What Can We Learn About Drones from the Ukraine War
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This is CNA Talks, the flagship podcast of CNA, a Washington, D.C.-based research and analysis organization. Unmanned systems have played an unprecedented role in the Ukraine war, representing a fundamental shift in how this technology has been used in warfare. In a future war scenario, tactics like kamikaze drones could be used against U.S. service members. How can the United States learn the right lessons from the Ukraine war?

and develop countermeasures for uncrewed systems without sacrificing tried and true methods of warfighting. Welcome to CNA Talks. I'm John Stimson. Today, we are going to discuss how uncrewed aerial systems have been used in the Ukraine war and how the U.S. can use this information to develop countermeasures for this technology. I'm excited to welcome Sam Bendett and Mike Peterson from CNA's Russia Studies program back to the show to discuss this. Thank you both for being here. Thank you. Thanks. It's great to be back on.

Yeah, so let's start with the context. Sam, can you give us a few examples of novel uses of uncrewed aerial systems that we've seen during the Ukraine war? Yeah, absolutely. It's great to be back on this podcast. I think last time we talked was well over a year ago. And I think it's important for our listeners to kind of get the larger sense of how the unmanned autonomous robotic systems in Ukraine have evolved.

progressed since 2023 onwards. In 2022, we saw the first instances of both sides using commercial technologies. In 2023, the instances of those commercial technology uses, such as commercial drones, Chinese-made DJI drones, rose exponentially. And by 2024, we're talking about literally millions of different types of tactical drones made by both sides.

Another interesting evolution that we can trace in this war is the uses of technologies that seek to evade not just the defenders electronic warfare capabilities or any type of physical kind of measures, but also technologies that enable faster operations. So we are tracing the development of tactics, concepts,

And military procedures that utilize, for example, Chinese-made quadcopters, and then we are tracing the developments of FPV drones in 2023 onwards. And then in 2024, sometime in the middle of that year, we are starting to see more and more uses of fiber optic control drones.

And this is a very significant development at the tactical level because it essentially enables the UAV and the UAV operator to be impervious to any type of electronic warfare or jamming countermeasures.

So we are witnessing more drones used in greater numbers. We're witnessing same technologies that are basically iterated upon. We're witnessing different types of technological evolutions as both sides seek to evade each other's defenses. We're witnessing more and more diverse uses of UAVs, both multi-rotor quadcopter types, as well as fixed wing UAVs.

that go beyond just intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and small-scale munition drops, which was essentially the goal for these technologies used at the beginning of this war. There's now demining operations, there's now additional reconnaissance operations,

There are kamikaze type one-way attacks and all manner of missions are performed by these tactical drones. Now that's a UAV development that we are witnessing since 2022. There are also developments with unmanned ground vehicles and we're witnessing more and more of them in combat.

in logistics roles, in one-way kamikaze attack roles, as well as in combat roles and evacuation and supply roles. So UGVs are growing in significance and importance. And just like tactical commercial UAVs, we're witnessing these UGVs built with commercial components as well. And both sides are fielding greater numbers of these technologies because they can quickly put them together.

So the attritional nature of UAV uses in the war in Ukraine is also applied to unmanned ground vehicles. And we're also witnessing Ukrainian maritime forces

using more and more unmanned surface vehicles against Russian shore-based and sea-based assets in the Black Sea. These USVs now are not just one-way attack drones, but they can also carry different types of equipment that pose a significant threat to Russian air and maritime and shore-based assets. So these Ukrainian USVs are now armed with FPV drones, they're armed with short-range missiles,

different types of bombs and Ukraine is definitely maintaining its lead in the uses of this maritime technology. Russia is catching up, trying to copy Ukrainian maritime robotics successes, trying to field unmanned surface vehicles of its own and come up with ways to use tactical UAVs against Ukrainian assets. This mostly concerns Ukraine.

the developments within the tactical space, with USVs we're talking about operational space. This discussion should also include a greater uses of one-way long-range attack drones,

Ukrainian uses of these UAVs against Russian energy infrastructure, military infrastructure, as well as Russian increased use of greater numbers of these one-way long-range attack UAVs against Ukrainian facilities and Ukrainian targets. So by this time in 2025, by April,

2025. We're witnessing more and more drones in greater numbers in more and more diverse roles.

and greater roles and a growing mission set and growing mission requirements for maritime and ground robotics. And of course all of this is giving rise to lots and lots of different types of cutter measures by both sides. The ultimate goal is to field cheap, attributable systems as quickly as possible, replace them as quickly as possible without the mission getting impacted overall.

The question of, you know, novel uses of UAVs, it's really like, when are we not seeing novel uses of UAVs? To Sam's point, right? This is just the pace of innovation here has been so rapid. It's really been quite eye-watering. If you think back to the beginning of the war, when the TB2 Bayraktar drones were all the rage, I mean, the Ukrainians were making songs about them, for goodness sake. And now...

We're hardly seeing them at all, if at all, on the battlefield because the pace of innovation has outstripped their use. So to Sam's point, this is really an incredibly rapid innovation cycle that we're seeing, and that innovation cycle has advanced dramatically.

the use of, to Sam's point, USVs, UAVs, all kinds of unmanned systems, UGVs, in ways that I think were totally unimaginable before the conflict started. And one of the points I usually make about this is the

The uses of unmanned aerial vehicles, specifically in this war, have paralleled the developments of air forces in World War I and in some ways World War II. So in World War I, the initial biplanes that flew

on all sides were essentially performing intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance roles and light bombing where the pilot would drop bombs out of their own cabins. We saw the emergence of combat airplanes where these planes were armed with machine guns of different calibers. We saw larger numbers of bomber aircraft

aircraft fielded by all sides. We saw interceptor aircraft being developed towards the end of this conflict in World War I. So between 1914 and 1918, there was an absolutely massive

and very rapid evolution of air power, and the iterations and the discussions and the debates about its role continued in the 20s and the 30s leading to World War II. So in Ukraine we're witnessing a very similar evolution of unmanned air power, where we're not just seeing UAVs perform ISR missions,

or light combat missions, but they're now also interceptor missions where short-range FPV-type drones are going after the adversarial reconnaissance UAVs. We're witnessing bomber-type heavy drones carrying smaller UAVs into combat at greater distances. We're witnessing both sides field larger UAVs as signal repeaters and so on and so forth. And again, this is all happening

happening within the span of approximately three years. - You know, there's clearly a lot that we can learn about how drones can be used in warfare from this conflict. But as you've pointed out, there are also limitations. This is a very specific conflict, one that, you know, that doesn't necessarily look like what a likely American future war scenario would look like. We're a very maritime nation. We're very unlikely to be fighting a land war just because of geography.

So how do we look at what's happening in the Ukraine war and how do we draw lessons from it in a way that is like, you know, how do we do this analysis in such a way where we're taking the right lessons from it and not like overreacting to every development as if that's going to be the most critical thing going forward?

Well, what is that famous phrase from Princess Bride? Never fight a land war in Asia. Is that right? Yeah, it's one of the classic blunders. Right. Right. So I think it's a very far reaching comment in a movie that really, really doesn't talk about geopolitics. Yeah.

Look, the United States obviously is paying very close attention to what is happening in Ukraine. We have different services which are learning the lessons from that conflict, which are trying to see what specifically applies to the U.S. military, how it should apply to the U.S. military.

So there are lots of articles out there now in the public domain about army units, Marine Corps units, standing out their own tactical UAV forces, trying to experiment with technologies, essentially trying to see how and what should be implemented.

adopted. And of course, Ukraine is not the only conflict where unmanned surface vessels are a threat. In the Red Sea, the Houthis based in Yemen are a very credible force that is also fielding unmanned surface vehicles, missiles and UAVs of different types.

And so this isn't a copy-paste type of approach. Every military is unique. Every military's expectation of the war it fights are unique. Every military's understanding of the conflict it is going to fight are unique. And most importantly, every country's military capabilities are very different.

United States has no equal right now when it comes to the military capabilities it can bring upon its adversaries. United States military industrial corporations and efforts, again, are second to none. There's a very robust high-tech private sector, which is working with the Department of Defense on fielding different types of systems.

But the most important lesson in Ukraine is that you cannot predict and control how the fight is going to take place. And probably for the longest time, United States felt threatened.

rightfully that it could probably control the pace and scale of conflict where it is engaged in. And what the war in Ukraine has taught us and what is hopefully going to be internalized is that you can't really predict how a conflict is going to take place where you and your forces are going to be involved. And so the number one lesson that we have briefly touched upon is

You have to have technologies which are large in numbers, which are cheap, and which are attributable. Meaning if you lose them, it's not a big deal, you can replace them again and again and again and again. And the United States has lots of powerful, very capable systems, but there are few in numbers and they're very expensive.

So this is the debate that is happening across the DoD and certainly across the services which are paying close attention to the war in Ukraine. To what extent they can now change and adapt their acquisition cycles to now incorporate technology that is actually cheap

but that is also numerous and easily replaceable and possibly even easily repairable at the front. This is what Ukrainians are doing very well, this is what the Russians are copying and also trying to do well as well. So it's all about large numbers of cheap and attributable systems

that can actually perform a diverse mission set. Of course, both sides are also using long-range one-way attack UAVs, which are also relatively cheap. They can fly over a thousand kilometers, but do not cost millions of dollars. They can barely cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. And in many cases, for example, in Russia's case, they can actually cost well below $100,000 per drone.

So, this is what the United States is trying to understand, how it can adapt its acquisition to now build and incorporate these type of technologies, which are likely to be used in a future conflict in large numbers. And of course, if we are looking at China as a potential threat, China is paying close attention to what is happening in Ukraine, China has the capability to build millions

of different types of UAVs, one-way attack drones that can pose a very significant problem for the United States military. And this is an interesting point too. This is, you know, Sam's absolutely right. There's this problem that the U.S. faces in terms of its ability to be agile enough in an environment like we're seeing in Ukraine where the innovation cycles happen just so quickly.

But I think it's also worth remembering, you know, we were talking about the uniqueness of war and the, you know, never get involved in a land war in Asia. Well, you know, I think no one, the United States is not interested in fighting a maritime conflict in Asia either. But I think that's the one that is preparing for most. And one of our colleagues and my good friend at CNA, Josh Tallis, said,

likes to remind people that in the maritime domain, missiles are still the dominant medium. There are limitations to the ability of drones to actually affect, at the operational and strategic level of war, the course of combat over the geographic distances that we're talking about. Now, that may not always be the case, and I suspect that it won't always be the case, but at least for the time being, the point here is that...

I would think that the U.S. Navy and the Defense Department in general can be careful about going into whole hog if their primary sort of threat vector is a maritime conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

At least at this point, we are investing in those drone capabilities that at least have shorter range implications or applications. We do have some surface vessels that can travel over long distances, but they're not attritable. We haven't produced them in large numbers. And they're designed to do things unique to what the U.S. needs them to do. So we're really talking about a bunch of cheap, attritable systems.

Sam's absolutely right. The U.S. needs those. But I think we ought to also be careful not to sort of forget the point that missiles matter. And in fact, the cost for a T-LAM, for what it gives you, is actually far, far less than comparable for a drone. So these are sort of cautions that I would provide, at least to the U.S. Navy.

when they think about how they want to invest their money. I don't disagree in any way with Sam here, but we're still living, I think, at least in the maritime domain, in the missile age.

Well, that's exactly the point that I was hoping to draw out of this is that like, you know, it's easy to see a conflict happening and see it being like the biggest example of a land of a, you know, a conflict between two equal parties in the modern era and think, oh, this is the new model of what war looks like. And we need to follow that model to be relevant. But as you both have pointed out, and we've had learned in this discussion, there are very specific conditions in the Ukraine war that would not apply to every conflict.

Here's a good example to that point, John and Mike. A couple months ago, I quoted a Russian military blogger who posted on Telegram his basic question about the evolution of the tank, right? And because tanks came under threat from FAA drones, from quadcopter drops and other serious threats, right?

it didn't diminish what the tank is still doing in combat, right? It didn't do away with its key role. It is now basically in combat with more protection, maybe slightly heavier, but a tank is still a tank. And so this blogger basically said, okay, but in the future, we need to essentially incorporate all of these threats into how we design tanks, right? And so he said, even if we do away with a tank, we still need...

infantry to advance, but then we need infantry to be protected by something. So there's got to be a vehicle that can accompany infantry into battle. But now we want this vehicle to have large caliber weapons and maybe heavier protection so it can really

protect the infantry and enable other types of mission sets. So now we're talking this vehicle getting larger, getting a larger turret, and maybe it's not necessarily wheeled, maybe it's tracked because it can pass through more obstacles that way. And lo and behold, we still arrive at a tank.

So a tank is still a tank, but this particular tank may be a bit smaller, may be built with composite materials, feature its own UAV complement, feature its own electronic warfare and counter UAV defenses, and other types of defenses against both land and air-based threats. But we're not doing away with what the tank has been since, what, 1916?

right, for over a century. We're changing its nature somewhat, but we're keeping its basic operating role and its basic operating design. And Mike is right. And this is what

we are essentially analyzing and looking at when it comes to the war in Ukraine, right? What can we take from the war in Ukraine and apply it to the United States capabilities without taking away some of the benefits that have been enjoyed by legacy systems, but also understanding that legacy systems will have to make space and coexist with some of the newer emerging technologies which are fighting in Ukraine.

and kind of zooming in on that Sam and you've kind of touched on this to some extent but there are of course differences between U.S military hardware and Russian military hardware so what are some examples of you know like novel uses of drones we've seen the Ukraine war that you would consider to be a particular threat to existing U.S systems and can we take any examples of countermeasures from the Ukraine war that we should be developing now

Well, look, the United States has not trained yet for a conflict in which its ground forces can be overwhelmed or attacked by thousands and thousands of tactical drones, right? This is what we're seeing in Ukraine on a regular basis. This is what is happening to the forward operating forces who now have to adapt to that. The United States has not had to train for this type of threat.

So even a typical radio-controlled FPV drone can be a significant threat if it's launched close enough to the American positions and in situations where the United States may not anticipate this type of an aerial threat to exist.

Another significant evolution, which I mentioned at the very beginning of our conversation, was the use of fiber optic controlled UAV. And this is now recognized as a major threat by Ukrainian and by Russian militaries because both sides are fielding this particular drone that cannot be jammed.

that can fly low to the ground, that provides excellent video footage, and can now go longer than the original intended distance. So we started off seeing fiber optic drones fly at no more than 5 to 10 kilometers.

Now there are experiments and operational cases where these drones are fielded at up to 20 kilometers and developments that would enable these type of UAVs to fly up to 40 kilometers. So that's well beyond the line of contact, well into the adversarial rear positions.

that can greatly impact their logistics, their supply, and any matter of equipment and military personnel. So fiber optic UAVs obviously are a threat. Another very significant threat are a growing use of AI-enabled UAVs. So UAVs with terminal guidance,

with image recognition, with terminal lock where a UAV can recognize and then with the operator's approval lock onto a specific target and then go to that target without communicating with the operator and again becoming impervious to

electronic warfare or any type of countermeasures and both sides in Ukraine war are experimenting more and more with this type of limited autonomy both sides are seeking to field advanced AI capabilities or greater autonomy for their drones and both sides are now investing in developing swarming capabilities where groups of UAVs can operate

and overwhelm their targets without a lot of communication or without the need to communicate with the operators. So AI capabilities alongside with other rapidly emerging capabilities like fiber optic drones are a threat and these threats are maturing quite rapidly. And again, the point is United States never had to train

to defend itself against these type of UAV attacks. Just to foot stomp that point a little bit here, I've had some conversations with people inside the Pentagon and, you know, there is a, I think there are some real serious discussions over this question of lethal autonomy. I think there is some resistance inside the U.S. Defense Department to the idea of providing these systems with lethal autonomy and maybe even equipping them with, there's some, there are

The idea of equipping them with AI is popular, but combining that with lethal autonomy is not. And I think that that is a very serious conversation that is both ongoing and needs to be resolved quickly here because certainly, as Sam points out, our adversaries are not waiting on this and they are beginning to move into that space. And we had better have an answer for that. And we've seen Chinese and Iranian and other forces around the world now trying to train Chinese

using tactics and concepts witnessed in Ukraine. So utilizing tactical, operational level UAVs of different types and kinds with different level of human control against adversaries at the tactical edge and then further out. So we are witnessing, again, certain branches and certain units within the military taking this threat very seriously and trying to train

almost in the same way as, for example, Ukrainians are training and trying to utilize this technology. But this is not something that United States military had to do on that particular level, right? We used to dominate the air littorals. We used to dominate the airspace with both manned and unmanned systems. But now the possible threats which are emerging have adversaries learn from Ukraine and try to utilize this technology

multi-level UAV application and multi-level UGV application and even looking at how unmanned surface vessels can be augmented and strengthened as a threat against civilian and military maritime traffic.

So one of the things to sort of respond to a little bit of this is that, you know, all is not lost. I mean, Sam has, I think, done a really great job of characterizing the nature of this threat. But I am, you know,

You know, maybe this is unfounded, but I am cautiously optimistic that we, the U.S., will be able to begin addressing this in a more systematic way and in a way that sort of speaks to our strengths as a military. The point here is that, you know, I think about the example in the Red Sea where there was a

an enlisted sailor who discovered that he could use the five-inch gun on a destroyer in ways that had never been used before to destroy incoming unmanned aerial vehicles.

And that innovation happened quickly. He figured that out for himself and passed that along to the ship's CEO. And now that is something that is being implemented into the fleet very, very quickly. So, you know, that's just one example, but there are plenty of others as well. So one of the things that we have working to our advantage is something I think similar to the Euclidean.

Ukrainians, and that is that we value bottom-up innovation. We try to work it very, very quickly. We're not great at top-down innovation. At least we're not structured to be good at top-down innovation in the Pentagon. But from the bottom up, there are some real advantages to that. And that may be, you know, that it's a question of when we are able to innovate and how quickly, right? Sometimes you have to learn the hard lessons of battle first. But

I do think that there is some cause for a little bit of optimism, given the sort of nature of how we like to push decision making as far down the chain of command as possible when it comes to tactical ideas and even some technical ideas.

I think to foot stomp that point a bit, Mike, it's that, you know, the United States military does do a lot to empower its component commanders and to like, you know, give the ability to improvise and to like make decisions that need to be made in the moment to the people who are actually in the field making them.

The ability of our units to improvise, to like empower the people in the field making the decisions and not require like, you know, that to go up an entire hierarchy before those things can be implemented will be incredibly valuable to, you know, capitalize on the talents of our military and the talents of our commanders and to have relevant units making the decisions that need to be made for the for the situations they're in.

And that's a reasonable mirroring, I think, of the Ukrainian force, as I mentioned, right? One of the

One of the things, and it may be born of desperate innovation, but one of the aspects that I've been consistently impressed with among the Ukrainians is their ability to innovate incredibly fast. The Russians are doing it too, but the Ukrainians, to my mind, are driving that innovation cycle in part because they're allowing their troops at the front line and empowering them to really sort of push innovation as quickly as possible.

Again, maybe born of desperate necessity, but nonetheless, here we are. They say that necessity is the mother of innovation. Yeah, right, right. That's right. And that's why both countries now have their own unmanned systems force branches.

So separate military branches dedicated specifically to the development and use of unmanned systems. And Ukraine was the first mover in that space. It did launch this branch in, I think, by September 2024. In December of last year, Russia followed suit and said that they would launch theirs

by the third quarter of this year and so there's lots of preparations already happening on the Russian side. Ukrainian intelligence recently stated that Russians want to have 200,000 personnel making up this unmanned systems force and these are going to be people who will be flying and maintaining and repairing and iterating on different types of aerial ground and maritime systems. So this is a serious lesson from this conflict that

Each side can field so many different types of technologies that there's a requirement for a separate branch to deal with them, and obviously a separate military bureaucracy to deal with that that comes with its own benefits and detriments.

Absolutely. One other thing I wanted to foot stomp from both of you is that you mentioned the importance of training. And I think that when we get into these conversations about technology and technological innovation, it is very easy to sort of lose the human element of these conversations.

you know, like the conversations we've had about, well, what technological countermeasures do we need? What do we build into our systems to counter these things? And like, yes, that is part of the conversation, but humans play a role in warfare, are going to continue to play a role in warfare. These systems still require human input in almost every case. So just remembering that, like, we also need to be thinking about the, like, you know, the human aspect of this, the training aspect of this, I think is very important to not lose sight of the full picture of this.

Well, there are thousands and thousands of UAV pilots being trained on both sides of this war on any given point. The training varies, but is usually distilled to the very key elements of what the operators may need at the front. So it's not just learning how to fly a specific system or to operate it. This training now includes training.

technological breakdown of the system, repair of the system, and any related training that can enable those units to operate under pressure, such as, for example, tactical medicine, right? How to give first aid in case of an attack or in case of an injury. And these trainings usually take place over a course of several weeks.

And at the end of a month or let's say a month and a half, there could be a full-fledged operator who is then sent to the front to actually pilot and maintain these specific systems. It's a bit different, I believe, in the maritime domain. But when it comes to UAVs specifically or even UGVs,

The training has been condensed and takes several weeks of practice, followed by obvious combat applications, which is a real lesson for these operators. When it comes to defending against these type of threats,

there's also a lot of training as well, as both sides are trying to field units that can identify and interdict different types of aerial, ground, and maritime threats. On the Russian side, this is happening slower than on the Ukrainian side because the Russian Navy was slow in recognizing the threat and was slow in incorporating lessons learned and developing a common training set

to teach its sailors and soldiers across different fleets how to handle ukrainian usvs for example but training is a very important element the human element is absolutely key and there's constant recruitment there's constant recruitment for operators and technology specialists who will be able to operate these systems to maintain those systems and to build upon these systems

to help them evolve into something much, much more lethal. So it's not just a technology race. It's also a human resources race on both sides. And the advantage usually comes from those who can field most capable and most willing people who have most freedom to act. Sam, would you say that the training can be condensed because the systems, generally speaking, are...

a bit more simplified. As we were talking, I was thinking about the training for, say, jet pilots, right? Those are really complex systems and they take a long time to train someone adequately on and sort of exploit the full capabilities of the technology.

And it strikes me, as you were talking, that maybe one of the advantages of drone technology is that it is comparatively simple, and so it allows for quicker training cycles. Would you say that's true, or am I wrong there? The most important element here to consider is the fact that a lot of these tactical drones, for example, are built with commercial technologies or are themselves commercial technologies.

like DJI Mavic series made by China, which is supposed to be a drone that you can fly almost out of the box, that's easy to learn, easy to maintain, easy to operate. FPV drones are also built largely from commercial components and still rely on components sourced from China. So these are technologies which have been around for a while in this world. There's a lot of knowledge

in how they are to be used. And there's a lot of familiarity across different services, military units, and even across the civilian population that's interested in this aspect of the war, in how to operate these systems. So the training can, in fact, be condensed because the training strips away any theory

and just concentrates on the technology itself. What do you as a pilot need to operate this specific drone? And again, when it comes to certain commercial technologies which have been repurposed for this war, it is just a matter of several days to just several weeks, especially with the DJI Mavic and similar types of technologies.

It's different for military-grade UAVs. It's different for larger, more expensive systems. But when it comes to these millions of tactical drones, the training can indeed be condensed because there's now so much knowledge and familiarity with it that it can just take place over the course of six weeks max.

You both have given us a lot to think about, and I'm sure we have a lot of ground still to cover. But unfortunately, we are just about out of time for today. But I've learned really a lot from talking to you. And this has been a great conversation. So thanks so much for being on. Thank you. Thanks very much for having us back. Absolutely. For our listeners, we'll have some links in the show notes to some of the research that the Russia Studies program has done on this topic, as well as some of Sam's recent analysis in the media. So make sure to check that out.

And I want to thank you all so much for listening. And we'll see you next time on CNA Talks. The views expressed are those of the commentators and do not necessarily reflect those of CNA or any of its sponsors. CNA Talks is produced, edited, and mixed by John Stimson. Our theme music is by Edward Granga. If you enjoy our show, we'd love it if you could give us a five-star review on Apple Podcasts and tell your friends about us. Thanks again for listening, and we'll see you in two weeks.