Iranian ballistic missiles have entered the Ukraine War chat
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On Tuesday this week, the Pentagon said it's confirmed that Iran has given a number of close-range ballistic missiles to Russia. Washington says it's not sure exactly how many rockets are being handed over to Moscow, but the Defense Department assesses that Russia could begin putting them to use within a few weeks, leading to the deaths of even more Ukrainian civilians.

One has to assume that if Iran is providing Russia with these types of missiles, that it's very likely that it would not be a one-time good deal, that this would be a source of capability that Russia would seek to tap in the future, Pentagon Press Secretary, Air Force Major General Pat Ryder told reporters on September 10th. That same day while visiting London, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the new supply of Iranian missiles allows Russia to use more of its own longer-range ballistic missiles for targets that are farther from the front line.

So let's talk about what, if anything, changes in this war after this latest weapons transfer and where the Russian-Iranian partnership is headed. Welcome to the Naked Pravda. Howdy, folks. I'm your host, Kevin Rothrock, the managing editor of Meduza's English Language Edition. Welcome back to the show. We disappeared again for the past two weeks. Oops.

Yours truly got COVID for the second time, which threw a wrench in our little production schedule. For today's episode, I spoke to Dr. Nicole Graevsky, a fellow in the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She's also an associate researcher with the Belfer Center's project on managing the atom at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Graevsky's research focuses on Russian and Iranian policies, particularly on Russian nuclear strategy, Iran's nuclear decision-making, contestation of the non-proliferation regime, and nuclear deterrence.

Next February, she has a book coming out with Hearst Publisher titled "Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine." Hopefully we'll get her back on the show to talk about that once it's available. According to U.S. officials, dozens of Russian military personnel have already been trained in Iran to use the Fath-360 close-range ballistic missile system, which has a maximum range of 75 miles, about 120 kilometers. I asked Dr. Gryevsky if she thinks there's anything the general public should know about these weapons beyond their range.

Yeah, I mean, these are short-range systems. And so in contrast to the weapons that the Russians are getting from North Korea, which are more longer ranges, these are short-range. They're usually used for close contact. They have higher levels of precision. And so if you recall the April 14th attacks where Iran attacked Israel, they used a lot more of their longer-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. This is different in actually the family it comes from in terms of Iran's missile arsenals, one of the more advanced missiles.

variants of its weapon. And so I personally think that this weapon or missile was created in some ways to kind of adhere to some guidelines, actually, that wouldn't put Iran under as much scrutiny because of the range and like the payload. So this is the missile technology control regime. Yes. Initially, there were reports that Russia was going to receive a longer range missile from the similar family called the Zolfagor. And that has like around 700 kilometer range.

But this is very short range. It's 120 kilometers max. I think that this was a conscious decision on the side of the Iranians because had they violated what was category one of the missile technology control regime, which really covers missiles that are over 300 kilometers, but also 500 kilograms of payload. And so this is much smaller, much more compact, and also is a shorter range.

The Missile Technology Control Regime, the MTCR, is an informal political understanding. Doesn't that sound so polite? Among 35 member states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The regime was formed in 1987 by the G7 industrialized countries, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA.

Russia has participated in this informal understanding since 1995. The MTCR distinguishes two categories of controlled items. The first includes missiles and drones with a range of 300 kilometers, about 190 miles or more, and a payload of 500 kilograms, about 1,100 pounds or more. And the understanding prohibits these items from being transferred to other states. Ready-made components of items like engines, control systems, and software also fall under transfer restrictions.

The second category covers everything else, divided into 18 sections with notes and exceptions outlining under what conditions a missile or its technology can be exported. The MTCR is not a treaty and does not impose any legally binding obligations on its partners.

Do you think they're a violation of the MTCR, this regime we've been talking about, or is that... They're a violation, I think, of Category 2, which covers weapon systems that may... They're not as complete or as, I guess, dangerous as Category 1. But the drones also fell under Category 2, and that was an argument that a lot of European governments made. And so I think Iran's decision was actually...

kind of calculated to do that. And do you trigger worse consequences if you violate category one versus category two? Like what's the incentive? Well, so Iran's not a member of the MTCR, but the Iranian nuclear deal had MTCR provisions that basically restricted what Iran could export up until October 2023.

And that embargo expired in October 23, but then the U.S. and the U.K. and France and Germany and the European Union extended those sanctions and these embargoes.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, or just the Iran Deal, is an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program reached in July 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA, plus Germany, together with the European Union. In a nutshell, Iran agreed to halt its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

In 2018, however, President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the pact and imposed a new round of heavy sanctions on Iran, after which Iran announced that it would no longer abide by the deal's obligations. So Iran's technically still constrained under that sense.

But I think Iran was worried that this would trigger more sanctions and the snapback provision, which would reimpose all the UN sanctions on Iran if they exported category weapons. And you mentioned the drones. How do you say this? Shahed 129s? Yeah, Shahed 129s.

Oh, and the 136 as well. And that's just, these are just different models of these loitering munitions? Yeah. And so you said those were also, should I talk about that in the past tense? Is that transfer done or is that ongoing? Well, I mean, Iran violated it and has violated it with some of the stuff that they provide the Houthis. Yeah.

But it wasn't as, I guess, like escalatory as providing a long range or mid range ballistic missile system, which would be under category one. But that was part of the rationale, actually, for the European Union and the U.S. to extend sanctions on Iran after the embargo expired. I mean, these are a lot of like technical loopholes or kind of technical terms, but it's important in terms of like what the reaction would be and how Iran kind of anticipated this reaction to be calibrated. Do you think these distinctions are important?

from a sanctions perspective or from a perspective of how the West decides exactly to punish

Iran for what it's doing. Do you see the technical specifications as significant for what happens on the battlefield in Ukraine? Like, does this significantly change what Russia can or will do? I mean, I think it would improve Russia's ability to kind of overwhelm a lot of Ukrainian defense systems. And it also gives Russia this comparative advantage that these are shorter range systems, they can do this with higher precision, and overwhelm and really exhaust Ukraine's like

air defense systems, which are already under quite a bit of strain. So it is, I think, a pretty significant move in terms of what Ukraine will experience on the battlefield.

A few days ago, as I'm recording this, Joe Biden was asked whether the U.S. would lift restrictions on Ukraine using long-range weapons for strikes on internationally recognized Russian territory. The president said his administration is working that out now, and an announcement about a policy shift here is expected any day. Until recently, many U.S. officials, including Biden and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, have supported restrictions on Ukraine's long-range strikes deep into Russia using American weapons, fearing that it would escalate the conflict.

That hesitancy has been eroding since this spring when Biden authorized Kiev to strike targets in Russia using American weapons, but only along the border near Kharkiv. Washington subsequently credited these strikes with halting Russia's latest offensive in the region. If the Biden administration, if it keeps going with removing restraints on weapons that are sent to Ukraine, are we going to see American-delivered weapons in Ukraine targeting Iranian-delivered weapons in Russia? Like, is it going to be kind of like...

the allies deliver weapons and then they fire at each other. And is that the future of the war? Well, I mean, the shot heads are kind of already part of this, right? And so Iran's been like involved in this war since, you know, autumn of 2022. And so, and in some ways, this is really helpful for the Iranians because they're able to get data online.

on a lot of these missile systems, or I guess drones, and then now potentially missile systems, and their operational use against Western components, Western armaments. So Iran benefits from that in that regard. But they also like are very excited about the fact that they can use their weapons against the West. I think for the Iranians, it's kind of like a pride thing as well.

And what are the factional politics in the Iranian leadership when it comes to going forward with this kind of collaboration with Russia? Like you mentioned that they're getting...

you know, valuable military information through whatever intelligence sharing occurs when these weapons transfers happen and they're getting national pride. But, you know, Iran just got a recently got a new president. What are the politics on the Iranian side beyond what you've already mentioned of like going forward with this? It's really interesting because I think this agreement was brokered under the previous Raisi administration. Reuters suggested in December 2023, which makes sense. I mean, Shoigu visited Iran a few months prior to that.

And a lot of these weapons actually are the Fatih family missiles were on display during his visit. And there's a photo of the IRGC Aerospace Force General pointing to these weapons and kind of showing them off to Shoigu.

So that's one really interesting component of it is that this happened prior to the new president who wants to ostensibly improve relations with the West and ostensibly get an agreement on some kind of sanctions relief. But also the internal like kind of military side of it, which is the IRGC Aerospace Force is the same organization.

branch of the IRGC that manages the drones and have been instrumental in providing the Russians with UAVs and training them and even being spotted in both Belarus and also in Crimea, training and supporting the Russians. So it's kind of a logical institutional extension of that, but with ballistic missiles. And what about Iran's military industrial production capacity here? Because I know that Iran's been under pretty severe sanctions for a long time now, and yet they're

yet they're exporting what appear to be fairly, I mean, sometimes they're advanced and sometimes they're more primitive. The drones, I guess, are less advanced, but these newer close-range ballistic missiles are nothing to shake a stick at. And so how capable is Iran of producing weapons that are like this? Iran's quite capable at low-cost production. Are the FAA 360s, you would describe them as low-cost missiles? I mean, they're definitely lower cost than what you would see from American or Western ballistic missiles.

And that's partly because Iran, you know, does a lot of this domestically, but also because that's by design. Iran has produced a lot of these shorter range ballistic missiles and armaments for its proxies.

And so like Houthis, the Houthis have had similar variants of related variants, not the same missile, but they've used that. I mean, Hezbollah has some of the Fateh family missiles. These have been in Syria. So Iran has a lot of, I guess, like production demands. And so they can do a lot of this at volume. And it's, you know, considerably less expensive for them. And actually with this particular missile, it's much more lighter. I mean, it's not as inexpensive as the drones, but it's...

but it's still comparatively lower in cost than a lot of the Western countries. And you tweeted the other day that you didn't think or you don't think that we would be seeing Iranian drones or ballistic missiles in Ukraine if Trump had not withdrawn from the Iran nuclear deal. What do you mean by that? Like, what's the logic there? Okay, so I mean, essentially, the withdrawal from the nuclear deal opened up

kind of the Russia-Iran relationship in many ways. I mean, they already had ties in Syria, and that's like really important in terms of thinking about military cooperation. But Iran became much more reliant on Russia. And Iran also experienced an internal shift where you see the kind of ascendance of hardliners like Raisi come to power and really build their whole presidency on closer ties with the Russians.

On top of that, and this was kind of alluded to earlier, is the drones would have been, if the United States was still kind of within the nuclear agreement, and if Iran hadn't kind of shifted closer to Russia, the drones and the ballistic missiles would have been under the JCPOA restrictions, at least up until October 2023. And so you wouldn't have seen like this kind of willingness. And also from that logic, it also comes that Iran may have improved their ties to the West. Yeah.

because of the JCPOA and because of the sanctions, really. And they wouldn't be in a situation where they're so hostile and their nuclear program's expanding and then they need the Russians and the Chinese. And how badly would you say Iran needs Russia today? I mean, like, how strong is the partnership? Is the information and weapons that they're sharing, does that suggest to you, like...

really deep trust? Is there a scenario where the United States or the West could pry them apart? Is that on the table at all, or would that require a complete... Yeah, I mean, the Russia-Iran relationship is interesting because there's quite a bit of compartmentalization. And I think within the military, especially the IRGC, there's an inclination for closer ties to Russia. I mean, Russia has a lot more advanced military technology, and Iran has been interested in that. But

But Iran really needs Russia more for the military angle of it and also this kind of solidarity on the world stage. And they also have similar concerns about protests and regime security. And I think the Russians and the Iranians have collaborated quite closely there. But like a few days before the ballistic missile news came out, I mean, the Russians and the Iranians were fighting over the Zangizar corridor and the Iranians were accusing the Russians of violating their interests and stabbing them in the back.

Earlier this month, the Iranian media reported that officials were taking diplomatic steps to convey their categorical opposition to a proposed transportation route intended to establish a land connection between mainland Azerbaijan and its territorial exclave located to the west, bordered by Armenia, Iran, and Turkey. Iranian officials fear that the Zangzir Corridor would eliminate Iran's access to Armenia. Instead, they've endorsed an alternative route that would connect Azerbaijan's two regions via northern Iran.

along the Iranian side of the Aras River. So there's still a lot of mistrust domestically towards the Russian, but that's usually located amongst reformists or so-called reformist more moderate factions because they view Russia as precluding closer ties with the West for them.

In January this year, the Wall Street Journal cited multiple U.S. officials who said Russia was planning to acquire short-range ballistic missiles from Iran to enhance Moscow's ability to strike key infrastructure in Ukraine. According to the Wall Street Journal, American officials said Moscow's desire to acquire Iranian missiles was evident in mid-December 2023 when a Russian delegation visited an Iranian training area to observe ballistic missiles and related equipment displayed by Iran's

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force. That was the first time the Russian delegation's visit had been disclosed. It happened a few months after a September trip by then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to the headquarters of the IRGC Aerospace Force in Tehran, when Shoigu observed a display of several short-range missile systems.

Are you aware of any factional politics on the Russian side? I know that you previously noted that it was sort of strange that Shoigu was playing the lead role in the delegation that visited Iran, despite the fact that Shoigu was sort of, you know, he was removed from the top of the defense ministry. Many people speculated that he'd been demoted, but...

It's not entirely clear who's steering the bus now. What do you see? Do you see any... Is there debate about this within Russia's military leadership, or is it just sort of a consensus that Iran's our

or buddies? I mean, I think before the war, when Russia was a little bit more diverse in their opinions, or at least vocal about it, there were some dissenters on closer cooperation with Iran. The Shoigu visit, which I thought was really interesting, was because you see him with his own delegation sitting at the general staff headquarters for the Iranian military and sitting with the head of the Iranian general staff as if they're both

equals in terms of like agreements or in terms of kind of I'm in rank. And it is actually striking to previous images was when he was defense minister and he often goes there with military delegation. So I do think he's still playing a role in this relationship.

And I do think that maybe this still actually occurred when he was still a defense minister, too. So that seems a lot more logical, considering that the agreement may have been in December 2023. In terms of Russia getting these weapons from Iran, does that signal to you that they desperately need these weapons and without it, they would flounder, their advance or their ability to attack Ukraine would be significantly diminished? Like, you know, when you talk about military aid from Ukraine,

Kiev's allies, that's essential to their ability to defend themselves, to maintain the war effort. Should we be thinking about it in similar terms when it comes to Russia getting weapons from abroad, or is that just a kind of like supplement to an already sustainable war machine? I think that the Shah heads were much more substantial and needed at a critical time when the Russian military was really having substantial setbacks. I think this is just going to

I guess, augment Russia's ability to have more of a decisive edge in operations. And it's just going to really...

strengthen their ability to kind of degrade Ukrainian defenses. It's not like it was, you know, in like October 2022, when Russia was really facing substantial setbacks. I mean, this is more about Russia kind of breaking through a lot of Ukrainian defenses. Okay. I had one last question. It's not really in the same spirit as a lot of these kind of technical questions I've been giving you. But I wonder, what is it like just from a personal standpoint to track Ukraine's

these issues? Because I mean, like, I find this is not my expertise or anything. So I only come at it kind of like here and there when there's a big headline about it. I mean, like weapons transfers, but also sort of the state of the Russian war machine and the Iranian war machine and so on and the American war machine. Are you pessimistic about the kind of general trajectory of the arms trade and the way that alliances sort of sustain or discourage

conflict or do you feel like the world's moving in an okay direction? Like what's your, what's your sentiment? Well, I mean, it's really hard to study both Russia and Iran and to suggest that the world's going in a great direction. I mean, I think that both countries are, um, their trajectory, they're incredibly grim. And so it was just, you know, seeing war not only in Ukraine, but also throughout the Middle East. I mean, the Russians and Iranians are still pretty active in Syria. And then also of course, um, Israel and Gaza are

But I mean, there's a lot of strange things about both the Russians and the Iranian military industrial complex. But the Iranians do come up with new weapons that are essentially the same weapon almost every day. Not every day, but very frequently, like almost on a monthly basis. And in some ways, it's somewhat just...

I guess, strange to watch because they, and their namings of a lot of these systems are very bizarre. And I mean, it's interesting to think about how the Russians actually deal with them at times because the Iranians are very much egotistical when it comes to a lot of their weapons and their equipments. And they'll make these videos and kind of highlight this with like techno music, whereas like the Russians tend to have really boring military videos that are just

like a missile firing. And so it's like interesting to think about just like the institutional cultures and the way that they both think about their weapons. But other than that, I mean, it's not like enjoyable to do. So their military cultures are not similar? No, not at all. I mean, Iran has a really strange military. So they have Ar-Tesh, which is like a

I guess it would be their conventional army or their conventional military. And that has an air force, a ground force branch, and a naval branch. And then they have the IRGC, which is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. And they have a aerospace branch and they have a Quds Force, which is like kind of their like expeditionary paramilitary force that goes to other countries.

And then they have the ground forces and they also have the naval forces. And so there's like parallel structures within Iran, whereas Russia is just pretty much simply, you know, centralized military with certain branches. And so in that sense, it's kind of interesting because the IRGC Aerospace Force is really what's been pushing this cooperation. And the Air Force, for example, the Arteche or the Iranian Conventional Air Force will be getting the Su-35s, but they just don't have as much like connections or like

proximity to the Russians. So it's like interesting to think about it that way. Thanks for tuning in, folks. This has been The Naked Pravda, a podcast from Meduza in English. Remember that undesirable status back in Russia means our entire news outlet now relies on readers and listeners around the world to support our work. Please visit our website for information about how to become a contributor with one-time or recurring pledges. Thanks again. Until next week.

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