130. ANALYSIS: Daria Isachenko on Turkey-Russia relations, Nagorno-Karabach, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and trajectory of relations in 2023
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Welcome to the War in Ukraine update from Kyiv podcast. I'm Jessica Gnauer, a senior lecturer in international relations at Flinders University in Australia. And I'm talking today with Daria Isachenko. Daria is a research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Daria focuses in her work on Turkey-Russia relations, as well as Turkey and regional cooperation and alliances in Eurasia.

So I look forward to discussing some of these issues on the podcast today. Thanks for joining me today, Daria. Thank you very much for the invitation. So first of all, you know, when we're thinking about Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Turkey has been a really interesting player in that context, in that they do have ongoing relations with Russia and they're also a NATO member country.

So could you provide some context to Turkey's relations with Russia prior to Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine? I think the most important thing to understand about this relationship is that it is above all a dynamic relationship, because much of the analysis that tries to explain how this partnership works

they have this kind of aesthetic projection of their own expectations. And this has some ground because this is a relationship that has been influenced by like 12 or so wars. So there is this kind of an assumption that this legacy must influence their current relationship. So if they cooperate, so basically conflict is then seen as a norm.

But if Turkey and Russia cooperate, then this is something not normal. And which is why there is this, okay, they are historical enemies, so they cannot be friends, then let's call them frenemies. So this is kind of a basic understanding. But what it ignores, this kind of dynamic relationship, is that already in the 20th century, in the early 20th century, after the collapse of both the Ottoman and Russian empires,

there has been an important transformation. So Turkey and Russia, their relationship is no longer about kind of struggle for supremacy or struggle for domination, but it remains a competition, a dynamic competition. Yeah, I guess also an interesting factor in Turkish-Russia relations is the fact that they're both situated on borders.

opposite sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey aligning with Azerbaijan and Russia aligning with Armenia. Can you talk about how the way in which Turkey and Russia have supported different sides in that conflict has impacted their relations with each other? Sure.

First, one thing, a general observation on the conflict, on this regional conflict management is that when we look at, yes, Turkey and Russia are on opposite sides in Syria, in Libya, in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Ukraine, but we look at the level of their positioning. But what we don't look at

which is important to actually examine, are the interests behind. Because when you look at the interests, what is it that they are after? They are not necessarily opposed. So in all of these areas, we see how this basically mutually beneficial partnership emerged. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 basically added another field of interaction to this relationship, along with Syria and Libya.

And Turkey did increase its footprint in the region. We see already kind of a grown relationship with Azerbaijan because they also signed a Shusha declaration in the summer 2021. So this relationship increased. Then Turkey and Russia also established a monitoring center, which is also important.

because most of the time when we talk about Turkey-Russia, we basically talk about Putin and Erdogan. But not only in Azerbaijan, but also in Syria, there are important monitoring centers, patrolling mission, for example, in Syria. So there is this kind of a daily interaction between Turkey and Russia that goes beyond Putin and Erdogan. And what else about Turkey and the South Caucasus is that Turkey is not a newcomer.

Perhaps it was a surprise to many that Turkey stood behind Azerbaijan, but Turkey is not a newcomer. Already after the war in Georgia, between Georgia and Russia in 2008, Turkey also had this kind of a cautious approach as it does towards Ukraine now and actually offered to establish a stability platform for Caucasus.

Also after the Nagorno-Karabakh, after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in the fall 2020, Turkey and Azerbaijan, they again initiated a regional platform, 3 plus 3. The idea was that Turkey, Russia, Iran, plus Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia cooperate all together, but

But basically, the idea behind was that Turkey, Russia and Iran, they kind of manage their differences within this platform. Now, Georgia was not that enthusiastic about taking part in this platform. So it's unclear how it's going to unfold. But what it does show is this willingness and readiness to work together.

together. And especially in the South Caucasus, but also in the wider Black Sea region, we basically see this Choki-Russia condominium. So this idea that they can work together and what unites them in this condominium is the idea that they want non-regional players out. By this we mean the West.

and this kind of shared understanding of regional order that unites them in this region. So there was this kind of idea, yes, like Turkey challenged Russia's backyard, but we see this idea that they are able to share the region already before Nagorno-Karabakh war. Perhaps I would mention two things why Russia is not worried.

about Turkey challenging its position in South Caucasus. First is the conviction, I think, in the Russian establishment is that Moscow can manage Ankara.

because this relationship is manageable for them. It's an interdependent relationship, and Russia does have economic leverage towards Turkey. And the second idea why Russia is not worried about Turkey encroaching in the post-Soviet space, and here we are talking not only about the South Caucasus, but also about Central Asia, because Azerbaijan is basically a gateway space

for Turkey not only to establish itself in the South Caucasus with this trilateral relationship with like Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, but Azerbaijan also an important, I would say like a mediator for Turkey, for aspirations of Ankara in Central Asia.

So Azerbaijan is really important in this sense. But why Russia is not worried is because they know that South Caucasus, in particular Azerbaijan, but also Central Asian states, they very much also use just like Turkey to balance. So they don't want to rely just on one kind of center of power, but they are aware of their sovereignty there.

and they are also aware more than one player needs them.

So they are also ready to maneuver and to balance between Turkey. For example, like Azerbaijan, of course, Turkey is a close and strategic partner, but also Azerbaijan doesn't want this kind of too warm embrace. And perhaps at this stage, I also would want to point out there is this famous slogan to describe Turkey and Azerbaijan relationship to

two states, one nation. Sometimes you would encounter this slogan in the media, in the press articles as one nation, two states. And here we see how it transformed because of this strong Turkish support. But in Azerbaijan, they do insist that we are talking here about two states, not one nation. Because, I mean, Turkey also called its military operation, its military support of Azerbaijan in Akron-Karabakh as

one homeland. So the support of Turkey inside Azerbaijan is very much appreciated, but there is also this kind of awareness that we are talking here still about two states and this remains so. Mm.

So, I mean, if we fast forward to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, and as you mentioned, there's a kind of a frenemy relationship already occurring between Turkey and Russia. In what way did Russia's

full-scale invasion impact the relationship between Turkey and Russia? Here we need to distinguish that there are currently kind of two big spheres in Turkey-Russia partnership. One, there is a bilateral sphere and all what comes with it. We're talking about energy relations trade, like nuclear energy cooperation and all of this. And the second sphere is this regional conflict management.

And this has grown since 2016 over the crisis in Syria. So now, if we are to look for a change, I would say that this kind of bilateral relationship, it now takes kind of a priority for both.

And I would also perhaps do a little bit of background how two spheres influence each other, this bilateral aspect and regional conflict management. Now there is a close interrelation so that this bilateral relationship, it also helps them to manage regional conflicts. This was not always the case. For example, if we look back to November 2015,

This is when Turkish air forces shot down a Russian fighter jet and this kind of caused unprecedented crisis. Then Russia replied with sanctions.

And the relationship remained critical until then Erdogan extended kind of his will to normalize. It was then in the summer 2016. But back then we see basically that why this jet crisis happened is that the priorities were different. Their interests in Syria were actually at odds. And this shows us the importance of how

not only the position matters, but also really the interest. Because if the interest at odds, we cannot compartmentalize, we cannot manage. But both Russia and Turkey, they did draw some important lessons. For example, Putin learned that

Turkey is a NATO member because when he complained about, well, he talked, he mentioned many things about this crisis, but I think what most important, what disturbed Putin was the fact that Erdogan did not call Putin to manage this crisis, but he called to Brussels.

But now we see a change. Now Erdogan calls Putin and they do manage to deal with the issues just by phone call. This is important. And also, I think the most important sentence you would hear from Russian officials is that, yes, we do have many differences in the regional conflicts, but it's our level of bilateral differences.

relationship that makes us to manage things. So we see here this closer relationship between bilateral level and regional crisis management. They both like one sphere helps to manage the other. But now with the war in Ukraine, I think they both focus more on bilateral ties because Russia now needs Turkey for trade.

Putin also suggested to build a gas hub in Turkey, which is also what Turkey wanted since over 10 years. So we do see now this focus on bilateral relationships. That's interesting. And, you know, as you mentioned, when we talk about Turkey and Turkey's foreign policy, we're often really thinking about President Erdogan himself. And we have quite an interesting year coming up.

for Turkey and for President Erdogan because we will have both presidential and parliamentary elections coming up in May this year. So what are the key objectives going to be for Erdogan as he tries to appeal to a domestic audience within Turkey, maintain popularity, win those elections or

What are his key considerations going to be there vis-a-vis Russia or vis-a-vis Russia's war in Ukraine? Well, unlike Syria, Ukraine is not a domestic issue for Turkey,

So the war in Ukraine does not feature that much in the elections campaign. Erdogan basically has been pursuing a policy that is also supported by majority of population in Turkey because there was a survey, it was objected

At the time before Russia's invasion, when we talked about still like Ukrainian crisis, not the war, it was in spring 2021. And back then almost 70% of Turks, they supported Turkey to be neutral in this crisis. Now there was a recent survey conducted by European Council of Foreign Relations. It was like February 2023.

And there the figures are 55% of Turks see Russia as a necessary partner.

and 14% see Russia as an ally. So again, almost 70% want to have a working relationship with Russia. Also, the opposition, there have been some already statements how they see this relationship, but they also say that they want Turkey to keep this role as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine. The Turkish opposition also wants Turkey

this Black Sea Grain Initiative to be still in place. And this is also, for example, when it comes to this Black Sea Grain Initiative, it was basically a result of this condominium between Turkey and Russia, because the dialogue that Turkey keeps with Russia, it's still important for this Black Sea Grain Initiative. So as far as this mediation is concerned, Turkey will keep its current position in

I mean, towards Ukraine. So Russia's war on Ukraine is not going to be a key issue when it comes to the presidential election in Turkey this year. Yes, the war in Ukraine does not feature that much in Turkey in elections now. It was not also the big issue in the program that opposition came up and also Russia.

Even last year, for example, I did a couple of field research trips. It was May, June, Ankara and Istanbul. And for me, it was really a contrast because in Germany, it was all about war in Ukraine. But when you come to Turkey, the issues are the migration, Syrian refugees, economy. So they do have other priorities.

And as someone who follows Turkey, do you see it almost as a foregone conclusion that Erdogan will win the elections and will win another term as president? Well, it's difficult to say. For now, it's 50-50, I think, because there are polls and different polls and some show Erdogan winning, some show Erdogan losing.

So I wouldn't dare to make any kind of conclusion, but I do think it's important because a lot is at stake for Turkey, for also for neighborhoods around Turkey. So there are a lot of expectations. As far as foreign policy is concerned, I would not expect any fundamental change in Turkey.

if opposition wins. I would expect a change in rhetoric, in the discourse, in the things how the Turkish leadership runs things. This I would expect, but not like fundamental shifts because I think one thing, and I think it's also true not only for the current government, but also for opposition is this,

kind of self-awareness of Turkey. Because after the Cold War in the West, the policymakers, they talked about Turkey as being a bridge, right? Being Turkey, a bridge between East and West. And this was like when Turkey was looking for its role because its role during the Cold War was a kind of outpost state on the southern flank of NATO. This was not relevant after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So there was this search for a new role

But now I think this with all this discourse inside Turkey on strategic autonomy, this kind of bridge between East and West, it just does not fit Turkey anymore because Turkey positions now itself as a central country and central country is an idea, it's a concept, it comes from Davutoglu who was a minister for foreign affairs under Erdogan and now he's in the opposition.

So we will see, like if Erdogan stays or if opposition comes, we will be seeing this tension in the self-awareness of Turkey between being a bridge or a central country. And this will play out more. I don't think it will play out in the Turkey-Russia relations,

But it will be an important tension between Turkey and the West. So how do you see Turkey's relations with Russia? You know, maybe as you were mentioning, the way in which Turkey sees its relations as a NATO member country, but then on the other hand, having these sort of quite global

good bilateral relations with Russia as well. How do you see those relationships evolving in 2023? Well, it will depend on elections because, I mean, Putin would prefer Erdogan to stay because they do have this modus operandi. They know how to deal with each other. So if opposition wins, it will depend on what kind of policy Turkey will be pursuing.

But I would point out that there is also kind of a feature in this relationship that everything is mutual. So it's basically a tit for tat. If Turkey cooperates, then Russia would reply with cooperation. If Turkey does not cooperate, then there would be difficulties in this relationship. I mean, sometimes it's described as cooperation.

transactional which I do like the word but I have a problem with the meaning attached because the meaning is kind of okay it's like a one-time thing that's situational it is situational but at the basis of transactionalism it's basically a transaction so you give something and you take something and this relationship would depend on how Turkey will position itself in the war in Ukraine and

By that I mean, for example, if the opposition in Turkey is interested in maintaining the Black Sea Grain Initiative, then Russia would expect Turkey to not to comply with the secondary sanctions because this was apparently the deal why Russia agreed to this. But overall, basically we can describe

The policy of Turkey towards the war in Ukraine is a kind of deterrence and dialogue vis-à-vis Russia. So deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, by that I mean it's the Turkey supporting Ukraine militarily, also rhetorically. Turkey also votes in favor of Ukraine in the UN General Assembly resolutions, but more so this military kind of support. This is deterring Russia. But then there is this dialogue.

So Erdogan tried to actually, it's not a balancing between Russia and Ukraine, but it's more balancing between dialogue and deterrence.

So Erdogan managed to keep this balance between dialogue and deterrence. And the question is how the opposition, if it comes to power, how will it keep this balance between dialogue and deterrence? And that would then mean what kind of reaction would come from Russia. But there is this understanding inside Russia

that there is still this economic dependency on Russia, that Turkey depends economically on Russia. This was the key lesson that Turkey learned after the fighter jet crisis in Syria in 2015. And basically what keeps this relationship intact is the idea that the costs of

of a breakup they are just too high which is why this relationship is intact with all its like tensions inbuilt tensions but the cost of a breakup are just too high and i think there is an understanding of this both inside russia and inside turkey and there have been also already statements from the opposition that they will keep this relationship with russia and as they

like to say it's not by choice, but by necessity. I think it's important not to underestimate this necessity. For example, when there was a discussion on the Turkey position, what do they do now in relation to Ukraine?

It was in the early days of the war and it was like a political show in Turkey. And then the two guests were discussing, OK, then if we side with Ukraine, who will send us tourists? Will Biden send us American tourists? So I think economic dimension in this relationship is very significant.

Well, thanks, Daria. I've really enjoyed the conversation and I appreciate you being with me on the podcast today and sharing your insights. Thank you very much once again for your kind invitation. Thanks for listening and thanks to Gonca Varol for our theme music.