cover of episode Gaza ceasefire: Biden, Trump and the remaining hurdles

Gaza ceasefire: Biden, Trump and the remaining hurdles

2024/11/28
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Samer Al-Atrush
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Samer Al-Atrush认为,加沙停火比之前更有可能达成,因为哈马斯失去了发动地区战争的威胁这一重要筹码。黎巴嫩停火后,真主党和伊朗都被排除在外,哈马斯对去年10月7日袭击以色列后会引发地区战争的预期落空,导致其地位削弱。哈马斯现在唯一的筹码是人质,他们不太可能在没有至少将时间倒回10月6日(袭击前一天)的情况下释放人质。他们的诉求包括以色列完全撤出加沙、重建援助以及难民返回。以色列政府内部对与哈马斯达成停火协议存在严重分歧,极端右翼势力甚至希望完全消灭哈马斯或重新在加沙建定居点。以色列可能接受的停火协议包括释放人质,但不包括完全撤军,而是保留在加沙边界地区的控制权。以色列认为哈马斯目前孤立无援,如果以色列坚持立场,哈马斯最终会接受其条件。但哈马斯也可能面临来自调停者和美国的压力,或者选择孤注一掷。在特朗普执政下,加沙停火更有可能达成,部分原因是拜登政府任期即将结束,以及内塔尼亚胡与特朗普的私人关系更好。特朗普被认为比拜登更支持以色列,但他更难以被忽视。如果特朗普下令结束战争,战争很可能会很快结束。特朗普与沙特王储和埃及总统关系密切,这可能使他更有可能促成停火协议。沙特阿拉伯可能利用结束战争的机会促成以色列与巴勒斯坦的和平协议。 Alex Dibble和James Hansen主要负责引导访谈,提出问题,并对Samer Al-Atrush的观点进行总结和补充。他们没有表达自己明确的政治立场。

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The discussion explores the challenges to a Gaza ceasefire, focusing on Hamas's weakened position due to the Lebanon ceasefire and their reliance on hostages as leverage. The demands for a ceasefire include Israeli withdrawal, reconstruction aid, and refugee return.
  • Hamas lost a major bargaining chip with the Lebanon ceasefire.
  • Hamas's main leverage is now the hostages.
  • Hamas demands include Israeli withdrawal, reconstruction aid, and refugee return.

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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. Today with me, Alex Dibble and James Hansen. Now that a ceasefire has been agreed between Israel and Hezbollah, many are now asking whether a similar deal can be struck to end the fighting in Gaza.

On yesterday's episode, our Israel correspondent, Gabrielle Weineger, told us she thinks that remains unlikely. So today, we're going to explore this issue in more depth and examine what the major obstacles are to a ceasefire in Gaza. Our guest is The Times' Middle East correspondent, Samer Al-Atrush. Samer, first of all, do you agree that a ceasefire in Gaza is unlikely any time soon?

Well, I mean, it's likelier than it was before the ceasefire in Lebanon because Hamas has lost another sort of major bargaining chip, which was the threat of regional war having Israel fight on more than one front. So

With the ceasefire deal in Lebanon, Hizballah has been taken out of the equation. Iran's been taken out of the equation, as I've indicated. Iran's unlikely to take any action now that there's a ceasefire in Lebanon. In that aspect, you know, Hamas has lost a major bargaining chip, a major point of pressure on Israel.

The other thing that's happened is that Hamas have been practically expelled from Qatar, which was hosting the political leadership. So Hamas is in many ways much more isolated and under much more pressure than they've been. I think over the past 10 months, Hamas was under the impression, certainly they believe that their attack last year against Israel, the October 7 attack, would set off some sort of regional war.

I think at this point they've been disabused of that. So their position is much weaker than it's ever been. On the other hand, they are now in a position where they think that there's nothing left to lose, right? And the only bargaining chip they have left is the hostages. That's something that they've always believed, that the main pressure card...

that they have against Israel as hostages. And they are very unlikely to sign onto a deal that would release all of the hostages without at least, you know, taking the clock back to October 6th, the day before they attacked Israel. So that would mean a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, you know, uninterrupted reconfiguration

reconstruction aid, the unhindered flow of refugees from North Gaza who have made it to southern Gaza to go back to the north. So these are the demands all along for the ceasefire. And I think

I think they're still unlikely to agree to anything less than that, but the pressure now is much more considerable than it was a month ago. So, Mayor, what are the obstacles then to a ceasefire on the Israeli side? I mean, is the biggest of them the political pressure that Netanyahu is under from the most hardline members of his coalition who would be very hostile to any kind of deal with Hamas?

Yes, unlike the Lebanon ceasefire where the war had run its course, nobody in the Israeli government has any designs on Lebanese territory. And yes, I think some people are disappointed that they didn't go all the way, but nobody realistically thought that was an option. In Gaza, it's an entirely separate issue. You have unity, not just from the hardliners. And there's a really cabinet that, you know, Hamas has to be entirely eradicated.

which again is an implausible goal, but that's one that they have nonetheless. You do have the hardliners, I mean, the extreme hardliners, because the Israeli cabinet is entirely hardline, but the extreme hardliners, the extreme rights, the Ben-Egbirs, the Smotriches, who also want to resettle Gaza. They want to bring back settlements into Gaza. So

all these things make it a much tougher choice for the government to reach unity on a ceasefire deal in Gaza. I think the main dissenter in the cabinet was Yoav Golan, the defense minister, and he's been sacked. So that was sort of the main voice of dissent against this policy, you know, the kind of voice that

I think you'll hear in the IDF and in intelligence services would say, well, you know, we killed all their leaders. A lot of a lot of their fighters have been killed by some estimates, 18000 or more, according to Israeli estimates. Hamas members have been killed. You know, we are not going to be releasing all the hostages by force. That's simply not acceptable.

a feasible prospect. They will more likely be killed by Hamas or by our own bombardment than freed by special forces operations. And we should strike a deal. So that was the argument that was presented by Gallant. He's out of the cabinet right now. And I think, you know, it's just going to be so much harder to reach a type of ceasefire.

So what kind of ceasefire agreement might the Israeli government be prepared to accept? I think what Israel would be interested in doing is reaching a ceasefire agreement that releases the hostages, but that doesn't stipulate that they have to withdraw their forces entirely from Gaza. They would want to retain control in a buffer zone. They would want to retain control along the border between Gaza and Egypt. Also,

in a quarter dividing Northern Gaza from Southern Gaza so that, you know, Hamas doesn't return to, to North Gaza so they can vet the returnees. And I think they're thinking now is that, well, given that Hamas is under so much more pressure right now, they're, they're, they're very isolated. If we stick to our guns and we don't compromise, Hamas will eventually be forced to accept these terms. I think that that's what they're looking at. Uh,

And certainly Hamas is going to come under pressure to accept these terms. They're going to come under pressure from the mediators. They're going to come under pressure from the U.S. I'm not sure that they are still in a position where they think, well, this is the best that we can get, or whether they're being placed in a position where they think, you

you know, we have nothing else to lose. So we might as well go out with the blades, you know? So that's a danger of putting them in that corner. So, you know, time will tell. I mean, they are, again, they are more isolated than they've been at any point. Fears of a regional war have dissipated, which had worked in their favor, really, in Hamas's favor to bring pressure on Israel. You know, people were telling Israel, look, if you don't sort out Gaza, you might end up with a regional war that might draw in U.S. forces.

That's dissipated for now. I think there's still fears of an default on the West Bank, but that also is something that doesn't seem as imminent as it might have, I think, some months ago, especially when Israel widened its military operations there and there were increased settler attacks against Palestinians there. But it's still a danger. And the U.S. is still pressuring Israel to make sure that tax revenues go to the Palestinian Authority there to prevent its collapse.

And is a ceasefire more likely to happen under Donald Trump than Joe Biden? I suppose partly because the Biden administration only has weeks left, but also because Netanyahu appears to have a better personal relationship with Trump than he does with Biden.

Yeah, I think, you know, Netanyahu has also had a difficult relationship with Trump. He's certainly been trying to, you know, mend defenses and sway Trump to his point of view. Trump is certainly seen as more supportive of Israel than Biden, although, you know, Biden supporters would argue that that's very unfair because Biden has been really 100 percent supportive of Israel. I mean, there has been a weapons shipment here or there.

of heavy sort of bunker busting type bombs that were withheld. But there's been a kind of successive multi-billion dollar packages

that have been sent to Israel. And I think many people in Israel recognize that, that the Biden administration has been very supportive. And in fact, that cost him a lot of Arab and Muslim votes in the US. So on the one hand, yes, Trump is seen as more supportive. On the other hand, unlike Biden, Trump is not the sort of person

I think Netanyahu would feel comfortable ignoring or thinks that he can get away with ignoring. You know, Biden could put down ultimatums. I mean, you know, they gave Israel an ultimatum about allowing more aid into Gaza, 350 trucks a day. Israel ignored it. And the weapons kept flowing anyway. I mean, the ultimatum did come with a warning that we might have to revisit our military aid. And that's not the sort of thing that you can do with Trump. You know, he takes things incredibly personally and he lashes out

and he acts, you know, if he's upset. So if Trump comes into office, you know, with the same mindset that he did before, which was saying that the war has to wrap up very quickly and that he would end the war, I would assume that nobody would ignore that. You know, when he comes into office, if he puts his foot down and says the war is over, I think the war will be over very soon. And the other thing is that Trump

has very close relations with the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. He has a close relationship with the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. So he's probably more likely to take their concerns and views on board than Biden perhaps did.

And they would very much like to see an end to this war. I think with the Saudis particularly, they're dangling the prospect that an end to the war and a commitment from Israel towards the Palestinian state, as unlikely as it is, that would in turn allow Trump to officiate over a Saudi-Israeli peace deal.

Samir, thank you. That is The Times' Middle East correspondent, Samir Al-Atrish. And that's it from us. Thank you for taking 10 minutes to stay on top of the world with the help of The Times. We'll see you tomorrow.

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