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I'm Venetia Rainey and this is Battle Lines. It's Monday, 2nd December 2024. Today we'll be focusing on the extraordinary events in Syria, where a surprise offensive by Islamist rebel groups in Aleppo has prompted a furious response from Damascus and Moscow.
I'll be speaking to Dr. Haid Haid, a Syrian columnist and consulting fellow at Chatham House, to explore why this has happened now and what it means for the wider Middle East conflict. Plus, an Israeli conscientious objector on why she went to jail for three months rather than serve in the military. But let's begin with a quick catch-up of the latest death tolls, both civilian and military, since October 7th, 2023. Gaza's death toll is 44,400 people. The West Bank's death toll is 733 people.
Lebanon's is 3,961 people. And just a short note on this, astute listeners will notice that that death toll is still going up despite the ceasefire that we reported on last week. That's because Israel is still conducting airstrikes in the country. Two people were killed over the weekend. Israel says that's in response to Hezbollah operatives being south of the Latani River. Despite these ceasefire violations on both sides, peace is still holding, but we will keep reporting on that.
And then Israel's death toll is 1,801 people. I'm going to add one more death toll to that list just for this week, and that's Syria's. According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Israel has launched 155 attacks since the beginning of this year, killing 474 people. We can actually break that down to civilians and combatants. So that's 64 civilians and 410 combatants, including members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah.
Now, why am I including that? Well, that's relevant because Israel's degradation of Iranian forces has partly contributed to what we've seen over the last week in Syria. In a stunning development, Syrian rebels led by jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham launched a lightning offensive to retake the northern city of Aleppo.
It's been hugely embarrassing for the ruling Assad regime and there are fears that it could reignite the Syrian civil war, which, as a reminder to listeners, erupted amid pro-democracy protests back in 2011 but has been largely in a stalemate for the last few years. The fighting has been intense over the last week. At least 372 people have been killed since last Wednesday, according to the Syrian Observatory.
Here with me to explain what is going on and why it matters is Dr. Haid Haid, a Syrian columnist and consulting fellow at Chatham House. So welcome to Battlelines, Haid. Thank you for having me. It's been a while since Syria was so prominent in the news. Can you start by giving us a picture of the state of the war this time last week, so before the rebel offensive started, and just outline who the major players in the war are?
In general, Syria is divided into three main sort of pockets. The biggest one is controlled by the Syrian regime. And then you have two other pockets in northern Syria. In the northeast side of the country, you have Kurdish-led forces that control that side of Syria. And then in the northwest, you have different opposition factions. Some of them are affiliated with Turkey.
Others are sort of semi-independent. At least the biggest of them is the Haya Tahrir Sa'a, which used to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda before. And then they sort of cut their ties with Al-Qaeda in 2016. And the list is still designated as a terrorist group by many governments. Going back to last week, I think for many, they have been...
for many in the region or elsewhere, they've been basically looking at the conflict in Syria as a frozen conflict. They also have been sort of leaning towards the assumption that Assad has won the war, and this is why we saw an increase in the number of countries that have basically started normalizing with Assad, including countries in Europe. Now, because of that, because of that sort of ill
either ignoring what's happening in Syria or considering the conflict to be over. People were surprised.
when they saw the current sort of clashes that are taking place there. The last bit I want to sort of highlight here is that despite the fact that the timing and the scale of the operation is indeed quite surprising, but the campaign, the military campaign or the fighting itself is not totally surprising. Indeed, it's surprising.
predicted sort of outcome for the failure to address the conflict in Syria for over 13 years. Okay, I'd love to hear more about that. So you weren't completely surprised by this. Why I was not surprising because for, as I said, many consider the situation in Syria to be sort of over frozen. But if you look at the situation of the people who live in northwestern Syria, the region where the basically fighting started from,
you would see that for them the clashes and violations and attacks by regime forces have not stopped despite seeing the conflict as a frozen conflict. That's one. Two, the political process in Syria has been clinically dead for years. And that means for them that it's not only that they are being attacked, but also people have ignored their political demands
and they are only addressing the humanitarian aspect of the conflict, although it's not a humanitarian conflict in nature. So for them, there is no political prospects. They are being under attack, and that's why for them, using violence and fighting is the only way to achieve what the political process has not been able to deliver. Now, what are the different factors that have contributed to the timing of violence
the current sort of clashes. I think there are different ones. One of them could be related to the regional dynamics. As you know,
Israel has been waging a war against Hamas and Palestine, but also against many Iranian-backed groups throughout the regions, mainly with Hezbollah in Lebanon. And that has led to an increase in the attacks of Israeli forces, not only on Syrian sides and Iranian-backed sort of groups inside Syria, but also pushed groups, especially like Hezbollah,
to relocate and send their fighters to Lebanon in order to defend their positions there against the direct sort of ground offense that was launched by Israel towards the end of September. So you have weakening of support from regional allies, and then you have, in addition to that, Russia has been busy with its own war in Ukraine for over two years now, so that also decreased
their support that provided to Assad. Assad also has been weakened financially as well as militarily. And all of those factors contributed to the assessment of opposition forces that this is the right moment to start.
So really a perfect storm where everyone's kind of been looking in other directions. What do we know about Hayat Tareh al-Hasham, the group that led this rebel offensive and also its leader Abu Muhammad al-Jalwani? Well, the group established itself in 2012 in Syria, or at least officially announced its presence in Syria in 2012. But there are reports that the group started operating there in 2011. And it seems from, again,
interviews, primary sources as well as secondary sources that the group initially went to Mohamed Joulani, the leader of the group of Jabhat al-Nusra at the time, with the support of ISIS, which used to be called the Islamic State in Iraq. And they were provided with support in order to do a branch of the organization in Syria. And then in 2013, when ISIS announced its
expansion to Syria that created tension between Abu Muhammad al-Julani and Abu Bakr al-Bardabi for the leader of ISIS and then the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra then Al-Nusra then pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and distanced itself from ISIS a few years later the group
felt that they cannot basically cooperate with other rebel groups as in they cannot merge with them because everyone's scared of that designation that the group has no one internationally wants to work with the group so because of that then the group again cut ties with al-Qaeda and then rebranded itself and then now it says that it wants to be just a
limited to the boundaries of Syria and just focusing on Syrian issues and Syrian demands, which in a sense is basically there are
planning to become the Hezbollah of the Sunnis in northwest Syria as an Islamist group that wants to become a political actor in charge of at least either becoming part of the political sort of settlement at the national level or in absence of that be the main actor responsible for controlling northwest Syria for now.
Okay, so we should expect to hear lots more about Hayat Tareel Al-Sham. Should we believe them when they say that they are more moderate now, that they're not linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS? I know there's been a neutralization of their language and they're trying to present themselves as a bit more mainstream. Should we believe them? It's difficult to answer that question, but what's missing so far is that no one has genuinely sort of engaged with them in order to, A, determine if they have changed their position or not, and B,
see if they could be engaged with in order to sort of improve the situation of those who are living under their control. Okay, so that's the background. Now walk us through, if you can, what's happened since last Wednesday. So on Wednesday, what happened is that in the early morning, opposition groups started attacking regional forces from different sort of
locations. Regime forces did not put up much resistance and that led to the collapse of the first line of defense and then what happened later is that opposition groups were able to capture massive areas from regime forces throughout not only rural Aleppo but also in other areas like Idlib as well as in the city of Aleppo. Now
Almost four days later, they have been able to impose full control over the governorate of Idlib. They captured almost now, they're saying, fully the city of Aleppo and most of the countryside of Aleppo. And they also have been able to recently advance in the governorate of Hama. Right now, the fighting seems to have de-escalated, but the clashes are still ongoing.
And how significant is this development in the course of the Syrian civil war? I think it's significant on different levels. On the ground, they have been able to almost double the size of the territories they used to control up to basically, let's say, last week. So that is massive for them. The other significance is related to
The importance of the city of Aleppo is the second biggest city in Syria. It's an industrial hub for the country. It also controls different sort of strategic routes and supplies as well. So that is significant as well. The third one, I think, is related to the fact that
the forces are still advancing and we don't know when the fighting will stop. And the last one is the political implications because up until last week, everyone sort of ignored what's happening there and there was no political sort of progress. But now, looking at what's happening there, that might also re-sort of give life to the political process and then maybe give some sort of boost to
the negotiations. What's the response been of Bashar al-Assad's major backers, Russia and Iran? I think most of them, they have indicated that they will continue their support
But there are still questions as to, A, the ability to mobilize enough forces in order to change the dynamics on the ground. And B, if those sort of resources and supplies and support will be able to not only sort of stop
the advancement of opposition forces, but then have the ability to recapture the areas that were lost recently. So still, there are many questions about, yeah, the level of scale of support and what kind of chiefs.
And what do you think this will do for the Syrian civil war? You mentioned peace talks might be back on the table, but I'm wondering if you think this is going to reignite the civil war in terms of fighting on the ground. We heard former MI6 chief Alex Younger saying this morning that he thinks this is going to reignite the civil war in all its dimensions. Do you agree with that assessment? My sort of remarks about the political process, I think it's more of a long-term prospect. However, in the short term,
what will most likely happen is that there will be more fighting because as I said, A, the opposition groups will try to take as much as possible and control as much as possible, especially at this point where Assad seems to be quite vulnerable. And then on the other hand, you have Assad and his allies would try to again control or recapture what they have lost recently. So,
Both groups, they are determined to continue the fight. But now this is only between those opposition and regime forces. If you look at what's happening elsewhere, there's also increased tension between the Kurdish sort of Syrian Kurdish groups
as well as between them and the opposition groups. Recently in Aleppo, they sort of coordinated, the Kurdish groups coordinated with the Syrian regime and they were able to take over some of the areas, especially the Aleppo airport from the regime and they were
trying to defend that location, but also you have forces from northeastern Syria trying to advance and connect the pocket they had in Aleppo and the countryside of Aleppo to their territory in northeastern Syria. Then that created more tension with rebel groups who were trying to basically fight against Assad. Now it seems that they have reached an agreement to allow the groups that are now trapped in Aleppo
to withdraw to northeastern Syria, but I don't think that the chapter of tension between those two entities is over. More tension will most likely be seen in the near future, and then more clashes could be seen in northeastern Syria between opposition groups and the Syrian Democratic Forces, or just let's say the Democratic Forces that are in charge of the northeastern Syria. And then there are also maybe...
either concerns or predictions or speculations that fighting might also take place in other areas in Syria, specifically in the areas that were recaptured by the regime in the countryside of Damascus, Homs, as well as in southern Syria and Daraa throughout basically 2016 to 2018.
So if that actually happens, that means that the fighting will not be contained to northwestern Syria or now to central Syria, but might be spread to southern Syria as well. Again, those are early sort of rumors, but it's something to keep in mind. And if all of those sort of fights took place in different areas, then yeah, it will be easy to see how the whole conflict will be
more sort of engaged in direct clashes. But even if we don't reach that point, what is certain for now is that the fighting will continue in the areas that were recaptured because it will be difficult for the forces to defend them for long, but also will be continued against regime forces in an attempt to capture more areas.
Are there security implications for Europe? Is there any chance we'll see another wave of refugees coming? I think it's safe to assume that more and more Syrians will leave the country because of the fighting that is happening. You have more than 2 million Syrians who used to live in Aleppo, and many of them are trying to either they left or are trying to leave the city. And the situation is not any better in other countries.
areas, even if there's not much fighting happening there. The economic situation is not sustainable for people to go and live there and try to make a living. So the assumption is that, yeah, more and more people will try to leave Syria and then try to make it to Europe. But whether they would be able to do so or not, I think that's not clear.
Is there any chance that Assad's regime could fall? I don't think that we are there yet. And I cannot see a scenario in which the Assad regime might fall because of the daring clashes. Because, A, as I mentioned, the regime allies have re-emphasized their support for Assad, especially Iran.
Iran has been able to mobilize its allies and the militias in Syria as well as in Afghanistan.
Iraq, and they're pushing those reinforcements to the front lines. But then I don't think there is a political will to allow even opposition groups to reach all the way to Damascus. So I don't think we are there yet, but it will definitely weaken the regime and weaken its political leverage. It will also maybe impact the way that
regional countries as well as countries in Europe are dealing with Assad because we have seen, as I mentioned earlier, an increase in normalization efforts with Assad because the assumption is that Assad has won and he is now stronger than before. And
In Europe, many countries, they wanted to normalize or at least improve coordination with Assad in order to send refugees back. But the current fighting shows that, A, Assad is weaker than even before, and two, that Syria is not safe for refugees to return. So that might have implications on the coordination and normalization efforts with Assad. Thank you so much for joining us. That's Dr. Haid Haid from Chatham House. Thank you for having me.
Coming up after the break, why an 18-year-old Israeli spent three months in military prison for refusing her mandatory service. Welcome back. Now for a very different, rarely heard perspective on the war in Israel. Back in February, a young Israeli woman called Safia Orr turned up at the Israel Defense Forces Induction Center near Tel Aviv and refused to do her mandatory military service.
The 18-year-old ended up spending nearly three months in military jail, receiving three different sentences before being officially declared a conscientious objector and exempted from service. She became the second teenager to publicly refuse the draft for political reasons since Hamas's October 7 attack and the ensuing war. A handful more have followed since.
Sophia, welcome to Battlelines. Can you start by explaining the role of the military draft in Israel and how young people felt about it prior to October 7th? So in general, the Israeli society is extremely militarized and the army is really one of the things that are at the core of the society.
People grow up in an environment that is very militaristic from a very young age in the education system, in holidays, in memorial days, with soldiers all around them all the time. And growing up knowing that they will also have to enlist and not just have to enlist, that this is something to be proud of. This is a service to your country and to the people around you. A lot of people either enlist not thinking about it because it's just something that you do.
And there are also a lot of people on the more nationalistic side that are also very, very proud to join the military. And in Israeli society, the more combative your role is, the more social credit you gain from it and more.
Being a soldier is an honor and to honor all the soldiers who died, you need to go and fight for their cause. Did you always feel like that when you were younger? Is that the sort of view that you grew up in around your friends and your family? Did you know any refuseniks? So I grew up in a very privileged environment. I grew up in a very left-wing family. My father served in the army, but my mom did not serve in the army and my sister didn't either.
And my dad says that he served around 30 years ago, and he says that he will never serve now. And it never seemed obvious to me that I would enlist. All of my friends, I mean, I have friends who didn't enlist. More people than you may think don't enlist. They just get exemptions, mental health exemptions or physical health exemptions, but they don't have any political feelings behind that.
I never thought I would enlist, but refusing is a very different thing than not enlisting. I knew I wasn't going to enlist from a pretty young age because I just didn't grow up with that kind of feeling of nationalistic duty of the need to serve the country. I just thought that I wanted to protect the people around me and to help them, and I didn't see the army as the best way to do that. But the more that I...
asked questions about military service and asked questions about what the military does and what cause am I supporting and trying to really understand the situation and what is happening on the ground. And when I asked those questions, I got answers back.
of what the army is doing, of what soldiers are doing. And I understood that it's not just that I don't want to enlist and that it crosses my red lines to enlist, but I also want to stand against it. And that is why I chose to refuse to do it in a very public way.
How did you feel when you were on your way over to the IDF Centre in February earlier this year? Were you nervous? Had you told friends and family that that's what you were going to do? Yes, I was very nervous. I told my parents when I was around 15 that that is the decision I wanted to make. To refuse or not to enlist? To refuse and to... When I was around 15, it took me... I think I started asking questions when I was around 14. I got to that decision when I was 15.
But it also took time to be more sure of it. So I think the more time passed, the more sure of it I became. Did October 7th change your thinking about that at all? The urgency of protecting Israel from a very real and then realized threat from Hamas? I think October 7th
made it way more clear to me that refusing is the right thing to do. Because it only proved to me what I've been saying for years before that, and that is that violence only promotes more violence.
And this is not a conflict that you can manage. This is a conflict that you need to solve. And when you oppress people and you treat them with horrible violence and horrible living conditions, and when the Israeli army teaches Palestinians that the only language it knows how to speak is violence, then it will get violence back.
That does not mean it's justified. It will never be justified. I personally know someone who was killed on October 7th. I'm sorry to hear that. It doesn't justify it, but it explains it. And those explanations are important. It didn't happen in a vacuum. There were years and years of occupation and oppression before that. And understanding that it didn't happen in a vacuum is our way of understanding what is our way forward. Because our way forward needs to be offering an alternative
and making it possible for Palestinians who are not as privileged as me and not able to see peace as an option because their living conditions don't allow them to see that kind of reality.
We need to offer an alternative, and Israel has both the power and the responsibility to do that. Will it do it on its own? I don't believe so. And that is why it's so important for me to reach to international audiences, to put pressure on the Israeli government, so that it does offer that kind of real change on the ground that will create also change in the societies. Because I believe in real human change.
Okay, so you're on your way to the IDF center, you're nervous, your parents know. What actually happens when you get there? I enter the enlistment center with my parents at first, then you go on your own on the bus, deeper in the enlistment center, and they think that you are enlisting as any other person. Then I told them that I refuse enlistment. You get sent from one person to the other, they don't really know what to do with you, because it's very rare, they don't really have a protocol for it.
Until you get to someone that is high enough rank to send you to a holding cell, where you are kept for a couple of hours, sometimes overnight, until you get your trial. Then you get your trial. It's usually around five minutes. It's not a very long or deep trial. And then you get judged for any number of days in prison. For my first time, I got sentenced to 20 days in prison. I went and spent those 20 days in prison. You get out and you get...
An enlistment note is to go and enlist 24 hours later. You served your punishment, now go and enlist. And then you have to go to the enlistment center and do it again. And that can go on for however long they want. They don't have a limit on how much time they will keep you in there, and you go again and again. And that is part of their way of intimidating people from doing it. Because they don't want people to do it. They don't want people to refuse.
Because when we refuse, we gain a voice and we gain some sort of power. You ended up spending nearly three months in military jail. What was it actually like in the jail? It's a very harsh experience, obviously. It is a prison. It's a military prison, but it is still a prison. It's much better conditions than what Palestinians suffer in Israeli jails. But it's still difficult.
But I think overall it really showed me the more inner workings and a really up-close look at how the military works and how it's meant to work and that the way of solving problems with force and of dehumanizing people
It's not a coincidence. The system is meant to work that way. The system is meant to work that way to maintain the occupation. And the way that it is now doing it to Palestinians, it's also seeping into the way that it's treating its own soldiers. The vast majority of the prisoners that I sat in prison...
are either draft dodgers or deserters. They ran away from the army usually because either they came from very low socioeconomic background that they needed to provide for their families or for themselves and the army doesn't give you
enough money for that, but also doesn't give you any time to actually go and do that outside of it. And girls who are sexually harassed at their base and the army never did anything about it and they complained until they ran away. Or people with mental health or physical health for them or their family that the army didn't take seriously. And they spent, I know girls who spent half a year in prison for that.
And that is the kind of dehumanization where a system that is treating some of the people it comes in contact with, the Palestinians, the way that it's meant to work on them, it will eventually dehumanize everyone that it comes in contact with. What was it like when you got out? Were you a pariah? I mean, how did your friends and family, your wider circle react? I mean, definitely. I mean, I definitely don't think of myself as a pariah or hero or anything like that.
Most of my friends, almost all of my friends, I think, knew that I was going to do it. I was very vocal about it beforehand and I was very vocal about it inside. And now that I'm out also, I think that talking to people about it is part of refusing for me because it is raising my voice inside a society that they live in. I think my close circle is very supportive and I'm very privileged for that because not everyone has that.
But when you go to a more wider circle, then of course a lot of the people in the Israeli society in general, especially when we post things online, I mean, a lot of the time I get threats that I should be killed or raped or I should have been taken hostage instead. I should be sent to Gaza and bombed there. That I'm an anti-Semite, that I'm a traitor, a self-hating Jew.
But in my more closer circle, I think that the most negative reactions are either that I'm naive, that I think that we can never make peace with Palestinians, that we can never talk with what they call the enemy, and that this can never be a realistic solution. I think that everyone that says this is naive.
Because if they believe that we can solve this with force after we've been trying for the past 70 years, 80 years to solve this with force and using more and more violence and things have just been getting worse, then I think that it's naive to think that there is any military solution to a political problem, to a humanitarian problem. There will never be.
And people tell me that I am ungrateful that all of my friends are going and enlisting and protecting me and protecting my country and that they are sacrificing themselves for me. And how would I feel if one of them died protecting me? I got asked that question at an Israeli interview. And I believe that refusing is the best thing that I can do for the protection of the Israeli people.
because it is trying to work towards a real solution that is better for everyone. We all lose in war and we all win in peace. And it's this kind of narrative that I want to promote. And refusing is the best thing that I can do for the security of the people around me, not enlisting in the army, because that is only throwing my body in that cycle of bloodshed. It's funny that you say that you are not driven by nationalistic beliefs
feelings, but actually listening to you speak just then, that is quite a nationalistic view. You just take a different view of how to protect Israel and Israeli people. I don't believe that because I don't, I feel love for the people around me. I don't do it for any country. I will not die and I will not be killed in the name of any country, any flag and any idea like Zionism. But I believe
will try and create a reality that is good for everyone living from the river to the sea, because I believe that every human being is born equal and deserves equal rights and dignity and liberty, and that Palestinian people deserve equal rights, the same as everyone else. And that is the kind of voice that I'm trying to promote to protect Israeli people that I love, that are around me.
not in the name of any country. What kind of help did you receive from Messar Vot, the Israeli organization that supports conscientious objectors? So Messar Vot is providing both a social backbone
a legal backbone and the media backbone, most of all. I think that we receive, obviously, it's a community where people that don't have the kind of support that maybe I had from my home can receive a backbone to feel that they are supported in doing that decision. We are always trying to improve on that. And there is a lawyer, multiple lawyers that are very, very helpful.
in supporting you, helping you get your exemption, helping you be safe, protecting when you're inside prison, and media work, getting interviews, posting things online, making our voices heard, and going to protests with us. And it's very important that we are supportive and lifting each other up because we are not that many.
And then just finally, what's life like for you now? Are there any long-term implications from your refusal to serve? Does it impact your ability to get jobs or anything like that? The biggest impact is a social impact. For example, I just started university and I've not told anyone that I went to prison. Only one person even knows what are my political beliefs and
That was also scary. So it's it's there is a social cost of I don't want people to find out. And there is no direct way of if your boss wants to fire you over hearing your opinions, most of the time no one is going to stop them. And there is not it's not written in the law yet. And most of the silencing and operation is happening to Palestinians with Israeli citizenship.
But we are going further and further into fascism, and that can change. At the moment, I think that the biggest cost is social, but you never know. Thanks so much for speaking to us, Safiya. Thank you. Thank you so much. That was Safiya Orr speaking to me from Israel. That's all for this Monday's episode of Battlelines. We'll be back again on Friday. Until then, goodbye. Battlelines is an original podcast from The Telegraph created by David Knowles. The producer is Yolaine Goffin.
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