E64: Iran’s Proxies to Fight to Maintain Influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in 2022
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This is Overwatch, a podcast presented by the Institute for the Study of War. I'm Jacob Taylor. Iran-backed proxy militant networks played massive roles in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in 2021.

On this episode, ISW Research Director Matt McInnis sits down with ISW researchers Kat Lawler and Zach Coles to discuss what Iran's so-called "axis of resistance" may do in 2022. Kat and Zach will also offer insight into the challenges and opportunities facing the Iraqi and Lebanese governments. Thanks Kat and Zach for joining us today here on Overwatch. Hello. Thanks Matt, great to be here. So today we want to discuss the year ahead for Iran's axis of resistance.

So what's on their minds? What do we see new in 2021? And what should we expect to see from them in 2022?

So first, let's talk about the threat that Iran's proxies pose to the U.S. and our allies and other partners in the region, especially in Iraq and Syria. So what do we see from them in 2021? I can get us started. So 2021 saw the first Iranian proxy drone attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. And we saw the first of those in April. And

They continued large-scale rocket and drone attacks on US forces and facilities in Iraq and Syria through the end of July. By the end of July,

The United States announced the end of its formal combat mission in Iraq and announced that that combat mission would end by the end of 2021. So Iran's proxies in response announced a ceasefire, stopped all attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, and established a December 31st deadline for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq, which is not what the United States had promised.

And in the meantime, even as we didn't see any attacks in Iraq between July and October, we did see continued threats in Syria during that Iraqi pause from Iran's proxies. So we saw a large scale attack on TAMF in eastern Syria, which was probably the most significant. And that multiple drone and rocket attack against U.S. forces was likely intended to cause U.S. casualties there.

But in the meantime, in Iraq, Iran's proxies became more focused on internal power struggles, on Iraq's elections. One proxy group attempted to assassinate the Iraqi prime minister. And internal competition between proxy groups on how to approach government formation and how to approach ousting the United States from Iraq definitely grew in that time period.

And as we move into the new year, 2022, and that proxy deadline for the ouster of U.S. forces from Iraq is approaching and will have actually passed by the time this podcast goes out, we are expecting to see a resumption of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. However, attacks on U.S. forces are most likely to take place in eastern Syria. The Iraqi proxy groups will be involved, but they have their own domestic issues to resolve, including forming a government now that elections have taken place in

and passing a budget that preserves their influence in the Iraqi security forces. So I do expect to see harassing attacks in Iraq targeting the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, the U.S. consulate in Erbil, and U.S. advisory forces that are at various air bases in Iraq assisting Iraqi security forces. But the big changes in 2022 are going to be the resumption of attacks in

And the big concern looking into the new year is that U.S. defenses no longer appear to be sufficient to consistently prevent casualties. We don't have counter drone technology that is sufficient to consistently interdict Iranian proxy drone attacks. And we're reliant on intelligence to counter.

predict and interdict those attacks, like the one at TAMF in Syria that otherwise would have caused substantive U.S. casualties. And if Tehran calculates that a mass casualty attack would cause a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq or Syria, I do assess that they would attempt to conduct

one or more mass casualty attacks. Yeah, thanks, Kat. And that's certainly very concerning that we may see that type of escalation and potential U.S. casualties in the new year. So I know we'll be keeping a close eye on that. A lot of this seems to tie to some of the internal dynamics happening inside Iraq as well, which you mentioned. So this formation of a government in Baghdad after the elections in October is

The Iranian proxies really disputed those. They were very angry about the results. So what's the process to form a new government likely to look like? And how will the proxies play into that? Right. So Iran's proxies thought they were going to do much better in the October 2021 elections in Iraq than they actually did. They lost a fair number of seats and one of their primary Shia rivals, who's a nationalist Shia cleric, Mokhtar al-Sadr, actually lost his seat.

actually secured even more seats this time. So there's an ongoing dispute between Sadr and Iran's proxies over who gets to form a government and whether that government will be a national majority government by the winningest group or whether that government will be a more traditional coalition government that gives all of the actors a slice of the pie.

The most likely course of action in terms of government formation is definitely a coalition consensus government because excluding either Sadr or Iran's proxies could cause pretty extensive violence in Iraq. The classic Iraqi pattern is to basically choose a weak consensus prime minister that all of the parties think they can influence or control and then elevate that prime minister while divvying up the cabinet seats amongst themselves.

But that usually takes a really long time. Government formation often takes around six months from elections. And it could take even longer this time since it took two months just for the election results to be ratified by the federal Supreme Court as proxies disputed the viability of those election results. So the most serious point

point of contention for Iran's proxies is going to be Sauter, the winningest candidates, claims that he's going to rein in corruption and limit funding to the Iranian proxy-led popular mobilization forces. And that's a non-starter for Iran and its proxies. The proxy groups will absolutely move against Sauter and his allies if they think he's close to achieving that goal or limiting the influence of Iranian proxy militias in the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi state.

And Sadr's best chances to limit the authority of the popular mobilization forces was definitely the current prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, whose chances of remaining in government are increasingly slim. Iran's proxies actually attempted to assassinate Khadimi, possibly without Iran's approval, in November. And so Khadimi is at this point a non-starter for them in terms of remaining in government, and he's been the only one who's willing to actually stand up to Khadimi

the increasing influence of Iran's proxies within the security forces. Well, yeah, that's pretty concerning. So after government formation, what are you looking for later in the year if we, of course, have government formation? Right. So once a government forms in Iraq, anything could happen. COVID-19 is still a huge problem in the country. The grievances of Iraq's popular protest movement, which was anti-Iranian and anti-foreign interference, those grievances have not been addressed.

And Iran's proxies may become more willing to conduct large-scale and destabilizing attacks on remaining U.S. forces or on domestic political opponents after they've achieved their government formation goals. Some proxy groups were obviously willing to kill the commander-in-chief, Prime Minister Khadami.

And Iran may not have been involved in that decision. And that really signals a beginning of a new era for Iraqi politics and for the use of force in Iraqi politics. I think that attempted assassination demonstrates the new and increasingly destabilizing dangers that are posed by Iran's proxy network in Iraq and in the region. So you've hinted at some fault lines that Iran may be having with its proxies in Iraq. So

So what trends are you seeing there in the evolution of Tehran's relationship with its proxies there in Iraq, especially since the deaths in 2020 of Gossam Soleimani and Abu Mekhti al-Muhandis? I would say that Soleimani and Muhandis both had close personal relationships and a tremendous amount of influence with the myriad proxy leaders in Iraq.

They were really good at making those leaders feel heard by Iran. And in their absence, Iran hasn't been able to replicate that same degree of control

Iran's Iraqi proxies don't have the same objectives as one another. They never have, or the same preferred means for achieving their objectives. And often those objectives conflict. So when they conflict, there aren't the same de-escalation or mediation mechanisms that Mohandas and Soleimani provided. And Iran is having a harder time keeping all of its proxy groups in line and on message.

And the militias are having to contend with Iranian orders to escalate and de-escalate with the United States, but also with the demands of the militia's base supporters to be sort of the true and pure resistance to the supposed U.S. occupation.

And some groups are trying to maintain or increase their political holdings, which they absolutely failed to do in the October elections. So I would say there's three trends worth highlighting here that we saw over 2021 that I'm expecting to see continue into the new year.

One is the establishment and really the emergence of the Coordinating Committee for the Iraqi Resistance. It came to the fore in late 2020, and it appears to be Iran's attempt to reassert coordinated control over the Iraqi factions. So this group issues statements on behalf of Iraqi resistance groups, and it notably does not include Asif al-Haq, which has been one of Iran's

primary proxies in Iraq over the years. So Asi Bal Al Haq, AAH, it's really unclear if they declined to join in order to assert their independence from Iran, or if Iran decided that AAH's regular resistance to Iranian orders, and particularly Iranian ceasefires, meant that they were not trustworthy enough to be included in this coordinating body. The second trend is that

Khatib Hezbollah, which was Iran's arguably most loyal and effective proxy in Iraq, has really split following the death of its founder and leader, Mohandas. KH went through a major internal power struggle in 2021 that has left it less able to respond as a cohesive unit to Iranian directives. But Khatib Hezbollah still believes that it can and should lead the resistance groups in Iraq.

And that's causing tensions with those other groups. And then the third and most dangerous trend is that regular competition between Asif al-Haq and Khatib Hezbollah and some of the other proxy groups. So, AAH has conducted attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq after Iran has called for a ceasefire multiple times this year and has publicly snubbed the new IRGC Quds Force commander and the Iranian ambassador, who's also a very senior Quds Force official.

AAH is likely trying to paint itself as the true, pure resistance to the U.S. occupation, and it has always painted itself as more nationalist and less in line with Iran. But its unwillingness to comply with Iranian orders to de-escalate definitely risks dangerous and unintended escalation cycles between Iran and the United States in the coming year.

And so Iran might respond to these trends by empowering other more cohesive Iraqi groups. And I would say the two most obvious candidates for that are Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Katib Saeed al-Shahada. Both of those groups are historically more focused in Syria than in Iraq, and neither were closely involved with Iraqi elections this year. So they're out of the political scene a little bit more. And I know our team will be watching closely in the new year to see if

The IRGC Quds Force attempts to place either of those groups above the fragmenting Qatib Hezbollah or the unruly Asi Bahl al-Haq in order to reassert Iranian dominance and Iranian cohesion among its proxies in Iraq. Thanks, Kat. And that really does paint a challenging picture for Iraq and particularly Iran.

how these groups are going to evolve and pose new dangers not only to the United States but obviously to the Iraqi people themselves and the government there in Baghdad.

Thanks for the really great explanation on that. Zach, if we can move over to Lebanon for a bit. Obviously, you know, Beirut has been the hub for Iran's proxies for many decades, especially with Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanon itself is in the midst of an unprecedented economic collapse.

ongoing political deadlock, constant risk of a conflict between Iran and Israel. So, you know, I know you've been watching this closely. So how are things looking for Lebanese Hezbollah given all of these circumstances? Hezbollah's political arm is part of the Lebanese Governing Coalition at this point, the March 8th Alliance. So Hezbollah is going to likely be blamed for this dual set of political and economic crises that have been building in the last

the last year or two in the Lebanese economy and Lebanese state, voters are probably going to blame Lebanese Hezbollah and its political allies for the state's failures to address these crises. It's also creating a situation in which Hezbollah can't extract as much revenue from the state itself and can't

provide those vote-winning services that it often has used to generate support amongst its political constituencies. And other regional adversaries aligned against Hezbollah and Iran, Saudi Arabia in particular,

is leading the charge on this, have taken advantage of this economic catastrophe to pressure the Lebanese government with sanctions and other economic coercive tools to limit Hezbollah's influence within the state. So what would that mean for Hezbollah's electoral future given those pressures? So Hezbollah faces a challenging election in May. Its political allies in the March 8th alliance are showing signs of wavering. The coalition itself is demonstrating early signs of possible fragmentation.

The real threat here, though, is the greater the risk Hezbollah perceives to its political power and influence, the more erratic its behavior will become. It could resort to military means to retain this influence, or it could simply undermine the credibility of Lebanon's elections through classic mafia-style threats and coercion of voters and other political players in the country. And Hezbollah itself has already gone through a series of phases in its political evolution,

and its evolution as a political actor within the country. Most recently, though, it has tightly integrated itself with the state, being part of that governing coalition, holding seats in the government itself. That integration constrains as well as empowers Hezbollah. Its enemies can target Hezbollah by targeting the Lebanese state, like we've seen earlier this year with the Saudi-led coercion campaigns. But if it loses substantial ground electorally,

what is it left with? It's got fewer non-military means to project power and could possibly enter into a new evolutionary phase in which it reorients around pursuing long-term objectives through chiefly military means and also developing and nurturing that parallel state structure it's spent so long developing. It could also reorient itself completely away from Lebanese statecraft and towards preparing for a conflict with Iran's regional enemies, especially Israel.

Yeah, so that could be a real kind of back to the future of Philippine Hezbollah becoming more active militarily within the state, more overtly coercive within the state, so much as early days back in the Civil War. Very concerning. So how is Hezbollah preparing for its possible next conflict with Israel then? Well,

Back to the future indeed. There are some key differences here though compared to the last war. We've seen a lot of indications recently that Iran is importing shipments of precision guided munitions and other high-tech weaponry to Hezbollah, mainly through the land corridor in Syria but also through maritime routes. Iran has a distinct vision for the role Hezbollah would play in this next conflict.

And that is substantially different from the role Hezbollah found itself in the last time Hezbollah and Israel fought back in 2006. For example, Iran recently conducted a military exercise in which it simulated an attack on an Israeli nuclear facility. The missile that was used during the exercise, however, had a pretty short range, not something that could have been launched within Iran and likely the most powerful

promising location for that to be launched would have been inside Lebanon itself. That's really the only way this kind of attack would have been viable. But Hezbollah, as it's become more integrated into the state, its risk tolerance has changed for this kind of operation. Iran has had to learn that Lebanese Hezbollah will not always escalate in the way that Iran wants because Hezbollah has its own interests, its own support base, and its own objectives. Taking this back, though,

If Hezbollah becomes detached from those political realities, if it loses in May, we may see a dangerous shift back towards a more risk-tolerant behavior and a willingness to be a literal launchpad for these Iranian-directed attacks on Israel. So the weapons that Hezbollah has acquired are intended just basically to raise the cost for Israel of sustaining a conflict.

And Hezbollah stores those munitions in locations that Israel knows would be politically damaging to strike, under schools and hospitals in Lebanon. They're banking on an Israeli and generally global unwillingness to allow for massive civilian casualties in the event of a provincial conflict. So in combination with a years-long amassing of less sophisticated rockets in Lebanon by Hezbollah presents a pretty deadly situation for Israel.

Israel. Iran and Hezbollah could begin such a conflict by oversaturating Israel's airspace with less sophisticated rockets and missiles, which would overwhelm Israel's air defenses and allow these precision guided munitions to hit critical targets within Israel itself. It does paint a pretty

scary picture potentially. So looking forward to the coming year, what are the odds that we'll see such a regional conflict break out? It's hard to put a definite percentage on it, but there are a lot of potential triggers that we're watching for in the coming year, including in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iran itself. Israel could decide to strike Iran's nuclear program

Alternatively, Iran could miscalculate its escalations against US forces in Iraq and Syria. JCPOA negotiations could collapse in some spectacular fashion.

Really, no actor wants a regional war this year, but a confluence of those factors could start one without careful calculation on all sides. Yeah, obviously we're very worried about any of these triggers escalating into a larger regional conflict, if not this year, then perhaps in 2023.

And so, Kat, from your perspective, what are you seeing that's worrying you the most this upcoming year? I would say that in some areas, Iran's axis of resistance is increasing its sophistication. It has these new drones and other higher tech weaponry that could inflict greater damage on Israel, on the United States, on U.S. partners and allies in the region than it ever has before. But

It's also missing some of its coordinating components, especially in Iraq, that could lessen

efficacy of the axis of resistance to achieve Iran's strategic objectives. And so that tension between greater capabilities, but also possibly less coordination among some of its core groups will be the crux of what I'm attempting to assess in the coming year. And I'm most concerned about that lack of cohesion leading to unintended or uncalculated escalations.

But the intended escalations are equally dangerous. And the threat of U.S. casualties in Iraq and Syria is also something that is on my mind as we move into 2022. Well, thanks, Kat. And thanks, Zach. You've posed some very important questions and raised some

interesting analysis for insight into what we may be seeing in the coming year. Obviously, there's a lot on the plate for the Biden administration and for the U.S. Department of Defense as it looks at these threats. But again, thanks for all the work that you do here. And we look forward to hearing from you more as these issues progress. Thanks, Matt. Happy New Year. Thanks for having us.

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