cover of episode Germany's Political Collapse

Germany's Political Collapse

2024/11/22
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The traffic light coalition's collapse was due to internal contradictions and the FDP's bad faith actions, exacerbated by economic pressures and public opinion.
  • Traffic light coalition consisted of SPD, Greens, and FDP.
  • FDP's hardline fiscal conservatism clashed with Green's need for government investment.
  • FDP deliberately provoked the collapse to position themselves for future coalitions.

Shownotes Transcript

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Hi and welcome to ones and two fps economics podcast. Every week we you take a couple data points to use them to try to explain the world. I'm Cameron, a body fp deputy editor with you in berlin, germany as always fp economics commons and cuma university professor at tooth is with us in new york.

Ki, adam.

I can. So just one data point this week for you all. And IT is thirty thousand. That is the number of jobs with folk swagger that are now set to be lost in germany as the company contemplates factory closures in the country for the first time ever in the history of volks wagon. Then volga is reportedly planning major job cuts as IT struggles to turn around its business. Tens of thousands of job cuts mark a ten percent pay cut across the board, and three factories all set to be closed in germany.

That's what the company now, kate, this is huge. It's huge for fox backing, but also for the german economy is really hard to state lor s is looking to shake off germany's economic malays as europe's largest economy looks set to contract for the second consecutive year he hosts industry.

This is just one indication of germany's economic problems. Industrial production is down in the country for several years now. This is predates the ukraine e war, in fact, and predates the pandemic.

So kind of long running economic problems that come to ahead with the government collapsing last week and now new election scheduled for early next year and more generally, just a pretty negative atmosphere in the country with recession and a lack of growth for the past several years and questions about whether germany's economic model fundamentally is flawed and may not survive in the years and decades ahead. So germany's economic malays and just how serious IT is, is something we wanted to talk about. But to start things off, obviously, there's been a lot of news around the world in the united states specifically.

And so one would be forgiven listeners are forgiven if they're not been following the news in german politics recently. As I mentioned, the government collapse. This is the government referred to as the traffic like coalition tion, three parties that had been governing together for the past three years. Yeah that that just collapse. But adam are curious if you give a bit of context in why that happened and what the kind of back story is.

yes. So the traffic like coalition was an important experiment, germany under angle, a miracle that had a series of of governments that basically always consisted of her Christian democratic party. This is going back two thousand and five. So center right in Christian democratic party, more often than not in coalition tion with the social democrats, the old socialist party of germany, that whose roots like that of the catholics center party, the Christian democrats go back to the nineteen sixth century, and so they'd formed the other kind of stodgy middle ground of german politics for much of the last twenty years.

And the election in twenty twenty one promised the formation of a progressive government um whose center of gravity was to the left and the coalition consisted of the social democrats and the Greens and the liberals who are kind of market liberal party whose party color is yellow so red, Green and yellow gives you the traffic light and in terms of the electoral dynamics here, the social democrats represent a constituency that is older, that is more blue color, but not very blue color. Most blue collar votes now tend to the right wing. In germany, like in united states, IT tends to be pension as basically who who are very committed and board in on the social wealth are Operators that germany built since the thousand nine th century and extensively, of course, since the midst the twenty century and the two parties that compete.

If you take for the future of germany, the Young people's vote note of the educated Younger folks, those who are tend to vote for the afd, the far right party, but for the college educated Younger demographic, the Greens and the liberals compete with each other, and they compete hard and very aggressively as IT as emerged. The fd p is a party that pulls below ten percent. The Greens aspire to pull over twenty percent.

Most of the time they pull around fifty in an proportional representation system. And you add these three parties up, you get your majority. So they are not entirely on the equal footing, but they are competing for a similar kind of zone, a similar space.

That is the future of germany, but envisioned in two rather different ways. One is a business friendly, market oriented, near liberal, socially liberal, but economically conservative position, which is the FTP, the liberals line. And the Greens are the worlds largest and most significant ecological party, and their program is also modernizing and progressive.

They would see IT at least, but of course involves much heavier degrees of government intervention, with a view to bringing about the energy transition and addressing the climate crisis. And the gamble of the coalition was that you could well together, an old social wealth, are party, the P. D, with these two different visions of german modernity in a single coalition.

And it's been tough. And it's been tough from the very beginning because the liberals, the FTP, have dug in on an increasingly hard fiscal conservative position. They watered that down because of the aftermath of code and because of the shock of the war in ukraine.

But increasingly, as the coalition has come under pressure, they've duggin on this. Finance minister Christian lindner was at the core of this, and this has made the position of the Greens, who need government investment, various types of other regularly, to intervention, increasingly impossible as well. And the tour, essentially at war with each other. And since the summer, where there was bitter, a bitter argument about the current budget in the aftermath of that, with polls in the offing anyway and the opinion polls running very hard against the government and the surging and the Christian democrats emerging as the dominant force, with over thirty percent in the polls, the liberals quite deliberately provoked the collapse of the government. And we know from research by Robert powers shit the tight weekly newspaper, that the fd p basically over a series of months actually prepared, increasing the aggressive economic programs which they knew would be rejected by their covers. Tion partners hoping to provoke chance, the shouts to finally step up because otherwise he's been basically a bit of anonymity and fire Christian lindner, allowing them them to position themselves and hope to get across the five percent hurdle that's crucial for presence in the bond's tar and therefore membership in the government in future. And so the FTP, the liberals are kind of trying to manual themselves for the aftermath of this government, with a youtube perhaps emerging as a useful ally of the Christian democrats in future covidien negotiations.

Yeah, I should say, you know, the differences between these parties were always kind of obvious, but the claim of the government was that they could kind of transcend these differences, are kind create some new synthesis that would create new progress in the country. But ultimately, as you say, they be kind of collapsed because of, you know, the contradictions. yes. I mean.

I wouldn't say I don't know whether degree, but I don't think the gap between link and hard work is anything any wider than the gap to see within the democratic party in the united states. I don't think the band with in the german government is wider than in the democrats.

And you could say, well, that proves the point that mean the democrats, after all, were profoundly dsf unctions when I came to actually trying to pass the progressive agenda of the bike administration, cinema and manta and essentially block that. And I think that would be, you know, for american audiences that are really useful analogy. The way the german handled this, unlike in the U.

S, is that when you former government, you actually sign in a coalition contract, it's literally called that or covode tion treaty, in which you spend months, if necessary, hammering out differences. And three, agree the legislation you're going to pass. And I think the liberals have been quite widely seen as an extremely bad faith actors since that agreement IT was arranged. And the social democrat and agreements have not had anyone near the same kind of problems, though, have differences to. And the liberals have been a spoiler because they have they have, despite the fact that there is a contract and have repeatedly acted to position themselves as they they were the opposition rather than a member of the government Carrying joint responsibility.

Yeah and i'm sure we'll get to this e later in the conversation and and strikes me that one of the differences, the united states in the U. S. The government had at least a lot more money to throw around and ultimately sort of the german government had this constitutional ruling that basically prevented them from spending the amount of money that they envisions in that coalition contract.

But I guess to look ahead to the coming election, IT seems safe to assume that all of shoulder, the social democratic chancellor who's been adopt the current government, is not going to be the country's next change there. Of course, the election is about to start to, who knows, I will see, is scheduled for late february. The campaign will be under way soon, but the assumption is that the next chancellor will be the leader of the opposition center right Christian democrats, that is, free drink merits.

And if we are to sort of look ahead to try to revision marts, let government in germany, at least there's a lot of talk among you know the Christian democrats opponents castigating merits for his work at black rock. Basically, he had left politics for a number of years and then became an executive at black rock in germany, the investment firm. Yeah, so they tend to investigate him as a kind of for you know and sex and capitalist type curious whether he would be more revealing to kind of look at how is political identity is rooted instead in his home region of the island, 就是 of western germany, that tends to be socially conservative, is also a kind of place where the social market economy of western germany still exists in, at least in the imagination of the people who live there.

Perhaps the famous middle stand industries that have always kept the country of float, the kind of small medium sized family firms are still active and thriving to some extend. Um is that really the kind of menu that that march is raised in and still living in and is going to try to bring back to germany? Mean, is basically march more of A A throwback to germany's west german pass rather than a kind of you know angle.

sex and future of some kind. I mean, the really .

interested .

that where bridge this is a big area yeah so you pursuit exactly going to be the salad I have .

been so exactly starting next year, if you want to know about the town and not only the region, the town were free merges from. I ve spent a lot of time. There is the town that my wife. Was raised in my in laws to live in.

In fact, mart is globally relevant expertise.

I know where his parents, his parents are still are the old age home, which I ve passed by regularly when i'm visiting my anyway, don't want to go down this rated hole. Uh, i'm curious here what what what you think about the the the economy there and how that might be coLoring him?

I don't think age is actually like a surprisingly the relevant issue here. I didn't I didn't realize how I started doing research for this episode like just how old matt is. I mean, he was born in fifty five. He's only one year Younger 的 angulation o and in fact, that's really decides for his entire career because where as mirco was on the other side of the I R.

And making you know a Young life in as a researcher and and researcher er in in his germany good old nurse was coming up through the real like exactly as you say, like the absolutely classic machine politics of Christian democracy, anti communist, cold war social market, liberal german, western german establishment. I mean, he he just absolutely, I think he's a cookie cut of figure. In fact, you could write the history of german politics in the last thirty years as pivoting on the fact that in the early two thousands, Angela meral made him her victim.

I mean, he he basically knows out of the party leadership by two thousand and four whatever he was, I think widely seen as the Young west german star and it's angle in miracles a cent that really interrupts that career and causes him to drop out of front line leadership in two thousand and four, not over substance, because in the early stages, angle merkle herself was quite a hard line market oriented near liberal. But I think pretty as a matter of him, just realizing that he was gonna all of the oxx y gen. Out of the room for the able future.

And he's an ambitious guy. And then making a very smart one, has to say, move to black rock, which in two thousand and nine was not yet the world destroyed months that that IT is today, but was literally just coming out of the two thousand and eight crisis as one of its great winners. And march leverages is very considerable track record already by that point in corporate law.

Interposition of black rock, which is you say, is a stigma for the german left, because the german left has quite a strong anti finance positioning in terms of these economics, I have tried quite hard, but I find IT very difficult to find anything marked him out as any way, in any way distinctive or different than exactly as you put IT. You're run of the mill german social market, conservative. I mean, he he likes the debt break.

He's at least said as much though I think everyone recognizes if he is in head a chance of the government theyll probably have to find ways around IT. But right now he doesn't pay for him to say that. So he doesn't say IT.

He likes tax cuts for for businesses. He wants to increase incentives for business. He would like to pair back family benefits in favor of reducing tax on overtime.

I just see him as a really middle of the road, but very dedicated and committed supply side liberal or supply side conservative. You know what in amErica would wants to be the run of the mail centrist republican kind of position? He is a value conservative.

I mean he was part of abortion shaft um which is quite significant in west germany. So he was part of a you know the once common place student ferny in germany once, as in in the vima republican and in the villiam's period. But in west germany, to be part of abortion shaft really means that you are distinctly on the conservative side of youth culture, to say the very least.

So that's really the kind of you know is a guy who quite likes to have take a hardline position. He's a noted polymict. He's really I mean, he comes across as, like I always say, comes across as a really mean schoolmaster.

But apparently that's popular with at least about third of the german electric. And he really is not afraid of parliament. S he goes after people really quite hard, and he is anti dream.

And that is the ticket on which both the liberals and the conscription democrats are running. IT narrows down their coastal possibilities to be onest. But he's and degrees in the sense not that he's a climate denial.

You just can't do that in germany, but he's you know he thinks carbon capture is probably the way to go. They have this slogan, which is technological openness, tech logi often height, which means government isn't going to try and pick technologies that matter. And he is a die hard defendant of the internal combustion engine. So he's you know he's is one of the few people, sentient people, who still believe that whether or not the internal condition engine survives long term is an open question. So it's a noted it's a nottle profile and it's really the alternative of the conservatism that germans didn't take in the early two thousands when they opted for miracle instead.

I mean, I guess if we look back and how we got to this point with this malaise and germany IT does seem like one thing that's gone wrong is that germany is kind of miss the boat on the digital economy. Obviously, the united states is a standout in terms of the major digital companies that dominate the U. S. Economy based on silicon valley. Germany doesn't really have an analog to that and is perhaps suffering for IT.

And i'm curious, what is the back story on where germany went wrong with this digital economy? I mean, was this rooted in failed political decisions? Or is IT failures of the country's capital markets to make good investment decisions as as a kind of failure on that side? Or in germany? Are these kind of two sides linked in some ways? I know some of the major financial actors are the longest bankin these banks that are under political control to some extent. So or the kind of financial decisions pared with political decisions in some fundamental way that LED to this ultimate problem.

I mean, it's it's easy to get down on germany and digital. I mean, human. I can both tell a story of how hard IT is to recorded a podcast online for lack of reliable internet connection in in the, in the most important capital city of europe, that apparently the fact the wifi connection just can't be accounted on in brain apparently goes back to decisions made in the one thousand, nine and eighties in a kind of chronic capital, rather than chance.

I help my coal had some bodies in the body, german private television business, who like copper cables as a way of of of, you know, running the, running the T, V. And telephone service. And so the germans got brought in on technology that that really, in the end, of course, has come off second best.

I think, however, that kind of impressionism is a little unfair after all. You know there's a facility in comparing national economies with each other. I germany's economy is large and important, but it's you know it's bigger than that of new york, but you know it's a bit like asking, when did new york state mister digital boat train?

I mean, europe as a whole failed to track the united states when I came to platform businesses and failed to track korea, taiwan when I came to hardware production. But germany, interviewed as a region within europe, has champions. I mean, IT has infilling in chips, IT has S A P in enterprise software and IT has semmens in industrial automation.

And by any standard worldwide, these are significant players in their particular niches of of tech and in quantum, where europe's disadvantaged tive to the united states in asia is relatively less severe. This is one of the conclusions of the draggy report. Munich university colony university of significant centres in IBM has a research center in germany for computing.

So you know, when we do like for like comparisons, it's important not to compare germany, where eighty million people in the economy of four trillion euros, with the united states, which is far vastly larger as an entity. But I think what's really telling IT is a the infrastructure de, as mentioned. And then on the other end, really the failure of germany's leading manufacturing firms other than Simons, which really does have a very important role in very high and manufacturing processes that firms other than those to really make the digital leap.

And by find away the most significant sector to fail. Here is the automotive sector, which is not just germans, but europe's leading sector of r and d if you look at the R N D rankings for europe, they are dominated by german auto firms. And they basically fail to understand that the future of the car was not ultimately refining the internal combustion engine and incredible suspension and so on, but basically making the car into a cell phone and social media and digital entertainment system on wheels. And that's what that's what none of the german car manufacturers are really grasp this. And so that's where theyve kind of they are now struggling to catch up.

So what would IT that mean then for the german car industry, get out, compete IT simply then by by tesla and chinese car companies on this new next generation of e autos? I mean, would that amount to A A fatal blow to the german economy? Is a whole. I mean, how much of the german economy is tied up in the car industry to begin with and in the kind of associated industries of parts success? Ta, I mean, if germany held on to the internal combustion engine, I mean, could that survives as as a niche product, I guess in some ways in the global economy in blow back with that have for the national economy?

I think there's really two ways of looking at this, and i'm always torn back and fourth between them. Like if you view this from a macro o perspective, then really you kind of have to say everyone should chill a little bit because you know, germans workforce paying social insurance, so people employed to thirty five million people. And the highest estimate that you get for the automotive sector is two million.

The core workforce actually making vehicles and key components for them is more in the order of the seven hundred thousand people. So we're talking we're talking a relatively modest action of a big complicated economy. So if you see some shinkin, we definitely have seen that in the german auto industry.

The they used to be turning out five point eight million vehicles a year before covered. They're now down to just over four millions of there's been a very dramatic decrease in their total volume production. You know, this is a shock.

It's a shot for particular firms. It's a shot for particular regions. It's a shot for the supply chain. You can go out to an estimate as highs two million people who are in direct ways employed still well. Of even ten percent of the workforce, but nevertheless a bigger number.

All of those those groups will, of course, be badly hit if the german auto industry goes into crisis. But it's just one piece of a very big aggregate, which is a highly soph, ticad modern economy, which doesn't actually live by metal bashing and exporting, but lives like most other economies, largely by integrating goods into service sector inversion. This is true for germany, as IT is for every other advanced the economy, even though the germs have a hard time ready realizing this.

So that as IT were a deflationary account of this crisis in germany itself right now, that argument is as though you're coming from a different planet, right? And you know fairness today, I think that because the auto industry truly is a symbol of german economic development, um IT wasn't germany though he invented the car in the late nineteen th century, was not in the early twenties century great success story. It's really the postwar west germany that becomes this dominant global player in high diced car production.

And for that, as IT were to change, is truly a changing of the tides, right? I mean, there are very few brands in the entire world more famous than, you know, the big four, V, W, Mercedes, bmw and and bush like these. These are iconic brands the world over.

And if they suffer really serious financial and economic crisis, understandably that a big blow to, after all, what is a modesty european economy, even more important are the jobs and where they're concentrated and these are core constituents of what's left of the german industrial working class, which are still highly organized in um the biggest trade union I think probably the most powerful trade union I think in the world anyway, which is ig meteo, the german metal working union which is heavily represented in vw. And we're talking code determination here. So they have board level representation.

And then there's all the spin off. And the spin off is not just jobs and and value added, but it's actually an entire technological network. As I was saying, the german automotive hub is arguably the most dynamic industrial R N D core.

I is just a fast in europe in terms of uncertainty, in terms of scale. Maybe airbus, you could count as a rival in terms of sophy cation, but you to know where there is large as a tech hub. And so for that to not just enter a crisis but to find itself historically eclipsed, you know, to be literally stuck in the technology that just doesn't make sense anymore.

And this is, you know, this is a performance oriented firms like german car companies like sweater blood, to get their acceleration figures, to know sub five seconds for a hundred kilometer in our telerate. Now know some jumped up electric car manufacturer comes along. You just wp, a few more engines are a bit more battery, and these things accelerate like no one's ever accelerated before.

It's humiliating to discover that the entire game that you are playing technologically is just irrelevant and an objective speaking by any measures of the electric vehicles once you can get the charging sorted out, are preferable in many ways to even the most sophisticated products of of the internal conversation engineer and that setting aside any environmental concerns, they are just higher performing vehicles and that that I think is really is an underived. It's a huge shock and IT affects IT affects at least three of the major parties like IT affects the S P D because of the workers and IT affects the fd p and the cdu because of business concerns and almost like a kind of cultural style. One way of describing the fd p liberals as as auto bar liberals, their idea of freedom is going as fast as they down, more like on the autobath in their porch like that, their fantasy of freedom.

It's like the american road trip that is all about speed and ultimate performance. So it's a kind exclusive it's quite a class exclusive idea. But that aristocratic idea of being able to just you know get in your push eleven at and go to two engine and fifty kilometers and now and like not look back, that's their idea of of the future. So it's quite IT shakes them to discover that you know they might need to do that now in a tesler or a chinese .

car having a bit OK. It's it's useful to to be reminded of that it's not just an economic crisis, is a crisis of identity for modern germany. We will take a quick break here, but we will be back in a second to continue talking about the german.

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And how are silly valley billionaires impacting U. S. elections? The first episode of on Candy valley comes out on october thirty first. Listen, whatever you get your pod casters. Okay, welcome back. So we were talking before about how, in all likelihood, the Christian democrats who are going to be leading the next government in germany.

And i'm curious, what kind of distinctive approach does Christian democracy offer for germany's current chAllenges you know that IT faces right now? But also more generally, I mean, you know, the united states doesn't really have a party with this distinct history, distinct philosophy at its foundation. So yeah, maybe we could try to unpack IT a bit.

I mean, what is Christian democracy distinctive approach to to economic issues? I mean, there are a couple they're come to mind for me. One, there is this kind of idea of subsidiarity.

I mean, that sort of rooted in catholic teaching, I think, where sort of concentric circles of policy making, where things happen at the most local possible level, but at the same time is that there's a kind of you internationalism at the heart of of Christian democracy. Well know, IT strikes me that is not accident that I was Christ. Democrats kind of pushed to create the E.

U. After the second world war and and pushed IT forward in the decades afterwards. So yeah, what is this all add up to? Is a philosophy free for for germany right now? I mean, maybe is a possible to imagine that the the Christian democrats could strengths in europe now, even maybe more easily than then the other parties have been able to in in germany yeah.

I think this is a super interesting question. Your absolutely right. Christian democracy was absolutely non accidentally the one of the driving political forces. So I could believe the driving political force behind the formation of the E. U.

After world war two, can you put IT in terms of internationalism? I would put IT, you know, I could put IT more negatively. It's an anti nationalism.

And Christian democrats, especially because Christian democracy comes out catholic. And first and foremost, protestant ism was always the religion of nationalism in europe, going all the way back to the reformation. Catholic has this unity kind of claim, and, you know, not always realized in practice, but that's an eeo logical resource.

And in the wake of fascism in germany, italy, catholic emerged as a claim on to a wider european identity. IT also, of course, differentiate europe history, ally from islam. So it's one of the dividing lines. And against communism.

So catholic m was one of the ankers ani communism in the postal period in all the way through to the portel, lor and solid dios in poland, which somebody like the Young Frederick merk, knowing people like this growing up in west germany a little Younger than him. But nevertheless, knowing folks in this kind of media, they dogged this so hard. They loved that, right?

Kathleen m. Was arriving to rescue eastern europe from the nightmare of communism. All of this is pretty deep in the DNA and in the generation.

It's surprising. These only one generation before federate Marks and angle, a miracle that is, hello coal. This was incredibly pronounced. So this was the chance of a germany that brought about unification from the mat, the eighties through to the ninety eighties. And if he he was he was a passionate european like he was a european that was really of the postwar generation exemplified exactly that kind of logic that you're invoking.

I'm not sure whether merch fits quite in that mold with angle, a miracle that was always this question, whether he was a european because SHE was his german, and he was very, actually a very angle phone in the american retina oriented SHE turned into a major figure in european in politics because of her all in brokering the constitutional arrangements in the late two thousands, and then in handling the U. S. Zoo are very ambiguous european figure that are deeply committed.

SHE did politics at the european scale. Merz started his career european parliamentarian, so he certainly knows the system. The germans, currently user of underlying the most consequential european commission president since the law in the eighties, is german and of his party.

So she's A C. To you figure another one of the people that was kind of caught in the wind shadow, the great shadow of angle, a miracle, and ended up exciting to brussels. And I think it'll be very interesting to see how matt's position himself in europe.

I would expect him to drive A A less perversely dogmatic line than the liberals have in recent years, who've basically used european opportunity for sound, often looking tough, but I would expect hurt to drive a heart back in on all european business. I don't think he's going to be a comfortable person for the europeans to deal with, because I think he's going to apply the same kind of medicine to germany if he gets the chance. And so that is the kind of mood in which the germans, they are very unwilling to make concessions to anyone else.

And I don't know quite how that's going to play out to be. The crucial issues will be who ultimately replaces micro in the french presidency and you know where and how that kind of anchoring relationship would work. He's a little bit you know, since his days in european, which are now no decades ago. Since he's spends so much of his time in opposition, it's a little hard to figure out you know exactly where he's going to stand on european and issues. I think.

yeah, I mean, this is a foot note here. I guess I should have mentioned that about this. Our land, in addition to being a place with kind of these medium size industries and and socially conservative, is also heavily catholic or or maybe that social conservatism rooted in the catholic in every town as the big catholic church, the center of town. And that is the with you that are still moves in. So we'll see if that informs, he is approach to any of these european matters may be this kind of civilization imagination about your mission. But I guess to return to the bigger questions about german's allays, i'm curious you know whether you just simply put its we should be imagine germany ending up in some ways as japan, basically a basic, a big economy, one that was a major exporter, is a major exporter rooted in these industry, is a one that that seems to be in stagnation and perhaps is because some kind of permanent stagnation. And if that's the case, is that even such a such a bad faith for germany, for what to end up as another japan in europe?

I think this is a very important and kind of prospect diable question just to make sure we are we give the right impression. I mean, japan and germany's economic trajectory since the early nineties are very, very different because whereas japan's gd people capital really trusted early in the late eighties, early nineties and has largely stagnated since. That's just not true for germany.

So germany is fifty percent Better off in real terms as best we can estimate that over the last thirty years. And anyone like you that lives there or the visit regular like me, can tell the difference. I mean, IT is an incredibly prosperous place now, not uniformly, of course late, most other advanced economies, germany's main problems, uh, inequality and good governance around issues like education, migration and so on.

But this is this is a very rich, affluent society which offers its citizens much higher life expectancy on average than virtually anywhere in the united states, let alone national average. You know, that has very, very high standard of living, by any measure, is a huge success story. That the difficulty, in a sense, is adJusting precisely to the fact that is no longer dominating the headlines as europe success, which for really since the early two thousands, it's been able to do.

There was a phase when I was the sick man of europe in the late nineties, and that stuck quite deeply in the germ memory bank. But the couple of decades now, it's been a success story really until, as you said, but even before, covet growth began to to slow down quite sharply. So I mean, A, I don't think growth is over, but b, if I were, I wouldn't be the end of the world.

But sea is the major adjustment necessary to this, to this, a new, even slower growth rate. And are there a whole bunch of outstanding, very significant social issues that certainly are, and I think of creative and constructive politics, which is where the Greens were at to real. And I, you know, I should admit i'm very party preparation, would never in my life for the C.

D. U. And i'm quite closely involved with the Greens, like the Greens are formulating a policy of modernization, that is, bet quality ative change percentile about adjustment to the climate crisis, i'm afraid with murder of the more traditional elements is that he still seems, I think, to think the prioritising business LED growth is the, the, the alpha omega of german politics. And I think that's quite remote from realities. Actually, indus reflect his age.

I guess to finish off this conversation, I wanted to return to someone you mentioned a little bit ago, namely Angela miracle. SHE is actually about to publish her member. When this podcast goes alive, I think the member will be officially released.

I have not been able to get my hands on IT, but apparently a copies on its way to me. It's titled freedom very simply. And i'm curious, you know, miracle o was chancellor sixteen years for much at that time, he was very celebrated. If we were to look back now of curious for how you think she'll be remembered by history, should be remembered kindly for her sixteen years in power.

Yeah, I managed to get like there's a very long exit from the memories that was published in the delight, the weekly so that as much as i've seen of the I have to say IT, it's just about what you'd expect an angle american memory to be. It's not exactly, you know, a page turning exciting prose. But it's interesting that the passengers, which have been published so far, are telling her about her childhood mini's germany and the complexities of growing up as a kind of Normal line, if not dident person, and then the encounters with truth, which are vividly described, and of which angle miral can, if you ever have the chance to meter in person, get a very, very funny impression. But the the bit that they've already, I think, preventively decided to put out, because it's so controversial, is the issue really of ukraine and georgia, nato membership, which was raised very abruptly into everyone's amazing in two thousand, donate by the bush administration in each last days.

And the reason why Michelle is defensive about this is that for her during her chances, the ship SHE continued the the policy of the time, essentially, which began in the nineteen thousand seventies, between what was formally germany in the fifties and sixties, as you'd expect, was a west germany was a hocker hally empty communist st. In battled rump state. And in the seventies the mood changed, and germany became a key player in the era of dealt with the soviet union, not with china.

That came later with economics, but with the soldier union. And with this year, with poland, with and with these, germany and merkel was in no way exceptional in continuing this policy. Growing up in his germany, SHE spoke very fluent russian in the same way putin speaks extremely fluent german.

And so the two of them had a possibility of exchange, which is very unlike that of any west european politician. There are east european politicians to have a similar that kind of relationship like the bulgaria prime minister. But miracle there was always a sort of questioned mark about her relationship with putting an intense interest in IT because it's it's by dingle, essentially.

And but he continued a policy which was essentially, at the time, no one really thought much of IT, but in retrospect, given russia's aggression against ukraine in twenty twenty two has come to seem like, you know, the hallmark of a kind of a peace man and a sell out to a tire that we should have understood was a danger to piece in europe, and we should have understood this years ago. And the key moment in retrospect for offenders of the ukrainian national cause is the fact that in O A, when the bush administration, very abruptly, and to the surprise, even the people like conditions, ice sudenly jump the gun and said, right, we going to bring ukraine, georgia in the nature. Germany and france resisted this and resisted this quite docketed.

And in the end, they ended up with this terrible compromise weren. On the one hand, they weren't given a track two membership in ukraine, then was not in the state that IT is in now in terms of its domestic politics. And on the other hand, there was a paper promise that they would, in due course, find their place within nato.

So they managed not really to give u kine and George any effective support. And georgia paid the Price later in the year with a nasty short war with russia. But on the other hand, to provoke that, they provoke russia and gave no effective support.

And mercer says this are self. And I think that's a really affair assessment. I think in due course, I mean I I don't get IT, I think this is A I think this is a very blant case of of hintin of you know the assistive tes of history changing the assessment of people's positions.

I think this I did need angle. Merkle can look after yourself. We don't need to worry about the fairness of history. Handle mle, but but I do this a very sudden shift in perspective, which doesn't accord with a reasonable account of decisions that were made at the time.

Obama, you know, because the ukrainean crisis didn't start in twenty two, as as everyone now likes to remind themselves, IT started in twenty thirteen, twenty fourteen, and IT was a mess. And IT was a mess from both the european red on the american side. But IT was a mess.

The americans were only too happy to hand off to build in in paris to sort out with the minds process rate obaa. Ma's administration was not interested in getting its hands dirty with that european problem. So it's not as though as IT where there was john the cane stride ent voice in favor of, you know, western backing for ukraine was actually the doomed position in washington.

IT absolutely wasn't. And michelin and a the the french government of the time on the front of where alarm had to do their best to to hold the line with, as we know, very limited resources. And that is maybe where you can really fault miracle.

And this is, to me, and more general point about her chance. The ship is that SHE just know he was a height of SHE is an incredibly sophisticated, brilliantly intelligent person. We provide wide view of history, but he did not make the decisive decisions that would have be necessary to prepare germany for the future on the energy front or on the defense, national defense front.

And I think a lot would be forgivable if you'd actually been serious move to establish german autonomy. And SHE knew IT, and he understood, because he had these very high stakes, very unpleasant encounters with trump and came back from those in the spring of twenty seventeen and saying, now europe needs to stand on its own two feet. And precious little happened.

And I think that's where I would really where I really think questions have to be asked as though OK fine. There was a continuity of policy. Picking fights with putin or standing, you know, certain positions called war positions against him is easy to see why that was unattractive. But then why not do is Michael would always say, why not do your homework? Why not actually make the investments, start building preparatory ory positions and and why instead persist with projects like north stream, which you know subsequently appear like, you know very, very bad investments. So I think that's where it's when it's not the atmospherics, it's actually the concrete detail of policy, which is where also I would and I mean, I wrote extensively and very critically about her governments in the euro zone crisis, where again, her leadership was was anything but liberal, anything but progressive, but really halting and in the end, totally inadequate to the crisis. And again, you know, in that case, SHE hands of decision making to the E, C, B, marier drag e, who have to have to pull, as the germans would say, have to pull the chest nuts from the fire.

Yeah, i'm very curious to see what he has to say specifically about nord's stream, that decision and the earth crisis. More generally, IT will be published both in german and english. So anyone out there who's interested because should be able to find a copy in their own language, I think other languages as as well.

So keep eye out for IT, otherwise we will be back next week. Ones and tools is written and edited by me, Cameron, a body along with adam tools. It's produced by cauda ti, Laura ross, by team rob sex and then F. A.

This show is made possible through the support of foreign policy readers, if you're interested, news and analysis from around the world considers subscribing listeners to ones and who's even get a fifty and percent discount, just go to foreign policy that com slash subscribe and use the promo code tool. Check out that's T O O Z E and listeners. As always, we love getting your feedback. You can leave voice messages on the ones and to the home page on foreign policy dot com or email us podcast of foreign policy dot com, or you can tweet us that at once and tools part. Thanks very much for listening and will be back in your feet next week.