126. ANALYSIS: Pavel Slunkin on Belarus’ position vis-a-vis Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka’s relationship to Putin, and whether Belarus would participate in a direct invasion of Ukraine
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Welcome to the War in Ukraine update from Kyiv podcast. I'm Jessica Gnauer, a senior lecturer in international relations at Flinders University in Australia, and I'm talking today with Pavel Slunkin. Pavel is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations based in Warsaw. Pavel focuses in his work on Belarus's domestic and foreign policy issues, as well as Belarusian relations with Ukraine.

Russia and the European Union. So I look forward to discussing some of these important issues on the podcast today. Thanks for joining me today, Pavel. Thank you, Jessica, for inviting me. So first of all, as I understand it, you yourself are originally from Belarus and worked within Belarus in the diplomatic corps for some years before actually leaving in 2020. And as

as far as I understand, not returning since then. So could you outline for listeners your personal story? Like what was your career trajectory and then why did you leave Belarus? Yeah, sure. Just like every Belarusian of my age, I have been living under the regime for almost all my life. Lukashenko was elected when I was six years old. And in just one year, he already usurped the power and he transferred the

constitutional powers inside the country through the referendum. He was, in those days, a popular leader. He was democratically elected in 1994. And using this popularity, he changed the legislation, the constitution, and made himself an authoritarian leader, the only decision maker, the main one. And since that time, he has been building up his authoritarian regime, making it more solid and strong.

Since 1996, there were a lot of attempts to overthrow him because the elections, they were usually falsified. They were always falsified. We had no democratic elections or referendum since 1994. When we had elections, usually the people who

voted against him. Part of the society critical to government, they went on straight protesting against the stolen elections, against the violations of human rights, and so on and so forth. But it never gave the result. I mean, he always managed to keep his power. And

And this is what happened to me too. In 2010, we had presidential elections. I was a graduate student. This was my last year at the university. Entering the university, I was expecting that, okay, maybe when I graduate, Lugashenka will already leave and I could potentially use my knowledge or in the international relations to provide a better education.

opportunity for my country to develop, but it never happened. So in 2010, he stole elections and I went on protests and we were protesting together with my friends. Some of them were arrested. Some of the people after this, they emigrated just because

Those days, the crackdown on the civil society happened, just like it's happening right now, maybe in a lighter version. But anyway, Belarus found itself under sanctions. People didn't believe that something will change here. And many of the talented people, Belarusians like me, my friends who I know very well, they left. They entered Western universities. They found jobs somewhere outside the country. So I felt that Belarus is ignored now.

by the International Society. They invited me to the Foreign Ministry in 2011. I didn't agree to come there. I thought that it is not appropriate to work for the government that still continues to represent its own people. But when in 2012, in 2013, Lukashenko started

How hard is he approaching the European Union bit by bit and trying to decrease his dependence on Moscow? I saw it as a positive trend. And it was multiplied after the annexation of Crimea, when Lukashenko saw how dangerous Russia can be to him. So he decided that he needs to balance his dependence on Moscow with this participation, with this cooperation with the West.

So in order to build some kind of a better relations with the West, he had to go for some liberal kind of reforms, changes inside the country. So he released political prisoners. He limited the repression. He allowed many NGOs working in the country and starting opening up the country bit by bit.

So it all started in 2013 and it was going increasingly better every year. And I agreed when, again, receiving this invitation, I thought that this would be a good idea if I can change my government through elections. If I can influence it through the street protests, I can do something from the inside, helping this trend to develop.

And the foreign ministry was the main institution that was lobbying for those changes inside the country in order to provide us better foreign policy, the more adequate, the more correspondent to the national interest of Belarus. So I gave a promise to myself that I will

agree and join the foreign ministry, but will never cross my principles. I would never tell the lies. I would never tell that the crimes are okay. I would never say that the elections, if they are rigged, that they are fair. So I expected that I would be fired in the first presidential elections. And the first presidential election happened in 2015. And the

Even the observers, independent observers, they say that Lukashenko, he maybe not counted the votes correctly, but they admit that he won elections those days and there were no protests just because Belarusians, they looked at what was happening in Ukraine after the Maidan revolution and after the invasion of Russia, annexation of Crimea, and they decided, okay, we would better not go protesting. So maybe Lukashenko is not the worst choice.

I was not happy with this choice, of course. I always wanted the other leader for my country. But as far as there were no protests, as far as there were no crackdown on the people, the development of the relations with the West has been going far and far and better and better. So this trend survived the presidential election. So I stayed in the foreign ministry. But in 2020, when the civil society has become already a very grown up, we had very strong independent media that was not only

fighting with these propaganda lies, they were already forming the mindset of the people. They were much more respected than the government sources of information. The NGOs, they were pretty strong. They could protect the human rights. People felt that they can publicly criticize the government. The government even allowed to go in protests

and not arresting people. So this was all developing more and more. And the society felt that, okay, in 2020, we can get even more.

So the presidential candidates, independent ones, the very respected persons, they decided to participate, expecting that now it's the best time to try. And they were supported, extremely supported by the society. So Lukashenko saw how dangerous it was, and he came back to repression. So he arrested the candidates, he started arresting the people, beating them on the streets.

This was the reason why after the election 2020, I decided to leave because I could already not stay there without not crossing my principles.

I didn't agree to resign myself. I said that, no, the foreign ministry doesn't, you don't owe the foreign policy of the country. You don't owe the foreign ministry. I should be a representative of my people who doesn't agree with the election results, who doesn't agree with the violations of our laws. I should be here inside the foreign ministry criticizing Lukashenko from the inside.

Of course, as you can imagine, they don't let me work with this kind of activities for a long time. And I was fired pretty soon. And after several months, I already had to flee the country just because I received some signal that they're going to arrest me. Since that, I moved to Ukraine and lived in Ukraine until the next phase of Russian invasion to Ukraine happened last year.

Yeah, that's so interesting. And I can imagine there are a lot of tricky decisions that you have to make along the way. You've mentioned elsewhere that during that time working for the foreign ministry in Belarus, you were actually present in the Minsk negotiations that took place in February 2015.

I think it's quite interesting because in retrospect, looking back now, it's very hard for me to really understand, were those negotiations a genuine attempt to try to get some kind of agreement or was there something disingenuous? What was your impression of those negotiations? Yeah.

First of all, this was a very surprising summit. We didn't expect it to happen in Belarus. Belarus was not at the table. It was not the site of the conflict. So it was not at the table discussing the negotiations. So I can't tell you what Merkel and Hollande privately talked to each other because I was not in the room. But from my analysis, being there that night, I think that the Western leaders, they came there just to achieve some kind of a ceasefire because they saw, had,

difficult it is for Ukraine and how dangerous it can be for Ukrainian sovereignty and even for the regional stability in the country, which was, I think, the main purpose why they tried to achieve some ceasefire. So I don't think that Merkel and Hollande fairly believe that this can bring a

real agreement between Russia and Ukraine. I don't think that they were that naive, just because Russia obviously attacked Ukraine, invaded Ukraine, annexed Crimea, and it has been helping those separatist guys who were ruled by Russian special services and intelligence services. So you should be very naive to believe that Russia, after doing this, would agree on some kind of a

agreements that would let Ukraine to achieve total integrity again. So I think that the main goal of Germany and of France was to achieve some kind of a ceasefire and not letting Russians go further and further, and maybe even in Kyiv, while they understood that Russia will not leave Ukraine alone. I don't know what were Russia's plans. I think that

Maybe initially they expected to change the government in Kiev, then they lost, so it didn't happen. So they decided to provoke those territorial disputes or ethical disputes for which there were almost no foundation. So they created it artificially with their own armed guys.

helping with this Donetsk and Luhansk separatists. And I think that the initial reason was to not let Ukraine to reach some kind of an accession or agreements with NATO in the EU. So they just didn't want to allow Ukraine to become closer. And when you have a hot conflict or then a frozen conflict, then of course it is already blocking you the way. So

So I think that this was the initial vision of Russia those days. So they thought that, okay, with this kind of control over Ukraine, it could be potentially enough to achieve their goals. But since the Minsk agreements, they were signed,

Russia has been changing to and Putin has been changing to. So his goals have been developing. And I think that with the invasion, the second wave of invasion that we saw on the 24th of February 2022, he already wanted all of Ukraine. He didn't only want to, I don't know, influence or control some parts of Ukraine or even, I don't know, try to change the government, making it more pro-Russian. He already wanted to make

out of Ukraine the same Belarus, not only a lie, but a puppet state that could be controlled and whose independence, whose sovereignty can melt down through soft and hard power from Russia. I think that the Minsk agreements are usually criticized by both sides, by Western politicians, by Western leaders. They knew, leaders, they say that this was a kind of a betrayal of Ukraine, while Angela Merkel says that

This bought some time for Ukraine to be better prepared for the war, which is, I think, also true. While Russia and Putin is criticized by his hard, tough imperialistic circles that he betrayed Russia and he should have captured Ukraine already in 2014 after being successful in Crimea. So as you see, the agreements, they were not good enough for any of the sides.

But I think that the content of the agreement was in some terms inevitable. We couldn't expect the other decisions or agreements if we remember in what context we lived those days. The West didn't want to look

the truth. The West didn't want to admit that Russia invaded the country, that it occupies the territory of Ukraine, and that the West should provide all kinds of weapons that are now provided to Ukraine. The macroeconomic support, those promises of accession to the EU, the candidate status, and so on and so forth. They thought that maybe Crimea is a kind of a special issue, that if we try to appease Putin, he would not go further.

Ukraine, I think, could not expect more from the West those days. That's why Poroshenko had to sign the agreement. It was not in line, like 100% in line of the interest.

Part of it was it really bought some time for Ukraine. It really allowed to be better prepared. The Ukrainian army has changed a lot since 2014 and become much stronger. And that's why in 2022, it defends so efficiently against the Russian invasion. So the Minsk agreement did really bought some time for Ukraine. But the other side of the coin is that at the same time, this time was lost by the West.

Ukraine didn't receive that much support that it should be. It took nine years for the West to understand, and even Russia to invade it again, to understand what are the goals of Russia and what it wants from Ukraine, while what we see now should already have happened nine years ago, but it didn't happen. At the same time, Russia also was preparing for this next phase of invasion. So I would say that

Like every diplomat would say, would tell you that there is no issue that it's black and white. It always have positive and negative sides. And that is the Minsk agreement. And in some terms, if we just remind ourselves in what context we lived, the Minsk agreements were the only possible agreement, I think, to be signed by Russia, Western states and Ukraine.

Yeah. And it is interesting, as you said, and sort of quite surprising that this ended up taking place in Minsk, in Belarus, even though Belarus wasn't actually a party to the discussions. So, you know, what does that tell us about Lukashenko's relationship with Putin and Russia, but maybe also with European countries at that time? Lukashenko, as I told you after the annexation of Crimea, he wanted to use it

as an opportunity to improve the relations with the West, to get out of this international isolation in which he was since the elections in 2010. So he didn't recognize the legality of annexation of Crimea. He never said that Crimea is legally part of Russia.

He even supported publicly the territorial integrity of Ukraine. And this was kind of surprising, not only for the Western politicians, even for me, who was, I was already inside foreign ministry those days. So I expected that Lukashenko will recognize the annexation of Crimea and would stand together with Russia in its war against Ukraine, but it didn't happen. And this was surprising.

So it let him receive a kind of ears of Western politicians to let him talk into them and explaining why he's doing so. And that his position differs from Russia's pretty much.

Even though he publicly, of course, has been repeating that we are allies with Russia, we support Russia. But at the same time, he was saying that those nations, Russians and Ukrainians, are equal for us, for Belarus. So I think that this rhetoric, the stereotypes that he used,

they let him achieve a different kind of angle of the Western look on his regime and on Belarus, on the role that it could play. So he was trying to show that he could be a neutral side in these talks. Because you can imagine that Russia wouldn't and Putin wouldn't go to Finland or Austria

or, I don't know, Switzerland to discuss Ukraine, while the Western countries, they wouldn't go to Kazakhstan, maybe, like a better alliance with Russia country. So Belarus was a kind of rational decision, a better option to be pretty close to Ukraine and the government that tries to stand neutral in the conflict. So they agreed to let him have this summit.

And Lukashenko used the summit then to improve his relations with the West even more. Because then a lot of the interest from the whole world and especially from the Western countries was concentrated on Belarus and on its role that it can play in Russia's war against Ukraine. And Lukashenko was using it pretty efficiently until 2020. Yeah, and of course,

You know, we've seen something quite different from Lukashenko with Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, where he's much more clearly aligned himself with Russia. Do you attribute that to what happened in 2020?

2020 in Belarus, the fact that there were those protests and those harsh crackdowns and Russia was assisting Lukashenko in terms of ensuring that he could maintain control. So is that the factor that makes the difference between those two instances? Yeah, obviously, maybe the only one or the main one.

without cracking down on the people, without this uprising by the Belarusian people, without repressions, tortures and rigged elections, Lukashenko would never, I think, agree to allow Putin to attack Ukraine from the territory of Belarus. So I would expect that Russia would try to convince him to do it, but I don't think that they would have enough

leverage to make him do so, just because the consequences of this decision are destroying for the Belarusian economy and for the Belarusian independence, for its sovereignty, and which also means for Lukashenko's power also. But Lukashenko did what he did. He trapped himself

He tried to survive those days. And the only ally, foreign ally that he had was Russia. They allowed him, they helped him to survive. And that's why his power since 2020 has been built up on those main pillars of his special services inside the country and on Russia's support, economic, financial, political, and military support.

So in 2020, when Russia already decided to invade Ukraine, I think that he didn't have enough chance to refuse. Just because if he would refuse, then Russia would find enough arguments to make him doing so. And if not Lukashenko, they would maybe change him or would try to do so. So Lukashenko, of course, was afraid of this scenario. So he agreed.

So I don't want to whitewash Lukashenko here. I'm just trying to explain why it is happening. This is his mistake. This is his crimes that he did in 2020. And these are consequences that he has now because of his activities two years ago. The Belarusian unsuccessful revolution, the

government reaction on this is part of this Russia's aggression of invasion. Without this, I don't know. I mean, we can't know how it would be. I can just judge from what I know. But I think that Russia would plan another kind of... So they potentially would invade, but maybe without trying to do this from the north. So they would be attacking as they are doing right now from the

the East only and from the South. Obviously, I can tell you for sure that we could avoid this. We can't know. But obviously, the dependence of Lukashenko on Putin, on Russia, was extremely different before elections 2020 and after.

I don't know to what extent you're still in touch with people inside Belarus or to what extent you can answer this question. But what is the view from sort of just the general Belarusian population of Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine? This is a very interesting and a very important topic.

And yes, as you rightly mentioned, I don't have this access to the ordinary discussions with the people inside the country. To understand how Belarusians live inside Belarus now, I just will give some examples. For commenting on Facebook saying that I stand with Ukraine, people I arrested and sent to prison for six, seven years. For seeing Ukrainian sons on streets,

they are jailed too. And Belarusians, of course, they know this, even though the independent resources, independent media were labeled extremists and terrorists. And for reading them, you are labeled extremists and terrorists. So people are obviously afraid of doing so. Even if they follow Telegram channels or try to find some info in the internet, they are still afraid of that. If someone would check their computer, they will say it and then they will jail the person.

So this is kind of a whole atmosphere that explains why sociological surveys are kind of difficult and challenging and that we can't really understand what people really think because what they say, this is like in every authoritarian or totalitarian regime, what people say publicly can differ very much from what he really thinks or she really thinks.

So when we do, and we together with my colleagues, we sometimes try to do online surveys, the results can differ very much from what is the original picture of this sociological landscape in balance. But if we analyze the data that we have, thanks to those online polls, then they show that surprisingly, the

invasion, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and not participation of Lukashenko with his own army in this invasion, even helped him to get back some of the ratings to increase his popularity in the country.

And I even talked to some people who were protesting together with me in 2020. They don't support Lukashenko, but they sometimes how they think the direction of their thoughts can be very weird for me. They say, look, Ukraine is under Russia's attack. Russia is attacking and mobilizing its people.

Russian economy is destroyed by Western sanctions. While we, okay, we are under sanctions. Lukashenko is like building this totalitarian camp. But if we compare this with Russia and Ukraine, maybe this is not the worst option.

So if we would won in 2020, then who knows, maybe Russia would invade us and the Belarus would transform and would become the whole country of a butcher city occupied by Russia. You remember the stories what happened under occupation with the people. So some people think like this. The others think that, okay, Lukashenko is the only guy who...

who can protect us from sending the army to Ukraine. So they see it pretty differently from how I see it. I see that Lukashenko is helping and doing everything possible, everything that Putin needs to occupy Ukraine and to invade it, while some part of the Belarusian society can think differently. Okay, he helps it, but maybe this is the price he has to pay in order to not let him even...

worse engaged in the war with sending the army. So they think that maybe Lukashenko is the last barrier that doesn't allow Putin to send the Belarusian army there. And if Russia changes Lukashenko, Putin another puppet politician to rule the country, then maybe the decision would be different. I don't agree personally with this assessment, but this is how some people think. And the

Because of this, we see that the legitimacy or, I don't know, alleged legitimacy of Lukashenko,

it has slightly increased since 2021. If in October, there were around 35% who would say that they are maybe more supportive for Lukashenko, now he already has 45%. So again, we should remember that the people who are critical to the government, they just don't participate. But still, this shows if we analyze the polls, like the direction, then we see that he,

has achieved some kind of success. But at the same time, when Belarusians are asked if they would want Belarusian army to fight in Ukraine, they say no. Like 90%, 95%, according to some polls, even 97%, people say, no, we don't want to, we shouldn't be there. And this, of course, is one of the factors that protects us from

Putin's, even Putin's decision to try to achieve this, to try to make Lukashenko do so or from Lukashenko agreeing to do so, just because the army as a force institution, it helped him, it saved him in 2020 and sending it now, understanding that it would be killed in several months or several weeks even.

This would mean that he could potentially find this dissatisfaction of people with their pricing again on streets while the army would be already killed in Ukraine. So he understands the risks and I think that he explains those risks to Putin.

explaining why this is not a good idea to send Belarusian army there. And Lukashenko tries to help Putin with everything, like treating Russian soldiers, training them on the Belarusian military facilities, giving out the control of some of the airfields near the Ukrainian border, letting Russians to

to concentrate their troops inside Belarus, to launch missiles, to shell Ukrainian cities and Ukrainian infrastructure. And all of this would potentially be lost if the Belarusian army invades, because Ukraine now doesn't respond to the attack from the territory of Belarus. But if the Belarusian army joins the Russian ones, then they would have no reason to not respond. They would do it. And all this infrastructure that helps...

and provides with all this industry, civil and military support to Russia's invasion, which is extremely important for Russia, it would be under danger. So I think that the decision of not sending the army is a rational one. It is a joint decision by Lukashenko and Putin and a pretty logical one.

That's so interesting because we have heard quite a few commentators and analysts suggesting at various points since February last year that there is a likelihood that Belarus would join with Russia in a direct military involvement in Ukraine. So from what you're saying, as I understand, would you evaluate that that is likely?

a very highly unlikely possibility? I would answer you...

like this, in February 24, when Russia invaded Ukraine and Lukashenko allowed to invade from Belarus, I thought that this is the matter of time when the Belarusian army would be there. But it didn't happen. And then with the development of the war, how unsuccessful it was for Russia, we saw that they can't achieve their goals. And of course, Lukashenko himself doesn't want to send the Belarusian army there.

And now, when we already know what Lukashenko does for Russia, for its invasion, supporting it with all I mentioned in the previous answer, I see it as a kind of irrational, it would be a rational decision. I will develop a bit my previous answer, because the Belarusian army is unprofessional. It consists of only 15% of professional soldiers that know how to do war.

And those 10,000 soldiers, they won't change the status quo in the war. They won't bring decisive changes to make Russia achieve the goals, while Russia would put on the threat everything that it already has.

But this doesn't mean that we should rule out completely this scenario, because what is rational for you and for me can be absolutely differently assessed by Putin, by a politician that has been in power for more than 20 years already, completely controlling everything happening in the country. He, I think, sees the world differently. And if you listen to him, what he's saying is

He is a conspiracy theorist believer. And of course, this also happened in COVID when he hid himself in bunkers, being afraid of meeting people. So I think that his rationality is a completely different thing than our rationality. So maybe in some point, he will think that this is already the moment has come and we need to send the Russian army there.

Even despite everything I can argue right now, saying that this is irrational, it could be rational for him. And if it happens, then Lukashenko would have no chances to refuse, I think. I call this, like, you know, there are, according to the UN, there are peace enforcement, right? I call it loyalty enforcement. So the resources, the instrument that Putin has over Lukashenko are enormous.

They have increased that much since 2020 that I just can't imagine how Lukashenko would stand this pressure. Because now when you read or when you hear from the Western intelligence services or from Ukrainian politicians and intelligence services, from Western politicians, media, when they say that Moscow is pressuring Lukashenko, this is not true. If we analyze the relations between Russia and Belarus, we see only...

cooperation, without any signs, without any indicators that would show us that Lukashenko is under Moscow's pressure. Putin helps to bypass sanctions against Belarus. If earlier a huge amount of Belarusian exports were exported through Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine, now this was all blocked.

And Russia provides the infrastructure, the railway, the seaports, and other opening companies there in Russia to provide a chance for Belarus to end the money that they have lost because of sanctions.

Russia also opened the market for the Belarusian goods that are sanctioned. And so those goods that lost their European and other markets, they are now sold in Russia. Russia keeps and even prolongs the agreements on natural gas and oil prices, which are maybe the lowest prices in the whole world. And I can continue. So every issue, every sphere we analyze, we see that Russia is helping to look at it.

And if Putin would need to pressure Lukashenko, he would use those loyalty enforcement instruments to make him do this decision. So this is just not true. I think when people say, when even, I don't know, intelligence services say, if they are sincere in this public analysis, of course, when they say that Lukashenko is under pressure, this is

their own assessment of what is logical for Lukashenko. They think that Putin needs the Belarusian army to participate, and they are pretty sure that this would give Putin something that would help him to achieve his goals in Ukraine. While I don't think this is true. So coming back to my previous answer, if Putin would want the Belarusian army to invade, it would achieve this goal pretty fast.

because he needs that many resources, that much leverage to influence the decision by Lukashenko that Lukashenko just would not sustain. Yeah. Well, thank you so much, Pavel. This has been a fascinating discussion and I really appreciate you being on the podcast today. Thank you so much, Jessica. This was a pleasure for me. Thanks for listening and thanks to Gonka Varol for our theme music.