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Hello and welcome to the latest episode of Battleground with me, Patrick Bishop, and Saul David. These past days have demonstrated in the starkest terms the truth that modern warfare is just as globalised as the modern economic system. What's happening in Ukraine is inextricably linked to what's happening in the Middle East, where the shockwaves of the Israel-Palestine war ripple outwards to stoke a regional conflict potentially.
The interconnectivity of violence has led to predictions that we're standing at the threshold of a third world war. We'll be asking how worried we should be and what could be done to counter the clear dangers that lie ahead.
The escalation has been predictable but seemingly inexorable. Israel's attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on the 1st of April produced an inevitable and telegraphed response from Tehran when they fired hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel at the weekend, thus crossing a red line.
It was an act of military theatre. Most of the incoming ordnance was shot down by Israel's own anti-air defences with a formidable array of Allied assistance, including RAF fighter jets. The only casualty, apparently, was an Arab-Israeli child.
The damage, though, was done. Israel now has a score to settle, and despite the pleas for restraint from Washington, London, the UN, and everywhere else, its leaders insist it is their decision and theirs alone to make.
You may wonder what all this has to do with Ukraine, our usual focus of interest. So tell us, Patrick. Well, Saul, I think this development is one of those moments when the fog lifts from what the English poet Matthew Arnold called the darkling plane where ignorant armies clash by night. And we can see the big picture with startling and quite alarming clarity without being too dramatic.
I would say that this is one of those make your mind up moments that decide the course of history. So let's step back and have a look at it.
Whatever you think about the Israel-Palestine conflict and the IDF's conduct in Gaza, that particular war is part of a much bigger drama in which Iran is a very malevolent player. So once Iran launched its attack, admittedly in response to a pretty heavy provocation in the form of the bombing of diplomatic premises in Damascus that you mentioned, Saul, that killed several senior Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and others,
Washington and Western capitals stopped focusing on the number of civilian casualties Israel was inflicting in Gaza and rallied very firmly to Israel's defense. So what we have to remember is Israel, for all the tensions that have emerged in recent months, is still essentially the West's
against the mullahs in Tehran. So that pretty sharp and ongoing criticism of the IDF was instantly replaced by expressions of full-blooded support, not without provisos admittedly. So what we've got here is a clarifying moment about where your interests lie, where the West's interests lie. And this lights up a landscape where the lines are increasingly deeply divided.
So we're seeing the world essentially being divided into hostile blocks in the way that they were in the sort of late 1930s and early 1940s. So let's look at where Russia is in all this. So Russia used to be able to keep a foot in both camps with its tactical support for Israel and its war with Islamic State, putting it virtually on the same side as Israel. But
But that's harder to sustain now, given its military partnership with Iran in its war with Ukraine. So this development, I think, will bring about a further solidification, if you like,
of the axis of authoritarian states we were talking about last week, Saul, of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea. And it makes the idea of accommodations and detente less and less likely. Very briefly, look at China's reaction. So China's foreign minister Wang Yi told his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir Abdel-Akhian, that China has noted Iran's statement that its action taken was limited and was an act of self-defense.
It's basically lining up with Iran on this. So, you know, the lines are ever more clearly drawn. But whether it makes a world war more likely, I don't know. What do you think, Saul? Well, it is similar to the 1930s, Patrick. You're right. And it also reminds me, frankly, of the pre-First World War scenario where you've got these
to armed blocs. And as we'll be discovering when we look at some of the comment pieces on all of this, I think we both instinctively know, Patrick, that the best way to deter aggression is by making sure you're properly armed. And that simply is not the case with the West. And it's clearly not the case in Ukraine. But we'll come to all of that. But I suppose one obvious point about all of this, we've had a lot of nuclear sabre rattling in the Ukraine war, is that this genuinely does increase aggression.
the nuclear danger. Why? Because it's probably pretty clear in the relatively near future that Israel is going to have to launch some kind of preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities to prevent them getting their own bomb, which some experts say could only be a year away. It's quite clear that if Iran is prepared to use conventional weapons without fear that Israel, which of course is
apparently a nuclear state but has never declared itself to be so, then it's certainly going to be a lot more dangerous if it's actually got nuclear weapons. Russia, of course, is now invested in this story. Russian military officials have quietly been supporting Iran with weapons and information as the crisis in the Middle East escalates. So it's emerged. A strategic alliance between the two hostile nations, reports the Washington Post,
has seen Russia supply an array of artillery to Iran, including prized anti-aircraft launchers and drones. The emerging dynamic between the two countries may also be enhancing Iran's air force, which had been seen as falling behind other world military powers. The Iranian air force is
primarily made up of rebuilt US and Soviet jets from before 1979. However, intelligence officials warn that Russia has been, and I quote, advancing a deal to supply modern Su-35 fighter jets.
These obviously would play some part in Iran's defences when, and it surely must only be a question of time, the Israelis move. So how would Russia react? Well, positions are hardening all the time and room for diplomatic manoeuvring is shrinking. And Beijing seems to be accepting that its interests, as you say, Patrick, are better served by closer links with Moscow, whatever damage that does to its relationship with the United States. Well,
Well, you might think that all that would underline as if it was really necessary the absolutely crucial role that Ukraine is playing in containing Russian aggression in Europe.
However, the message is still not really sinking in, is it? I mean, the Ukrainians have drawn the obvious parallel with what happened with the Iranian attack on Israel. They're asking, how is it that America, Britain, France also have thrown all their resources, including air power, without hesitation to defend Israel from Iranian missiles and drones, but it's only prepared to give limited help, which certainly doesn't include fighter jets to Ukraine,
to protect itself from Russian drones and missiles, which have killed so many people. And not just actually Russian drones, a lot of the stuff that's being fired at Ukraine is of Iranian origin. Now, this was pointed out
very forcefully by the Ukrainian presidential advisor, Mikhailo Podolyak, the other day. He said, "It looks extremely strange. How does the civilian population of Ukraine or the civilian infrastructure of Ukraine differ from the civilian population of Israel from a humanistic point of view?" And so, you know, he made the point as well that the Kremlin's been deploying the very same drones as Tehran when it's attacking Ukrainian cities.
And he went on, Russia and Iran use the same attack strategy and the same tools. And, you know, he points out that they're actually, as was proven in the weekend's events, that they're actually pretty effective.
vulnerable to Western anti-air defenses. So Ukraine could be protected in the same way if the will was there, as Israel was against the Iranian missiles. Yes. And what's interesting is the head of steam that's been building up in the Western media commentariat about the need for Europe to get serious about its own defense.
People, of course, have been saying this for a long time, but the warnings, I would like to think, are finally being taken seriously and the war clouds gathering over the Middle East and its linkage with Ukraine are underlying how urgent all of this is. Well,
Recently, Max Hastings, who's been a guest of the podcast, put it very eloquently in The Times in a piece headlined, If we don't rearm, our enemies will crush us. He wrote, In Britain, as much as on the continent since the end of the Cold War, it's been the all party fashion to treat defence not as a vital element in our polity, but as an option.
extra to the main business of government. Almost all our political debates is about personal entitlements, not national responsibilities. Why should other nations heed lofty British words about Gaza and Taiwan, Ukraine and Haiti, when our armed forces are threadbare?
and Britain has chosen to relinquish its status as a tier one military power. Now, Max, of course, is a military historian, so you won't be surprised to hear that he makes the comparison with the 1930s. He writes, just as it takes two to tango, it takes two to decide against resorting to violence.
It was plain to wise people in the Chamberlain era that Anglo-French diplomacy to deter the dictators was useless unless matched by rearmament. The same is true now. And he concluded that in the absence of USA, Ukraine could, and I quote, soon be toast and asked, when shall we get serious?
The immediate challenge is to prevent Ukraine from losing its war this summer when only a trickle of Western arms deliveries is getting through. If the Russians could take Odessa, as is not impossible, President Zelensky's predicament would be desperate. Europe must send Kiev yesterday. Every gun and shell it can purchase. We cannot manufacture the hardware ourselves in real time. So it's a pretty chilling message, but it's a timely one and it needs to be listened to.
Yeah, and this was echoed by Matthew Syed, who's a very good commentator, I think, on Ukraine and elsewhere. He berates European countries for their unwillingness to do the heavy lifting themselves. And he actually cites, rather interestingly, this experiment that was carried out by an agricultural engineer called Max Ringelmann back in the late 19th century,
And basically, he got a bunch of students to pull on a rope and measure people.
how much energy they exerted and so they each individual pulled a weight of 85 kilograms seems rather a lot but when he actually got them to do it collectively it wasn't the sum of all their efforts it was a great deal less and what was basically going on is that everyone thinks so the guy behind me can do can do all the the pulling and I'll sort of lean on the rope so he rather I think
interestingly and amusingly says this is what is going on in Europe at the moment. Everyone wants the guy behind to pull harder than they're actually doing. And he cites another historian, Niall Smyth,
Ferguson, a very serious historian, who is saying that we're only a few geopolitical inches from a Third World War. And Ferguson's point is that, again, we go back to the Second World War, you can see the development of the conflict as an accumulation of smaller conflicts in different regions that happen to occur simultaneously. And the same pattern, Ferguson says,
is occurring here. You know, Ukraine's been saying this actually for some time and it said it again the other day. One of the Ukrainian prime minister, Denis Shmihal, said that the US really does have to give them the 61 billion pound package that we talk about endlessly. There is a little bit of light on the horizon. There's another vote apparently on Saturday. That's tomorrow on releasing the money.
And he says, again, we need this money yesterday, not tomorrow, not today. If we don't get it, Ukraine will fall. The global system of security will be destroyed and all the world will need to find a new system of security. There'll be many conflicts, many such kinds of wars. And at the end of the day, it could lead to World War III.
I don't think we're quite at that point yet, but it may not be far off. Like you were saying before, it's all about this inevitability, I think, of an Israeli strike on Tehran's nuclear weapons programs. You know, what's going to happen after that? We can only speculate, but it ain't going to be good, is it?
No, but it is interesting that vote, Patrick, on Saturday. I mean, we reported a couple of weeks ago that it was possible the Speaker, Mike Johnson, was going to bring a vote to the House, and we gave reasons for that. And it looks like that's going to be the case. It doesn't definitely mean it's going to be passed, of course. But it's interesting that the Ukrainians are pretty confident about this. There's also been another development flagged up by our own Foreign Secretary, David Cameron. I mean, we were rather mean about his statement.
his diplomacy in the US recently. But there is some ground being made by the leaders of G7 countries, according to Cameron, who are close to agreeing a plan to use frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine. There's two ways you can do this. I mean, the US are quite keen to borrow billions to send to Ukraine in loans secured against the future interest on Russian money. The European Commission, on the other hand, is anxious just to send the interest payments on the frozen Russian assets to
that will probably mean less money being sent. So the US plan would be bigger sums of money being sent over a shorter period of time, which is obviously what they need. But it's interesting that these two things are happening together. And is it a coincidence? We have to ask ourselves, Patrick, that it's happening at a time when, as you pointed out at the beginning, the dots are beginning to be joined. There is a serious threat, not just from Russia, and the US needs to step up and meet it.
Yeah, well, they better get a move on. That's all I can say. That's it for part one. Do join us in part two when we'll be answering all your questions.
Welcome back. Well, before we go to questions, I thought I'd read out, because it is vaguely connected to everything we've been discussing today, a statement that's been given to us, the podcast, by our good friend Colonel Pavlo Hazan. You'll have noticed in the title, Patrick, he's been promoted. He has a new job, which we mentioned last week. He's responsible for the development of electronic support systems and technologies in the General Directorate of Electronic and Cyber Warfare,
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. So I asked Pavlo to give us a kind of sense of the importance of what he's up to and where we are now. And this is what he told us. And I quote, "10 years ago, a month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an anti-terrorist operation was launched by the Ukrainian government." It's interesting, isn't it? I've completely forgot that.
And until March 2018, says Pavlo, this war was called just that, an ATO. At that time, Ukrainian officials did not describe Russians as occupiers and international organizations expressed their concern about the situation in the east of Ukraine. So it certainly wasn't seen by most of us as a war, although the point Pavlo is making is it clearly was war.
This week, so we're fast forwarding a few years, the Avdivka, Bakhmut, Kherson and Robertino fronts were the most intense in terms of fighting. At the same time, our troops continue to actively inflict losses in manpower and equipment on the occupying troops, exhausting the enemy along the entire line of battle. But Russia has announced additional mobilization, which is why we have to be even smarter now, using electronic warfare and unmanned systems.
He goes on to say electronic warfare and cyber warfare, as well as unmanned and robotic systems, play a key role in modern warfare. These are the most important units of our combat operations. I mean, it's fascinating, isn't it, to read that when you think how important manpower is for Russians. It's almost the opposite for Ukrainians.
Pavlov goes on to say, we do not have as many soldiers as Russia, so our advantage has to be in high-tech equipment and quick reaction to changes in the situation. Today, in the field of electronic and cyber warfare, we are technologically superior to the enemy, but we need to increase the number and quality of this type of equipment.
equipment. He goes on to say some of the work they're doing, our task is to influence cyberspace. Today, most electronic devices have software, radios, radars, UAVs. Therefore, our task is penetration of those systems, analysis, hacking, and interception of the necessary data, both through wired networks and in the
electromagnetic spectrum and we are effectively destroying Russian UAVs, that's unmanned vehicles, radios, radars and other equipment. I mean, he goes on to say, actually, interestingly, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian army has destroyed between 120 and 140 large Russian vehicles.
electronic warfare complexes. But of course, there is a big challenge to meet, particularly with the threatened Russian offensive in the summer. And his final comment, Patrick, you'll be interested to hear, relates to World War II, because he says he's an avid listener of the podcast, as we know, and he encourages as many as his
of his soldiers to listen to it too. And he writes, "I believe it's a really brilliant idea to combine podcasts on World War II and this war, which is in fact World War III. This is the key to understanding the background of the Russian war in Ukraine and the European political structure in this context." So all fascinating stuff. Thanks for that, Pavlo. And yet more food for thought, Patrick, on the idea that we're already there.
Yeah, it is. I mean, the whole question of terminology is fascinating, isn't it, Saul? I mean, there's a respectable argument to be made for saying that the First World War and the Second World War really are the same thing and that, you know, the interwar period is basically sort of half time. That point has been made several times by respectable historians. And so maybe we should rethink our terminology on this one and just say, you know, it's already here. But as he's rightly said,
said, this is a multifaceted conflict, isn't it? And it's particularly illuminating to hear all his comments about the way that technology is absolutely vital. And one quick point to make about that, Patrick, is, and this is a really important one, actually, and I think we've considered this before, is that if Ukraine loses and Russia gets
a chunk of Ukraine or even all of Ukraine, we lose all this extraordinary technological capability that the Ukrainians have already developed almost entirely on their own, by the way. So it's absolutely vital that Ukraine in the longer term becomes part of NATO and the bulwark against these authoritarian states, which at the moment are on the move. It also speaks to the question of manpower that we've been discussing in recent weeks, doesn't it? So
You've got to make a very fine calculation when you're playing with someone's life about whether it would be better for the war effort to have them behind the lines, out of danger.
waging this cyber war, this high-tech war, than putting them in the front line in a trench where their stay might be very short. So you begin to understand the endless dilemmas that the Ukrainian military planners are faced with.
Okay, let's move on to questions proper. The first one is from Olle in Telemark, Norway. It's nice to get that reference, isn't it? Second World War reference, the heroes of Telemark, Patrick, which, by the way, is a story partly covered in my Sky Warriors. More about that next week. But Olle,
Olle asks, considering the continued holdup of the US military aid to Ukraine, why has a lend-lease agreement not been suggested, similar to the one provided to Britain from the US during World War II, but providing artillery, air defence, etc.? This could be more acceptable to the Republicans. A similar scheme could, of course, also be provided from Europe. Thanks for a great pod. I mean, what do you think about that, Patrick? It's an interesting thought, isn't it? Yeah.
Yeah, well, it's, you know, it would get around, I suppose, the isolationist arguments that the Republicans are basically advancing. And it did work for FDR when he employed it in the months between the start of the war and America's entry. And of course, it hugely benefited Britain and, of course, ironically, Russia.
By the way, we'll be airing a great interview we did with the American historian Evan Maudsley. So do listen out for that. But I suppose what we were talking about earlier about this, you know, using the interest from frozen Russian assets, etc., to fund the war effort is a kind of refinement of that idea, isn't it?
It is. I think it's the only logical way to do it rather than lend-lease. I mean, the problem with lend-lease is, you know, it's a loan basically and it has to be paid back. So, you know, to make the sort of loan to Ukraine that is going to make any difference would effectively cripple Ukraine in the long term if it was expected to pay that money back. And it's interesting. I had a student who worked on lend-lease in the Second World War. And he said to me, actually, Britain did pay most of the money that it had borrowed back.
at pretty hefty interest, you know, and there was a certain amount of bad feeling towards the end of the Second World War that America was making a lot of money out of Britain's desperation. But nevertheless, it paid that money back and was quite bankrupt. But, you know, in tough times at the end of the Second World War, you know, one of the reasons why the empire had to be
So you can see the issue as far as Ukraine is concerned is that, you know, at that time, Britain was a major power in the world. And I don't frankly think Ukraine's got the cash to be able to pay back that sort of money, even if it does hold off Russia. Yeah, if I remember rightly, the loan wasn't actually fully repaid until 2008.
Yeah, well, if that's true, I mean, it's extraordinary, isn't it, to think that it wasn't just kind of wiped out. I mean, even the reparations placed on Germany after the First World War were eventually just wound down. Germany certainly didn't pay back all the money that it was supposed to. And that, of course, a lot of people argued was a factor in the rise of the Nazis.
We've got one here from Charlie who says, hi both. I've got a relatively simple question for both of you. With the RAF taking part in defending Israel in its moment of need when targeted by Iran's drone and missile attacks, why on earth are we not more willing to support and get actively involved with Ukraine's defense, essentially? He says, this confounds my understanding. And if anything, is a perfect example of double standards. Well, I think we sort of dealt with that in the first half. But all I would say is that,
I think those are my sentiments exactly. And I suspect they're yours too, aren't they, Saul? They are. But I think we're getting closer to a point made by another of our listeners. And that is that to properly defend Ukraine, even in the short to medium term, we are probably talking about boots on the ground. I mean, the point about the RAF taking part in defending Ukraine is it would affect
to be taking part in the war, which you could say it's doing on behalf of Israel. And of course, the big difference between Iran and Russia is Iran doesn't yet have nuclear weapons, hence the point we were making earlier. But despite all of this, and despite Russia's nuclear saber rattling, I do agree, as we're going to come on to with another of our listeners who's suggesting that, you know, sooner or later, we are going to need boots on the ground in Ukraine.
Yeah, so I mean, what President Macron, he was rather derided, wasn't he, a couple of weeks back, or maybe a bit longer than that now, when he first raised this, and it was seen to be rather sort of rash thing to air at that moment. And we interpreted, I think, as being an attempt for him to kind of reposition himself after his rather more kind of understanding approach he'd taken to Russia at the beginning of the conflict, when he sort of more or less proposed himself as an intermediary and
in negotiations. But I think there's more to it than that. I think he's thought this through quite seriously. I think more and more people are coming to the conclusion that we do actually need to not just supply more weapons, but it will reach a point if things get parlous, which as people like Max Hastings are suggesting they will, when we do actually have to come up with, as you say, boots on the ground. Got one here from David Harrison.
who says, as a Canadian listening to the Ukraine podcast, my ears perked up when you were discussing potentially getting Canadian journalist Justin Ling on the podcast. And this would no doubt include discussion of Canada's entirely disappointing contributions to the Ukraine war. Well, this is something that David himself has pointed out. You know, there seems to be a feeling in Canada that,
among people who are engaged in this story, that Canada could do a great deal more than it is. Just on that subject, we've been in touch with Justin and we're going to be speaking to him possibly next week. So do listen out for that. Okay, a bit of insight from Charles Matizian. Sounds Armenian to me. So from my parish, or at least the parish that my family were involved in many, many generations ago. He writes, hello, I love your show. I had two thoughts concerning the Republican opposition to providing air
arms to Ukraine. And I think they are both founded on the party's fealty loyalty to Trump. First, it is well known that Trump holds a grudge. I think he is angry at Ukraine for not investigating Biden and saying Biden is guilty. And I think that's to do with the Hunter Biden
Biden case where there was a question of possible corruption money paid to Hunter for access to Biden in Ukraine. So that's the point Charles is making. And he goes on to say, accordingly, I think he would love to keep Ukraine starved for arms in case he should win the presidency in the fall. Trump has already stated that the first
thing Ukraine needs to do is release every scrap of evidence they have of the Biden investigation. We all know what that information has got to say or more information will be required. In other words, they need to agree that Biden is guilty of something. I can see Trump keeping Ukraine's staff at arms so that in a year they will say anything he wants in order to get those arms. The second thought is that I do not believe Trump will do anything to anger Putin in an election.
year. It is not Putin controlling things. It is just that Trump realises that the Russians have and can help him in his quest for the presidency. And I suppose there he's referring to their involvement in the election, you know, with the usual use of social media, etc. Accordingly, he, Trump, will put his needs above those of anyone else. Thank you. Well, it's interesting, Patrick, I'd completely forgotten about the whole Biden-Ukraine issue. And that
being a factor in Trump's determination to put pressure on the Ukrainians by not actually giving them the arms they need before he becomes president, when of course he'll have much more leverage. Yeah, no, he's got a very long memory, Trump, and he is a vengeful character. So yeah, this scenario that's painted by Charles seems pretty plausible to me. I mean, basically, Trump is
only interested in Trump and his own interests. So grotesque though it may sound, I think there's a sort of definite kernel of truth in that analysis. Okay, moving on to Martin. And this is the point we were making about boots on the ground. He's from County Kerry in Ireland. Great podcast today. That was last week. And your guest, Julia Strauss, was excellent. We agree.
Vladimir Putin is determined to outlast Ukraine, says Martin, in a war of attrition. It's how Russia fights wars and Putin is not for turning whatever the cost. So his question is, how can Ukraine win a war of attrition against Russia? Well, one way before we get to the second point Martin makes is, of course, getting the funding it needs so that it can fight in the way that Colonel Kazan said.
has said, i.e. not with extra soldiers or not with huge numbers of extra soldiers, but with technology. And on that front, actually, Patrick, one extra bit of news, which we haven't yet mentioned, is that there's been an attack on an airbase in Crimea this week using apparently eight drones.
attack missiles. We haven't mentioned those for a while, have we? There was some suggestion that Ukraine was actually going to get the longer range attack and these may be those missiles and they certainly seem to have done a lot of damage. The Mil bloggers in Russia are acknowledging that there was some quite serious damage.
Ukrainian sources insist that they've taken out another S-400 battery and there were also a lot of helicopters on the ground. So it could be that they knocked out some of those too. So it's interesting that with technology, they can actually make a difference. But Martin goes on to say...
I think Emmanuel Macron is correct. If Europe is serious about supporting Ukraine and Moldova, it'll eventually mean mobilising and putting boots on the ground. Force is the only thing that will stop Putin's desire for a 19th century style imperial expansion. Or you could, of course, take the 1930s comparison with Germany too. And I'm beginning to, I didn't think this a few weeks ago, but I'm beginning to think Martin and Macron might be right.
Okay, well, that's it from us for this week. Do join us on Wednesday when I'll be talking to Saul about his latest book, a fantastic new addition to the corpus of Saul David, Brilliant Military History. So this is called Sky Warriors, and it's all about the paratroopers in the Second World War.