some will say the DP is going to moderate its progressive foreign policy given the widespread...

suspicion or anger by the South Korean populace against China. North Korea has not made itself any friends in South Korea. So they would moderate. It won't be what Moon Jae-in did. On the other hand, I think they will be much more conciliatory towards North Korea and China. Lee Jang-mung has said, why should Korea be in any way involved in a Taiwan contingency?

I think they're going to implement a much more nationalist approach towards Japan. I think they would undo the forced labor issue. And then toward the U.S., progressives have tended to be a bit more standoffish with the alliance, often blaming Washington for raising tensions on the peninsula more than North Korea. So that's not the message that an incoming Trump administration is going to want to hear. They are looking for our allies to do more in the region vis-a-vis the China threat,

And whether it's a you're with us or you're against us, or more of a herding cats of just trying to get countries in the region to do more, but kind of to the extent that they can do it, I have a feeling it may be more, look, China is the existential threat to the United States as well as to the region.

we're looking for much more from you. And so if Korea and even Japan can't deliver on that, then I think they're going to have more strained relations. Well, a couple of points. The first is on your point about potential moderation by the DP. I thought it was interesting that the first impeachment resolution

also included reference to his Japan policy as being treasonous or grounds for impeachment. There was a lot of pushback to that, not just from the PPP, but in general, there was a lot of pushback to that. And in their second, the second impeachment motion that passed this weekend, that was not, that was omitted from it. So that's, you know, that's one sign moderation. The other is, it's just, it's just such a bizarre, um,

concatenation of events because on the one hand you could have a dp that comes in with the policies that you're talking about and some of those may be in friction with the united states but some of them may not under a trump administration so for example the dp won't want to do what yun has done on done on ukraine but a new trump a trump administration may come in and have decided like they know what they're doing on ukraine and it's not much right um or like the one the the you know the elephant in the room we didn't talk about is whether trump is going to like draw down

troops on the Korean Peninsula, like he's famous for saying that he wants to do that. And, you know, it's not clear that the DP would be 100% opposed to that, right? If it opens up avenues for conversations with North Korea, these sorts of things. So there's a whole, I think there's a whole host of things coming down the road that could be in many ways paradigm shifting.

and whether Trump wants to reach out to North Korea either early or during his second term. And I think a good argument could be made for both why he wouldn't be interested and why he would. Why he wouldn't, he, like any incoming president, is going to want to focus on the economy, on domestic issues. That's what he got elected on. And foreign policy always intrudes, but usually it's the crises, the shooting wars,

so i think he would focus on russia ukraine perhaps try to resolve that as he as he said he would uh middle east and then even though it's not a shooting war yet china will be the priority foreign policy issue not only for the trump administration but for congress there certainly has been a shift towards i think everyone wanting to be tough on china it's just a matter of

degree. So you could argue against it and also Kim may not be interested. He tried, it didn't work. He's getting more benefits from Russia with fewer conditions than he could ever get from the US. Or

Kim may see a way of gaining strategic objectives from engaging with Trump, canceling military exercises, maybe floating a peace treaty or a peace declaration idea. And then similarly with the Trump administration, we've seen the appointment of Richard Grenell as sort of special rep for

you know, tough issues or crisis issues, which would include North Korea. Alex Wong is the principal deputy national security advisor. You know, one media report of the incoming administration is looking to reach out.

That could be an indication that despite these other perhaps higher priority foreign policy issues that Trump or people in his administration will try to initiate dialogue with North Korea, which the DP would very much welcome, even if they aren't playing the balancer act that Moon Jae-in tried to play.

That's interesting. Sorry, just to build on this, I think it's interesting too because then we have a question of who is setting our agenda items in the alliance too, right? Because right now in South Korea with the political turmoil that isn't, it's going to be at least a couple months if

probably more until we have a more stable presidency. And presuming it is a Democrat, that's a long runway for not just the president in South Korea, but the foreign ministry and relevant ministry establishments to help shape what that's going to look like in the alliance context. So even if there are these high-level alignments, kind of a strange bedfellower, or however we want to portray it with the Trump and the Democrats in South Korea,

There's a lack of clarity, I think, on the part in the United States on who is going to be working in South Korea, number one. And number two, are the South Koreans then going to, in turn,

coming back and helping reshape what are the finer details of what that looks like in the region. I mean, especially considering Trump is going to be, the administration is going to be fixated on the bigger picture items, the China, the Taiwan question, not necessarily wonky alliance management issues. So that's a long runway. The other thing that I think is relevant to our conversation is, you know, it's not new to say that Trump in his first term did

have a personality-driven diplomatic style. One, if we're not necessarily having those leadership positions set in South Korea, that puts them at a really big disadvantage. And two, are those who are in place, like Prime Minister Han, they're not necessarily known for big, despite, you know, careers and illustrious careers as ambassadors, they're not necessarily known for going out on the golf course and in the kinds of ways that you or

or others were able to do during the first Trump administration. So I think that that puts South Korea at a bit of a disadvantage, regardless of what party is in control. Yeah, I mean, I think it's like, if you think about, in one sense, like if you had a DP in Trump, you could see like,

both of them interested in some sort of retrenchment that are for different reasons, but there would be less policy friction, right? In a bizarre sort of way. Like, so the United States wants to get out of the Ukraine war, like the South Koreans don't want to be involved in the Ukraine war under you. And it's like, there's one. And then the other is this sort of parallel interest in North Korea. I don't think Trump can help himself. Like, I think the spectacle of meeting with Kim, he just likes it too much. Like so much TV, so much coverage.

So he won't be able to get away from that. Of course, for the DP, they would like something. But I think like what you said, where the real rub will be is China, because there, you know, very clearly the DP has always wanted to have a China policy that was largely driven by its North Korea policy, right? They need China to make North Korea work. Like they need China's help.

And so that's where there may be friction because clearly on China, there's going to be a lot of continuity between Biden and Trump, economic security, all these other sorts of things. But we're over time. But I want to get, since this is a podcast about North Korea, I want to get back to one last question, which takes us back from the speculation back to the present. And I want to ask you both.

So what so we're in the middle of this, what looks like a very uncertain period, political dysfunction, a lot of waiting. And so what is North Korea's play in all this? What do you think that there are they going to take advantage of this? Are they going to sit back and watch it? Like, what do you what do you think is going to happen?

with North Korea. And we can't say, I don't know. One of them is, I don't know. The other one is, we'll see. That keeps them coming back. You took away my good answer. You know, it's been said...

Napoleon reportedly said, "Don't interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake." So when people say, "Oh, North Korea is going to take advantage and do something big militarily," well, they didn't do that during 1980 with the Gwangju Incident when there was real turmoil, real concerns about the stability of South Korea. They didn't move.

And then people say, well, what about tactical provocations? Well, they're doing that every day anyway. So I think North Korea is just sitting back and just watching its opponent implode and enjoying the country sort of tearing itself apart. And then if the opposition comes into office, whether North Korea is willing to engage with them or not,

It's, you know, the DP would be less willing to push engagement. I'm sorry, less willing to push for pressure or sanctions, less likely to engage in trilateral exercises or relations with the U.S. and Japan. So I think North Korea will just say this is good for me. I don't really need to do anything.

Yeah, Darcy, your thoughts? Yeah, I completely agree. I mean, the Napoleon quote, I think, is particularly apt in this case. We've overused it already, but yeah. Yeah, I mean, in this immediate term, North Korea gains nothing by any sort of low-level provocation, which I think we should take some sort of comfort in that. It's the medium term that I think we need to look at, and particularly what happens with how it's relating with Russia. I mean, I know this is a whole other kind of verms, but just shortly, I think it's a very transactional relationship

in the short term and how Trump will deal with Russia, as he says he will swiftly, I think that that's gonna potentially put North Korea in. If there's a friction or North Korea is no longer getting everything it needs from Russia anymore, then that's gonna be where North Korea will start looking more southward.

Yeah. So in the Woodrow Wilson Cold War archives, there is this famous exchange between Kim Il Sung and Ceausescu. I think it was Ceausescu during Gwangju, where they asked him, are you going to do anything about it? And his response is basically, no, I'm going to sit back and watch it implode. Right. That was basically his response. So it's very similar to what you're saying. And I agree. I mean, I think North Korea is going to sit back. But the other thing is, you know, the other

correlation we see is that North Korea can't help themselves when a new government comes in in the United States, right? They need to do something big. They did it to Obama, right? First nuclear within like, I think the first or the second quarter of the year, they did a nuclear test and under Trump, they did a thermonuclear test. They did not do one under Biden, but that was because they were in pandemic lockdown. So

On the one hand, I think I agree with you. They're going to keep their powder dry. On the other hand, once Trump comes in or any time a new president comes in, they feel the need, like they have to sort of make a big show or do something. So...

Anyway, we're over time and thanks for a great conversation to Darcy and Bruce. Happy holidays to both of you. I hope you have a restful and peaceful holiday season. For all of you watching The Impossible State, thank you again for joining us for another episode. This is our last episode before the holiday breaks. We want to wish you all

Happy holidays and a happy new year. We do have one more episode of the Capital Cable coming up later this week. So we hope you'll stay tuned in for that on Friday. So Mark Lippert, there you go. I'm advertising for our sister program on CSIS. But we'll see you all soon. And again, happy holidays and happy new year.