132. ANALYSIS: Alexander Titov on Russian imperialism, and mechanisms of territorial appropriation, in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine
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Welcome to the War in Ukraine update from Kyiv podcast. I'm Jessica Gnauer, a senior lecturer in international relations at Flinders University in Australia. And I'm talking today with Dr. Alexander Titov.

Alexander is a lecturer in modern European history at Queen's University Belfast. Alexander focuses in his work on Russian foreign policy, as well as contemporary Russian history, politics and nationalism. Thanks for joining me on the podcast today, Alexander. Well, thank you very much for having me.

So imperialism as a phenomenon has a long history across the world, but also in the Eurasian region. And I know that in your work, you have investigated imperialism in Northeast Asia. So first of all, for listeners who may not be familiar, how do we define the Northeast Asian region? And then could you also talk

a little bit about your work. What types of imperialism have existed in Northeast Asia in the 19th and 20th century?

Yes, this is a very good question. So there are various definitions of Northeast Asia, but for our purposes, and I was part of an HSE-funded research project called Competing Impurities in Northeast Asia, which was a joint project between UK and Japan universities, we defined Northeast Asia as essentially

countries such as China, Japan, Korea, and also Russia. I think that's one of the key elements is that traditionally you would say that Northeast Asia only includes the countries with East Asian culture. But our argument in the project, which the book should be coming out in September, is that Russia was very much in the late 19th century and early 20th century, very much part of this element

It was a very important element in the competing imperialisms. And unlike other European empires, it had a special role or claim in Northeast Asia because it was a contiguous empire. So there was no break between the capital, Moscow or St. Petersburg, and its Far Eastern territories, which it acquired from the Qing China in the 19th century. So that gave it a special status and a special claim

to be very much part of this regional network or competing network, rather than overseas powers such as Britain, which were also present at Britain and others, which were overseas empires and whose claim on territories, which they did have in particularly in China, were always different from Russia. That's our argument was.

Now, the key point which I was looking at, so we have several colleagues looking at different aspects of it, my point was that we started off as competing imperialisms. So Japanese Empire, Qing Empire, which was the name of the Chinese state at the time, Russian Empire, as well as various overseas empires. But if we look at just those three, China, Russia, and Japan in this period as empires,

And they were acquiring imperial territories, right? There was an imperial expansion. However, by the mid 20th century, very much the same borders, give or take, of course, borders changed a bit, but most of them were the same borders, but they were national borders now.

So my point was how did the imperial territories, which was widely acknowledged, it's an imperial territory, Russian territory, Japan, in Hokkaido, China, in Manchuria and so forth, how did they manage to turn those imperial territories into national ones? And I look at the three case studies, the island of Hokkaido for Japan,

Russian Far East, which is territories which Russia acquired into treaties from China in 1858 and 1860, which are now the maritime region where Vladivostok is and Amur region where Parbarovsk is, main Russian cities in the Far East.

And for China itself is Manchuria, right, which is now called Northeast Asia. And I look at how did this process of turning this territories from imperial ones into national ones happened within three cases. And what I found is that actual mechanisms of appropriation of this imperial territory into national one was very, very similar between all three empires.

That's why we can talk about the competing territories in Northeast Asia. And if I can just briefly outline kind of my main findings here, is that essentially I highlight perhaps four main mechanisms for appropriation of formerly imperial territory as a national one between all three states. And that is basically, first of all, is ethnic colonization, right? So ethnic settlement by...

imperial nations, so in case of Russia, that would be colonization of those territories with people from European Russia. Japan, likewise, was a very sustained colonization by the Japanese after 1868, after the Meiji Revolution into Al-Qaeda, which until then was not fully colonized by the Japanese.

and also since late 19th century the Qing government allowed the Chinese, ethnic Chinese were not allowed to settle in Manchuria which was part of the Qing Manchu homeland so they were finally allowed to settle in Manchuria as well. So all three pursued similar tactics of ethnic colonization. There is also a developed discourse which I would call a first discovery of superior civilization discourse arguing that this

lands are empty, they tabula rasa, they can be populated by the first discoverer, right? And there is a lot of disagreement who discovered first, for example, Sakhalin Island, whether they were Japanese or were they Russians and so forth. So there were always these arguments. But basically, the arguments are the same between three of them. And if there were people living there, such as Ainu or local tribes in Far East or Manchu tribes and others, they were seen as they're not worthy of

independent states or that they settled by a superior civilization. That was the case in all three cases, it actually justifies the creation of it because it's a superior civilization development and so forth. The third one is a natural borders one, essentially arguing that this territory naturally belongs to the states. So the Russians have this idea of natural space for Russia, which stretches from the Baltic to the Pacific. So essentially reaching the natural limit of a six

expansion, and that was the new territories were part of it. Japan argued only from the late 19th century that Hokkaido was one of the four main islands, which was not the case until then. So they changed their understanding of what Japan was.

And of course, Manchuria as well, that was not part of the Great Central Glade Plain, traditionally speaking. But certainly in the 1930s and 1920s, particularly when there was a competition with Japan over this, there was a concerted effort to justify how Manchuria and North East Asia naturally belonged to China on geographical arguments as well. So geographical name about natural borders. And then the final one is the so-called mnemonic appropriation. It's through

various cultural, historical and other devices, including, for example, the idea of simply renaming territory. So until the late 19th century, Hokkaido was called Ezo land, so the land of the barbarians. They renamed it Hokkaido, which is the seventh path relating it to Japanese historiography. Manchuria is named Northeast. And of course, Russians renamed all the

old names and created new ones to emphasize historical continuity. So, for example, the city of Khabarovsk was named after a Russian explorer, a 17th century Russian explorer who first tried to settle that land and was repelled by the Qing. But

when Russia reacquired the territory, as they argue, they named the city after him, right? So it shows this continuity. And what's important, so this is a detailed look at those three cases and how they develop and so forth, and there's an article coming out about that. But what I also argue is that this essentially applies not just to Northeast Asia or just Russia, it's actually quite a universal phenomenon, and they...

means of appropriating a territory which previously did not belong to a nation into the national so-called nation's dear body is actually pretty similar and if you look at arguments and strategies in Europe in North America in Australia and not just Western cultures but all other cultures as well including as I said China but India as well and so forth it's pretty much similar you know so you have a kind of limited number of

legitimizing factors, ethnic colonization, arguments about historical and antecedent possessions and so forth, one people arguments, etc. They're all pretty much similar, right? And how the states use them will really depend on historical circumstances and availability of the determination and willingness to actually employ them.

And it's fascinating research. And I always feel like imperialism is a phenomenon that deserves so much more attention and really underpins a lot of the roots of phenomena that we still see unfolding today. In that sense, if we fast forward to 1850,

the present day, you know, we have Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which took place last year. But one of the arguments that's been put forward is that there are some kind of imperial drivers that might underpin the way in which Putin himself, the Russian regime, has justified or gone about the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Do you see that there are

reverberations of imperialism that we're seeing currently in Russia's invasion of Ukraine? Yes, this is a very good question. And again, for broad popular understanding or terminology, imperialism probably

probably will do, but if you look at it more carefully, I would argue that actually, in a sense, it's even worse, because if it was an imperial expansion, it's taking somebody else's territory, right? It's establishing hierarchy, establishing difference between the colony which is being exploited, right, and the home country and the metropolis which kind of does the exploitation. In the Russian case, it's actually how they try to do it is very different,

Actually, because what they are trying to do is actually appropriate those territories, not as a colony, but as a part of Russia, part of Russian nation. And if you look at all of the arguments, particularly by Putin himself, who has been quite open about those things, and he's been writing and talking, and there is a kind of coherent argument.

narrative in his announcements on this project. It's pretty much clear, not so much he sees it as an imperial expansion, but as essentially as a restoring traditional form of Russian ownership of those territories, which are always in Russian. I talked earlier about this. There is not that many

arguments you can use to justify possession of a territory or appropriation of a territory. And if you look at Putin's rhetoric, he does use all of them, basically, very much in this justification of this war. So, for example, one of the most commonly used arguments for taking over territory or

holding on territories ancestral possession right and in the far eastern case for russia it wasn't possible because russia just was a newcomer there right so as was japan in that extent and china national china rather than qing empire in northeast asia but traditionally ancestral claim is the most important thing that this is this this land belonged to our forefathers therefore it's ours and so forth right and you know if you look at

his rhetoric, talking about particularly the Donbas, Crimea especially, but also Donbas, you know, talking about this is historical Russian lands. This is old-age Russian lands, which ended up by mistake, but the Bolsheviks gave them away for their own political reasons.

but they really belong to Russia because they are populated by the Russians, right? So there's another argument about ethnic settlement. If there are no Russians, you know, you can extend definition of Russian. Again, this is talking about Russian nationalism and there are different versions of it, how you define Russian nation. You know, you can talk about anybody who speaks Russian language, for example. Putin's claim, for example, about Russian Ukrainians being Russian

one people, you know, it's pretty much also goes in the same vein. Again, it's not something he invented himself.

And I would argue that all those things, they have much more power if they draw on some kind of historical understanding, historical tropes, which well spread around the population. And this idea of Russia and Ukraine being very close, you know, there are various arguments going back centuries about Eastern Slavs. So Eastern Slavs are Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, forming essentially one.

one nation. They all kind of have the connotations about trying to kind of appropriate this territory within the Russian states, which this that this territory is not imperial condition, but just taking what is ours. Right. And this is the phrase we're just taking what is ours is actually used by Catherine the Great

the Russian emperors at the end of the 18th century in 1790s during partition of Poland, for example, right? So a huge swathe of Polish territory was divided between Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia. And she was saying, well, those territories are ours anyway because they belong to the Asian Rus, to the Kievan Rus, and we are ancestors of that and so forth.

So Putin is not inventing anything new here, right? But again, to emphasize, this is about, even if it's expansionist policy, you know, it's framed in a national language, right? Rather than imperial language. But, and I think another point, of course, important one is the issue of relations with the West and idea of kind of strategic borders, natural borders that we need to control the North of the Black Sea to guarantee kind of Russian security. I have to say that, of course, the key question is,

So they're putting it out there, Putin sincerely believes in himself. The question is how far the Russian people believe in it, right? You know, and how far, even if they believe it, how far they believe in those things are strong enough to actually the consequences of a larger war and so forth. So that's a different question, but basically that's the official narrative and that's how they're trying to proceed with it. Mm-hmm.

So do you think that Putin himself really believes that sort of narrative that he's been putting forward? And then I don't know if you can answer this question or not, but to what extent do you feel that those ideas, that way of framing what's happening resonates with, you know, broader sort of Russian population in a domestic context?

Yes, well, I think Putin clearly believes in what he says, right? And it's been not kind of circumstantial rhetoric, but it has been consistent one for over many years. It changed its emphasis, it's changed its

strength and so forth. But, you know, I think it's even in 2008, when there were famous Bucharest NATO summit, which gave both Georgia and Ukraine promise of future NATO membership. Putin was talking to Bush, US president at the time saying like, do you really, do you understand that Ukraine is not a real country? It was kind of given by the Bolsheviks to us, you know, you can't, if you start doing this, you know, you know, this will,

have consequences, et cetera, et cetera. I think it's something he believed for a long time. You know, the other thing is, you know, whether he has the confidence, capacity and determination to actually proceed with those things, right? So it's not an accidental thing. It is his long term thinking about it.

But yeah, so I think he believes in it and it's not, you know, you can trace it over many years. It's not something we just kind of made up on the spur of the moment because he wants to invade Ukraine. I think he wants to invade Ukraine because he believes in those things, right? The other thing is how far Russian people believe. So it is a very difficult question. And I think we've seen that in 2014 when the Maidan revolution happened.

happened that there were volunteers going from Russia to fight in the West. So it's not just solely kind of Russian authorities sending troops, which have no choice to go. But, you know, there was kind of reasonably wide support for that. Yeah, so some kind of Russian nationalists did go volunteer and fight in Donbass. Historically, it's not the same as Crimea, for example.

So Crimea has an almost universal belief in Russia that it is a Russian territory wrongly given by Khrushchev in 1954 to Ukraine. Once you move beyond Crimea, it becomes less and less important. So being of the Poles before the war didn't give particularly high priority, in my Russian opinion, public opinion to Donbass.

But, of course, these things, once the big war starts, you know, that's, things change, right? So it's much more stark choices to face with. So issues, of course, of economic sanctions, but most importantly, the issue of mobilization, battlefield losses, and so forth. How far, you know, those territories are actually important, really, they're really important to kind of die over. Essentially, that's what's happening now. You know, it all kind of relates to the question of Russia's domestic politics, Russian domestic political system, and so forth, which, being, you know,

consolidating for quite a long time since Putin came to power. And I mean, I know it's not fair to ask a historian to make predictions about the future because that's not what you do. But can you comment on how you see the war evolving this year in light of what might happen, you know, what might change or essentially not change within the Russian domestic context?

Yes, again, a very good question. I would say that there is, I don't think there is a kind of substantial threat to domestic regimes. So, given that how things unfolded, and it's not just in Ukraine, but also Russia's relations with the West more broadly, the kind of antagonism between Russia and the West reached such high levels, almost unprecedented.

Even if you stop the war, sanctions will stay in place. Europe will not buy Russia oil and gas. America will still kind of sanction Russian banks. Basically, the losses are front-loaded already. So Russia will have to continue its turn, pivot to the east. So trade more with, rely more on China, trade more with China, trade with India, non-European world.

The consequences, for example, as I mentioned, that maybe Donbass is not so important, but Crimea certainly is. And, you know, Ukraine and, you know, lots of people in the West continue that the war will continue until Crimea is retaken. All those things saying is basically, you know, if it was like, OK, let's just go back to pre-war.

invasion status. It's not possible, right? So in that sense, I would imagine that given the absence of stronger position at home and also realization that basically, you know, you stuck with it. And even if Putin changed, I mean, Putin died, for example, and everything else, what do you do then? Give up Crimea, start paying, I don't know,

reparations, give up on nuclear weapons, break up Russia and so forth. There's no kind of appealing ways out, even if there was no Putin, right? I mean, it doesn't seem he's going there anyway. So I would imagine that's the most likely scenario. And of course, you have lots of different opinions about it and so forth. But it's all being decided on the battlefield, right? So how the battlefield will evolve will decide the outcome of it.

Well, thanks so much, Alexander. Thank you for tackling these quite challenging questions. I've really enjoyed the discussion and I appreciate you sharing your perspective with us on the podcast today. Well, thank you very much for having me. Thanks for listening. And thanks to Gonca Varol for our theme music.