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Evan, a former professor of international history at Glasgow University, has written extensively on the Second World War, including The War for the Seas, which won the Anderson Medal, World War II, A New History, and December 1941, which covers, of course, FDR's reaction to Pearl Harbour.
So, Evan, welcome to the podcast. It's really delightful to have the chance to take part in your podcast, Saul, and I'm very glad also that Patrick is here too. Yeah, well, we're old colleagues. I should tell listeners I did a PhD at Glasgow University and Evan was there for many years. So our paths did cross briefly at the end of the 90s and the early 2000s.
And I should also add that you pointed out to me when we were setting up this discussion, Evan, that it was actually going to take place today, 12th of April, 2024, which is the 79th anniversary of FDR's death, which I'd completely forgotten. So that's quite poignant, actually. And many thanks for reminding me. OK, let's start off just with a tiny bit of FDR's backstory.
and how he performed, sort of, you know, a quick resume of how he performed as a peacetime president before war. Yes, I think it's very hard to think of Roosevelt purely as a warlord or a supreme wartime leader, because he had taken America through another crisis in the previous decade.
he had been responsible for largely for the recovery from the Depression and with the New Deal. And he established a new kind of politics. It's also, I think, important to remember that he's a
He's a liberal Democrat, and the idea of being a warlord in some ways is far under that. So he has a strange background for a warlord. On the other hand, he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920, at a time when the United States was aspiring to become a sea power second to none. So it was really a major experience, and at that time,
He was only in his early 30s, quite remarkable. So he had this experience in wartime administration, which is important. Unlike the other major leaders, he did not fight directly as an enlisted man or NCR officer in the First World War. He was already an administrator at that stage.
And Evan, I suppose the other important point to make pre-Second World War is his physical disability. I mean, to what extent... It's really hard for us to get our heads around the sort of problems that inevitably caused him just getting around. I mean, how on earth did he overcome that to be the successful politician that he became with someone who, you know, served for four straight terms as US president? Yes, I was going to raise this question of his medical condition, which was...
in many ways, very remarkable.
He was a fit man into his middle age, and that was the period in which he was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. And then in 1921, he was struck down by a paralytic illness, which is normally thought of as polio. And that was when he was on holiday with his family at Campobello in New Brunswick. And really, from that time, he lost the ability to use his legs. He actually lost...
You know, he said most of his body below the waist. And, you know, given such a public role as a presidency, it was remarkable that he was able to achieve that. People knew that he had a disability, but it was, I mean, he didn't stand up. He didn't see him move from place to place. He had to travel by car even for short distances. But on the whole, he overcame that. And I think that the
In a way, that health crisis probably made him tougher and made him more ready to – more decisive and keen on achieving what his objectives were. Probably, if we're talking about Roosevelt's health as well and about the war, it's important to remember that his health did decline during the war.
I know you're talking, well, you're doing a series on 1944, but by March 1944, his health was really going downhill, high blood pressure, a lot of other things. He was a chain smoker, among other things, which didn't help his health. And by the time he got to Yalta in February 1945, he was a shadow of himself. And then he dies, as we know, on the 12th of April 1945.
And he's still a young man at that time. He was 63 when he died. We think of him as being older than that, but he was a young president. Yeah, and we'll come on to the what-ifs when we get towards the end of this chat, Evan. But moving back to the beginning of the Second World War, of course, we need to remind ourselves that Britain's in it, France is in it, but of course, America isn't.
for a couple of years. So FDR has to tread very carefully, doesn't he, in terms of over support for the Western powers because of political, domestic political reasons at home, not least in 1940, when of course he's going to be up for reelection. So how successfully in your view does he navigate that tightrope? I think you have to remember that he's in a strange position politically. There are pluses and minuses from his point of view about the war.
One is that he is the president, so he's much more powerful constitutionally than most of the other leaders. He's head of state, he's head of the government, and he's also commander-in-chief of the armed forces. So he's really very strong. On the other hand, and this is more important, he's in his position in a functioning democracy, which has elections in which public opinion is extremely important.
And in which American public opinion is perhaps not a majority isolationist, but certainly not willing to get involved in a European war based on the experience of 1914 to 1918.
So he has to tread very carefully. Although he is the president, it's a system with a division of power. So there's the judiciary, there's the executive, which is him, and then there's the legislature. And only – he can't go to war without Senate approval. He can't do an awful lot of stuff without the approval of Congress. Congress has all the money.
So he's got to move very carefully, both in terms of American public opinion and also in terms of getting stuff through Congress. Although it is true at that time that the Democrats are very strong, both in the Senate and in the House. So he has to move carefully. And the other thing about this system is it has elections at set times.
So Hitler and Stalin and even Churchill weren't worried about public opinion and parliament in that way. But Roosevelt knew that he had an election in November 1940.
He knew there was another election going to happen, a congressional election in 1942. And these things do, I think, affect what his freedom of action is. Certainly before November 1940, he's very careful to stress that his role is to keep the country out of war and to save the country from war. Even when he introduces the draft,
begins the draft in the summer of 1940, he stresses that there's no question of going to war. His election, his inaugural campaign speech in October 1940, just before the election, says,
This is a speech he made in Boston in October. And while I'm talking to you, mothers and fathers, I'll give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent to any foreign wars.
They're going into training to form a force so strong that by its very existence, it will keep the threat of war far away from our shores. So even at that stage, on the one hand, he's fitting in the idea that what's happening is to protect the security of the United States. But at the same time, he's also beginning to develop in the background stronger relations, especially with the British.
But even after June 1941 with the Russians. So he's doing things that are moving towards war, which are within his executive powers. There's the famous basis for destroyers deal in which the United States gives the British 50 destroyers in exchange for base rights in the Caribbean and elsewhere.
and there were talks beginning informally between the leaders of the various armies. But the line that he's taken, at least until November 1940, is that we're not going to war. Once he wins the election, things become much easier for him. And so November
He wins the election December of 1940. He's talking about Lindleith and he's beginning to move directly more closely to the British. So to what extent do you think he was persuaded by the campaign of Lindleith?
close personal diplomacy launched by Churchill about the moral duty and the practical duty of America to come in. What I'm really saying is, do you think that without Pearl Harbor, the Americans would not have, or rather Roosevelt, would not have got behind American entry into the war? As I understand, you're saying, was Roosevelt affected by, because there are two issues, was Roosevelt affected or was the American public affected? In a way,
I think Roosevelt was always intent in getting into the war with Germany. And I stress Germany rather than Japan, but he saw Germany as the greatest danger.
But I mean, that was not a line that you could take directly with a large isolationist population in the US. And I think those people, there was a growing number of people who in polling and so on expressed a support for the British and for the war and for the moral issues involved in the war against Nazi Germany. But they were less keen about
actually getting involved in the fighting and sending troops to Europe. Even when Roosevelt's talking about the war effort, and this is with the British, and this is in the summer and autumn of 1940, before Pearl Harbor, he's
envisaging a kind of naval war in which America plays a part supplying arms. This is the arsenal of democracy also from the winter of 1940-41 after the election. But it's giving supplies and fighting a naval war rather than necessarily fighting a land campaign in Europe. But
And I think what's important about Pearl Harbor is not Roosevelt, it's the American population. Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the United States three or four days later totally changed the political landscape because there's no longer anybody in the United States who's isolationist, really. Everyone is in favor of taking part in the war, in defeating, in particular, the Japanese who've attacked American territory on a Sunday.
All of that changes things and gives Roosevelt much more freedom of action. So I don't think that Pearl Harbor in itself, although it was disastrous for the American Navy, was disastrous for Roosevelt's policies. It gave him what he hadn't had before, which is American public support.
We all, of course, remember the famous date which will live in infamy declaration, Evan. But there was a recent book, which I'm sure you're probably aware of, written by Brendan Sims. And I think it was Charlie Lederman. So it's a joint authored book that argued that
about Pearl Harbor that argued that but for Hitler's declaration of war, FDR might have found it difficult to get the American public behind him in a war against Germany. Do you go along with that? Yeah, I've written actually another book of my own about this whole episode in the question of Hitler's declaration of war. And I was at the, I was at, Brendan gave a big seminar about his book, which I attended and gave a paper at.
I think that the Germans probably would have gone to war anyway. And they were... It's a whole different topic, but why that happened is interesting. Nevertheless, I think that...
Roosevelt was extremely keen on the war with Germany, and he would have pushed that through that and achieved that, I think, anyway. And I think his initial view, the line that he took at Pearl Harbor is that what's happening at Pearl Harbor is actually German policy. The Germans have put the Japanese up to this, and that fundamentally Hitler is still the enemy. And that is still the line that he takes throughout much of the war. It's Germany first.
And so I wouldn't agree with the argument that there was any doubt that Congress would have supported a war effort in December 1941, even if Hitler hadn't declared war. Can we just spell it out for our listeners, Evan, what Roosevelt's thinking is? So he's basically buying into the Churchill argument.
that if Britain falls, then America will be next, that Germany will then essentially have all the naval assets that Britain would have surrendered or lost. And therefore, it's just a short step from there across the Atlantic to threaten the American continent. Yeah, that's a line which
Admiral Stark, who's the chief of staff of the Navy, is taking along with others. It's often called Plan Dog, Plan D, which is, you know, what's the real danger? What's the real task? The real task is saving Britain. And we have to do that in order to win the war. That has to come first. And although, I mean, the Plan Dog document, it comes from the chief of staff of the Navy, typically,
Roosevelt doesn't actually publicly endorse it. He never really, you know, he doesn't actually say that's what we should do. But I'm sure that that is the case. And the American military also realized that, that Britain has to survive. And that is a major priority. Although in 1941, in early 42, well, in 1941 before Pearl Harbor, there's quite a big controversy between Roosevelt and the army.
army and navy and air force uh army air force about providing uh equipment to the british in the sense that the more equipment we provide to the british the harder it's going to be to train and equip our own armed forces so you mentioned germany first i mean everyone's now in agreement that
it's going to be Germany first. There's a little bit of controversy as to whether or not Admiral King, and I'm sure we'll mention him in a moment, is fully behind it. But at least sort of, you know, in theory, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President are all in lockstep on that. Where there is a divide, of course, is how you go about Germany first, where you're going to tackle the Germans and when. So can you tell us a little bit about that, Evan?
and the role FDR plays in ultimately backing the British preference? Probably Roosevelt's most important decision or most important intervention in military planning did concern what happened in 1942, what the first step was into going to war with Germany. And he...
The choice was whether he would follow the advice of his military leaders, especially the US Army and George Marshall, who was the chief of staff of the army, or whether he was going to really follow the line of Churchill. What Churchill was proposing was an extension of the North African campaign by landings in Northwest Africa, in Morocco, in Algeria. And it was a British plan which was
Probably the worst operation name of the entire war, which is Operation Gymnast. You know, they were gymnasts. They had an idea of landing in North Africa to finish off the campaign. And Marshall and the army thought this kind of indirect approach to the war would be a waste of American resources and would not bring about the decisive defeat of Germany, but would simply prolong the war.
And there's a long debate about this in the course of the summer. There's people to and fro between London and Washington, telephone conferences and so on. And in the end...
Roosevelt decides to back Churchill and not to obey his – not to follow the line that his army leaders want, which is for a cross-channel landing in probably in northwest France in the late summer, early autumn of 1942 or in 1943.
And he goes for the North African option. And that leads to Operation Torch in November of 1942, which...
on the whole is successful. The problem is that it does in fact delay the onset of the eventual landing in Normandy, what you'll be talking about in these seminars in the course of this upcoming months. Yeah, it's fascinating, isn't it? But just to get your opinion on that, Evan, I mean, it's the single biggest decision he has to take in terms of strategy in the Second World War. Are you in no doubt that it was the right decision? Yeah.
Yeah, I think it was the right practical decision. I don't think the other option could have happened because an invasion of North Africa or a cross-channel invasion would have been a largely British operation in 1942 and even early 1943. So it was important there were enough American forces available. And, I mean, Marshall...
Marshall wasn't happy about it, but he swung in behind Roosevelt and he said, if that's what you want, then that's what we'll do. There's a quite important comment that Marshall made in the 1950s when he was talking about his wartime experience and about this debate over Operation Torch, about North Africa between Roosevelt and the army leaders. What he said was this, we, the army leaders...
fail to see that the leader in a democracy has to keep the people entertained. That may sound like the wrong wording, but it conveys the thought.
Also, when he was talking to Marshall and others about the planning of Operation Torch, he said, if anything – this is in July, August 1942 – he said, if anything, make it before Election Day. And Election Day was in November 1942. Right.
They don't actually make Election Day as it happens because it takes longer to create a torch than they'd want to. But what I think Marshall was getting at was that to keep the American people behind the war in Europe, and particularly to ensure that the war against Japan does not seem to receive too much emphasis, to keep it a war which is, in fact, a Europe First War, it's essential to make some progress in Europe anywhere –
in 1942. And that's what I think leads to Torch and so on. And on the whole, I think that was the right political move as well as the right military move. Torch is not a scorching success. And I gather, Saul, that you're writing a book on Tunis grad, is that right? That's exactly right. I was about to mention that. Is that the actual title of the book? It
It is the title of the book. And that's really the point, Evan. I just want to, you know, just to quickly mention this. I mean, I have skin in the game, as you say, but there are lots of sort of arguments and counter arguments for what they're going to do in 42. But Churchill was pretty clear. And I think FDR came in in agreement with him on this, that we need to do something, as you've already pointed out. So where are we most likely to get the
the biggest traction. They did hope that the North African campaign, you're quite right, I mean, Torch is not a great success. They get troops on the, you know, the landings would have gone very badly if they'd been properly opposed. So let's just say they tried to land like that in Northwest France in 1942, it would have been a disaster. And I think that's actually a very good point. But what North Africa enabled them to do is to capture ultimately by the following spring an enormous Axis army of veteran troops in
But more importantly than that was the degrading of a huge chunk of the German Air Force. And thirdly, and probably arguably most importantly, the ability to operate in the Mediterranean and effectively knock Italy out of the war. So there was a lot of good that came from that North African campaign. And the obvious question to ask is what was the alternative and how well would that have gone? So I don't think
In my mind, there's any doubt that it was the right decision. And it was interesting that FDR instinctively, you know, realized that. Yeah, I think it's also important that he backs what they do take Algeria and Morocco at the Casablanca conference.
He says, "Okay, well, we've done that, and the next step is Sicily. We're going to go further." And Sicily, in my opinion, is extremely important. Although I think there are problems with the landings in North Africa, in Sicily, the whole package comes together. It's in many ways the most important amphibious operation of the war because it puts together all these technologies which are used later.
So I think the kind of dress rehearsal in the Med is critically important. Okay, we're just going to take a quick break. And when we come back, we'll hear about FDR's relationship with Stalin and Churchill.
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Evan, can we talk a little about the importance of the personal relationships between the warlords? Now, this is, of course, a world war. The vital importance of all the ingredients to go into an enormous conflict is obvious. But at the same time, there was a big human element in all this, isn't there? Tell us something about FDR's diplomatic skills, his approach to his relationships first with Churchill and then very different kettle of fish, Stalin.
Yeah, thank you, Patrick. I think that's really an important question. It's also worth bearing in mind that FDR had not met Churchill. I mean, I think they may have run into one another in London in 1918, but they weren't friends and they weren't people who had operated together in any way. And it's not until the autumn of 1939 when Churchill, who was first Lord of the Admiralty, opens the correspondence with President Roosevelt.
And as you know, there's a whole lengthy correspondence. Of course, they don't actually meet for some time, but they certainly correspond about many things. They're very similar. I mean, you can have an entire podcast about Churchill versus FDR. I mean, Churchill, I think, was probably
probably a better orator, whereas FDR, I think, was rather more as a man of the people. And I think Churchill probably had a greater sense of history than FDR did, although FDR did read history at Harvard. Nevertheless, I think that they were very similar. They were patricians. They were well-connected. They were internationalists.
Churchill, there were family links with the U.S., with Churchill's mother and so on. So I think there wasn't a huge cultural difference, and they got on really well. I mean, one of the classic stories of the relationship is when, right after Pearl Harbor, Churchill invites himself over to Washington and spends two or three weeks living upstairs in the attic in the White House. And again, that's a marvelous story. They get on really well together, although...
although the staff find Churchill, you know, strange in terms of his habits. And also one of the other things is that the Americans are very impressed by the British staff system and they introduced that. So I would say that
Well, it's been argued that Churchill was keener on Roosevelt than vice versa. I wouldn't want to come down on one side or the other. I mean, they're really quite similar and they have a lot of common interests. They also have certain interests which are different, for example, on the role of the British Empire and what's going to happen to that. I mean, Churchill is an imperialist, whereas Roosevelt isn't.
although he is in favor of a much stronger America playing a world role. So I would say that it's really quite important that that relationship exists. And if you think about alternatives, that if you had –
who was the candidate in 1940, the Republican, being the president, if Roosevelt had lost the election in November 1940, or if he'd lost the election in 1944, the relationship with Britain would have been much less warm, I think. So basically, I think what I would argue about Roosevelt and Churchill was they are both men of the world in the sense of taking a worldview,
and having a certain kind of perspective. They understand one another, which is really important. And I think right the way through the war, even in Tehran in late 1943, where there were issues, nevertheless, they get on very well. There are questions, but there's never any, I think, personal animosity. Roosevelt and Stalin is trickier.
I heard the podcast which Giles Milton gave on Stalin as a warlord. And he talks a lot about the way in which Stalin receives Roosevelt, about how he receives Churchill. I think the thing about Roosevelt and Stalin is that Roosevelt is more –
Obviously, there isn't a track record which Churchill has of opposition to the Soviet Union. Churchill was involved in intervention in Russia in 1919-1920. He's a conservative and strongly anti-communist.
That's less true of Roosevelt, under whose, when he's president, the U.S. recognizes the Soviet Union. So there's that. I think also, and this is important, 1943-44, is that Churchill has very little to give Stalin.
Whereas the United States does. That's where all the Lindleys comes from. There is Lindleys from Britain, and you shouldn't forget that. But the person who you don't want to alienate if you're Stalin is Roosevelt rather than Churchill. He seems to get on with Stalin when he meets him at Tehran. And there's quite an important meeting where
The three of them get together and they're trying to decide what to do about the landings in France, which are now projected for 1944. And at Tehran, Churchill is still trying to push the Mediterranean as a priority. And he would appear to be prepared to push France.
the landings in France back further on into the summer or autumn, or not at all, rather than have a landing in May. And at that point, it would appear that Stalin and Roosevelt gang up on Churchill. It's actually quite embarrassing for Churchill. And they say, well, no, there's no way. We have a date in May. And Stalin says, I don't care whether it's May 1st, May 15th, or May 30th, but it's got to be in May 1944. That's when we have the landing. And at that point, it's clear that Roosevelt
joins in and he's also for landing then rather than at any later time. Evan, there's also a fascinating moment at Tehran where I was just reminding myself as I was rereading the notes about this, where Stalin's talking about the, they're talking about the reconstitution of Poland at the end of the war, which of course is a big British priority. Stalin's suggesting that they move Poland west, which is exactly what happens ultimately. And
FDR is not that averse to that idea, but says to start and listen, there are an awful lot of polls who are voting in the elections next year. And therefore I absolutely cannot endorse that at
at the moment. But I, you know, I'm not, I'm not, you know, wholeheartedly against it either. I mean, that's the sort of, you know, it's a fascinating insight, really, isn't it, into the kind of role he's playing between Stalin and Churchill, as far as, you know, the future settlement of Europe's concerned. Yeah, it's important to remember that Chicago is the second biggest Polish city in the world. And it tends to look democratic. So yeah, I mean, there are all these underlying political things going on. I mean, the other thing also is that
One of the things that came out of the First World War was not to do backroom deals, not to have secret diplomacy and decide things in advance. And what Churchill was to do is have secret diplomacy and decide things in advance, as well as possibly shifting Poland to the West. There's also the idea of writing down who gets what percentage of influence in each country. That's Churchill's effort to do that.
I mean, that's one of the areas where it's worth thinking about the comparison between World War I and its outcome, and World War II and its outcome. And...
And just parenthetically, I'd say that what Roosevelt's keen to do is to avoid something like the end of World War I, where the U.S. backs out of interest in world relations, just leaves Europe to itself. And he always says, Roosevelt does say to Churchill, you know, we're not going to be here for more than two years after the end of the war. You know, we can't keep American troops in Europe very long. So anything which is resolved has to be a European solution,
which Europeans can support, and America can't do that. This is before the atomic bomb, but certainly in the atmosphere of 1944, early 45, that's how he sees things. The big strategic decision, which we haven't mentioned yet, and we probably should, you've referred to it there, Evan, is
unconditional surrender, which is agreed at Casablanca between Churchill and Roosevelt. Interesting that Stalin's invited to come to a conference and refuses, so they don't actually get to all get together until Tehran. But to what extent is this FDR's policy and was it a good one?
Well, I think it's partly – I don't blame Stalin for not going because it's a long way and it was a particularly dangerous part of the war. It was right in the middle of the Battle of Stalingrad, so he wasn't going to Casablanca. But I think part of the point of unconditional surrender was to keep the Russians sweet.
They want to make it absolutely clear that there is no intention of doing a deal with Germany, no British American intention of doing a deal with Germany and that what will happen will be the crushing defeat of Germany, which they are completely enthusiastic about.
And I think that's kind of what lays behind that. I don't think that it was thought through very clearly on an inter-allied line. But nevertheless, I think that's the motive that you do that because, well, first of all, the Germans are bad, but you want to make clear to the Russians that we're all in this together. I think that's how I'd see it. I don't think it actually prolonged the war. I mean, some people argue that this is a crucial mistake and so on.
And I really can't see a situation in which there could have been negotiated peace. I mean, the whole point about Hitler is burning bridges. You know, there's no way anyone can do business with Hitler and probably not with any kind of successor regime.
which involves, say, the army or right-wing politicians in Germany. I mean, it was so discredited by then that there was no real alternative. I don't think it really affected the war with Japan either. The other thing to bear in mind is that, in fact, there is a conditional surrender
Because in Italy, they accept a conservative government once Mussolini is out. And in Japan, they accept the emperor. It's not as radical as you might think. Even in Germany, fortunately, most of the main Nazis are dead, and they hold the Nuremberg Trials. But pretty quickly, they realize they need the Cold War period. They realize they need the Germans, and things change.
So the big event for 1944, Evan, is, of course, as you've just mentioned, the long-awaited invasion of Northwest Europe, Operation Overlord.
FDR's original choice as Allied commander was Marshall, his loyal and very effective US Army Chief of Staff. Why does he change his mind and eventually appoint Ike? Well, what Roosevelt said was that Marshall was Army Chief of Staff, so he was responsible for all activities of the Army, and he was based in Washington. Whereas Eisenhower had been a major planner as well in Washington.
In 1942, you're one of the people who actually had been in favor of not going to North Africa, but to have a cross-channel landing. And in fact, he ended up as being, at the end of 1942, the overall commander of the invasion of North Africa, partly because...
although it was largely a British operation, it was to be depicted as an Allied operation headed by an American general. And anyway, so he was quite experienced and he had experience as well as the commander of that whole thing. And I
And I know that Roosevelt met him in Tunis, I think, on the way to – he was going to the Tehran conference. I mean, on the way to Cairo and Tehran. And I think he was quite impressed by Eisenhower when he met him then. What he said to – I mean, Marshall was very disappointed because he was kind of the obvious candidate. What Roosevelt said to him was –
I don't think I could sleep at night if you were out of Washington. You know, you, Marshall, were out of Washington, so you need to be here as my backstop there. I don't know, maybe against Admiral King, I'm not sure, but in any event, basically, I think he wasn't trying to rock the boat. That was why he wanted to keep Marshall there. He may also have thought that
Clearly, Eisenhower was good at dealing with people in his headquarters in the front. He had frontline experience. He got on with the naval people, got on with Cunningham very well, who was the naval planner.
So he was in many ways the obvious choice. And I think that's probably why he backed him. And that happens, I think, in the winter of 1943-44, probably in December or January, that it's clear that Eisenhower is the man. So that would be my answer, I think. And another good choice, as it turns out. So as we work through FDR's role in the Second World War, we're struggling to...
find moments as a warlord, as a war leader, where he's making bad calls, aren't we? Yeah, unlike, say, Hitler or Tojo, he's got the resources to make mistakes and not to have bad calls. He's being guided by his military leaders. He's not suffering...
I mean, although, for example, there are setbacks in the South Pacific, there's setbacks in... Pearl Harbor was a setback. There's setbacks in Tunisia and so on. But on the whole, the war is going well. I mean, I think what he wants is operations that lead to gradual success. You know, one thing builds on another. The people think the war is going well, that battles have been won, that the Allies are advancing. And...
It's important not to take a massive risk too early on in the war. I don't think that he had a direct input into the planning of Overlord, the planning of land use in Normandy. That was done by other staffs, British and American. But he does install some of the key leaders and he backs them up.
And I think at one level, that's right. I mean, I think probably the war could have been won in 1943, you know, if there had been an earlier landing. I don't want to seem to be too parochial about this, but I tend to take a somewhat Russian view of the Second World War. And to be honest, June 1944, it quite laid in terms of the fighting of the war. I wouldn't say the war had been won by then, the ground war.
But certainly the German army was not in the kind of state in June 1944 that it had been in 1943. You would question then, would you? I mean, because obviously one thing leads to another, doesn't it? His support for Torch leads to Sicily, as you already pointed out, and it leads to Italy, all of which bring advantages, but they also bring disadvantages. And the big disadvantage was there's no chance of a cross-channel invasion in 1943. But you seem to be saying, Evan, you think there was a chance of success in 1943.
I think there was a chance it was success in 43. It would, it would have been, it would have been bloodier. It would have been, it would have been more difficult. But if you take the larger view, I mean, the, if you took a, the level of, this is a different question from, from, uh, Roosevelt as warlord. But I say, if you think about the level of, of, of German defense since 1943 in the West, uh, they were still very limited and the Germans were taking a massive beating in Russia from June, July, uh,
I think that Hitler was certainly worried. And he began to think about making the West the big front, you know, by the end of 43. So it was possible. But I mean, even in 1944, there were doubts. You know, it wasn't...
100% certain. I mean, I think it was 98% certain it would be successful, but, you know, I, I'd, uh, my, my father-in-law landed in Normandy. He also landed in Sicily. So, uh, I have, I have some contact with, uh, with, uh, with all that, but, uh,
I mean, it obviously would have been more difficult in '43 than '44. Okay, so moving on to '44, you mentioned FDR's health is failing. You know, he's effectively, as we now know, dying from that point onwards. I mean, it's a long process. His health is failing quite considerably through the years, you mentioned.
he's got an election at the end of it. Obviously, he doesn't have to put himself up for re-election. And given his health, you might question the reason why he did it. So why did he do it? I haven't prompted you for this. This is totally on my end, but I have a great quote exactly about this. In June of 1944, Thomas Dewey is named as a Republican candidate. And then in July, Roosevelt announces that he's going to run again.
I think the real reason – well, what he says to that head of the Democratic Party when he's explaining his decision, he says the following –
reluctantly, but as a good soldier, I will accept and serve in this office if I am ordered to do so by the commander-in-chief of us all, the sovereign people of the United States. So that was really quite well done. He doesn't actually go to the convention because he's head off to the Pacific to meet Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur. But I think the reason he told other people when he wasn't making a pompous speech was
The real reason was that I think he probably felt that only he could deliver the peace. Only he could keep the alliance together and achieve a post-war setup which didn't involve American isolation or Cold War. And I think he was, he certainly hoped that it would be possible to
do some kind of business with the Russians. That was one of his objectives. I think what he also wanted was, he wanted America to be a great power and to stay in the game, which hadn't happened after 1917, 1918, because it was Wilson
had been ill, Woodrow Wilson, and hadn't been able to push his program through. And Roosevelt was an eyewitness to all that. So he wanted to avoid that. I think also he wanted to see China recognized as a great power, at least to have China developed in a way that
It could be used as a support for the United States and Asia. And I think also he wanted the resolution of the colonial problem, which meant why do you have the British Empire? So all of those things, I think, were pushing him in the direction of staying on. And I mean, he...
He might have survived. There was some talk that he might have just stayed on until the war was won and the immediate aftermath, and then he might have resigned. I mean, he was only 63, so he wasn't compared to, for example, the two incumbents in the current election campaign in the United States. He was nearly 20 years younger than they are. So there is a kind of – I think some commentators on the final conference he attends, Yalta, at the beginning of 1945 –
have suggested, partly because of his failing health, he allowed Stalin to run rings around him. It's a bit strong, I think. But is there any kind of sense that he didn't give his best in that conference and that there were consequences as a result of that because of his health? Well, he certainly wasn't well at that time. He was compus mentis, but he was not...
observers were not very impressed by him. If someone's assessment is made on the basis of that confrontation between Stalin and Roosevelt, then that might hold true. I think earlier on, he was much more on board. The other thing I might mention, by the way, is that Stalin wasn't very well either. People who meet Stalin after the war are shocked by what kind of personal, physical cost he's paid.
I wouldn't buy the idea that Roosevelt either sold out to Stalin or was incompetent, and therefore that's why the situation developed as it did. I mean, it is true that he was trying to
maintain a strong relation with Stalin in order to kind of broker how the deal will work out in Eastern Europe. But I think, as everyone agreed, by the time they meet at Yalta, the Russian army is already in control of almost all of Eastern Europe. And there is very little which the British or the Americans can do. Whether Churchill's attempt is to, you know,
the percentage disagreement that we will control this and you will control that. Poland and Yugoslavia are a bit trickier, but there's an attempt to do a kind of a secret deal. But I think ultimately Yalta, Realpolitik decides things. Its power goes where the armies are. And I think that's what explains the eventual outcome. I mean, it's often argued not so much that
I mean, a related argument is not only that Roosevelt was ill at Yalta, but that he dies two months later, two months later in April. And the fact that because he dies and because hardliners, and that would include Truman, enter the fray, that the atmosphere changes and that pushes, that accelerates.
a change and makes the relationship between East and West more difficult. I taught a course on the Cold War for about, for some years, so I've gone over this question extensively. I think it's one of the big questions, but I don't think it was, I don't think, Saul, that it was his health that was the critical issue in February 1944. It was just the reality of the situation on the ground. Yeah.
Just finishing off really with his death on the 12th of April 1945, as we've mentioned many times, and Harry Truman, relatively unknown, not unusual in American politics to have a relatively unknown vice president propelled into the White House. The issue, of course, in this instance is in the middle of the war, albeit it's coming close to the end in Europe, but there's still a lot of fighting potentially against Japan and we know what happens next. So
The big question is, would FDR have authorized the use of atomic weapons in August 1945 to end the war against Japan, do you think? Well, he was dead, so it's not a decision he'd made. I mean, certainly what FDR was, one of the important things that he does is the Manhattan Project. He does back development of the atomic bomb. And although it's probably fair to say that initially,
the bomb was intended as a deterrent so that if the Germans were to get the bomb, they wouldn't be able to use it because the Allies would have a comparable weapon. So it was originally aimed against Germany. It was partly aimed also laterally at military targets. You know, say in 43, 44, they're thinking, well, can they bomb Truk, for example, the big Japanese naval base with an atomic bomb? Is that a good use for the bomb? The idea of dropping a bomb on a city is one that...
never had to make. It's very hard to, to, to call that. I don't know. I mean, he didn't, he didn't oppose the bombing of, of Japan. Well, the bombing of Japan only starts in January 45 in a serious way. And the fire bombing only starts in, in March and April. So he's, he's not involved in that decision at all. Although he does put the people in place who make the decision. Truman, uh, says as I suppose he would, um,
I didn't really have a decision. It was a decision I had to take to bomb Japan and bring the war to conclusion. Churchill says the same thing. Both, to be fair, what else could they say? But the question I was trying to ask is if FDR had lived, would he have taken such a... I mean, you've half answered that, Evan, but would he have taken a similar decision, which is to demonstrate to the Japanese the awe of this weapon
in the only way that even the scientists, Oppenheimer included, felt needed to be done, which is to actually use it on a live Japanese city. I mean, that's what even the scientists were suggesting needed to be done. Yeah. Some people argued that the point of atomic bomb was to deter the Russians.
In other words, that the possession of the atomic bomb in itself did not make it a valuable weapon to use, a negotiating weapon to use in early Cold War discussions, actually having used the atomic bomb on a Japanese target.
and demonstrating the devastating effect of that bomb would be valuable. Again, when the second U.S. Army bomb, not Nagasaki, but the post-war at Bikini, the Russians are invited to send observers to see what this is actually like. So there's that element as well, whether that kind of
I don't think that was... That is a kind of realpolitik view, and I can understand why Truman might do that. I can also understand why Roosevelt, who was an internationalist, might have had qualms about that. I don't know. But there were people...
high up in the administration. I think Stinson was not terribly keen on using the atomic bomb, but it really is, it could only be speculation. I think everyone wanted to avoid an invasion, and I think that an invasion would have been awful. Very bloody, yeah. Well, for the population of Japan, as well as for the United States forces. It's this kind of odd truncation of the war, which nobody expects, or relatively few people expect.
And it's the atomic bomb that makes that possible. But that in itself also has consequences, devastating consequences. Okay. So in conclusion, then, Evan, we have to, you know, on the balance sheet of a successful warlord or not, where do you come down? Yeah, when I began thinking about this earlier on, I was thinking, you know, can you really call...
Roosevelt a warlord? I mean, is that really a term you can use? This guy is a Democrat. He's a liberal. He's an internationalist. He's linked to all kinds of progressive forces in the United States. Even if the war hadn't taken place, he still would have been probably the greatest president in the 20th century. I wouldn't see him purely as a... The warlord has this kind of concept of Chinese...
Chinese generals in the middle of nowhere, or Kaiser Wilhelm. That's what a warlord means to me. And I think he's more a supreme military leader. I'd rather use that term. And is he a successful supreme military leader? Well, yes, he is. And he has all these advantages. He's 3,000 miles away from the nearest enemy, and he's on top of the world's biggest economy.
But he does create an effective political apparatus. What exists, to some extent, is a continuation of the New Deal, an act of American government. He picks the right people for the job. He makes the right decisions. He is able to keep public opinion on the side of the war, even when it gets difficult. And one of the things about the Islamic bomb decision, for a second, is that
Whether the American public would have tolerated two more years of war and invasion of Japan is certainly an open question. But getting back to being a military leader, I think he is. And I think also he's a warlord in the sense that he wants America to be a great power. He thinks that America does have this kind of...
it's an american century in effect which is coming up and it's a kind of imperial view of the presidency which which he adopts and i think from that point of view he functions as a warlord he's successful in that function well that was great wasn't it um do join us on friday for our latest episode on ukraine and back of course next wednesday for another episode of battleground 44 goodbye