EP71: Ports, Power, and Provocation: China's Naval Ambitions from Djibouti to Cuba
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Summary: In this episode, we explore the growing trend of China establishing military bases around the world, particularly in strategically important locations along maritime trade routes. The author of the study, Justin James McShane, argues that this expansion represents a significant shift in China’s ambitions, moving from a regional defense posture to a global power projection strategy. We detail China's existing bases in Djibouti, Gwadar, Cambodia, and Tajikistan, and discuss the potential for new bases in Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and other locations. This expansion poses significant security and economic challenges for the United States, as it could disrupt global trade, compromise U.S. security, and alter the balance of power. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of understanding and addressing these developments, suggesting that the United States must reassess its strategies and strengthen its alliances to counterbalance China’s growing influence. Questions to consider as you read/listen: What are the strategic implications of China's growing network of military bases around the world? How does China's pursuit of a "blue water navy" impact its global presence and influence? What are the potential security concerns and challenges posed by China's military expansion?

Long format:  Ports, Power, and Provocation: China's Naval Ambitions from Djibouti to Cuba By Justin James McShane (One sentence thesis: Not well known to most but China’s global expansion of military bases from Djibouti to Cuba signals a shift towards power projection and control over strategic routes, posing significant security and economic challenges for the United States.) TL;DR: China has established military bases around the world—in Djibouti, Gwadar, Cambodia, Cuba, and Tajikistan—strategically placing itself near key shipping routes and U.S. interests. This expansion aims to create a true “blue water navy” that can project power globally. Americans should be concerned, as China’s new bases could disrupt global trade, compromise U.S. security, and shift the balance of power. Introduction: China's global influence has grown substantially over the past two decades, with its ambitions stretching far beyond its immediate borders. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the development of strategic military and logistical bases around the world. As China expands its presence in locations such as Djibouti, Gwadar, Cambodia, Cuba, and other possibilities such as Equatorial Guinea, the implications for the United States and its allies become increasingly pressing. These outposts, coupled with China’s efforts to build a true “blue water navy,” signify a shift from regional defense to global force projection. Americans should pay close attention to these developments, as China’s expanding military footprint in these key locations could reshape global power dynamics, affect U.S. security, and challenge long-standing economic and strategic interests across critical maritime routes and in the Western Hemisphere. INFORMATION In my prior posts I suggested a definition of what constitutes a “blue water navy”. I wrote then… Here is a proposed standardized definition of “blue water navy” that I suggest: “A blue water navy is able to independently and regularly sustain and operate in open ocean at distance from your own territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) a force projection to both deliver a large number of combat troops and associated logistics and also protect long distance shipping lanes vital for your home country’s trade. Sustained means measured by at least one month of force projection activities with support as well as full time shipping lane protection. Plus there has to be a component of demonstrated force projection and shipping lane protection orientation if not actual capabilities beyond one’s EEZ. A blue water Navy must have the capability to detect, identify and engage targets over the horizon. This implies some degree of sophistication in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as weapon capabilities. I do think that some static features to serve as minimum requirements would be necessary to serve as thresholds. I propose: At least one functional aircraft carrier that is open sea worthy. A cadre of cargo ships that can be used in trade and/or logistics enablers for far off force projection. Submarines (both attack and Ballistic missile submarines) Cruisers Destroyers Frigates Landing craft”

When my definition was applied to China I concluded that the PLAN was not a blue water navy because: “What makes it not a blue water navy is logistics,  sustained force projection realities and its orientation. The PLAN fleet lacks the necessary logistical infrastructure, operational range, and global basing capabilities to project significant military power across vast expanses of the open ocean. It lacks friendly ports that would be available to it in the time of global conflict. It also primarily focuses its naval operations within its near seas, particularly around the East and South China Seas. [It’s naval strategy is focused mostly on anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy] This means they are not currently capable of sustained operations far from their home shores like a true blue water navy would be.” Well, there is some cause for stopping and reevaluating this in terms of a trend. DJIBOUTI This is China’s only claimed military base outside of China. It began in 2017. Its location is strategically important because it is in the commercial shipping area of the Red Sea that is under attack by pirates off Somalia as well as the Houthis in Yemen. The heavily fortified base is 0.5 square kilometers (0.2 sq. mi) in size and staffed by approximately 1,000–2,000 personnel, and has an underground space of 23,000 square meters. The base has a 400m runway with an air traffic control tower, as well as a large helicopter apron. PAKISTAN China has already acquired control of Gwadar Port on 16 May 2013. Originally valued at $46 billion, the value of CPEC projects was $62 billion as of 2020. By 2022, Chinese investment in Pakistan had risen to $65 billion. China refers to this project as the revival of the Silk Road. China's continued investment in the port, despite its lackluster performance, has raised suspicions that it is intended for use as a Chinese navy base. Gwadar Port is located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, at the junction of major oil trade and shipping routes. It's also near the Straits of Hormuz, which are used by more than 17 million barrels of oil per day. CAMBODIA The PLAN developed Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand in late 2022. It has a pier facility that could berth an aircraft carrier. Its strategic position is clear when one looks at a map as the Straight of Malaca is nearby. TAJIKISTAN The Chinese maintain a small military post in Gorno-Badakhshan., It is a mountainous region in eastern Tajikistan. It is not on the shore or have access to any waterway, but it is important to note. The Chinese insist that it is not a military base but instead is an outpost. But it is one. CUBA Recent satellite imagery analyzed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reveals China’s expanding military presence in Cuba, with four key signals intelligence (SIGINT) sites Bejucal: Located near Havana, this site has undergone significant upgrades over the past decade, including the addition of a new radome, indicating an evolving mission set. El Salao: Situated east of Santiago de Cuba, construction began in 2021 on a large circularly disposed antenna array (CDAA). Once operational, this facility could monitor U.S. military activities, including those at the nearby Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Wajay: Approximately 10 kilometers north of Bejucal, this complex has expanded over 20 years to include 12 antennas and various support facilities, suggesting a complex SIGINT mission. Calabazar: Close to Wajay, this military complex hosts over a dozen dish antennas and pole antenna arrays, indicating involvement in space-monitoring and SIGINT operations. These developments suggest that China is enhancing its intelligence-gathering capabilities in the Western Hemisphere, potentially intercepting sensitive communications from U.S. military bases and other strategic sites. The proximity of these facilities to the southeastern United States raises significant security concerns. EQUATORIAL GUINEA China’s pursuit of a naval base in West Africa, particularly in Equatorial Guinea, has garnered significant international attention. Reports indicate that China is negotiating with Equatorial Guinea to establish a military presence at the Port of Bata, a deep-water commercial port on the Gulf of Guinea. This development would mark China’s first permanent military installation on the Atlantic coast, enhancing its global naval reach. U.S. defense officials have expressed concerns, noting that such a base could enable Chinese warships to rearm and repair in proximity to the U.S. East Coast, posing strategic challenges. The potential base aligns with China’s broader strategy to protect its overseas interests and secure maritime routes, especially in regions like the Gulf of Guinea, which is vital for global shipping and has faced piracy issues. While some analysts argue that fears of China’s Atlantic naval ambitions may be overstated, the establishment of a base in Equatorial Guinea would signify a notable shift in China’s military posture, with implications for U.S. and European security interests. GABON In August 2023, then-President Ali Bongo of Gabon disclosed to U.S. officials that he had privately assured Chinese President Xi Jinping of China’s permission to establish a military presence on Gabon’s Atlantic coast. This revelation alarmed the U.S., which views the Atlantic as a strategic area and perceives a Chinese naval base there as a significant security threat. Following a military coup in Gabon, U.S. diplomats engaged with the new authorities to dissuade them from honoring Bongo’s commitment. Concurrently, the U.S. has been urging Equatorial Guinea to reject similar Chinese overtures for a naval base, emphasizing the potential risks to regional stability and U.S. security interests. But it doesn’t stop there. The October 2023 U.S. Department of Defense China’s Military Power Report outlined that the PRC has already considered “Burma [Myanmar], Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan” as potential locations and that it probably already has attempted to set up bases in Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. In comparison, a July 2023 AidData publication highlighted on eight possible basing locations, based on Chinese financial flows abroad: Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Bata, Equatorial Guinea; Gwadar, Pakistan; Kribi, Cameroon; Ream, Cambodia; Vanuatu; Nacala, Mozambique; and Nouakchott, Mauritania.   Conclusion: China’s global strategic expansion through its bases in places like Djibouti, Gwadar, Cambodia, and Cuba is reshaping the international landscape. By securing footholds along vital maritime routes and near U.S. interests, China’s long-term ambitions are clear: to enhance its ability to project power and protect its expanding interests worldwide. For the United States, understanding and addressing these developments is essential. America must reassess its strategies and strengthen its own alliances to counterbalance China’s growing influence. By staying vigilant and proactive, Americans can help ensure that the country remains secure and prepared to meet the challenges posed by a rapidly changing global power structure. 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