Summary: In this episode, we discuss the work entitled “Rethinking Gropolitics” by Jeremy Black. In that book Black examines the similarities between the geopolitical challenges facing the United Kingdom in the early 20th century and the United States today. We discuss how the work “highlights the parallels between Britain's position as a declining global power facing rising competition from countries like Russia, Germany, and the United States, and the US's current situation with China”. Black emphasizes how both countries struggled with balancing their global commitments with domestic political pressures and how their strategic priorities shape their future. We talk about how Black’s theories are different than our own. Where Black suggests that just as the USSR and the US emerged as superpowers following World War II, the world may see the rise of new superpowers in the future as America decoupled like Britain did. We discuss how this differs from our view that the decoupling will result in regional powers and most likely no single superpower or multiple superpowers. Questions to consider as you read/listen: 1. How does the text relate the current geopolitical landscape to the historical example of Britain's transition from global superpower to a more regionally focused power? 2.What are the implications of the author's comparison between the current state of the US and Britain in 1904 for the future of the world order? 3. What is the author's argument about the role of technology in shifting global power dynamics? Long format: A contrary view of geopolitics and deglobalization I’m reading an interesting book that although I find it interesting, ultimately, I would not recommend. It is titled “Rethinking Gropolitics” by Jeremy Black. I don’t recommend it because it covers history that I think all of us are very familiar with. He notes that 120 years ago Halford Mackinder gave an important geopolitical talk featuring what he called the “global pivot”. As we all know at the time (1904) Britain was the world’s true one and only superpower with the world’s greatest navy and true global reach and force projection. Mackinder noted that at the dawn of the 20th century, at the time, Britain was becoming more isolationist and seeking to consolidate its position and not expand its influence. At one point he summed the feeling to be at the time that there was no need for Britain to be the school marms of the world settling arguments it had nothing to do with (sounds familiar, eh?) Further he noted even back in 1904 that this isolationist/consolidating positioning was leading to serious challenges from more than one power: the USA, Russia and Germany. All three he noted were growing and expansionist. He noted the change in technology of the time from the primacy of maritime to rail-borne land power and even an audience member noting the new age of air. Quoting directly from his work is the following sentiment: —-start of quote—- So also in 2024 for the United States and the challenges it confronts, notably from China but also from the very volatility of a global system in which US leadership is under great challenge, as, more generally, is the civilizational model of and from the West. Indeed, China deliberately sets out to contest US international models, seeing the United States’ global liberalism as a challenge to national sovereignty, as well as being self-interested, with China presenting instead the Communist model of “managed socialism.” At the same time, the United States itself is very divided by the question of engagement with the outside world, as well as the nature of prioritization in strategic areas and tasks, for example, competing commitments to Taiwan, Ukraine, and the Middle East. This is a prioritization that sees geopolitics in action. In part, the use of geopolitics in this context is an aspect of the debate about prioritization, one that is rhetorical as well as analytical. This then sets the stage for a consideration of the 120 years from Mackinder to now, as well as geopolitics present and geopolitics future. There are clear parallels between past British and present US geopolitical issues. Thus, in 1883, William Henry Smith, a Conservative politician, who had been First Lord of the Admiralty in 1877–80, spoke to the House of Commons about “the duties to be discharged by the Navy, and which are of a very varying nature throughout the world, because heavier duties fall upon the Navy of this country than fall upon the Navies of all other countries taken together. We have a large commerce, and practically we have to perform what are called the police duties of the seas, and we have, in consequence, to maintain an ironclad Fleet equal to any emergency.” This he explained later that year was difficult: “At this moment, ironclads have to be employed in the China and Australian Seas, in the Pacific, on the Coast of North America, and in the West Indies. Our Fleet is scattered in a manner in which the Fleet of no other power can be scattered; and while it is discharging duties in three or four different seas, if, unfortunately, we should be engaged in a war, Foreign Powers might be able to concentrate their forces against our Navy.” Comparable issues were to face Britain and the United States as leading powers. ——end quote—- Well if this analogy holds true, would it not be the case that instead of a series of decentralized regional powers that many of us including myself believe will happen, that new superpowers will arise as the USSR and the USA did after WWII? Dunno. Interesting to always ponder the other side, right? Get full access to GeopoliticsUnplugged Substack at geopoliticsunplugged.substack.com/subscribe)