Elbridge Colby & The Strategy of Denial
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All right, boys and girls, we are back with another edition of the Ben Dominich podcast brought to you by Fox News. You can check out all of the Fox News podcasts at foxnewspodcast.com. Today, we have an interview with Elbridge Colby. He is the author of the new book,

The Strategy of Denial, American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. It's a book that really focuses on our confrontation with China and the potential ways that it could play out. Most likely, of course, over a dispute regarding Taiwan and the attempts that China might make in the coming months or years to try to attempt to take Taiwan back. Bridge is considered an expert on all of these matters.

He's someone who served within the Trump administration, writing the strategic documents that essentially are at the center of the military conversation about our defense strategy going forward. And it's someone who has been thinking long and hard about these issues for some time. His book is on a number of

of end-of-year best-of lists, including the Wall Street Journal's. He talked to us at length about this and a number of other factors regarding the debate over foreign policy within the Republican coalition. Elbridge Colby,

coming up next. From the Fox News Podcasts Network, subscribe and listen to the Trey Gowdy Podcast. Former federal prosecutor and four-term U.S. Congressman from South Carolina brings you a one-of-a-kind podcast. Subscribe and listen now by going to foxnewspodcasts.com.

Albert Colby, thank you so much for taking the time to join me again. It's good to talk to you. Great to be with you, Ben. Thanks for having me on again. So we now have your book to talk about, which last that we talked, I believe, was only in it was still in that medium period before it actually gets out there and you have people react to it.

the strategy of denial. It's my compliments to you on ending up on a lot of end of year best of lists, including the Wall Street Journal's. It seems to have had a significant response when you were writing this book. How much were you thinking about translating the ideas that go into

the strategic writing that happens at the highest levels of the Pentagon and government into a form in which the average American could actually understand what you were talking about. Well, thanks, Ben. I really appreciate it. And I, you know, it's been great, great to see the reception. And but I think, yeah,

I thought actually thinking about it a lot. I mean, I wouldn't say that the primary purpose of the book is to, to, to, you know, sort of speak to as broad a sort of an audience as possible. But what I did want to do is to break the strategic argument down into a logic that is clear and accessible as possible. So, and one of the things, honestly, I've been really pleased by is that, you know,

people who are not experts or even like working professionals, you know, you know, family, friends, you know, retired or, you know, haven't worked in a long time. I've said, you know, I picked up your book and I read it and it's like, I get it. It's very, it's clearly stated. And that, that to me is, is very gratifying because, you know, for a couple of reasons, I mean, as a writer, it's obviously nice to hear that, but it's also, I mean, it's,

You know, I guess I have a fundamentally like small are very Republican view of this, which is that, you know, the people are supposed to decide and internalize and kind of think about what the overall national posture, you know, position or strategy should be. And they're not going to decide whether to put more F-18s in Okinawa or not. But they're going to say, you know, are we focusing on this or that? And I think people people can get that. And so that's very, very gratifying. And also, practically speaking, I mean,

you know, we live in a democracy. So our representatives do pay attention to what people say. And so it's really important that people do so. At the same time, I actually think

the same logic is actually necessary for the more, you know, the Pentagon and the defense establishment, because they need to have a clear sense also of what we're doing and, you know, what we should be trying to do and how to make choices that really requires the same level of sort of like just putting it in plain English. I mean, you mentioned the Wall Street Journal thing. I was kind of happy when they, when they wrote that, or I was very happy when they wrote that up, but they said like Colby in plain English says this thing that was very, like, I was happy about that because I feel a lot of this stuff,

in the foreign policy kind of world is cloaked in a lot of expertise, well, real expertise, but it's sort of like hidden behind, you know, so that it makes it hard to access. And that makes it, you know, so that only a small number of people can really participate in the debate. And I don't think that's the way that it should be. One of the things that we've learned over the last decade or so in American politics is that when you stop making an argument because you think you've won the argument, you

the argument actually continues just without your participation i think that the free traders in particular in washington dc learned the ramifications of when that happens you know they thought they had won the argument they thought the argument was over uh and the argument continued without their participation and then they woke up one day and everyone hated free trade

That's I mean, the trade one is so interesting because, you know, I'm not the world's expert on trade, but I mean, there's this kind of like, I mean, in a group, you know, in the blob, that's like where there's a lot of sort of dead enders and so on. So let's say the free trade zealots are among the most recalcitrant. You know, it's like it's like, you know, the people don't understand how good this is for them. And I'm kind of like, well, I don't know, like maybe me.

know what the benefits of like the trade, you know, I mean, sure. Like I think free trade is good in a lot of ways, geopolitically and stuff. But I mean, if, if the people are saying they don't like it, then maybe we need to kind of work through, you know, the trade and said, instead of saying like how stupid everybody else is and how they don't know what's good for them. The people have spoken and the people are wrong. I want to ask you to explain some of the terms that you use in this book.

because I mean, I understand them, but I think that you are using them in ways that are probably going to be new to most readers, especially those who didn't go through, you know, four Paul courses and that type of thing in college. Your book is called The Strategy of Denial. What is what is a denial defense strategy?

A denial defense, and I use denial for a couple of things, but I think in the military context, it basically like it's grappling with this issue.

debate about what do we need our military to do? And, you know, for the last kind of generation, you know, we were talking about regime change. We were talking about occupying other countries and pacifying them. And that's a very high standard for our military. You go back to World War Two, we were going to unconditional surrender the two opponents. That involves a big war and a lot more people dying.

What I'm trying to do here is in the context of a massively powerful and wealthy China is to say, OK, what do we actually need to do that's consistent with Americans' interests and our reasonable expectation of how much we're willing to suffer and risk for it? Right. Because, you know, I mean, let's say I say we should argue to defend Taiwan, but it's not an existential interest. I don't think we should all be willing to slit our own throats for it, but rather we should be willing to go a certain distance. And if we can make

our strategy fit within that certain distance, then we'll be golden, you know? And so what the denial of defense is, is look, what we really need to do, we may want to do more than this, but at the basic, what we need to do is we need to deny China's ability to subordinate the other countries that are in this anti-hegemonic coalition. I talked about it. Yeah. And talk about that coalition for a moment, because I think people probably instinctually understand what it is, but define it for them. Yeah. I mean, I think it's,

It's basically the the idea that we're on our own. We wouldn't want to, but like we're not strong enough or resolute enough on our own to balance China and nobody else is. So we have to go. We have to work together. So it's a coalition. OK, you know, it's and it's defined. The anti hegemonic part is a negative thing. But actually, I think negative.

having things in common that are negative is actually makes it more ecumenical, makes it more admissible or people can be admitted because it's like we're, it's countries that are bound together by their opposition to being dominated by China. You know, they could be,

Blue, red, yellow, black, whatever, you know, free communists like Vietnam. I mean, I hate communism, but like, you know, let's we'll work with them if they're if they'll work with us is my view. And and that's that's basically focused on again, that's the geopolitical meaning of denial is denying China dominance of Asia, which is going to be the world's largest market area.

and which if they dominate that area, they are definitely going to intrude and impose themselves in our lives and undermine our freedom. So the denial of defense, which is basically defeat the invasion so that they can't impose their will on, say, Taiwan or the Philippines or Japan, is in service of the bigger goal, which is keeping that coalition going, because it's all well and good to say that we have a coalition and you kind of get this out of this administration a lot. But it's like the Chinese also have

a strategy to work with that that can that can I think of it as like short circuiting or collapsing the coalition. Right. Instead of fighting everybody all at the same time, like Hitler, you pick it off. You know, you make a Chinese say you kill the chicken to scare the monkeys in the forest. They can see it. You make an example of a few countries and you essentially cause a run on the bank. And that coalition basically collapses. The thing that I found additionally interesting is.

you know your your description of a fait accompli attack you know essentially the idea that you already know the outcome you know the way this story ends so you know you should actually just lay down your arms and give up um tell me a little bit about what that means and why it's most likely that that would be targeted at taiwan and and maybe as as option b the philippines

Well, let's start with the first point, because I think this is a really important point that you put your finger on. And I use the term imagined wars in the book. I don't know if that's a good term or not, but it's basically the idea that, you know, people say like the American military hasn't won a war in decades or, you know, what have you. And it's like, well, that's true. But.

Everybody thought the American military would win the war if they took them on direct, took us on directly. Right. So in like I'm sure the Russians in their heart of hearts were thinking for decades. In fact, I know they were for decades. Like, how do we fight these guys and win? Or the Chinese have been lusting after Taiwan for 75 years.

And so they would have loved to have taken us to taking the sun, but they couldn't because they, they could imagine reasonably how this would go. You know, you don't pick a fight when you, when you know you're going to lose. And that's like, I think that's where we've, you know, the kind of the macro point is like, I think people have become so accustomed that that, Oh, so these things don't happen, but it's like, well, no, they didn't happen because people could imagine how it would go. And they didn't even get near to it because it wouldn't be to their advantage. Right.

So then if you think about it, that's the kind of the backdrop. So why, how does the fait accompli fit in? Well, the fait accompli is basically the idea, again, going back to that Hitler analogy, like it's a bad idea to declare war on everybody all at the same time, you know, like generally. You've seen, wait, wait, wait, you've seen the Norm Macdonald sketch, right? Oh no, I actually, somebody was, I never,

was that big of a door for television? This friend of mine was telling me how funny he is. So I got to go back. And I was like, no, no, there's a there's a it's it's from the last appearance on the David Letterman show. Oh, yeah. You know, he says he comes out and he says, you know, I was reading, you know, about this thing that happened, you know, back in the day where, you

you know there was this one country germany and they were looking around and they were looking to start a war and they decided to declare war on the world exactly right bad idea bad idea that would have been another one anyway uh it was a great sketch but um yeah no exactly right so i mean

You know, even China is going to that's going to be bad at a minimum. They're going to it's going to be tremendously costly and risky. Their best strategy. You know, I'm trying to put myself in their shoes to think how, as you'd say in the

kind of government world, you'd say, how's red thinking red? It's kind of the bad guys usually like, but like, how's red thinking or what's their best plan? Like if I were in the Chinese system, what would I be arguing for? And there it's like, okay, they want to collapse this coalition so that they can become dominant, but they don't want to fight everybody all at the same time. So how do you do that? Well, my sense is you laser in

on a couple of countries, particularly paradoxically ones that are connected to the United States, because the real like steel in the backbone, the steel on the spine of this anti-hegemonic coalition is America, you know, and it's because we're so strong. Nobody else is as strong as we are.

And it's the perception of how reliable we are. I mean, it's just like, you know, just imagine you destroy. You need to in the process of winning this conflict. You need to also destroy the perception that we can be reliable. Exactly. And that's why people actually slight digression. But why I think people are underestimating China's interest in going to war, because they're

You know, I think they the risks to going to war with the United States are gigantic, of course, but they're not going to be able to work their way to this regionally dominant position without some kind of showdown. Now, that doesn't mean a total war, but it means they have to like publicly and very visibly show that we're full of it, basically.

And that's going to involve a direct confrontation of some kind and either a war or like where we back down because we know how that imagined war would go. And that's that's going to be critical. So if I'm if I'm China, I'm looking for those opportunities in the coming potentially in the coming decades could be sooner. But, you know, that's that's the thing. So so the fait accompli is basically the idea you you know, you use your advantages of proximity. If you're China, you're

you're a hundred miles from Taiwan or you're 200 miles from the Philippines. America's 10,000 miles away. And you create a new facts on the ground by seizing the target. You impose your will on them. They don't have a choice anymore. And then you use what are the, essentially the advantages of the defense. I mean, you know, there's a whole technical debate about it, but basically if you're a prepared defender, uh,

you know, in this kind of context, you're going to be in a good shape because we're going to have to then counterattack across the whole Pacific. And I mean, it's just going to be very, very difficult. And we're probably not going to do it in a way that's real, that's actually going to kick them out. And China can do that. Well, just one last point. If China can do that actually only a couple of times, like, I don't think the whole thing would fall apart just because of Taiwan. But I think our margin is actually a lot narrower than people appreciate because China might only have to do it like

two or three times for people to say, given how strong they are, like, I better cut a deal now because I don't want to be

subject to that. And if you look, the historical example I use is the wars of German unification. It's a little obscure, but like the 1860s, the German Prussians and then the Germans, they fought three short, very sharp wars that transformed the map of Europe. So you can have system level effects with relatively small wars and vice versa. You can actually have big wars that don't really settle that much. So, but I think the formers are worried about here. Well, both, but the former. We'll have more with Elbridge Colby right after this.

So I want to try to give my best devil's advocate argument for the quote unquote other side in this. And when I say other side, I actually I actually don't really believe that there is strong representation for the other side of, you know, not defending Taiwan when it comes to the level of decision makers, meaning that.

I think that the vast majority of certainly Republican senators, you know, and I think you would have enough Democratic senators to support Taiwan in this instance that they would understand the importance of it.

I think you would really only have outliers politically who would be opposed to mounting any kind of defense of them, in part because of the level of understanding of how much this would affect international trade, how much it would send a message, a negative message to our allies, et cetera, et cetera. But to the degree that that argument does exist, and I think is actually prevalent among portions of the right, their argument is,

you know, we're going to lose this anyway. So why should we invest anything toward it? You know, and aren't you just another neocon warmonger if you think that we ought to be out there, you know, defending Taiwan, a place I've never been and I'm never going to go. And that to me is something that I think actually has

I don't know how significant of a truck it has within the right of center movement or even within the left, but it certainly does have a degree of buy in. What's your response to that?

Well, it's it's a respectful one. I think I think it can be addressed. But I you know, I think I was on with your colleague Tucker a couple of months ago and I said to Tucker, I said I was thinking about his question to President Trump throughout the whole book, which is a very interesting.

relevant question. It's an important question that deserves a serious answer. Why should Americans die for Montenegro? Montenegro is not really my concern here, but why should Americans die for Taiwan? In a vacuum, I don't want any Americans. To your point about the

of the neocon. I mean, I, I'm, I try not to be too sensitive, but I get very sensitive when I'm referred to as like an Uber Hawk. One of the reviews referred to me as like an Uber Hawk. And I was like, man, I was against the Iraq war. I'm against the Libya intervention. I was in favor of that. I took so many spears from all the neocons, you know, the neocons are all like the falling that I'm like, you know? And so it's like, I want that. And I, you know, I mean, can't we just have like a carve out here where it's like, we get permission to be really anti-China. Yeah.

I'm not, I am in no way, I'm no way a neocon or a warmonger. I left the Republican party over the Iraq war in 2006. And, and my, my position is the Chinese communist party is a threat to the entire world and needs to be destroyed and ought to be balanced against it every way possible. Exactly. No, I mean, and that's why I was like Ross, you know, our Mitchell friend, like Ross wrote,

Tom and I was very happy because he like really vouched for my, you know, you and me were like, it was lonely. I mean, I, you know, you know how, like, I mean, I mean, we were definitely not in the mainstream. So I'm like, I want some credit now for having Tom.

taking that position. So like, but you know, I mean, geopolitically, like, I mean, it's very different, right? I mean, one of these things is about like, should we like dedicate massive amount of American resources to a peripheral region to like transform this society to prevent them from having any kind of, you know, these weapons and stuff like versus, well, this is like the most powerful state in the international system to emerge since the United States itself. It's got an enormous military.

You know, it's like so one of these things is like, hey, should we just spend a lot of time on like futile crusading in the Middle East? And the other is like, should we be prepared to fight to avoid the world being dominated by China, which is pretty clearly wants to do? I mean, I think that's very easy. So but I will say this, I think so. The other you know, I get it from both sides, you know, from the left. Usually I get, oh, he's a threat inflator and he's like he's just looking to the defense industry, blah, blah, blah. And so.

And I'm like, I don't take that argument that seriously because I was like, I'm just like, hey,

have you seen what the Chinese are up to? Like, I have a lot of respect for these people. Like they're really, really rich. They, they, they got themselves completely out of pot. Well, not completely, but as a society completely out of poverty over the last 40 years through like hard work and focus and a lot of stuff, but like, you know, and now the hypersonic test the other day, like apparently our physicists, according to the FT, I think we're like, they violated the laws of physics, you know? So I'm like, ah, that, you know, so I actually think the much more potent argument is that,

bridge what you're saying can't be done. You're going to chew up the American military in something that just can't be done. So actually, I don't agree with it.

But I think it's I think it's a real it's a real argument. I mean, there's sort of the military argument, which I would take on, which is like, look, you know, if you talk if you look at the real experts, I mean, you know, what we have to do is defeat the invasion. And that gets back to the denial standard. It's like we don't have to win the whole war. We just got to kill the fleet and the air armada and the air and the troops that land. That is feasible. That's our wheelhouse. We're good at technology. We're good at aerospace stuff.

We can do that militarily. We just need to make the effort and we're not. And that's infuriating. But then there's this kind of broader macro point about the right, which I just, you know, I mean, I think both of us obviously were, are the same mind on this, but there is like, and I'm loathe to kind of go on this, but there's sort of this like deep sort of self flagellating aspect that I, you know, I mean, I'm, I'm definitely on the right side of the culture war and so forth, but I'm also like, you know, I,

you know, I don't want to commit suicide. I mean, and I don't want like the Chinese Communist Party to be running the show. I mean, as deep as our problems are, we're a lot better than that, that system of government. So, I mean, well, don't you think that a big part of this is simply driven by revulsion to the the major media voices who have been present on the foreign policy issues for the past couple of decades and

who for the most part, no longer have any kind of trust, you know, well within the right when it comes to warning about these things, you know, meaning that, you know I mean, you, you, you mentioned, you mentioned Ross, you know, the, the whole kind of, of superstructure of, of,

right-leaning major media people who have been talking about foreign policy on TV and in newspapers during this time, they just have no level of trust among people anymore. And so when they trot themselves out and basically make an argument about, well, America needs to defend Taiwan, it doesn't really matter if I can point to, well, but for

But Bridge Colby says that we should defend Taiwan and Ted Cruz says we should defend Taiwan. And, you know, the vast majority of people who you would categorize as being, you know, non neocons, but still active within the idea of national security and what we ought to do in terms of projecting American power around the world. They're in this same position, too. It gets corrupted by the idea that.

you know, well, but all these other people who we've learned, you know, we're totally wrong about Afghanistan or Iraq or something like that. They're they're sounding similar arguments.

Yeah, I think absolutely. I think you put your finger on it. I think, well, I mean, a couple of points. One is I think people are, you know, Bill Kristol's, Robert Kagan's, Max Boots of the world. I mean, all these people, like people shouldn't believe what they're saying, you know? And I actually, Kagan said something, I don't know, this might have been a year ago or something, and we're on Taiwan. He wrote a piece and I was, I actually, I mean, I felt a little bit like churlish, but I was like, I just want to say that like, I'm not, this is not what I'm in. And these are the, is this kind of guy who's why we're in this situation?

So like, you know, I don't mean to be, you know, kicking people out of the of the political coalition on this point. But I also think it's important because there's more value. I mean, politically, but also intellectually in terms of the intellectual integrity argument that like it's not like I'm not. That's a very different perspective and argument. The fact that a Wolfowitz or whatever agrees is like more kind of a, you know, clock, you know. And so, I mean, I'm

And, you know, it's funny. I have a friend, we've talked about this, who's more focused on like domestic stuff, but he was like, you know, well, I...

I supported the Iraq war because all the people that I were aligned with us were, you know, we're supporting it. And so now it's like the reverse, right? So they lost that credibility. And now, so it's like, you know, Bill Kristol and Max boot are trying to say that Republicans are like traders and whatever. So it's like, now it's just out the baby with the bath water in the other direction. And so that's one of the things I'm trying, you know, I'm trying to be a different voice. And I, you know, I mean, I do feel this perspective, you know,

does have the momentum. And I think your point about political leaders and senators, I mean, in some ways, it's an interesting thing that I was talking to somebody the other day, like, I actually think Republican, particularly the kind of newer rising generation,

Is is more creative on the foreign policy and more in line with what I'm talking about than the kind of blob intellectual elite, which is very sort of encrusted and like sort of barnacled and attached to the old neocon way. But, you know, I mean, I think it's at the end of the day, I mean, at the end of the day to Ben, I mean, I just I feel like, you know, conservatives.

aren't going to ultimately cotton to something that's like, hey, America is so awful that we should just like sit in the corner and just, you know, I mean, like, I think we got a lot of problems for sure. But like, I just I don't see how that's going to carry today. Yeah. So talk to me a little bit going back to Taiwan about what a denial based approach would look like in practice.

And particularly, I'm curious, you know, the United States and Taiwan are not the only actors here. What do you see from the rest of the anti hegemony coalition in terms of their response to what would be going on?

Sure. So, I mean, in practice, I think what China is going to have to do to bring Taiwan to heel probably is invade directly. I mean, the only other thing that might work would be a sustained blockade of the island, because I don't think people on Taiwan want to live under Xi Jinping's boot. So, I mean, I don't think they're going to kind of get hoodwinked out of that.

So but a blockade is very difficult to sustain and it's probably likely to escalate anyway. It's an act of war. So we're going to come to Taiwan's defense. So, you know, the key here is like, you know, Napoleon comment, like if you want to take Vienna, take Vienna. It's just kind of like don't screw around. Just go downtown and resolve the issue. So if you're China, I think what you want to do is you want to mountain invasion, get across the strait before we really have a time to kind of meaningfully respond and

you know, land a lot of soldiers and then just force the capitulation of the island. And, you know, people talk about an insurgency on the island, but like, I think the Chinese, the PRC, they're, they're ruthless. They're very adept at suppression. They do it all the time. They've done it for decades. So I don't, I don't think we can put our stock in that. So what we need to do basically is have, um,

you know, airplanes, drones, ships, submarines, satellites that are all arrayed and ready to go in a sufficient time, particularly given how much warning we might have, which could be quite short to go to get in, to get up there or get in there and shoot missiles and sink their ships and shoot down their aircraft to a sufficient degree that whatever force gets ashore, you know, the Taiwan Taiwanese can, can pretty much handle on their own.

And this is a tractable problem. I mean, we're very good at this kind of thing. And then in terms of the other partners, the key here, the U.S., Taiwan itself, which really, really does need to do more and focus particularly on its self-defense against this kind of invasion. So really like

You know, they're going to be saturated with Chinese attacks because they're like literally within China's like the window of all of China's weapons, basically. So they're just going to have to be really light and nimble and operate. I mean, think like the Mujahideen in the 80s with Stinger missiles. They're going to have to be out there with anti-ship missiles, throwing mines into the strait, you know, with with motorboats and stuff like that.

And then together and then and then the Japanese and the Australians are probably the only other relevant parties because, you know, to get there and to operate against the PLA, you've really got to be able to bring the noise. So, I mean, there's only a few countries in the world that can even technologically and kind of from an organizational point of view do that. And that that that makes it pretty difficult.

pretty limited if the war were to expand uh that that would change but i mean in terms of taiwan itself i think that that's pretty much what would be required and again it really is it's doable we just need to do it more of the ben dominich podcast right after this uh you write uh in uh in your chapter on this limited war after an effective denial defense uh were the chinese invasion to falter one option for beijing would be to try to rescue victory from defeat through

through horizontal escalation, but you go on to say that it's unlikely to work for Beijing. I think that's something that is present on the minds of of Americans, even if they don't define it that way. What does that look like and why do you think that it wouldn't work?

Yeah, I mean, just a brief point on the China thing. I actually think, you know, there's been a sharp increase in the perception of China as our primary rival for a number of polls. But I think I think the American people kind of get it at this sort of like intuitive level in a way, actually, that's sort of ahead of the trend.

the, you know, quote unquote establishment. Yeah, no, I think they've been ahead of the curve on that one. Yeah. And I think I think that would happen. So let's let's say, you know, you defeat we defeat the invasion or they decide, you know, they basically they get there and are modest at the bottom of the Taiwan Strait or they they they they go home and

Then they got a decision. I mean, it's very humiliating for them. It's very dangerous, including like, you know, Xi Jinping might be put up against the wall and shot by his comrades. I mean, that kind of thing has happened. So he decides not to give up, but he can't mount another invasion directly. He doesn't have enough ships, you know, and then we've been hitting the other ships that he might use in aircraft and transport aircraft and that kind of thing.

So in that context, what he might try to do is say, I want to mount like an economic war against the United States or I want to show people that I'm willing to take this a lot farther. I'm going to, you know, reach out and hit America. I'm going to operate from their base in Djibouti or, you know, hit oil refineries in the Middle East and and, you know, use sanctions against the United States.

I think the problem here is that by this point, it will be clear to everybody that this is like a major, major thing that we can't just lose. Right. Like it's a big showdown. You know, I mean, it's once in a century kind of thing. God willing, you know, and that, you know, if we do back down, it's going to be immensely consequential and probably going to lead to more bad news.

And I think in that context, in addition, the Chinese are going to be seen as the aggressors here, not only in the Taiwan situation immediately, but taking us out of a kind of a more limited war and saying this thing is now getting out of hand. And so people are going to say, I think people are going to respond by saying, no way. Like, we are not backing down. All we got to do is hold the line and they've got to accept it. And that's a difficult situation because they're not going to be able to, like, force us off the island at that point.

And they're going to be doing things that are going to make them look bad. And they're also, you know, what if they escalate in the Middle East? Like, well, maybe the Emiratis and the Saudis are going to come in on our side because they're going to say, hey, you can't like attack our oil refineries, you know, or the Europeans might say, you know, et cetera. You get you get the kind of impression. But I think that what's good for the goose is good for the gander. I think this is also true for us. So if the Chinese seized the island, I don't think we're going to be able to use those kind of strategies to get them to give it up either.

And that's why this denial of defense is so important. It's got to be directly focused on the fight itself. The process by which you wrote this book, I'm curious whether you participated in any simulated war game like activities in terms of constructing it. Yeah, I mean, over the years I have. I mean, not...

there was nothing that was specific, like drove it. I do think the thing about war gaming in my experience, and there are other people who are much more, you know, expert at it, but like, is that it, in a sense of war is like a, is essentially like a story, right? I mean, it's a linear narrative that involves going down a certain path for certain reasons. And it forces you to

to confront, okay, in this kind of, you know, oh, we can talk about all these weapons till the end of the day or planes or whatever, but how are they employed and what's the effect? And then what's the, you know, the human mind kind of, you know, that's, we live, you know, we live in time going forward with particular decisions. So it kind of forces you to, and that's a lot of what I was thinking. I don't mean a story in a kind of jocular way. I mean, like winning here, quote unquote,

quote unquote, winning is having the story unfold in a way that's favorable. And actually I was thinking, I was in a war game a couple of years ago where I was actually making this exact point to a guy, actually another participant is a retired military guy. He's like, hey, you need to like go downtown and get them early. And I was like, it's important.

that we be seen as the sort of reacting party politically, that we were not initiating because it'll be important for our people to know that and think that and for other people, because then they'll put more skin in the game. And this is where I use that, like the example of Lincoln and Fort Sumter, that the army wanted to pull the federal forces out of Fort Sumter because they were so exposed. But Lincoln said no, because he basically wanted the South to fire first, which then led to much higher levels of support

for the war in the northern states, which was obviously tremendously consequential given how difficult it was. What are the ramifications on the international stage for China in a situation where they embark on this escapade? And do those tell us any lessons about the the weakness or strength of of international coalitions to effect change? I think that

So I think that the strength of the coalition is going to be highly contingent. It's going to be dependent. Like, so, and this is, I think a problem with the way the current administration talks, like there's a lot of talk about these coalitions and partnerships, but they don't like, they love to talk about those. They love the optics. They love the photo op, like the quad. I mean, the quad's fine, but like they had a meeting. Okay. Like,

are they are there you know i mean yes you need these meetings so that's good for you yeah exactly like okay great you know instead and actually they can be counterproductive if it's like a lot of activity that makes the chinese think that there is a coalition forming that they need to get out in front of it can actually precipitate so i i mean that's kind of the nature of the beast but but i would say the key i mean and also you know

The Chinese can... I mean, I think they understand. I'm sure they understand this coalition and that they need to break it apart. So it's not like just the fact that a coalition is forming is enough because the Chinese have a way to respond to it. I think...

What we need to do is basically, you know, we need to lead because of how strong we are in Asia, but we need to offload more. So I think we need kind of like a regional sheriff model in other areas like the Middle East, South Asia, India, you know, the Middle East would be the Abraham Accords Coalition and Europe would be the Europeans doing more on their own defense. Then we need to get our partners in Asia to do more, particularly the Japanese and the Taiwanese countries.

So that's like the coalition. It's not like, I mean, we're at the summit of democracy thing. You know, it's like this big brouhaha. But I mean, is it really affecting the power relationship and how China is seeing that? I don't think so. And actually, it may be alienating some of the people we need to bring along, like the Indians and the Vietnamese and the Thais and so forth, Emiratis. You know, I look at this book and I see you making this argument. And I don't know that I hear this level of depth or.

from the leadership class that we currently have in Washington. And I understand that most of the time that we listen to them, they're doing it in the context of a four-minute hit on cable news. The restrictions that are involved with that are obvious, and you don't necessarily expect them to delve into things with such depth. But one of the things that I worry about is that

in the wake of having what feels to the American people like two unsuccessful wars, or at least, you know, a wars that at the very, at the, you know, at the very best kind of case scenario in one case achieved a place that wasn't as bad, maybe as it started and another that achieved a place that was just as bad, if not worse than when it started.

that there's a need for competent foreign policy leadership coming from the top that gives people faith that the American leadership class has a firm hand on the wheel. They're certainly not getting that from this White House. In that vacuum, what should our leadership class be saying about foreign policy and national security as it relates to China? Yes, but but also in general.

Well, thanks, Ben. I mean, honestly, that means a lot because it's actually what I'm trying to do. I mean, my vocation is, I take it seriously, is I think that, you know, somebody like me who thinks about foreign policy and national security for a living, we should actually...

try to solve the problems that actually exist, even if it requires fundamental change. And actually, that's why my partner, Wes Mitchell, and I started this, you know, our marathon initiative, like, oh, another think tank, but actually it's a desire, it's like a think tank to be like, we're going to do deep work and produce books and kind of, you know, related articles that really try to grapple with the problem. Because I think, you know, frankly, I think...

um well how do i put this in a way that's not but like i i think a lot of the it's like a clarity you know it's like a um uh it's like a a priesthood almost that that where people have forgotten the or they've lost touch with like the original fervor and sort of like or not so much the fervor but like the logic you know so so you get a lot of people for instance you know it's like

Oh, well, we've had this international order, this rules based international order since 1970 or 1940, whatever. And like, therefore, we need to we benefited so much. And it's like, well, A, is that true? B, is it still true? Or was it true? Is that what really happened? Is it still true? And like, how does that connect to Americans interests? And there's just a lot of hand waving there.

And, you know, a lot of people, they have jobs where they, you know, they had an important job in the government where they arranged meetings and they wrote the talking points. But, you know, and then they go to a think tank where they do Twitter and they do, you know, short articles and they're an expert on the next NATO summit. But it's not like.

it's kind of a lot on autopilot, you know? And at this point, you know, I think about, we were talking about the neoconservatives, like the first generation neoconservatives were like phenomenally important. And she has very sympathetic, Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, James G. Wilson, Moynihan. These guys were like, okay,

Our models aren't working anymore. Like, let's you know, we're getting mugged by reality. Let's let's change it. And to me, I'm like, well, the American, you know, let's what is in the American people's actual interests, you know, and what are they saying? Like, and then how do we correlate and relate our foreign policy to this in a way that's accessible? And I just I mean, it's bizarre. I was joking with somebody earlier today, like.

I mean, it's good for me individually that it seems like not many other people are doing that. I mean, Wes certainly is my partner, but like it's bad for the country. Shouldn't we have an elite that and I'm not to say that I'm like, you know, a foreign policy expert class, whatever you want to say, that is actually trying to do a good job for the American people. Like, isn't that I mean, that's why I get up in the morning. I think I'm serving the nation as much as if I were in the in the government. I'm just doing it in another way. But I think I don't know. You know, it has these sociological aspects.

And I think we had talked about this before, but like,

It's a very elite structure where like it's, you know, because of the power of the presidency, it's like about a lot of it kind of comes down from, you know, just basically one elected official. So actually the touch points with democratically, not just touch points, but actual real engagement with the democratic branches is pretty attenuated. I mean, if you go back to Hamilton, like they were trying to set up a quasi monarchical structure in Washington.

In foreign policy. And that's, you know, so you have like a courtier class in a way. Right. And so, you know, people deal with members of Congress, but not in a way that's like instinctive because the members of Congress aren't, you know, they might get a job. But like at the end of the day, the executive branch is where the action is. Right. So the incentive structure is kind of off. But, you know, anyway, I mean, I I hope this book.

You know, I want to speak to everybody. So, you know, I mean, obviously you're honored to be with you, but I'm also talking to like radio shows across the country, big or small, because I want to I want people to grapple with the arguments in the book because it concerns us all. You know, it's not like modern art. It's like some tiny fraction of people care, probably rightly appreciate now.

Look, as listeners to this show have heard me say before, you're always going to have a class of elites. And what this country deserves is a better class of elites. Elbridge Colby, thank you so much for taking the time to join me today. Thanks, Ben. It's a pleasure as always.

So this week we have a premiere at the Federalist of our new documentary, Meet the Parents. It focuses on the moms and dads of Loudoun County who took back Virginia and led a fight over the school board in Loudoun that attracted national news attention.

And really was at the center of the conversation for the Virginia gubernatorial race and something that is now being reflected on across the country in battles with school boards that are taking place and cropping up in all manner of different ways, but mostly driven by frustrations over school policies on lockdowns and the teaching of critical race theory. This documentary is something that we put together back in October.

with a number of interviews, both with parents and then with some attorneys who were involved in the disputes related to that school board. And it was really an opportunity to hear from the parents themselves about their perspective about what was going on in their community. Far too often, we have people who weigh in and comment on these matters on a national level in the news media without ever taking the time to go into these communities and listen to the parents themselves.

The documentary is about 40 minutes long, 45 minutes, and it is something that I hope you will check out and watch. Again, the title is Meet the Parents, and you can find it at The Federalist and on our YouTube and Rumble channels. I hope that you'll take the time to watch it because there's a number of surprises I think that you'll find.

One is that many of these parents were not politically engaged before this school board battle emerged. Many of them considered themselves either politically independent or moderate. They did not think of themselves as conservative activists or Tea Partiers or anything along those lines. And I think that there was this

false depiction of what was going on in Loudoun as being driven by a lot of those same conservative activist factors, when in reality it was frustrated parents who had in many cases never even paid attention to the school board before the school lockdowns and the lack of in-person learning made them pay more attention to what was going on in the classroom and what was being taught to their students who were in these supposedly great school programs.

It's something that I think we need to pay more attention to going forward. And it's also the type of approach that I hope that more people will use when it comes to talking about these issues. Far too often when these types of things are debated, we have people on national news media who are quote unquote experts in the field. Those people obviously should be heard from. But far too little of the time is spent actually talking to the people who

who in a very organic way in this county made a difference politically, changed the conversation within a gubernatorial race and had an impact on a national level in ways that I think are going to be turning this into an example of how people should approach the difficult and often very personal fights that happen over school reform within their communities. Again, the documentary is Meet the Parents. I hope you take the time to watch it.

I'm Ben Domenech. You've been listening to another edition of the Ben Domenech podcast. We'll be back soon with more. Until then, be lovers of freedom and anxious for the fray.