SummaryIn this episode, Brian and Chad interview Travis Dickinson about the argument from reason. They discuss the different options for explaining the existence of logical principles, focusing on naturalism and Platonism. Travis argues that if God does not exist, logical principles either do not exist or exist as brute abstract objects. He explains that naturalism, which denies the existence of anything outside the natural world, cannot account for the existence of logical principles. Platonism, on the other hand, posits the existence of abstract objects in a separate realm, but this explanation is ad hoc and lacks independent reasons. Travis concludes that the most plausible explanation for logical principles is the existence of God. In this part of the conversation, Brian and Travis discuss the argument from reason and its connection to the existence of God. They explore the idea that our ability to reason and use logic points to the existence of a higher mind, which they identify as God. They also discuss how the argument from reason can be used in practical apologetics to engage with skeptics and point them towards Christ.Takeaways
Chapters00:00 Introduction01:17 Guest Introduction03:33 The Incompatibility of Naturalism and Logical Principles05:01 Reason as the Observable Phenomenon06:29 The Plausibility of God as the Ground of Logical Principles16:21 The Ad Hoc Nature of Platonism24:23 The Limitations of Platonism26:14 The Need for a Ground of Logical Principles27:13 The Argument from Reason and the Existence of God30:07 The Platonic View vs. the Theistic View35:17 Jesus as the Originating Logical Principle39:38 Jesus as the Ground of Being and Logic51:03 The End of Every Philosophical Question is God================================We appreciate your feedback.If you’re on TWITTER, you can follow Chad @TBapologetics.You can follow Brian @TheBrianAutenAnd of course, you can follow @Apologetics315If you have a question or comment for the podcast, record it and send it our way using www.speakpipe.com/Apologetics315 or you can email us at [email protected]