America Votes: What It Means for Asia
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Hi, I'm Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policy's Editor-in-Chief. This is FP Live. Welcome to the show and to our final episode of our special series, America Votes What It Means for the World.

Every day this week, we have released an episode that explored how the two presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Kamala Harris, might agree or disagree on how to manage a different part of the world. And today, we're tackling the vast mass of territory that is Asia. In many ways, if you set aside the unpredictable wars in the Middle East and Europe, the primary driver of recent U.S. foreign policy has been competition with China.

If you want to pass a climate change bill, make it about China. If you have a big industrial policy plan, make it about China. If you want to get the G7 to align on something, make it about China. And this isn't just hypothetical. This is exactly what has happened in the last four years. Whether that's right or wrong, it's become an animating principle in Washington with both parties largely in the same camp.

And just as there's agreement on being tough on China, there's also a fair bit of agreement on partnering more closely with countries like Japan, South Korea and India, all of them big economies in Asia. The question then is, where do Trump and Harris actually disagree on all of this? What do their advisors say?

where I have two excellent guests with me today. Ryan Haas served as the Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the National Security Council between 2013 and 2017, and he is now Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. And Lin Kwok is also at Brookings now. She's the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asian Studies there.

Ryan Lin, welcome back to FP Live.

Thank you, Ravi. It's great to be with you. Thank you so much, Ravi, for having us. So, Ryan, I'm going to start with you first, and we have to begin with China. What do we know about how Trump and Harris differ on managing Washington's relationship with Beijing?

Well, I actually think that there is a fairly wide divergence between how a Trump administration or a Harris administration would approach China. This cuts a little bit against the grain because the commonly held view in Washington is that there is a consensus on dealing with China. But if you really look at the potential leaders, President Trump is focused on trying to find leverage to secure concrete objectives, concrete measurable goals.

In the first term, he was fixated on the trade deficit as a proxy of fairness in the US-China relationship. Fast forward to 2024, 2025, the trade deficit is still with us. And I expect that if he is reelected, that this will be an issue that he will focus intently on as well. And to get at the trade deficit, he needs to find sources of leverage. The source of leverage that he prefers most is tariffs.

and his unpredictability, this irascible, unanticipable nature of the way that he approaches China. The other feature that makes President Trump unique is his commitment to personal chemistry, this innate belief that he has that through charm and charisma and personal rapport, he can bend other leaders to his will, including Xi Jinping.

And that is part of why Donald Trump goes out of his way during campaign events to praise President Xi, even though the overall mood in the United States towards China is pretty dark and negative.

He's trying to put in this bank of goodwill for future use with President Xi, the ability to try to move him on issues that are a priority to him. Now, looking at the other side of the ledger, I don't think that Vice President Harris as president would adopt any of those approaches necessarily. She's much more focused on taking a conceptual view of strengthening America's long-term competitiveness for dealing with an ascendant China.

And in her articulation, the most important elements of that are investing at home in America's sources of domestic strength and aligning with allies, cohering with them to present more of a united front for pushing back against Chinese transgressions.

Those are not high priorities for President Trump, and that's where the split sort of emerges. Ryan, just one thing there I have to point out, and this has come up in the debates as well. You mentioned the importance of tariffs for Trump, but the Biden administration continued many of the Trump tariffs on China. Doesn't that mean then that there is a fair bit of consistency over the last seven or eight years on China policy?

I think that philosophically, Harris and Trump have different views of what tariffs are capable of doing. I think that President Trump views tariffs as this magic weapon that can be deployed at will to make the world more in his likeness and preference. He has talked about tariffs as being able to solve America's child care problems, its health care problems, its infrastructure problems.

Vice President Harris doesn't talk of tariffs in these ways. She views them much more as a narrow targeted tool to protect specific industries that are running up against state-backed competition from China. So I actually think that the analogy breaks down when you start to look at it a little bit more closely. Let me bring you in here, just flipping this a little bit. Do you know or have any sense of whether Xi Jinping would rather a Trump or a Harris presidency?

There's a saying that the devil alone knows the mind of man. And I think that's particularly true in the case of Xi Jinping and what he thinks. I do not know personally what he thinks, but I suspect that if I were Xi Jinping, I would be more worried about a Trump presidency given some of the

the erratic behavior and inconsistencies that one might expect from a Trump administration or at least a Trump presidency.

So if I were him, I suspect I would be more worried about Trump. Then again, I think coming back to your initial question about whether or not there are the sort of similarities versus differences between a Trump or a Harris administration, I think he would be, Xi Jinping would be quite clear eyed about the fact that there will be similarities across both administrations.

And so let me outline some of my thoughts on that in terms of similarities. In my view, I think that the differences between potential Trump or Harris administration are overstated. Both view China as the United States primary or main strategic competitor.

Second, I think both would prioritize the Indo-Pacific region given its interests in countering China. And because of this interest in countering China, I think both would also seek to engage allies and partners to do so. Now, former President Trump has been accused of riding roughshod over being dismissive of alliances.

And of course, we might see him revert to his more transactional instincts and demanding greater contributions from allies. But I think a more hawkish and focused Trump 2.0 would ultimately seek to deepen security and economic ties with

important allies and partners so as to better counter China. So I think Xi Jinping would likely have all these similarities in mind and not have too rosy a view about a potential Harris administration and what that might mean for China. Ryan, let me bring you back in. I think one thing that has come up again and again in these conversations we've had all week is

is whether there is any daylight between Harris and Biden. We keep talking about the Biden-Harris administration, but we don't know exactly what Harris's own unique views are or her own policies are, not just on China, but Asia more broadly. Do you have any sense of where there might be daylight between the two of them? Well, I will be irresponsibly speculative to offer a response to your question, which is that

I think that Vice President Harris and Joe Biden, President Biden, are just products of different generations, different eras. President Biden grew up in a Cold War era where there was good versus evil, black versus white, democracy versus communism. And you see that carrying over to the way that he approaches competition with China today. He talks about the battle between democracy and autocracy, that we are at an inflection point in history and that the good guys have to prevail.

You don't hear Vice President Harris use that sweeping language. She's much more lawyerly and precise in the way that she talks about things. And she's a product of a different generation, a generation that grew up in the post-Cold War era that doesn't necessarily see the world as divided between democracies versus autocracies, but sees a need for the United States to lead

and confronting and galvanizing action to address global challenges. So that's where I think the principal distinction will be. And I think it'll be seen very acutely in the way that she approaches and deals with China and the rest of Asia.

And I want to just begin to broaden out a little bit outside of China itself, but to neighboring areas, which all again have to deal with China. And Lin, I want to bring you back in here. The South China Sea, we've all been worried looking at the escalating tensions over the last few months between the Philippines and China. And the US has a mutual defense treaty with Manila. Do you have any sense of how the two candidates might treat this particular issue differently?

I think it's important to start with the similarities again. I think the broad goals and objectives between the two candidates are broadly the same. So both will be focused on securing what the United States refers to as freedom of navigation, but perhaps more accurately should be referred to as freedoms of the seas. Both would be focused on countering China's expansive claims

and both would be concerned about maintaining the rule of law in the South China Sea. I know Trump is always criticized for his lack of regard for international law, but I think it's also important to remember that it was

Secretary Pompeo and a Trump administration that finally had the United States not just saying that both parties needed both parties to the International Tribunal ruling needed to abide by the tribunal ruling, but going further to say that the United States was aligning its maritime claims and position on the ruling as well. Where we might see differences is in

Trump versus Harris response to a potential triggering of the mutual defense treaty that you pointed out, whether or not Trump administration would in fact come to the Philippines aid in the event of the triggering of that 1951 mutual defense treaty. And also separately, whether or not the Trump administration or President Trump

would demand greater contributions from the Philippines beyond the nine Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement sites, which the United States uses as facilities and could use in a potential war with China.

Um, and that would be damaging for, um, the U S relations with the Philippines and, uh, potentially undermine, um, the sense of its reliability as an important ally. Um, I think a Harris administration, um, given vice president Harris's focus on international law is likely to honor, um,

the mutual defense treaty and not set it out as a negotiation or bargaining tool. I think she is going to stand very clearly behind the fact that it is an ironclad commitment vis-a-vis the Philippines, as the Biden-Harris administration has clearly stated. I suspect that at the outset of her administration, she is likely to reiterate

both the fact that the mutual defense treaty does cover the South China Sea, as well as the fact that it also covers Coast Guard vessels. So I think she's going to be quite clear about the extent of U.S. obligations under the mutual defense treaty.

Ryan, I'm wondering if you agree there, but also take us to Taiwan, because that's another huge potential flashpoint that the United States might get involved with. And contrast the Trump and Harris approaches to defending Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression.

Well, Ravi, if you look back at the record of President Trump's first administration and some of the recounting of it by Bob Woodward and others, President Trump continually goes back to this question, what are we getting out of our defense of our support for allies and partners? What are we gaining from it? He treats these relationships like an insurance company would treat a client that is underpaying on his or her premium.

And the same unfortunately applies to Taiwan. He perennially asks why the United States is so committed to defending and protecting Taiwan.

He refers to Taiwan as the tip of a Sharpie pen and to China as the resolute desk in the Oval Office. This is a pattern of thought that no one can unsee after they've seen it. And so we need to take him seriously at his word that I think that he also believes that Taiwan has taken advantage of the United States by, in his words, stealing America's semiconductor industry and relocating it in Taiwan at America's disadvantage.

And so if President Trump returns to office, I expect that he will focus on things like urging Taiwan to increase its defense spending, urging Taiwan to increase purchases of defense equipment from the United States, urging Taiwan to increase investments, including semiconductor investments, into the United States to support reshoring to the United States. And this will be sort of the animating focus of President Trump's approach to Taiwan, where

Whereas in the case of Vice President Harris, as Lynn was saying, I think that I've yet to encounter anyone who has been around her who says that she asks why we care about our allies and partners. I think it's just intrinsic, it's understood, and it's embedded in her worldview that the United States is stronger as the leader of a team than it would be standing alone.

And I think that Vice President Harris is also very committed to the idea that certain principles must be upheld, including the principle that territory should not be seized by force.

And when you apply those to Taiwan, I think that she would be very stout in her defense of and her upholding of the commitments that the United States has made to Taiwan. You know, Ryan, as you were talking there, you could have been speaking about Europe in terms of the differences between the two candidates. A lot of what you said resonated with the Europe episode that we just had. But Lynn, as I continue to broaden this out a little bit more,

There's a growing number of countries in Southeast Asia that think that they should align with China instead of the United States. And this is important in terms of how the next American president thinks about policy. But you've written a great essay about this, arguing that America's China policy is forcing it or making it lose Southeast Asia. Tell us why.

So first, let's take a step back. In the piece that you mentioned, I highlight an annual poll of Southeast Asia. And in this poll, 2024 was the first year when respondents were asked who they would pick if they were, respondents from Southeast Asia were asked who they would pick if they were forced to align with the United States or China. The majority of respondents in that poll picked China over the United States.

You mentioned that it's because of the US-China policy. I would argue that perhaps it is partly because of the US-China policy that a result of weak US economic engagement with the region over the years, which has led to a gradual erosion of support for the United States if countries or respondents were forced to choose to

And very importantly, in the last year, we saw a steep drop in support for the United States of about 20 percentage points among Muslim majority countries. And these are countries like Indonesia, Malaysia.

and Brunei. And so I think that was what was ultimately responsible for tilting the poll towards China in this year's poll. And respondents were not asked the reason for them picking China over the United States. But if we look at a separate question in the poll, respondents were asked to rate or rank their top geopolitical concern. And

about 50% selected the Israel-Hamas conflict as their top geopolitical concern. And the South China Sea dispute, which is more proximate for Southeast Asia, was only ranked at the top dispute by 40% of respondents. So you can see...

how salient an issue is real. Hamas is even as far away as Southeast Asia. So I think, you know, the US policy in Asia is affecting its position in the region, but also its policies out of Asia. So in this respect, in the Middle East is bravely or dangerously eroding its support in the region.

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Ryan, let me bring you back in. One of the other trend lines, I think, in US foreign policy has been a big investment in industrial policy, which tends to favor bigger countries, right? So in a world in which every big country is trying to ensure that it protects its own supply chains,

which is a post-pandemic phenomenon. These are things that smaller countries can't really compete on in the same way and of course Asia has a lot of those countries. You add to that, this is now specific to the Biden administration, but a focus on the G7, a group of rich countries and of course in Asia Japan is in that group, South Korea wants to be in that group,

What's your sense of how, again, Trump or Harris might differ on how they treat bigger groups like the G7, like the G20, and how that impacts Asia policy? Well, my general impression, Ravi, is that President Trump prefers to deal with countries on a bilateral basis, where he can employ America's asymmetric power to try to use leverage to secure concrete objectives.

And Vice President Harris and President Biden have demonstrated greater comfort working in larger groupings. Now that holds up to a point because the Biden-Harris administration has sort of tailored its approaches to countries that it prefers to deal with and lessened its emphasis on groupings that it finds less productive. So, for example, the G7 has a lot more energy under a Biden administration than the G20.

The quadrilateral grouping involving the United States, Australia, Japan, and India has a lot more energy than ASEAN. And the reason is because these are purpose-built organizations that the United States feels like it can use to advance and accelerate progress on its priority areas. They're countries that are by and large democratic societies that sort of share similar values and similar visions.

And so that's where a lot of the energy is. So if we sort of project forward into the next four years, I think the outcome of the U.S. election will sort of tell us whether we're going to be heading in a direction towards greater bilateral engagement to deal with specific issues or groupings of like-minded countries that allow the United States to really play a disproportionate role in agenda setting going forward. You know, Lynn, as you were talking about the

the way in which Southeast Asian countries, especially Muslim majority ones, weight US policy in the Middle East as they think about aligning more closely with the United States or with China. I'm curious where South Asia fits into this. Again, the countries there have even greater Muslim majorities. India has the second most number of Muslims in the world after Indonesia.

And then you have Pakistan and Bangladesh, both of which have upwards of 150 million Muslims each. What is your sense of how that part of the world is viewing American policy in Asia? And to Ryan's point, it could be that there are overriding principles, such as maybe the Quad, such as other interests that take precedence for them over the Middle East, for example. Your thoughts?

I don't work closely on South Asia, however, at least when we talk about India, the approach that we've seen from India thus far has perhaps out trumped Trump in some respects in terms of its degree of how transactional it is. You talk about the quadrilateral grouping.

But also before that, we had the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, which focused on the maritime domain and brought India in as a key player. So India in the last, you know, since about 2017 has really been rising in prominence in terms of its diplomatic engagement and its proximity or closeness to some of the key Western powers.

And I think it's taken its work to take advantage of that rise in diplomatic strength to serve its own national interests, which is understandable given that all countries seek to serve their own national interests. First and foremost, you know, Trump isn't the only one talking about America first.

But in the case of India, I think its view of its national interest might depart in important respects from some of the other Quad members, for example. So, for instance, its

a terrible crime when China supposedly breaches its sovereignty in its disputed border and the rule of law needs to be upheld there. But it's less offensive in the Indian mind somehow when Russia invades Ukraine. So I think in respect of what's happening in the Middle East, I suspect that India might have

As a government, its foreign policy is unlikely to be too much disturbed by what's happening in the Middle East, despite its large Muslim population. And it will stay the course in terms of what it perceives to be in its best, quite calculated national interests.

And of course, it's worth pointing out Muslims are still only 14% of India's population. So even though it's large in raw numbers, it's a minority, definitely. Ryan, let me bring you back in. Something Lynn said there stayed with me. She used the phrase out-Trumped Trump.

And it occurs to me that during the Trump era, there were all these reports of countries and leaders that realized that Trump was transactional and that the best way to handle Trump when he was president was to make him feel like he was winning in any bilateral negotiation or discussion. So this is reports from the Koreans, reports from the Indians and elsewhere.

And it strikes me that we might be in a sort of post-Trump world or a Trump world, I should point out, where Asians just want to be more transactional, that whether or not Trump comes back to power, they're realizing that they're best off just being more transactional with the U.S. Do you agree? Up to a point, Ravi. I think that a lot of countries in Asia, their self-identity is that they are not subordinate to China.

that China does not dominate the region. And so I think that, yes, there will be more transactionalism if President Trump is reelected, but that's not going to wash away the overriding strategic imperatives that countries across Asia have.

for having a balancing power that is willing to exercise its influence to uphold certain principles. And so if the United States is unwilling or unable to perform that function, I expect that these countries will look elsewhere, including by bandwagoning amongst themselves to try to guard against being overrun by China's ascendance. But what do you say, Ryan, to the view across many Asian countries that

They're not always happy with US policy on China. They feel that America has been far too hawkish over the last seven or eight years and that that hawkishness is going to harm them eventually. They worry about the rising tensions. They blame America for some of those tensions. And of course, for many of them, many Asian countries, China is their biggest trading partner. So they're not thrilled with US foreign policy. What I say, Ravi, is that we should listen.

We should listen to what our partners and our allies tell us about what their interests are. America's unique advantages in this long-term competition with China are its domestic dynamism, its alliances and partnerships around the world, and its ability to galvanize solutions to global and regional problems. We do best in all those areas when we are closely linked up with our allies and partners and we're listening and taking on board their interests and their concerns.

The reality is that we have a very unique view of China. No other country in the world shares the threat perception that we do of China because no other country is the leader that feels threatened by China's rise in the way that we do. And so it's absolutely essential for us to listen, to be empathetic, and to find ways to align our policies with the top interests and concerns of those who we consider to be our closest friends in the region.

Lynn, it's hard to disagree with Ryan's prescription of listening and being empathetic, but if you had one piece of advice for the next President of the United States on Asia policy, pick a country, pick an area, what would it be? Well, if I may, three points. First, I would say that I would urge the next President of the United States

on the security front to be consistent in its strategic approach. And this means ensuring that its actions are strongly undergirded by international law and consistently applied throughout

And in the defense of international law, I would urge the next administration, as you pointed out earlier, not to be unduly confrontational, because if we listen to some of the Southeast Asian countries, at least I think Northeast Asia is slightly different. But if we listen to some of the Southeast Asian countries and how they highlight the main concerns that they face,

They highlight the challenges posed by increasing US-China competition and the possibility of the outbreak of a war more highly, I think. And they actually rarely mention their concerns about China's activities in the South China Sea. So they're worried about an unduly confrontational US approach.

Second, of course, and we've heard this often and I needn't have to say it again, but I think we need better implementation in this respect, greater economic engagement with Asia. And the third area in which I think that I would urge the United States to work on is, of course, greater both bilateral as well as multilateral engagement with the region. I think it's done well in Northeast Asia in terms of aligning countries

itself with Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea in terms of the threats facing the region. But I think there is still a great divergence in terms of threat to perceptions in Southeast Asia and focusing on a few countries like the Philippines as well as Vietnam might backfire on the United States because as we see its reputation in other countries,

is deteriorating. And even in the case of say, the Philippines, a very strong US ally right now, the Philippines is still part of ASEAN. And given the sometimes inconsistent approach towards Asia policy seen in the United States over the last few years, you know, the Philippines might also be afraid in the future to go too far ahead of the ASEAN pact. So I think it makes sense

for the next president as well, not just to engage with important countries bilaterally, but also engage multilaterally with ASEAN so that you have the entire region as a whole more on board with what the United States is seeking to do, which is, of course, to defend and promote the rule of international law.

Well, if not the next president, I'm certain that their next team is listening to this, and I hope they will take both of your excellent pieces of advice. That is all we have time for today. Lin Kwok, Ryan Haas, thanks for joining us and playing the game. Thank you, Ravi. Thank you so much, Ravi.

And that was Ryan Haas, the director of Brookings' John L Thornton China Center and former director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council, and Lin Kwok, also at Brookings as their Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies.

Thanks for tuning in for that final episode of our special series, America Votes, What It Means for the World. If you want to catch any of the previous episodes on the Middle East, Europe, Africa, or Latin America, you know where to find us. On the podcast, it's right here. If you want to try the video, that is at foreignpolicy.com slash live.

Thanks for joining us on this tour around the world. As always, we love hearing from you. Contact us at live at foreignpolicy.com. Next week onwards and beyond, back to regular programming. We will be watching the election on November 5 very closely and anxiously, and we'll pick it up from there with some expert guests to figure out what the new president is going to do in the White House for the United States and for the world.

FPLive the podcast is produced by Rosie Julin and the executive producer of the show is Dana Schoen. I'm Ravi Agrawal. I'll see you next time.

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