162. US policy continues to restrict Ukraine
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Ryan Reynolds here for, I guess, my 100th Mint commercial. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. I mean, honestly, when I started this, I thought I'd only have to do like four of these. I mean, it's unlimited premium wireless for $15 a month. How are there still people paying two or three times that much? I'm sorry, I shouldn't be victim blaming here. Give it a try at mintmobile.com slash save whenever you're ready. For

Hello and welcome to another Friday episode of the Battleground Ukraine podcast with Sunday Times bestselling historian and author Saul David. I had to get that in, Saul. And me, Roger Morehouse, standing in again for Patrick, who is enjoying some well-earned R&R.

It's been another intriguing week in the war for Ukraine, with Russia's advance continuing, albeit glacially slowly, towards Kharkiv and stopped almost completely in Donbass, while Ukraine strikes at targets in occupied Crimea and in Russia proper with growing audacity and firepower. First to developments on the ground, and that surprise Russian offensive towards Kharkiv that erupted a couple of weeks ago now.

It's continued its progress and Russia has claimed another couple of villages, but the advance has slowed considerably and in places has taken only around two to three kilometres in the past week. You suggested very plausibly last week, Saul, that this might be an elaborate feint to draw Ukrainian forces away from other fronts and thereby facilitate a Russian attack elsewhere. However, thus far, that doesn't seem to be happening. Indeed, the front in the Donbass is similarly mired.

with only minimal Russian advances being reported there despite apparently heavy losses. And this last few days indeed has seen some of the highest daily Russian losses since the opening phase of the war. So what do you think now, Saul? Is it still a feint or is it intended to be something more substantial than that? I doubt the Russians know themselves to be truthful. The latest assessment from the ISW is that the Kharkiv offensive was a Russian feint to draw off resources from the Donbass, but they decided...

Not quite sure how they know it in this amount of detail, but they decided at the last minute to scale back the number of troops they were actually going to use for the Kharkiv offensive. Now, I'd love to give the Russians credit for some clever operational plan to link more than one front in a coordinated way. The sort of thing they were very good at doing in the Second World War, actually, Roger. I really would love to be able to give them credit for that. But I don't think they have either the sophistication or the staff work

I think what's happening here is that they saw an opportunity to open a new front that would distract the Ukrainians and more importantly gain some cheap territory in a way that is always helpful for domestic political consumption. But were they seriously trying to capture Kharkiv, a city of 1.5 million people? Almost certainly not. Are they trying to stretch Ukrainian resources? Undoubtedly. Is there a dastardly scheme behind all of this? I really doubt it. It's all just

bargaining chips for the inevitable negotiations that will have to take place if this war is ever to end. And as ever, the ordinary Russian infantryman is paying the price in a single day. I mean, you talked about recent casualties. I saw a figure, Roger, in a single day of the Kharkiv offensive, more than 1,400 were killed and wounded, according to Ukrainian military sources. And that's a record for, you know, months and months and months.

Meanwhile, and scandalously so, there are reports that contrary to Antony Blinken's comments when he visited Ukraine last week, the US is not prepared to lift its veto on Ukraine using American weapons like HIMARS, artillery and ATAKOMs to fire into Russia proper, where, as we know, Putin has been massing troops.

During a meeting of the Ramstein Contact Group, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reiterated the White House's unwillingness to approve Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons in strikes against military targets in Russia. And he went on to say that he expects Ukraine will continue, and I quote, to use the weapons that the US provided on targets inside of Ukraine. I mean, I can't tell you how infuriating this is for me, Roger. What's your feeling about all of this? I

It is insane. I mean, effectively, you know, forcing Ukraine to fight with one hand behind its back is crazy at this point. And you can see, I mean, you know, I'm tempted to agree with you on, you know, this sort of the whiff of ineptitude, I suppose, in this Kharkiv offensive on behalf of the Russians.

But this is still a formidable foe for the Ukrainians to take on. And as I said, to effectively force your ally to fight with one hand behind their back, I think is insane. And like all of these things, we've drawn so many red lines for ourselves collectively over the last more than two years.

whether it was F-16s or the delivery of tanks or whatever it is. I mean, and all of those have been met with shrieks of escalation, escalation on behalf of the Russians.

and then have been overcome, we've got over ourselves and we've done it anyway, this will be the next one. And let's collectively fight like we mean it and support Ukraine in a really meaningful way. That's what I would say. So like you, it drives me a little bit nuts, I think. Yeah, just one thing to quickly add to that, Roger. I mean, the Russians are clearly rattled by all of this. Certainly the British comments recently, Cameron saying he was happy for Ukrainian forces to use British weapons against Ukraine.

Russian territory. The ISW has come out quite strongly in their assessment that the US and other Western limitations on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets in Russia have created a sanctuary in Russian border areas from which Russian aircraft can conduct glide bomb and missile strikes against Ukrainian positions and settlements and where Russian forces and equipment can freely assemble before entering combat, which is exactly what's just happened for the Kharkiv offensive. So why wouldn't they do something about it? At

And the Russians are concerned, as I say, because there is now more nuclear saber rattling. They've announced they're carrying out tactical nuclear drills. And this, in their own words, is to make Ukraine's allies realize that they're serious about this. But as you say, Roger, they've made these threats so many times before. It's utterly laughable that anyone should pay attention to them.

Yeah, indeed. I mean, we'll see how all of that sort of pans out in the coming weeks and months. But it's been interesting that, you know, both those comments from Cameron and also Macron being much more sort of hawkish in the last few weeks and months. I think there's perhaps a sense, and I hope it's not wishful thinking, but there's perhaps a sense that things are shifting in that respect, that the collective West is, you know, waking up to the realisation that it's in a fight.

So, I mean, we'll see. We'll see how this pans out in the months to come. Hopefully not too late for Ukraine to do what it needs to do. Yeah, one quick aside, Roger. When we come to questions, there's an interesting comment made by one of our US listeners who points out the political constraints that may be hampering Biden's ability to, you know, to release the shackles, so to speak, as far as weapons are concerned. But we'll come on to that. Indeed.

Now, in the air war, we saw rather more of the same, I suppose, this week, with Ukraine continuing its focus on targets in occupied Crimea and in Russia proper, and putting, one would assume, some of its newly arrived weaponry to the test. Over the weekend, two Russian minesweepers, the Koroviets and the Tsiklon, were hit and sunk in the harbour at Sevastopol.

And it was reported that that was achieved with Atakum's ballistic missiles. Now, this is, of course, yet another substantial dent in the once mighty Russian Black Sea fleet, all of which has been achieved, as the joke runs, by a country which doesn't even claim to have a navy. Right.

Elsewhere at the weekend, Ukrainian drone strikes were carried out against Russian military and petrochemical infrastructure in occupied Crimea, at Novorossiysk on Russia's Black Sea coast and in distant St. Petersburg oblast. Bear in mind that distance, it's an impressive feat of logistics to get drone strikes up to there. And including in those targets were Belbek airfield near Sevastopol,

the oil refinery at Slovyansk and Khrushchev's Skyer airfield near Krasnodar. And in those attacks, it's been reported that certainly at Belbek, I think two MiG-31s were destroyed and one Sukhoi-27. Of course, the Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed that Russian forces destroyed a majority of those drone strikes and attackings, but it's nonetheless clear from official Russian sources and social media that at least some of them got through.

Now, we've speculated on this stuff before, Saul, but I reckon this might be a fruitful way forward for Ukraine, at least in some sort of partial manner, you know, to make the most of that long range weaponry that they have, assuming that they have that permission that we just talked about.

But also the drones that they have developed themselves, therefore, you know, beyond that Western constraint, we could say, and to use both of those to hit Russia where it hurts, primarily targeting military, industrial and petrochemical infrastructure. Now, how do you see that aspect?

Yeah, I think that's the way forward for the foreseeable future. Even with the extra kit they're getting from the Americans, I mean, unless they change their policy, they can't use that into Russia proper. So they're using these long range drones, as you say, they can now use British kit storm shadows against targets in Russia, probably France will follow suit before too long, maybe the whole of the

EU for that matter. And I think eventually America will be forced to come around as well. But meanwhile, as we've reported a couple of episodes ago, Ukraine is developing this extraordinary ability with unmanned drones, both sea drones, which are having an effect in the Black Sea, not actually in this instance. It seems, as you say, Roger, that attack arms were used against these two ships

One of which was, I mean, I heard reported, you might be accurate that they're both minesweepers, but I heard that one of them was a ballistic missile Corvette, which is a, you know, particularly significant target because they don't have many of them left. And they pretty much cleared out everything from the West of the black sea so that the grain shipments can continue to move. And I,

Foolishly, the Russians had left the last couple of ships or possibly recently moved the last couple of ships to Sevastopol and they've been taken out. So this does seem the way to go because it's the most efficient way to fight the sort of war that Phil O'Brien says is, you know, in the end, the only war that matters. And that's to attack the industrial base and the supply systems of your enemies. So it makes complete sense to me.

Now, meanwhile, away from the front lines, there was an interesting development in the economic battle this week when a court in St. Petersburg ruled that Russian authorities can seize over 700 million euros, that's $760 million, worth of assets from three large European banks on behalf of a subsidiary of the Russian energy giant Gazprom, which, of course, has been badly hit.

by the sanctions. It's interesting, isn't it? While they've been able to get a lot of oil out of Russia and sell it to people like China and India, the gas situation is much more dire for Russia because of the sheer quantity that it used to supply to Europe. And those taps have

pretty much been turned off entirely. Now, these two banks, two German and one Italian, were among the guarantor lenders under a contract for the construction of a gas processing plant in Russia and, with the general pullout from Russia in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine, have now been deemed in breach of contract. Are there any lessons here, do you think, Roger, for other Western investors? Well, I think the most obvious one is not to do business with authoritarian regimes, Saul. I think they're

Of course, there's always money to be made in such markets. And of course, the more volatile the area, the richer the pickings, if you like.

But given the general unpredictability and the lack of any reliable rule of law, I suppose, the structure of a rule of law, I often wonder why Russia, even before the invasion, was considered to be a worthwhile market. I mean, surely anyone that's read Bill Browder's brilliant book, Red Notice, would have served to curve even the most avaricious of corporate investors because it's just not an environment that's conducive to large-scale investment, I would suggest.

But more seriously than that, perhaps I think this might provide a prompt to Western governments that are still wrestling over what to do with the $300 billion of Russian state assets abroad that were seized following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Of course, the idea of using Russian money for Ukrainian reconstruction has some major implications, but

not least in setting a potentially dangerous precedent, but it does appear to have an element of moral force about it. And I think perhaps this case will serve to ease some of those Western scruples around this issue. We'll see. Yeah, I mean, you mentioned Browder. There's an excellent interview with Bill Browder on our Sister Disorder podcast in which he calls for the seizure of

not just the interest on the money, which, as we mentioned last week, that's the Russian seized assets. Brad is calling not just for the use of the interest, which was signed off by the EU last week. We mentioned this in the episode last week. So that's going to go to the Ukrainians. It's about in the region of about 2.5 billion euros as things stand. Obviously, that's going to increase.

But Browder is saying, no, no, absolutely not. We need to hand the whole lot to Ukraine while the war is ongoing to allow them to fight the war. But it's interesting that this preemptive Russian seizure of assets from European banks might be just the justification the EU needs to, as Browder asked for, hand over the entirety of the assets.

Now, lastly, an amusing story caught my eye this week, and it related to the Russian equivalent of Alexa or Siri, you know, the virtual assistant that can answer questions or draft emails. Well, the Russian version of this feature, which is known as Alisa and is run by the Russian firm Yandex, was criticized this week by Dmitry Medvedev, former prime minister under Putin and now deputy chair of the Russian Security Council.

Medvedev claimed that Alisa failed to provide responses that, and I quote, adequately cohere with ongoing Russian information operations. Perhaps it used the Boo word war and slammed Yandex as a coward for failing to provide the correct answer, suggesting that they may be concerned about offending their Western clients.

Yeah, it's a great story, this. Medvedev has appeared to be increasingly unhinged, I think, after 2022. And he's often the one doing the most vociferous nuclear saber rattling against what he would describe as the perfidious West. But I think this story is actually strangely revealing. And we often assume, I think, in the sort of non-totalitarian, non-authoritarian world that

that things like controlling information are relatively straightforward in that world, in the totalitarian state. But I think this story shows that, you know, especially in the modern era, it can actually be very hard to control political messaging in every sphere of life and including the virtual one. You know, if you go back to the sort of the heyday of the totalitarian state, if you look at, you know, Stalin, Soviet Union or Nazi Germany,

all of those methods of communication were top down. So it was actually relatively straightforward to control them. But even then it was a challenge.

And then now, you know, with digitization, with social media and so on, a lot of this communication is bottom up. So it's a completely different model. It's much more difficult to control. So where you have now, you know, Russia, which is certainly in an authoritarian phase, perhaps developing into a much more totalitarian mode, but it's certainly trying to control the messaging online.

at least on this question of the war in Ukraine and all of that. And you can see how this is a profound challenge, that they have to control that virtual sphere as well. So again, we'll see how this one pans out. But it's really quite instructive, the perils of not living in a free society.

Yeah, you're absolutely right, Roger. I mean, one of the best sources we've had, at least from what's going on from the Russian side, are the Russian mill bloggers. And you can see how difficult it's been for Putin's regime to control these guys. I mean, they have actually slung a couple of them in prison, actually, as a warning, presumably to encourage the others. But if you want to know what's going on, if you want to know what effects...

Ukrainian military action is having on the Russian armed forces, you need to be keeping an eye on the mill bloggers, which of course is the sort of thing that the ISW and a lot of the open source media

analysts are doing exactly that because these guys are actually saying, no, no, hold on a second. This is the reality on the ground. And it's very, very difficult to control that when they're using things like Telegram and the various other social media messaging services. So it's true, Roger, that it is very hard for them really to clamp down entirely. Okay, we'll take a short break there. Do join us shortly for listeners questions.

Okay, welcome back. We've had a fairly good crop of listeners' questions this week, so we'll kick off first of all with Martin from County Kerry in Ireland, who says, can I ask what you make of Estonia and Lithuania saying that they may consider sending soldiers to Ukraine to train Ukrainian troops on the ground and free up Ukrainian troops for the front line? Will this be the first tentative step for NATO to get involved on the ground? And also, what do you make of Putin replacing Shoigu with an economist?

The Russian economy is going into overdrive, says Martin, going towards a war economy. Is Europe prepared for war to the same extent? I don't think so. On the last point, absolutely, I agree with you, Martin. This is one of those aspects that I fear has to change. I mean, I know I talked about this two weeks ago when I stood in for Patrick last time, and I know it's an ongoing theme here. This is one of the aspects that I think has to change,

For all the headline stuff about packages of aid and so on that's been sort of so held up in the US and elsewhere, I think in general, the West has been rather slow in sort of realizing that it's in a sort of generational conflict here, albeit by proxy, but that's what it is. We are quite happy to kid ourselves that we're not at war. Russia absolutely thinks it's a war with the West.

So we have to sort of wake up to that fact. And again, there's sort of a pincer movement on the horizon with the potential of Trump being reelected later this year in the US and potentially pulling the rug.

from Ukraine in terms of that large-scale aid. So at that point, I think it's up to the Europeans to sort of try and take up some slack, which will be very difficult. So I absolutely agree with your last point. Are we prepared for war? Absolutely not. And that's something I think that probably has to change.

I mean, the two questions are linked in a strange way, aren't they, Roger? Because Martin's asking, are these comments by Estonia and Lithuania saying they may consider sending soldiers to Ukraine to train Ukrainian troops rather than obviously fighting combat and free up Ukrainian troops from the front line? Will this be the first tentative steps for NATO to get involved?

No, because they are already involved and there are already trainers on the ground. We know that special forces have been there for a long time. There are other comments coming out, probably from France, actually, given that they've been the most outspoken on this recently, saying that, no, there's training already going on.

up to a certain point, but I think it would be the thin end of the wedge. And that's no bad thing, frankly. I mean, will we eventually see NATO troops fighting Russian soldiers? Possibly. And certainly the Russians need to feel that that is a possibility because it will make it much more likely that they come to their senses sooner rather than later. Now, the interlinked

The thing is, is the war economy. And clearly you're right, Roger, of course, that Western Europe hasn't really got into its head that it's fighting an existential struggle that could be a real problem. And we've got questions coming on about that, i.e. where next for Russia? And we'll deal with that in a minute. But certainly it is a serious issue for Europe and the US.

because these things are all joined up. An authoritarian regime causing trouble in Europe is only going to encourage authoritarian regimes elsewhere. So the question of the economy is important. And Russia has appointed the new guy because...

They want to join up the defense industrial base with the actual military effort on the ground. There's clearly been a lot of corruption, which we reported. I mean, that's endemic, frankly, in the Russian military, the Russian MOD. It's amazing Shoigu's lasted this long. And the reason he did, in my view, is because he's a yes man. You know, he reminds me of Keitel and Yodel in the Second World War. He basically told...

Putin for a long stretch, what he wanted to hear, and he was utterly loyal. There was never any doubt that he would join a plot, the sort of pregogion movement against Putin. And you could say the same about Keitel and Yodel in the Second World War, couldn't you? Yeah, absolutely.

Martin's question references Estonia and Lithuania. By way of explaining that position, I think those countries that were part of the Russian Empire, if you like, and in the case of Estonia and Lithuania, part of the Soviet Union as well,

they feel what's going on at the moment most keenly. Now you can talk to sort of, you know, Macron's, as we said, Macron's been very hawkish. He kind of gets it in that sense. There are other, you know, European politicians. You look at Annalena Baerbock in Germany, the foreign minister, she gets it. But the Baltic states and Poland really feel the Russian threat in a much more visceral sense, right?

So, you know, just to sort of, I'm sure this is preaching to the choir with our listeners, but just to sort of explain that in a sense, that's where they're coming from. You know, they feel this, not only are they cheek by jowl, you know, living next to Russia or to Belarus,

They feel this historically. They feel it in their bones in a way that Western Europe doesn't. Even those politicians that get what's going on, they don't feel it to the same extent that the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians do. So just by way of explanation of that. Now, we were going to link it with another question. Chris French from Fairfax says,

Now, he wrote,

Between these two appointments is the idea that the defense establishment can be run as a business. And we all know how well that worked out for the United States in the 1960s and the Vietnam War. I'm hoping that the Belousov appointment ends up as badly as the McNamara appointment.

What'd you think of that one, Saul? Yeah, it's an interesting analogy. Actually, I'd forgotten McNamara had an economic background. It makes sense in theory that you would put an economist in charge of defence, so to speak, to get the biggest bang for your buck. But the reality about economists, frankly, in my view...

Roger, and we don't want to insult too many of our listeners who are economists, is that they're fortune tellers. They don't really understand what's likely to happen next. There's an awful lot of modelling going on and not a lot of it is accurate. So are you as likely to, yes, get a technocrat, yes, get a sort of bureaucrat to run the military rather than the guy who really doesn't know what he's doing? But the idea that he's suddenly going to

turn what has been an incredibly corrupt institution like the Russian MOD into an efficient, streamlined, war-fighting, war-winning machine. Very optimistic in my view it's not going to happen.

Yeah, it's interesting. I mean, Chris says that the first name that popped into his head was Robert McNamara. The first name that popped into my head was Albert Speer, of course, Albert Speer, who, you know, revolutionized the German war economy, albeit too late after 1943, and the Second World War, not an economist, of course, but an architect. So, you know, but a technocrat, nonetheless. So, you know, some parallels, some sort of discordant elements there as well. But, you know, he pays you money and takes your choice.

Okay, moving on to Oliver. I was listening to Bill Browder speak recently, and I'm guessing that was on the Disorder podcast. He's pushing for the West to sanction a handful of oil refineries in India and China that receive crude oil from Russia and onward sell it to the West, given that the only thing that Putin understands, says Oliver, is money. Why is the West not being more aggressive towards stopping these loopholes? I suspect the issue is our fear of an oil price spike, but surely the West and other oil pricing countries can

control this and I'll just give the send off to from Oliver off to Ukraine to deliver another truck and medical supplies in a few weeks please tell your listeners that Ukraine still desperately needs our support so I thought I'd add that little message well done Oliver yeah well done good on you and it is important that if anyone does want to contribute in any way either to all the various charities that we've mentioned before on the podcast or

or do something yourself like Oliver is doing, then, you know, then we would urge you to, to help out if you can, uh, on the specific thing about, um, oil price. Yeah, it is something that concerns the West, I'm afraid. And going back to the, the point I mentioned before about, about, um, American politics, it's tremendously important. The price of oil, uh,

is going to affect decision-making there. So is that why they're not closing these loopholes? Well, you know, it's famously difficult to get sanctions to bite. What I think is clearly happening, having looked into this in the last week, Roger, before I did my interview on disorder, is that, uh,

while, of course, there are lots of loopholes for sanctions, in the end, slowly but surely, they are beginning to affect the Russian economy and the long-term outlook for Russia. If it doesn't find some kind of resolution with the West, because clearly it's going to want to trade with the West in the future, it's downhill all the way. So I think the economic, it's a slow death, but it's a death that's happening nonetheless. Yeah, I think you're right. I mean, it is going to be a balancing act always between Russia

you know, hurting the economy that you want to hurt and at the same time hurting yourself and you have to try and achieve that. It's a very difficult thing associated to that. You can see how

disruptive, you know, things like the energy crisis and the cost of living crisis in this country over the last six months or year or so, how politically damaging and disruptive that can be. So this is a very difficult balancing act to strike. But I think on one point related to this, I mean, slightly tangential, but if you look at, and you very often see these sort of figures being publicized, if you look at things like, you know, exports via places like Tajikistan, for example, Central Asia,

which were minimal from, you know, take, for example, Germany. Let's throw Germany under the bus. You know, from German industry, exports to Tajikistan were minimal prior to February 22. Now, of course, they're huge. And you can see that it's just being used as a backdoor into Russia. Now, to some extent, as we said in the previous discussion,

the West has got to get serious. And those companies have got to stop doing that. Of course, they're doing it to protect their bottom line. And that's capitalism to that extent. Capitalism, you know, the market has no morals. But, you know, if we're serious about taking on Russia in this respect, then those companies have got to step up or be actively prevented from doing that. So, you know, those loopholes also need to be closed, I would suggest.

Okay, we've got one here from Frank, and I think this is heading in your direction, Roger, and I'll explain why in a minute. And Frank writes, I enjoy listening to your Battleground series. The Ukraine war on the 44 series, both are excellent. I'm an ex-Navy submariner and understand the capabilities of the subforce. Knowing the capabilities of the German Type 212 submarine, I feel it would be perfect for the Black Sea. Germany could donate one or two of those submarines to Ukraine, cut it in half,

put them on barges and float them down the Danube, then put them back together and there you go. Frequently, submarines are cut in half during overhauls to take out old and put in new equipment. Just a thought. Two Type 212 could cause a lot of damage to the ever-decreasing Black

Well, we've already spoken about this, but Roger, the reason I'm sending this in your direction is because you know a little bit about German U-boats in the Second World War, don't you? Yes, thank you, Saul. I'm writing about that at the moment for my next book. Now, I think Frank, as an ex-submariner, as he says...

who knows a bit about the subject. I suspect he knows this already, which might be what sort of influenced his question. But the Germans actually did this. There was a precedent for this. They did this in World War II. They sent, I think it was ultimately four. They sent four of their, what was then Type 2. He talks about Type 212, which is the modern version. But then it was the Type 2 submarine, which is sort of coastal submarine, which was less useful in the Atlantic. So they tended to be sitting around the Baltic, not doing very much. So they did exactly what Frank described,

They cut them up and they put them on barges and they took them by road and by rail and they're ultimately by barge on the Danube down to the Black Sea where they were reassembled and wrought havoc amongst the then Soviet Black Sea fleet. So there's absolutely a historical precedent for this.

Now, on the point that Frank's making here, you know, would this, is this a possibility for now? I mean, you know, logistically, sure. I'm not yet sure whether, you know, Germany is quite in that place politically for all the reasons that we talked about two weeks ago and then were discussed again last week.

So I'm not convinced of that, but potentially, absolutely. And as I said, there's a very strong precedent for it to happen. Okay. Kate says the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia have been occupied by Russia since 2008 with the upcoming election in Georgia and most of their population wanting closer relationships with the EU. Is it possible

possible that Georgia may attempt to reclaim their territory while Russia is engaged with Ukraine? How easily could Russia withstand an attempt? Also, if Russia were to succeed in Ukraine, is Georgia likely to be their next target? Well, it's the last bit of the question, Kate, that I think is closest to the mark, because the situation in Georgia, as I think all listeners know, is that the government is pro-Russian, but the

people, certainly the majority of the people, are pro-West. So there's the fault line, really. And you've got to think of Ukraine, frankly, before the revolution in, when was it, Roger, 2014, I suppose, latterly, when, of course, the pro-Russian government was ousted. And

Exactly a similar scenario could happen in Georgia. But if that did happen, there would almost certainly be a Russian military incursion. And the problem with Georgia is if you look at it geographically, it's incredibly difficult for the West to support in any way. And in any case, the government, as we say at the moment, is pro-Russian. So, no, there's no likelihood in the near future that Georgia is going to try to attempt to reclaim its territory.

It should do, of course. It certainly has a right to, but that's not on the cards in my view. It's the other way around, that Georgia will eventually be subsumed into Russia. And I think the big threat, actually, when we talk about what is the long-term threat for Russia, is not so much towards the NATO countries, because the NATO umbrella, in the end, I think will protect them. It's towards those ex-members of the Soviet Union that

of course, are close to Russia and within its wider sphere of influence, including Georgia, that it might try and get its hands on at some stage. Yeah, I'd agree. I think it's certainly on that latter point. It's possible. It all depends, I suppose, on what happens at the moment. You know, you've seen in the last week, uh, there've been these sort of large scale protests in Tbilisi and elsewhere, um, against this, you know, what they call the foreign agent law, um,

The current ruling party, as you say, is quite pro-Russian. I mean, actually, it's quite difficult for countries like Georgia, you know, living next door. I mean, it's once described, I think Estonia was once described as, you know, a mosquito living next to an elephant. You know, the elephant could just roll over a tiny bit and the mosquito would be crushed. And that's kind of, you have to sort of see it in those terms.

So it's difficult for countries like Georgia, and in a way they have to carry out a very difficult balancing act in their foreign policy. That's not to excuse the current ruling party at all, but there's a degree of that horrible word in international relations, pragmatism has to sort of kick in. And that implies, I think in many cases, a sort of what we might call anticipatory obedience. And I suppose that's in a way is the idea that's behind this foreign agent law.

So it depends, I think, as to how this develops, as to what happens in the next few weeks and whether that government can survive. I think they passed the law, but it still has to go to the president, I think, from the last thing I read on it. So this is still an ongoing situation. But if Georgia...

As you say, with a largely anti-Russian population, if it falls again to another sort of coloured revolution, I think it was the Rose Revolution in Georgia way back, I think we could see Russia acting again to, as it would put it, protect its interests in the Caucasus.

Yeah, and this answers another question we've had from someone called Jamie Hall, who makes another point, which I'll come on to in a second. But his question is, in the medium to long term, do you see Russia invading one of its neighbours? And if so, who? I imagine it more likely to be a non-NATO country than a NATO one. Well, we've just answered that question, Jamie. I hope to your satisfaction. But Jamie goes on to say, I'm a long time listener to your brilliant podcast, which helps me to keep up.

up to date with the latest news on the Ukraine conflict. It's particularly helpful to me as I work in the defence industry in the UK. I recommend you to colleagues and clients alike. Well, thank you, Jamie. And he goes on to say, I was wondering if it would be cheeky to ask for a shout out on the podcast as I'm about to complete my

a four-month-long charity walk for Ukrainian refugees. In short, I'm walking the 1,227-mile land border remotely from the UK over 120 days, so approximately 10 miles and four hours a day. It's for the Disasters Emergency Committee's Ukraine appeal. It finishes on Thursday, the 23rd of May. Well, we're delighted to mention it on the podcast, Jamie. Great effort. That's a

phenomenal thing you're doing. I've just had a quick look to your link. It's JustGiving. Anyone who's interested in supporting Jamie, just type in Jamie Hall on the JustGiving website and it should take you to his Ukraine humanitarian appeal. He's walking 1,227 miles, which is the distance of the land border between Russia and Ukraine,

And he's doing it in a relatively short period of time. A good effort. You're obviously taking a bit of time off work, which can't be that popular with your employees. But great effort, Jamie. Yeah, great job, Jamie. Well done. Just to go back to your point, a rather sort of darker question, but, you know, who's next on the list? We mentioned Georgia. I would add to that Moldova.

Again, not a NATO member. And Moldova, unlike Georgia, has been sort of flirting with Western institutions, EU and so on. So I think in the event of some settlement in Ukraine, I think Moldova is probably also next on Russia's hit list, sadly for it.

Talking of geography, Roger, when you look at Moldova, of course, it's particularly vulnerable if Russia gains any more traction in Ukraine. So it's got a vested interest in the war going Ukraine's way because it's nestled, I think if I'm right, between Ukraine and Romania, which means that Russia's got to go through a bit of Ukraine to get there. Having said that, there is already a pro-Russian breakaway region called the Transnistria. I mean, this is taking me back to my 19th century history days,

Roger, I mean, this is the Crimean War all over again, isn't it? But in any case, that is the situation. OK, final question from Philip Minns. He's in Paris in France and he writes, having listened carefully to the discussions about Germany by Roger two weeks ago and your correspondent Gabriel last week, may I add one further ingredient to the mix? Forthcoming elections.

And those, of course, are the German election. So he goes on to say the German Chancellor Schultz is currently the head of a coalition between his party, the SPD, the FDP, Free Democrats and the Greens, which is becoming more unstable by the day. In addition, the party riding high in the polls at the moment is the ultra right AFD, which the German Constitutional Court has recently branded as extremist.

And yet seems to be, as he goes on to say, being, you know, making a lot of traction in those former GDR provinces of Germany. So that's the former East Germany. As the historian Kate Hoyer, whom you interviewed not so long ago, pointed out, there is lingering Russophilia in these parts of Germany. And the AFD, whose pro-Russian sympathies are no secret, is doing its best to exploit it.

So the final point made by Philip is that Scholz has to take account of all of this and it's very much in his interest not to be seen as a warmonger at this point. So Roger, what's your feeling about all of that? Yeah, I mean, it's a balancing act, all of these things. This is one of the perils, I suppose.

having talked earlier on about, you know, the difficulties of totalitarian systems or authoritarian systems, at least you don't have to worry about being reelected. So you don't have to make these sort of short term compromises, which are all too necessary in democratic systems. You know, we bemoan the state of our infrastructure in this country. But, you know, the essential problem is that no politician is going to sign up for a 10 year plan because they know they're not going to be in power in 10 years.

So, you know, this is one of the sort of the failings, I suppose, of our system is that all these balancing acts and sort of compromises that are necessary. Now, you know, I think Schultz is trying to sort of hold a very fragile position here, and I don't see it working long term. I think he has to...

in a sense, you know, kind of find his, how do we put this, find his cojones on Ukraine. Or if he doesn't have them, then, you know, he has to be, he has to remove himself. And maybe that, maybe the election will do that for us. But, you know, it's interesting that there are characters in German politics that appear to get it. You look at someone like Boris Pistorius, you look at Annalena Baerbock, the foreign minister, you know, who'd have thought that a Green would be as hawkish as she is, but she is.

and has been very vociferous about supporting Ukraine. We have to see how this all pans out. But as he says, it will be interesting to watch. Okay, that's all we have time for. Another great contribution by Roger. Thank you for that. Next week, Patrick will be back. We'll be dealing with another episode of Battleground 44 and of course on Friday with the latest news from Ukraine. Goodbye. Goodbye.