cover of episode Frontline special - Major General Rupert Jones

Frontline special - Major General Rupert Jones

2024/11/24
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James Hansen 探讨了美国批准乌克兰使用远程导弹的意义,以及此举是否构成升级。他认为,乌克兰有权自卫,西方对乌克兰武器使用的限制是不合理的。 Major General Rupert Jones 同意这一观点,他指出,真正的升级是俄罗斯在库尔斯克部署朝鲜军队。他分析了克里姆林宫对远程导弹事件的反应,认为这反映了他们对局势的担忧。他还探讨了向乌克兰提供远程导弹对战场的影响,认为这虽然重要,但并非决定性因素,战争的胜负取决于各种武器装备的协调运用。他认为,逐步向乌克兰提供武器是为了避免激怒俄罗斯,但这种做法是不必要的,因为乌克兰有权使用武器自卫。他分析了拜登政府批准乌克兰使用ATACMS导弹的原因,以及未来是否会批准其他导弹的使用,他认为,目前尚不清楚美国政府批准乌克兰使用ATACMS导弹背后的政治考量,以及未来是否会进一步提供武器支持。他还分析了批准使用ATACMS导弹而不批准使用风暴阴影和侦察兵导弹的原因,他认为,这似乎是缺乏一致性的做法。 他进一步分析了特朗普当选对俄乌关系的影响,认为特朗普可能会寻求某种和平协议,但他不太可能完全放弃乌克兰。他认为,特朗普可能会避免像拜登在阿富汗那样撤兵,因为他会关注自己的政治遗产。他还认为,与普京进行真诚谈判的可能性很小。他认为,乌克兰可能更倾向于某种形式的停火协议,但克里姆林宫则坚持要求乌克兰完全投降。他还分析了乌克兰对库尔斯克的入侵,认为这是一个战略性举动,为其提供了重要的谈判筹码。 最后,他还分析了乌克兰战争一周年以来的局势,认为俄罗斯和乌克兰都处于艰难的境地,俄罗斯在战争中损失惨重,而乌克兰则难以恢复攻势。他高度赞扬了乌克兰人民和领导层在战争中展现出的非凡韧性。他认为,西方对乌克兰的支持力度不足,且附加了过多的条件。 Major General Rupert Jones 详细分析了美国批准乌克兰使用远程导弹的意义,认为此举并非升级,而是纠正了先前不合理的限制。他指出,真正的升级是俄罗斯在库尔斯克部署朝鲜军队。他认为,克里姆林宫的强烈反应表明他们对局势的担忧,因为他们此前可能认为美国不会批准这一举动。他分析了远程导弹对战场的影响,认为这将使乌克兰能够打击此前无法触及的目标,但其本身并非决定性因素。他认为,逐步向乌克兰提供武器的策略存在争议,因为乌克兰有权使用所有武器进行自卫。他分析了拜登政府批准乌克兰使用ATACMS导弹的原因,以及未来是否会批准其他导弹的使用,他认为,目前尚不清楚美国政府批准乌克兰使用ATACMS导弹背后的政治考量,以及未来是否会进一步提供武器支持。他还分析了批准使用ATACMS导弹而不批准使用风暴阴影和侦察兵导弹的原因,他认为,这似乎是缺乏一致性的做法。 他还分析了特朗普当选对俄乌关系的影响,认为特朗普可能会寻求某种和平协议,但他不太可能完全放弃乌克兰。他认为,特朗普可能会避免像拜登在阿富汗那样撤兵,因为他会关注自己的政治遗产。他还认为,与普京进行真诚谈判的可能性很小。他认为,乌克兰可能更倾向于某种形式的停火协议,但克里姆林宫则坚持要求乌克兰完全投降。他还分析了乌克兰对库尔斯克的入侵,认为这是一个战略性举动,为其提供了重要的谈判筹码。 最后,他还分析了乌克兰战争一周年以来的局势,认为俄罗斯和乌克兰都处于艰难的境地,俄罗斯在战争中损失惨重,而乌克兰则难以恢复攻势。他高度赞扬了乌克兰人民和领导层在战争中展现出的非凡韧性。他认为,西方对乌克兰的支持力度不足,且附加了过多的条件。

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Welcome to The World in 10. In an increasingly uncertain world, this is The Times' daily podcast dedicated to global security. I'm Alex Dibble and I executive produce the podcast. The World in 10 is partnered with Frontline, the interview series from Times Radio, available on YouTube, with expert analysis of the world's conflicts. At the weekend, we bring you Frontline interviews in full. Here's one from this week. I hope you find it interesting.

Hello and welcome to Frontline for Times Radio. I'm James Hansen. And today we're marking a thousand days since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And I'm delighted to be joined by Major General Rupert Jones, who was previously the UK's most senior commander in Iraq and jointly led coalition forces against ISIS in Iraq. Rupert, it's always a pleasure. Welcome back to Frontline. James, very nice to be with you.

We'll come on to the significance of this thousand-day anniversary in due course. But first of all, the big story of the past day or two has been President Biden seemingly approving the use of long-range US-supplied Atacoms missiles by Ukraine inside Kursk. How significant a moment do you think that is?

Yeah, I mean, I think it is significant. And I think you're right to use the word seemingly, because, of course, there hasn't been any formal statement on this. It's come out through reliable media sources in Washington. And, of course, in a way, that's right and proper. And President Zelensky has kind of backed that up, saying, you know, you don't get announcements about these things. The missiles will do the talking.

Um, so, so, you know, we're all working a little bit, uh, in, in the gray on this, but I think it is, I think it is significant. It is important. Regrettably, it shouldn't be significant because it is slightly extraordinary that these restrictions were imposed on the Ukrainians in, in the first place. Um, uh, and it's, and it has really limited the Ukrainians ability to operate in, in, in the meantime. Uh,

We would not impose these restrictions ourselves. The Americans wouldn't impose these restrictions on themselves. And yet we've imposed them on the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians have absolute right to use weapons in self-defense. We've given them weapons and then limited how they use those weapons.

And would you very much say this is in no way an escalation? I mean, you have the Kremlin spokespeople already coming out saying this is an unprecedented escalation. I think Dmitry Peskov said it was adding fuel to the fire and that it's qualitatively a change in the US position. A Russian foreign ministry spokesperson said it's a radical change in the essence and nature of the war.

And yet, actually, this is entirely within the confines of international law. And when you consider what Russia has been doing in terms of deploying North Korean troops in Kursk, which seems like a serious escalation, I mean, I would argue this is not an escalation. But what is your reading on that, Reuters? I will completely agree with you. It's not remotely an escalation. But of course, because the West has imposed these sort of restrictions, it's

It's a kind of PR win for Moscow. It just plays completely into their hands to allow then Moscow to come out with – and Putin has commented on this recently – but to come out with these absolutely ridiculous claims about escalation. They're not remotely escalation. They're absolutely all about escalation.

giving Ukraine the ability to defend themselves. So not an escalation at all, merely taking off a shackle that should never have been there. And you're absolutely right to say the only significant escalation that's happened recently is the provision of North Korean troops in support of Russia. I mean, that really is very escalatory. Ukraine are just continuing to defend themselves.

Does the strength of the response nonetheless, though, from the Kremlin, does that suggest they're rattled in some way by this? Because presumably they would have thought, given it hadn't happened until now, that maybe these long range missiles would not be approved by the US.

Yeah, I mean, I think they had grounds to think that, you know, they were going to play for time. Biden's administration not long to go. And they might have thought they were just going to be able to sit this out. Whether they're rattled is hard to tell. But they certainly will be thinking carefully about the implications of this. Because, of course, they've been able to exploit this constraint by positioning –

much closer to the front line than they'd have been able to do. Knowing they could sit there with impunity, they can no longer do those things. So those supply dumps, the infrastructure, the routes, the headquarters, all those things behind the front line, assembly areas, they were almost kind of out of bounds, essentially.

It's like some slightly peculiar board game where the rules said that these couldn't be touched. And of course, Russia has been able to exploit that. They can no longer do so. Those assets will now be in harm's way. And I'd expect the Ukrainians to go after them very aggressively.

Well, let's just expand on that if you can, Rupert. I mean, what difference do you think it's going to make on the ground in Kursk? And to begin with, we understand these attack teams are only going to be allowed to be used in the Kursk Oblast. We understand Russia have regained about a third of the territory that Ukraine captured over the summer in recent months. What difference do you think this is actually going to make on the ground?

Yeah, I mean, it's going to make a difference. Undoubtedly, these are extremely capable missiles that can now be used to their full potential out to almost 200 miles. Very, very capable. And that is, of course, a good thing. But what we mustn't do, and you and I have discussed this before, as have many others, is to think that the provision of a single new capability to Ukraine's arsenal is decisive.

You know, we've had these conversations, haven't we, when main battle tanks were put into the fight, when F-16s came into the game.

And quite understandably, it always generates a bit of conversation. Is this going to be the game changer? None of these things are a game changer in and of themselves. As you know, warfare is about the orchestration of all of these assets. And now they've got another instrument to play with, to bring to bear. That is helpful, but in and of itself, it can't change the calculus of the battle.

And as you say, in the first instance, it appears that they will be used in and around Kursk to allow the Ukrainians to defend their foothold there.

Is this, in your view, Rupert, one last gesture by the Biden administration in support of Ukraine? Or could we still see, between now and Donald Trump's inauguration at the end of January, could we see, for example, the Storm Shadow and Scout missiles also being approved for use and potentially outside of Kursk? Yeah, I mean, it's really hard to know, isn't it, what the politics in Washington are that have brought about this decision now.

I confess I always found it pretty extraordinary, the political decision-making in the first place that led to the missiles not being provided. So who knows what the administration is thinking about? Is it trying to secure its legacy? What is it that it's trying to do? Hard to know. It would seem to me that Washington hasn't got much more to offer this side of Trump's inauguration.

As you say, the next bit of the calculus is, will Britain and France be allowed to offer up their missiles, which, as you know, are under, if you like, Washington restriction because they contain some American technology?

Both London and Paris have made clear for some time that they would like to provide those missiles, but have been constrained from doing so. One assumes, and there's media speculation to suggest that there'll be conversations going on at the G20 to get the release of those British and French missiles.

And I appreciate you are probably as confused by this as I am, Rupert, but can you explain to me, if possible, what the difference is between approving Atacoms and not approving Storm Shadow and Scout? Why would you approve the use of one but not the others? It's really hard to see why you would. I mean, it would seem, you know,

In the extreme, I don't see any difference. It just seems to me that, and of course, there may be things going on that we're not seeing. But as far as one can tell, it is merely that that authorization process has not yet happened. I cannot see why Washington would allow their own missiles to be used now, but deny Britain and France from providing similar authorizations.

I mean, I suppose just to play devil's advocate, the arguments in favour of this more piecemeal approach to, you know, weapon supplies to Ukraine. And you mentioned, you know, there was the debate about main battle tanks and it was the F-16s. Now we've got these long range missiles. I suppose if you gave Ukraine access to all of them in one go at the start, even though that would clearly help them on the battlefield, that maybe would be a significant escalatory step.

action that could provoke a drastic response from Moscow. And the argument might be that the piecemeal approach is wiser in the long term. Yeah, and of course, that is an argument. It's an argument I would wholly push back on, because of the point I made earlier, that these are restrictions that should not have been there in the first place, because Ukraine has

Absolutely right under the law of un-conflict to use the weapons at its disposal for self-defense. And self-defense includes striking legitimate targets, in this case, inside of Russia. The law is absolutely clear about that.

And by being so rather mealy-mouthed, as frankly we have been for the last two years in the provision of our equipment, we just play into Moscow's hands, not only on the battlefield, but going back to our earlier conversation, because it just gives Moscow another ability to...

to come up with this false narrative. If you just do it all at once, Putin gets to say his ridiculous lies, and then we move on to the next thing. And, oh, by the way, all the way through, it has been clear that Putin's threats of escalating to tactical nuclear weapons and all of these sort of things –

They've never led to any substance. And the idea that President Putin has in his arsenal the ability to really change the calculus of the war seems fallacious. Now, that's not to say they can't make tactical gains on the battlefield. They can and they are.

But they're very small gains. You know, these aren't substantial breakthroughs. So I think we should continue to assess Putin's threats carefully, of course. And I'm absolutely certain the intelligence communities are doing that really, really rigorously. But then assess and judge his words against his previous actions.

Let's come on to the election of Donald Trump. Of course, he'll be inaugurated for his second term as US president in January. Some of the analysts I've spoken to since his election victory a fortnight ago on Frontline

have actually said that maybe we have been too pessimistic about what a Trump presidency means for Ukraine. And certainly some of the mood music from his conversations, his early conversations since his victory with President Zelensky has seemed more positive. Now, of course, Zelensky is a very good diplomat and he knows it's in his interest to try and build good relations with Trump. But how do you see the relationship between Kiev and Washington playing out under a Trump presidency? I mean, I think the first thing to say is we don't know. And

And, you know, we should watch this space carefully. I think it's fair to say. But I would agree with those comments. I think, you know, President Trump, you know, he likes to use really bold phrases. I'll end the war in a day. You know, he's used previous comments in his last presidency. But he doesn't want to be a loser.

He really cares about what people think about him. He's got this kind of slight blind spot that in many ways most politicians do not.

And I suspect you were thinking carefully about President Biden's legacy with regards to Afghanistan and the ignominious withdrawal of American and indeed NATO forces at President Biden's bidding. You throw away your gains if you do that. If President Trump takes a similar approach in Ukraine, he will have that on his conscience. He'll have it on his legacy.

And I don't think he'll want to do that. He's a dealmaker. He's a pragmatist. He'll be looking for some way through this. But I think it's most unlikely that that's going to involve just throwing in the towel, handing the gold to Putin. And I'm sure that Trump will wish to negotiate in some way or form with Putin in a way that others have not.

But I don't think that automatically leads to, you know, capitulation for Ukraine. I think it's been much more nuanced than that. I certainly hope it will be.

And I think what's pretty clear is he wants some kind of peace deal at some point. He wants some kind of negotiated settlement. But actually, I would say that the mood music from Ukraine is more positive towards that. You know, if there was some kind of freezing of the front lines, Kiev might be more open to that at the moment. The Kremlin are very, very much insistent that they want the complete capitulation of Ukraine, which simply isn't going to happen. And so if Trump feels like Moscow is being...

obstructive in some way. He may look more sympathetically on Ukraine. I think he's made the comments in the past that he's prepared to arm Ukraine to the teeth if Moscow don't come around the negotiating table. I think that's absolutely right. You know,

People who think they can genuinely negotiate with President Putin haven't studied him enough, nor have they studied actually the history of Russia and how Russia does its business. So the idea of a real negotiation in good faith with President Putin seems unlikely.

As you say, the facts on the ground are probably changing views a little bit in Kyiv about outright victory, regaining all of their pre-2014 lands. And so some kind of frozen conflict seems possible, undesirable, but every outcome, frankly, or every credible outcome is frankly undesirable.

I don't buy the talk of some kind of UN-policed, demilitarized zone. I simply don't know how that would come about, the idea that any NATO forces could be part of that UN force. I mean, I just don't see how that's a thing. But a frozen conflict, and of course there was a frozen conflict in Ukraine prior to the latest invasion 1,000 days ago,

And so returning to some kind of frozen conflict, deeply unpalatable, though it is for the Ukrainians, may seem more appealing than it did a year, two years ago. And this is where their incursion into Kursk, it seems to me, has always been a smart move.

Because, I mean, there was lots of talk at the time, which I'm afraid I just didn't buy at all, that Kursk was all about taking pressure off the front line and drawing Russian reserves.

For me, that was completely missing the big play. The big play was a strategic one, which was to take some sovereign Russian soil, which is humiliating for President Putin, and finally gives President Zelensky a genuine bargaining chip. It almost doesn't matter how big that salient is. As long as they can hold some sovereign Russian territory, then they have a very, very potent bargaining chip.

Because as I say, you can't negotiate with President Putin in good faith. But if you've got something he needs back, and make no mistake, he needs his Russian soil back, that is deeply humiliating to him. Then it gives you a position of greater strength when the music stops. And I suppose the key question is, therefore, what does Ukraine get out of any kind of peace settlement? And you would assume they'd be looking for some kind of long-term security guarantee.

be that NATO membership, be that some other kind of security guarantee. I suppose the issue there is, first of all, whether the Trump administration would want Ukraine in NATO, particularly given the skepticism that Trump has demonstrated towards NATO in the past, and also whether Ukraine would believe this security guarantee. And they would have good reason to be skeptical. I mean, you can look at the way that the West let them down over the Budapest Memorandum, for example. They will want this to be ironclad.

I agree on both counts. It is not unreasonable for Kyiv to expect some kind of security guarantees. Indeed, I think it's necessary for the future security of Europe that some kind of security guarantees are provided, not least so President Putin understands that when this stops, it really does stop. It's not just a pause ready for the next go.

So I think security guarantees are vital. But as you say, how do you really convince Kiev that they're for real? And I think, as you say, it's a really moot point as to whether President Trump would be willing to provide those. Indeed, of course, nations have been pretty cautious about providing those sort of guarantees hitherto.

Let's talk briefly, Rupert, about the fact that today marks a thousand days since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Zooming out a bit, where do you think we are in terms of the conflict on the ground at the moment?

Yeah. I mean, in a really difficult place, frankly, for both sides. Let's look at it from Russia's perspective. I mean, it has been a pretty ignominious 1,000 days. They thought they were going to steamroller Ukraine. They failed. They looked really, really poor in the first year. And then slowly, they were able to use their mass and weight and defenses to rest the initiative.

But they are absorbing a huge amount of their budget on this conflict. They're not making any real gains, seismic gains. And their military are proving themselves to be pretty inept. They're suffering astronomical casualties. We should be cautious of thinking those therefore lead to capitulation because Russia can absorb casualties.

But of course, they do have finite amounts of Soviet-era equipment. So they might be able to train, mobilize more people, but can they continue to equip them to stay in the fight? At what point does the economic pressures begin to really bite on Russia? Now...

Putin might therefore be thinking that Trump's arrival is good from that point of view because time comes back on his side. From a Ukrainian perspective, they were in a really strong position after a year. They were the ones with all the plays, but slowly the might of the Russian machine has ground them into stalemate and incremental gains are being taken off them.

And they are really, really small amounts of territory. The difficulty, of course, is that every piece of territory for Ukraine is sovereign. And so even a small village, a small hillside, that is all sovereign Ukrainian territory.

And it's hard to see how Ukraine can really regain the momentum. And that's why I come back to this. The Kursk attack, I think, was really smart because it was able to take the Russians by surprise and take some terrain that they can bargain with because I think it's very hard for them to really regain the initiative. It

in large part because of how the West has supported them in a really incremental manner. And time has just slipped away from the Ukrainians and they're going into another winter under constant aerial bombardment. And I suppose one final thing to say a thousand days in,

is just to kind of reiterate the resilience of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian leadership, which is not commented on enough these days. You know, when the full-scale invasion began, there was an outpouring of admiration and solidarity for the Ukrainian people and indeed President Zelenskyy.

And I think we almost take it for granted now, but it is harder to be resilient a thousand days in than it is 10 days in, because that's a thousand days of drone and missile strikes in Ukrainian towns and cities. That's a thousand days of Ukrainian men losing their lives on the front line. That's a thousand days of Ukrainian families being separated. And it is remarkable how much courage they continue to show.

I could not agree with you more. I saw some footage yesterday from, you know, tax on Odessa over the weekend. And it's like kind of watching, you know, something out of the Battle of Britain.

you know, through, through, through the blitz. And the Ukrainians have absorbed this, you know, day in, day out, week in, week out, as you say, for, for a thousand, a thousand days. And of course those attacks have moved or moved around. Um, but for the population, for the government, for the military, they have showed extraordinary resilience, uh,

And they do so for themselves, but we should not underestimate the degree to which it is in our collective interest that they do so. And that is why I continue to find it so deeply galling that we are not willing to back them sufficiently. And through that resilience, they can, I think, have every right to continue to feel pretty let down, despite all of the support we've provided. It's

It's come with too many conditions and has come in too iterative a manner for my taste. Major General Rupert Jones, we always appreciate your time. Thank you so much for joining us today on Frontline. A pleasure, James. Thank you.

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