EP74: Ukraine will just build a nuclear bomb in 6 months
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Summary: In this episode, we examine the possibility of Ukraine developing a nuclear weapon within six months. Justin James McShane, debunks this claim by outlining the technical challenges and logistical hurdles that would need to be overcome. He points out Ukraine's lack of enriched uranium, the complex process of uranium enrichment, and the need for specialized equipment and expertise in manufacturing gas centrifuges. McShane also emphasizes the difficulty of securing necessary materials and establishing a covert production facility in a war zone. He concludes that a six-month timeframe is unrealistic and highlights the significant resources and expertise required for a successful nuclear program. Questions to consider as you read/listen: 1. What are the technical challenges and logistical hurdles Ukraine faces in building a nuclear weapon? 2. What factors would make it extremely difficult for Ukraine to develop a nuclear weapon in a short timeframe? 3. How do the current circumstances and the history of Ukraine's nuclear program affect the plausibility of this scenario? Long format:  Ukraine will just build a nuclear bomb in 6 months… Trying to guess the new administration and what it will do in Ukraine and the reactions of Ukraine or Russia is a fool’s errand. Some folks say “they [Ukraine] will build a [nuclear] bomb in 6 months. Checkmate.” Let’s look at that claim.  1 Ukraine has zero stockpile of high enriched uranium (HEU).  2 According to my research the Ukrainians have four nuclear power plants. One is currently under Russian control. So they potentially have low enriched uranium (LEU).  3 LEU needs to be enriched to 90% for it to be considered weapons grade uranium otherwise known as HEU. That process to enrich from LEU to HEU requires gas centrifuges.  4 A nuclear bomb requires about 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of uranium enriched to 90% to 93% U-235. 5 Ukraine has zero gas centrifuge manufacturing in Ukraine needed to enrich LEU to HEU. How do we know? IAEA. It is unlikely that Ukraine would be able to buy HEU in the open market because whoever sells it is under export restrictions requiring licensing and even if not, then that company will know it will definitely be used. Not great optics.  6 So companies or a government consortium needs to be spun up quick to produce Zippe-type centrifuge or American style centrifuges. Can that be done covertly? Maybe. The physical plant could be under 500 m2. But it’s a battle zone and who knows if they can keep a lid on it. It would seem logical to me that Russia would target such companies and physical plants. But for the sake of this thought exercise that the Russians can’t destroy the static sites where these centrifuges are made…. moving on.  7 So they’d have to secure a lot of material unnoticed. That includes: carbon fiber, maraging steel and high-strength aluminum; Items for electric power control systems, such as frequency convertors and process control software; Equipment to operate cascades, such as pressure transducers and vacuum pumps. Those are pretty unique systems and if bought suddenly sure signal what you are doing. After they get the materials in sufficient amounts then they have to physically make the centrifuges which takes time. Then they have to test them to make sure they work according to specifications which takes time.  8 Using non-cascading methods, it takes 4,000 centrifuges to produce 25 kg of 90% uranium per year. They have to let them run for a year to have enough HEU for ONE bomb. Just one.  9 Let’s say the Ukrainians decide to get a lot more sophisticated and the Russians let them.  Let’s say that on their own they build a 12-cascade plant can produce 90 kg of HEU per year. That’s 3 bombs only in a year’s time. That cascading pipework which is complex and under the best circumstances could add several weeks or months up front. It is difficult to run and maintain if you have zero experience.  Six months? The math isn’t there. There’s an entire bunch of if’s and best case scenarios. (By way of reference Iran is a lot closer because they already have plenty of gas centrifuges constructed and likely have them in cascade) 10 Let’s leave all of the above behind…. There is delivery of the bomb. Having a bomb doesn’t matter at all unless you can put it on target. The next question is the method of delivery. Dropping a bomb is easy presuming it is stable and small enough and you have a big enough bomber to deliver it. Delivering a bomb aboard a missile rather than simply dropping it from the air entails mastering both ballistics — all the calculations involved in getting the warhead to its target — and the miniaturization of the nuclear charge so that it can be mounted on the warhead. Not as easy but possible if given enough time. I would think for all of the above reasons six months is not realistic or possible.  If you think or believe or feel I am wrong, please tell me of the above where I am wrong. An appeal to authority (i.e., because so and so said so) that’s quite fine but if they don’t provide facts, sources or an alternative timeline with details than the above, then that’s not too useful, I suggest.  Sources: https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/enriched-uranium#:~:text=Thus%2C%20for%20example%2C%20to%20produce,require%20more%20than%204000%20centrifuges.&text=This%20is%20for%200.2%25%20tails,HEU%20would%20be%20much%20reduced) https://pubs.aip.org/physicstoday/article/61/9/40/413428/The-gas-centrifuge-and-nuclear-weapons#:~:text=More%20than%2090%20kg/yr,LEU%20for%20an%20undeclared%20facility) https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/ukraine-and-soviet-nuclear-history#:~:text=This%20report%20informs%20Molotov%20in,outside%20in%20Ukraine%20in%20Kazan) https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2023/03/23/russias-disinformation-goes-nuclear/#:~:text=Russian%20claims%20that%20Ukraine%20has,power%20plants%20from%20international%20suppliers) https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/ukraine#:~:text=In%20April%202015%20Energoatom%20signed,Canada%20%E2%80%93%20was%20signed%20in%20April) Get full access to GeopoliticsUnplugged Substack at geopoliticsunplugged.substack.com/subscribe)