Deep Dive
Shownotes Transcript
I'm Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Welcome to the China Global Podcast.
The waters as well as the rocks, reefs, and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants, China and the Philippines, over Second Thomas Shoal, which is a submerged reef in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren'ai Jiao.
In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef.
And since then, the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of Marines. In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it.
Beijing does not recognize the ruling, however, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines. Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines' routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre.
On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino Navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish.
Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.
To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China's approach to the South China Sea, I am joined today by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School's Paul Tai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia. Thanks so much for joining us, Feng. Great to be with you, Bonnie. Can you help us understand why the South China Sea is so important to China?
We've had various observers emphasize energy security or sovereignty issues or territorial integrity. What's the single most important Chinese interest in the South China Sea?
Well, I think the South China Sea is first and foremost a sovereignty issue for China. In the current standoff with the Philippines over the second Tom's show, for example, Beijing frames this as a sovereignty conflict. But I think it will be useful to view China's interests in the region as dynamic and evolving.
Sovereignty certainly provides the basic framework that structures Chinese thinking, but it is often entwined with other interests. And as an analytical matter, I think the relative importance of these interests is often determined by situational dynamics. So, for example, over the past decade, from 2009 to 2012,
China's assertion for sovereignty was connected with its quest for great power status. As you remember, during that period, China was keen to demonstrate its arrival as a great power in the region and to show that its interests could no longer be ignored.
But then, since China started island building in late 2013, I think security has become a more important interest. And this security interest has at least three interrelated aspects. I think the first is a desire to have a degree of strategic control over the South China Sea,
in order to keep the sea lines of communication open. And second is, I suppose it's purely military. I think the intention here is to create a strategic bastion for its submarine fleet and to eventually break out of the first Iron Chain from Japan to the Philippines. And these two aspects are connected to the third aspect, which is becoming growingly important,
and that is contingency planning regarding Taiwan. Now, many military experts doubt the utility of the artificial islands in actual conflict, but I think the islands and their military infrastructure, alongside improved submarine capabilities, will at least complicate the planning of potential adversaries.
In the last decade, China's activities in the South China Sea have caused, I think, greater friction with its neighbors. And you mentioned the island building, there was the militarization of the islands, and then harassment of various fishing, energy exploration operations by other claimants that were operating in disputed waters.
And so we've seen friction with almost all of the other claimants, and not only with the claimants, but also with ASEAN overall, where progress has really slowed on negotiating a code of conduct with the organization. So some experts have argued that China's overstepped a bit.
and that it has damaged relations with its neighbors, even, of course, as it has sought to defend its own sovereignty and security interests. Do you agree with this? I mean, has China pushed these claimants and its neighbors to pursue a more active balancing strategy?
Right. That's a complex question. I think the answer really depends on how China views its core interests in the South China Sea. If Beijing prioritizes sovereignty and maritime rights above all else, then they probably don't see themselves as out-stepping. But
If good neighborly relations and regional stability are considered more important, then yes, they have gone too far. So as I see it, the crucial issue here is how China defines its national interest in the South China Sea. Is sovereignty paramount? What about political and diplomatic relationships? And maybe there are other ways to frame their national interest.
So I think this raises a deeper question for Beijing, which is, have they developed a sound conception of China's natural interest in the region? This is a very tricky question, but it directly affects their policy goals.
So here we are essentially evaluating China's strategy towards South China Sea. And when we talk about strategy, we usually talk about both goals and means. And for China, it's a delicate balancing act on both fronts, and it's been very challenging for them. And other states' responses are,
I'm not sure if balancing is the best description. The Philippines might be the closest example, but even there, we need to be careful.
Different administrations have responded to China in very different ways. Just look at the contrast between Duterte and the Marcos. And I wouldn't say Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia, I wouldn't say they are adopting a balancing strategy. Their approaches are usually described as hedging. That is to say, they are reluctant to pick sides.
Well, since you mentioned the Philippines, let's talk more about Philippines' relationship with China and what's taking place at Second Thomas Shoal. Obviously, there were some understandings that were reached between Beijing and Manila under former President Duterte. President Marcos has not followed those understandings.
And I think both countries have different views as to what should take place, how the situation should be managed around Second Thomas Shoal.
So how do you analyze the main causes of the confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal? And why is it that China really started aggressively blocking the Philippines rotation and resupply operations to its Marines when for so long it had allowed those operations to take place?
Right, so from China's perspective, the immediate issue is that the Marcos administration has broken what they call a gentleman's agreement. This is a tacit understanding that existed between Duterte, that existed under Duterte and also initially under Marcos.
And this was the understanding that as long as the Philippines gave China prior notification about resupply missions, and as long as they didn't bring construction materials to reinforce the Sierra Madre, China would not interfere. And the larger problem, I guess, from China's perspective is that President Marcos is overambitious.
He's trying to change the status quo established during Duterte's time by publicly reasserting Philippine sovereignty. He has adopted, as we know, a high-profile international diplomacy. He's basically attempted to internationalize the dispute and shame China on the global stage. And at the same time, he's leveraging
the US-China rivalry to gain strong American support in these territorial disputes. And this approach doesn't sit well with Beijing. And why is China blocking the resupply missions? Now, many commentators focus on the tactical aspect. That is to say, without the resupplies, the Sierra Madre would eventually collapse.
But I think there might be a more principled reason, principled from China's perspective. China considers the Second Times Show its own territory, so it objects on principle to a foreign country supplying a foreign warship on China's territory.
But of course, that doesn't explain why for so long they allowed these resupply operations to take place. And it really has only been
recently that they have been acting very aggressively. And it's interesting that Bloomberg recently reported that the Philippines has now repaired the Sierra Madre sufficiently to last another decade. How do you think Beijing will react to that?
Well, I think this probably would not come across as a surprise to China. Look, the Sierra Madre was grounded in 1999, so it's almost 25 years since their time. And the fact that it has not collapsed,
must have reminded the Chinese that the Philippines has periodically succeeded in reinforcing the warship. So I wouldn't say it would be a surprise to them. The question is about the future, what it's going to do in a future tug-of-war with the Philippines over the Sierra Madre, we'll see.
So how does Beijing view the repeated statements by U.S. officials that the U.S. would honor its commitments under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, which it repeatedly says, of course, applies to the South China Sea?
And I was at the Shangri-La dialogue this past June when President Marcos gave his keynote address. And it wasn't in the speech, but it was in the Q&A afterwards that Marcos said if a Filipino soldier is killed, that would cross the Rubicon and likely be seen as an act of war. How do you think that China reacted to that?
Right. So first of all, on the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, I think China takes the treaty very seriously. But Chinese policymakers and analysts, they make a distinction between principled commitments and underground realities.
And to them, there is a large gray area in interpreting what could trigger the treaty. So in your introduction, you mentioned the incident on June the 17th. I think this incident is a good example of this.
This was, as we know, the most serious confrontation between China and the Philippines since the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012. And as we saw in the videos, some Chinese sailors carried axes and knives, although not firearms. And as you mentioned, one Philippine sailor was injured.
So, immediately after the incident, some U.S. commentators argued that this constituted an armed attack on Philippine public vessels, and this should trigger the treaty. But neither the Philippine nor the U.S. government saw it that way. I think they instead wanted to de-escalate.
So the Chinese view is probably that the U.S. security commitment to the Philippines is one thing, and the U.S. willingness to fight China over tiny rocks is quite another. And probably they don't think the U.S. has the appetite for that kind of conflict. And President Mark's statement, the Shangri-La Dialogue,
I think Beijing is likely to take its words with a grain of salt. First of all, as I mentioned, his microphone diplomacy has, I think, already cost him credibility in Chinese eyes. And second, the Rubicon statement will be taken, I think, as cheap talk because
The Philippines lacks the capability to fight China alone. Any war scenario would have to involve the United States. And China believes the U.S., as I mentioned, is unlikely to get involved in a conflict where it has little substantive influence.
That's fascinating that you think that the United States would not come to the Philippines aid. I think there are scenarios in which the United States would. For example, if the Philippines is unable to deliver supplies to their Marines on the shoal, I could imagine a scenario in which the U.S. Navy escorted in
The Philippines boats that carry the supplies. And you may have seen there have been a few articles recently by some Americans. I think Oriana Mastro was one and Craig Singleton, another one that advocated that the United States actually play a more
forward-leaning role and become more involved in demonstrating its resolve and willingness to support the Philippines. So I'm not saying the United States is looking for a conflict. Clearly the United States does not want to see a conflict, but I do think that there is a potential for a scenario in which the Philippines
actually invokes the treaty and the United States responds positively. So I wonder if Chinese experts who
claim that the U.S. won't come to the Philippines aid or somehow suggest the Philippines is a puppet of the United States or the U.S. is trying to draw China into a military confrontation? Is there maybe a misunderstanding or misestimation of what the United States wants?
would really do? And are these assumptions about U.S. willingness or unwillingness to intervene, do you think they're held at higher levels in Beijing? Right. Bonnie, this is a really important question.
I hope to describe accurately what I understand the views and the assessments of Chinese analysts. Well, first of all, regarding U.S. action, I think, first of all, we could distinction between different types of U.S. actions here. And most
First of all, most, if not all, Chinese analysts believe the U.S. has significant influence over the Philippines. And the question is, how is this influence being used? And they consider two main types of scenarios. One is the U.S. encouraging the Philippines to challenge China.
And the other is the U.S. pressuring the Philippines to de-escalate when things get too tense. So what's interesting to me is that many Chinese analysts see the U.S. doing both. They believe the U.S. is happy for the Philippines to cause trouble for China, but only up to a point, not enough to trigger a major conflict. So
I think that experienced Chinese policymakers and analysts have a good grasp of the situation on the ground and the complex interplay among the Philippines, China, and the U.S. Of course, I can see dangers here. This doesn't rule out the possibility of miscalculation or misjudgment.
And those risks are always present in any conflict situation. And I would reference the article you mentioned, the master article at the New York Times. I do see, you know, I'm not sure if I agree with her, but I can see a dangerous dynamics at play here.
This is that both sides believe the other doesn't want to fight in the South China Sea. And this could lead to aggressive behavior because one side might think the other won't dare escalate. And if both countries follow this logic, it's only a matter of time before a new incident triggers something more serious, maybe even a regional war.
That's why I think de-escalation and self-restraint from all the parties are crucial. The provisional agreement between Beijing and Manila has not been made public. And the readouts from those two capitals is somewhat contradictory. The Chinese claim that
that the Philippines agreed to prior notification of the resupply operations and inspection of the cargo of the boats that are carrying supplies to the Marines on 2nd Thomas Shoal. And the Philippines has denied that they agreed to those two things and also claimed that in the recent resupply operation on July 27th that there was no inspection of the cargo even though China claimed that there was.
How do you interpret the actual understanding that was reached and why do you think that China came out publicly and said something that they knew the Philippines would deny? Which makes me concerned again that this agreement is going to actually hold for long. Absolutely.
First of all, my understanding about the new agreement is that this probably resembles the previous agreement.
gentlemen's agreement under Duterte, there will be of course differences and I can see one difference is that the previous agreement was verbal and based on test understanding. This one seems to have a text, although neither side has released the text.
And it's a very hard question to ascertain which version of the agreement, the Chinese version or Philippines version, is plausible. But I know, you know, I mean, I can see some plausibility in the Chinese version because
it's unlikely that China would allow resupply missions with no conditions attached. As we know, Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasized that no resupply of construction materials is the bottom line for China. But actually, I think what's really interesting, to me at least, is that it's possible to reconcile the two versions.
It may be that the written agreement doesn't include the conditions, but China conveyed these conditions verbally and the Philippine side understand what it has to do in practice. And so this would allow both sides to say what they want to say to their domestic and international audiences.
Anyway, that's my interpretation. And as for the mission that you mentioned on July 27th, the most recent one, again, if we, you know, if we...
put some plausibility into Chinese version, then most likely the Philippines gave prior notification so there was no need for Chinese vessels to inspect Philippine vessels. And it's also likely that this time the mission didn't carry construction materials since the Philippine side, since their announcement, made no mention of such materials.
I think it was last month that there was an article published by the former head of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Hainan, Wu Shizhun. And he argued in that article that China should set a deadline for the Philippines to remove all of its forces, take them off of the Sierra Madre.
and said that if the Philippines then doesn't comply, that China should block delivery of supplies and force the Marines off the reef and then destroy and remove the Sierra Madre. It was very specific in laying out a course of action that China should pursue to resolve this territorial dispute once and for all.
I found it rather surprising. I've read articles of course by other experts in China who are not quite that hawkish, so I imagine there's a bit of a debate. Do you think it's likely that that kind of suggestion that has been put forward by Wu Shicun would be adopted? Maybe you can talk a little bit about the
the debate or the parameters of debate in China about what to do regarding Second Thomas Shaw. Yeah, very interesting. Well, first of all, regarding Dr. Wu's statement, you know as well as I know that Dr. Wu has a reputation for being provocative. And this isn't his first controversial statement.
We just need to remember that he's not a government official and he's expressing his personal views. And whether China would actually follow such a drastic course of action, I think it will very much depend on how the situation evolves. Right now,
We have a temporary agreement in place, and the first mission under the agreement was completed without incident. So there's no immediate need for China to take such extreme measures. I think in general, China tends to avoid highly escalatory moves like the one Wu is suggesting. My understanding is that China prefers to keep situations under control,
It likes to have options. It's not a big risk taker. And apart from Dr. Wimsel, I have not seen anyone else making such recommendations. We talked a little bit about the risk of conflict over second time of Shoal.
How high do you think it is? Do you think if there were like an accident or a... President Marcos has certainly said if a Filipino soldier was killed, that he implied he would invoke the treaty. So that could lead to U.S. involvement. So that's certainly one scenario.
There could be other scenarios as well. It could just be China-Philippines, but again, could involve the United States. Do you think if there were such an accident that it would necessarily escalate into something more serious and serious?
Do people in China understand that there really is, at least in my view, there is a growing risk of conflict? You may disagree, but I think I'm of the view that the risk of some kind of accident in the South China Sea over the shoal is actually more serious than a near-term risk of an accident or conflict in the Taiwan Strait. So what's your view on this?
Right. I do not necessarily disagree with Yvonne here. I'm just, you know, going back to some of the earlier comments we made, I think you could argue that Chinese analysts may be underestimating the risk here and underestimating the resolve of
of the US to get involved here. It may or may not be the case. But the immediate future at the moment, the risk, I think, of conflict over the second term is low. As I said, as noted, the two countries have reached an agreement and we'll see how long it will hold. And I think at least...
In the near term, I think the incident on June 17th is kind of wake up call for three parties, the Philippines, China, the U.S., and I think they all recognize the need for a period of de-escalation to cool things down. But as you pointed out, I think the situation remains delicate.
The agreement is only temporary and the tensions could flare up again if any side feels the others are not adhering to its terms. And as you know, the real test will come if there's another incident or if one side decides to push the boundaries of the current agreement. And that's entirely possible.
So that leads me to my final question about whether you've thought of ways to stabilize and de-escalate this situation at Second Thomas Scholl. And is this a
something we can only manage effectively, or are there really ways to reach a final resolution? I know that China has put forward the idea of the Philippines removing its Marines, the Sierra Madre from the Shoal,
Frankly, even if that were possible, there's great concern in the Philippines and in the United States that China would occupy the Shoal and then do island building and militarization just as they did on the other features 10 years ago. So there's a lot of distrust between the parties.
So is this something we can only manage? And if so, how? Or is there a final resolution that can be pursued? Yeah, right now I can't see any solution to resolving the dispute.
in the immediate future. I think in the near to immediate term, this is only an issue to be managed rather than resolved. And the Sierra Magia, this is difficult because it's essentially a time bomb. As long as it's there, you will be a source of trouble and be a source of tension between China and the Philippines.
Two countries are basically locked in a very uncomfortable tug-of-war reef. And my sense is that China probably will not
tolerate this indefinitely. So in the short term, something like the agreement with the previous gentleman's agreement or the new temporary agreement, I think can help manage the conflict. But for lasting peace, China and the Philippines will need to come up with a political solution. I don't know what that will look like. I think the basic idea would be to let
friendly relations, dissolve territorial disputes. But as we all know, it's veritable order. You will acquire wisdom from both sides and certainly encouragement from the U.S.,
And unfortunately, such wisdom is sorely lacking to national politics these days. And another approach could be a multilateral agreement. You mentioned the Code of Conduct in your introductions. So something like the Code of Conduct that China and the ASEAN states are negotiating. But that's also more about managing.
conflicts than resolving them. And unfortunately, there isn't much momentum behind those talks right now.
Ultimately, in the long term, stabilizing the situation, I think, will require a shift in how both countries view their interests in the South China Sea. That will be difficult. But until then, we are likely to see a cycle of tension and temporary de-escalation.
We've been talking with Zhang Feng, who's a visiting scholar at Yale Law School's Paul Tai China Center. Thanks so much for joining us, Feng. Really appreciate your analysis. Thank you very much, Bonnie, for having me.