Malaysia’s Path in a Contested Asia
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Welcome to the Asia Chessboard, the podcast that examines geopolitical dynamics in Asia and takes an inside look at the making of grand strategy. I'm Andrew Schwartz at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Welcome back to the Asia Chessboard. I'm Mike Green. My co-host, Jude Blanchett, is not joining us because he said he lost power.

This is a geopolitics show, but I assume he means he lost electrical power, so it's just me, but I'm really delighted to be joined by Elina Noor to do a deep dive on Malaysia.

Alina is a senior fellow in the Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment, where she focuses on Southeast Asia for the impact of technology, dynamics of governance, nation building. She worked previously for the Asia Society Policy Institute, the Daniel K. Inouye Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Brookings. She is a graduate of Oxford University and the Security Studies program at Georgetown.

Welcome. Delighted to have you on and to really help us understand Malaysia. Oh, yes, excellent. Thanks for having me, Mike. It's a pleasure to be with you.

So we always start, as you probably know, by asking how you got here, not just at Carnegie, but focused on the international security of Southeast Asia and of Malaysia. I always feel like such a failure when I'm asked that question because I initially started out wanting to be a hugely successful international lawyer. And I quickly realized that all the paths that were open to me needed either some sort of connection or an immense amount of money.

at the entry level. And so I pivoted to joining a think tank and that sort of whetted my appetite for international affairs.

But in all honesty, I think it was really my parents, particularly my dad, who instilled in me, I didn't know it at the time, but when I was really young, he used to play the news incessantly on TV. And I found it hugely irritating because as a child, like who wants to watch the news or listen to the news, right? But I think it was his subconscious effort to try to get me interested in international affairs and what was going on in the world. And so it turns out,

My career path took me down the think tank world. Well, it obviously worked. Where did you grow up? I grew up in Malaysia. I was born and raised in Kuala Lumpur, which to me is a hugely exciting city. But maybe if you're a little more exotic and prefer nature, not so much. I like KL. So let's start with an overview of how the world looks for the Malaysian government, the strategic elite.

A little bit of a primer for our listeners on how you would describe Malaysia's strategic culture and view of the world, particularly right now in this era of competition. Malaysia's foreign policy trajectory has been, in my opinion, pretty predictable and steady despite the political shifts that we've seen, especially in the last few years.

Foreign policy conduct has almost been on an autopilot mode for the last few decades. At times when you've had really strong personalities like Mahathir Mohamad, of course, you've seen a more activist approach, at least at the rhetorical level.

Even when you've had quieter prime ministers, foreign policy in Malaysia has always really been centered on very vanilla-type principles, you know, non-interference, respect for international law, being friendly to all nations.

And that has continued under the Anwar Ibrahim government. Of course, the world has changed over the last few decades and we see an intensifying geopolitical competition. And so I think over the last 10 years or so, what Malaysia has sought to do has been to keep its head low most of the time.

And just try to navigate these tensions as best as possible while trying to advance what Putrajaya feels to be the country's best interests. So, you know, as Trotsky said, you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you. Or you may not be interested in geopolitics, but geopolitics is interested in you.

What are the threats that you think worry officials or foreign policy experts in KL? What worries people? You go to Hanoi, Tokyo, Seoul, and you ask that question, and you immediately get a list. But if you ask that question in KL, what worries officials most?

Yeah, you know, when I was working at KL, I used to get asked this question by visiting foreign delegations. And my answer was always nation building. The greatest threat or risk to Malaysia is the internal state of the country itself. And I think this is true of many post-colonial countries trying to build that sense of national identity. But a lot of that concern has been

overtaken in some part by the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China. And given Malaysia's foreign policy posture, I think Putrajaya's main preoccupation right now is just to try to get through these rough waters as calmly as possible, not antagonize any side, remain true to its foreign policy principles of being friendly with both sides, and really try to leverage in economic terms the

this competition. And that's what we've seen in the semiconductor chip industry. We've seen that with the on-shoring or friend-shoring policy that the US has taken, which Malaysia has sought to take advantage of. So I think right now,

Unfortunately, Putrajaya has woken up to this idea that it will have to try to balance its relations with these two powers and their friends on both sides, but also try to keep in focus what matters to Malaysia. That latter priority remains.

I am not so sure that Putrajaya itself has convinced the country of what those priorities should be for the long run. When you're talking about post-colonial states that spend decades preoccupied with nation building and internal resilience,

They're talking about the United States of America in the late 18th century. And some scholars like Fritz Zakaria in his first book argued the U.S. didn't really actually have that confidence or that nation-building resilience until the 1890s, over a century. But in Malaysia's case, how would you describe the state of the nation-building experiment? Is this a country that is, although not active strategically,

nevertheless a net exporter of security for Southeast Asia? Or do you see Malaysia's nation-building preoccupation as a sign that actually there are fissures and vulnerabilities where Malaysia might actually be more of a net exporter of uncertainty? How secure is this nation-building experiment? And what impact does it have on Malaysia, even if it's not in an activist, farm-palsy way? What impact does this nation-building struggle or effort have

on Malaysia's ability to at least be an anchor of stability in Southeast Asia. 'Cause there is, let's face it, there is a lot of drama in Malaysian politics. - Yes, there is. As a Malaysian, I can't keep up at times, most of the time. But yeah, as you were saying, Margaret, the United States has had a few centuries benefit of the nation building experience, and it seems like it's still a work in progress in the United States.

And I would say that Malaysia, you know, having just achieved independence in 1957 and only just coming together with the states of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo in 1963, is still very much early in that experience.

And so, yes, there are massive fissures in race relations that have still gone unresolved. And in domestic politics, there's always this mantra of the three R's, race, religion and royalty, that are hugely sensitive and sometimes taboo issues. And you see these three R's playing up in any election, whether it's by-elections or general elections that are held.

And I think this undercurrent of communalism in Malaysia has fortunately been confined to just the national scene. It hasn't really projected itself on the international stage.

Where it has, I think, played a part is in Malaysia's astute adherence to this principle of non-interference that China also happens to share. And both Beijing and Putrajaya understand that these are hugely contentious issues for their local constituencies.

And any indication that China, for example, might want to exploit in terms of these communal frictions in Malaysia is seen as a huge red flag in the bilateral relationship. And China has always understood that to its credit. But I think at times in Malaysia, particularly in the heat of elections running up to a certain date,

You've seen that China has become the bogeyman for race relations in Malaysia. It always struck me that the most vocal advocates of pan-Asianism, of the idea that Asian values are different from Western values, championing of non-interference in internal affairs, the loudest voices on that historically were Prime Minister Mahathir and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.

the leaders of multi-religious, multi-ethnic states that don't have a clear identity. And I always thought this manifestation of Singapore and Malaysia's foreign policy identity was an expression of insecurity about a sort of coherent national identity at home. Is that fair? And if it is, is it still true? That's really interesting. I hadn't thought of it that way. I'm not...

Sure, it could be a measure of insecurity, but I think that insecurity is warranted in this case because we've seen, particularly in Malaysia with the 1969 racial riots, that trauma still lives on. That was during my parents' generation. And this is just one personal story, but my mother still has...

huge anxiety whenever there is any talk or sense that race relations are deteriorating to a level that might incite violence. And so I think a lot of Malaysians, particularly older generation, still hold on to that fear and worry that the country could be torn apart once again.

It's so interesting what you said about Beijing being careful not to trigger Malaysian anxiety about ethnic politics or China interfering in ethnic politics, because in other countries, Beijing is exhibiting no such caution. You look at Canada, Australia, the US, maybe it's just Western democracies, but the interference and effort to sort of get into the diaspora and get into the communities to shape policy, to blunt things like AUKUS,

Security Technology Agreement among the US, Australia and UK to go at Canada. I mean, very aggressive. But what you're telling me is maybe the history of Malaysia is well understood, but there is no such kind of united front activity or effort to shape the diaspora or control

Chinese language media or other things, you don't see much evidence of that. Is there discipline in the Chinese approach? There's certainly been attempts, not in the same concerted manner as we've seen in other countries, for example.

But I think there is a special understanding, and maybe in Malaysia we take this for granted vis-a-vis Beijing, that there are certain boundaries that should not be crossed. And this quote-unquote special relationship that we sometimes in Malaysia think we share with Beijing may or may not be true, but when you hear on the Chinese side that

Words like, oh, we still remember when Tun Razak, the nation's Malaysia's second prime minister, how well he treated China at a time of political and international isolation. We in Malaysia feel that there is something more to that understanding beyond just pragmatism.

How is the debate in KL or in Malaysia more broadly about China? You know, there are debates about China. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies surveys suggest that in most of Southeast Asia, there's growing anxiety about China. But what's the nature of the debate? Is there a recognition that China is a security challenge the way you have a very clear shift in the Philippines, for example? Is there anything even approaching that or is it

really more case of not wanting to worry about it or a sense that Malaysia has the relationship with China to control? What's the nature of the debate about the China challenge? Or is it seen as a challenge? It's certainly seen as a challenge, but I think how sharp that challenge is depends on who you speak to in the Malaysian landscape. Obviously, if you're going to be speaking to the defense security folks, there's a real concern that China is just going to run roughshod over everyone else in the South China Sea the way it has the Philippines.

Malaysia has been fortunate in that it's further south in the South China Sea, that it hasn't had to confront China in the way that the Philippines has. But we all know that China has really been testing Malaysia in its presence, its continued presence in and around the EEZ. But I think there's also a real sense of pressure

and opportunity in terms of the economic and investment relationship, more the trade relationship than the investment front. And so there is a lot of hope that China will continue to be this leader

true friend, as Anwar Ibrahim said, to Malaysia in terms of the economic relationship. China has been Malaysia's largest trading partner for the past 15 years. You know, some countries get pandas. Malaysia gets to export fresh durian to China. And so, you know,

In a sense, I think that speaks a lot about the relationship, that there are particularities about that economic relationship that Malaysians are banking on, particularly in a post-COVID era where the Anwar Ibrahim government has to prove to the people that it can deliver. How do you interpret this fascinating case when Lakhdar came back to power?

and pulled out of the agreement with Beijing on this massive development project and then negotiated a better deal. To me, that was, you know, you could look at that as a really quite brilliant negotiating strategy by Dr. Mahathir,

Or maybe it was reactive and domestic. How do you characterize or describe that? Who knows what goes on in the mind of Mahathir Mohamad, right? So I don't know if there was a predetermined negotiation strategy to eventually drive the price down to, what was it, like a 30% cut from the original cost figure. But that's what happened. Honestly, I think both sides were keen on the project taking place. But the...

costs were really too high. And of course, there were allegations of corruption. And so eventually what Malaysia got was a better deal. And when Premier Lee Chiang visited Malaysia in June this year, they launched the ECRL,

It's a great fanfare. You'll have to spell out the acronym for the acronym loving Washingtonians in our audience. Yes. Oh my goodness. Sorry, I got your question. Yeah. Let me think. I think it's the Eastern Corridor Rail Link, if I'm not mistaken. And is that a Belt and Road project?

Yes, so it's supposed to be a belt and road project, but I worked on the BRI very early on at its conception and Malaysia's participation in it. And one of the difficulties, of course, is trying to figure out what projects fall under the category of the BRI, because some are private sector led and some are joint with government projects.

But I think by all intents and purposes, the ECRL is supposed to be a BRI project. Is Malaysia attracted to or signing on to any of China's other big initiatives, the Global Security Initiative, Global...

development initiative, global civilizational initiative? Do those resonate or have attraction or even public support? So before I answer that, let me just pause and say the ECRL is the East Coast Rail Link. So it connects the east coast of

Too many acronyms. I know. GFI, GBI. Speaking of acronyms. Chinese and Indian. Malaysia was an early supporter of the Global Development Initiative, which is not surprising really because...

Putrajaya, as I mentioned, has always been very keen on development projects, infrastructural projects, anything to kickstart the economy. On the GSI, the Global Security Initiative, there hasn't, to my knowledge, been explicit support of it, but there are principles in there that I don't think...

Putrajaya is opposed to. So far as regional peace, stability and prosperity can be advanced, that's something that Malaysia can get behind. That doesn't mean that Malaysia is fully behind the concept of the GSI per se, but as with many other Chinese proposals, if the principles align with Malaysia's foreign policy interests, then sure, there can be some sort of concurrence on those ideals.

On the Global Cultural Initiative, the GCI, obviously there are huge cultural linkages between both Malaysia and China. And I think recently it was reported that both Malaysia and China are going to try to propose for the lion dance to be admitted or accepted by UNESCO as a heritage performance of sorts. And so I think...

In many respects, Beijing relies on what it considers to be the Chinese diaspora, but what Malaysia doesn't always see as Chinese diaspora. These are Malaysian Chinese who have long left their ancestral homes in China, who themselves consider themselves as Malaysians first and foremost. But those cultural linkages are still there. And obviously, there are things like the lion dance, martial arts that are still a shared interest by both countries.

On the security initiative or security relations, I don't think most people appreciate how much the Malaysian special branch and the US, but also Australian intelligence services have worked together over the years. I remember during the post 9-11 years, there was actually quite a close relationship. Not something that is advertised a lot because there's no political gain for Malaysian leaders, but there's an awful lot of security gain. How would you describe the

you know, relative security relationships between the U.S. on the one hand and Beijing on the other? The Beijing or Chinese-Malaysia security relationship is very nascent.

And really nothing very much substantively has been done between Malaysia and China on the defense front. There have been some minor joint exercises, coordinated exercises, really command post type exercises that have been initial steps. There was a 2009, if I'm not mistaken, memorandum on defense cooperation between China and Malaysia that really hasn't

gone very far. And you contrast that to the Malaysia-US security relationship. It's one of the oldest and most vibrant that Malaysia has. It goes back to the Cold War, in fact. And as you pointed out correctly, a lot of this has been behind the scenes, mainly in

for Malaysia's benefit. And to its credit, Washington understands this perfectly. I would probably like to publicize this more, but there's a very robust bilateral and multilateral defense and security cooperation that both capitals have enjoyed in Putrajaya and Washington. And in 2014, President Obama and Prime Minister Najib issued this comprehensive partnership. So they did go for some publicity there.

What do you make of that? It's 10 years later. Was it just publicity or do you think it actually set an agenda for the U.S.-Malaysia relationship that has real traction? I think it started off with the best of intentions, but there really hasn't been very much follow-up in substance since. Of course, a lot of domestic political changes have taken place in both countries that have sort of detracted from working on that relationship. And I think that

When Anwar Ibrahim went to California earlier this year, he had talked about wanting to progress that relationship, that partnership to something more dynamic. I haven't heard anything since. And my personal opinion is that the U.S.-Malaysia relationship right now is probably as good as it gets. There are certain fundamental differences that are never going to be bridged.

And in terms of the political relationship, economic security relationship, this is probably as good as it gets. What are those obstacles that we're just not going to get around? Give us a hint. Well, I think what's going on in Gaza right now is a huge stumbling block to furthering that relationship. And Anwar Ibrahim, of course, has been very vocal about that. Probably not so much to the pleasure of Washington. Historically, that's been an

issue in U.S.-Malaysia relations. I remember being in KL for the first time some decades ago as an academic, new PhD for a conference, turning on the news and

The news anchor kept referring to the Zionist state. That's deep in Malaysian politics and culture, and it's a problem for the US for sure. But it is something that, it's a perennial, but it comes and goes. Right now, it's a particular problem. I'm sure you've seen the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies survey where the US just took a massive hit among thought leaders in Southeast Asia, especially Malaysia and Indonesia.

because of Gaza. It's clearly because of Gaza. Yeah, well, hopefully there's a path out of that one. What other issues? Is democracy promotion or human rights issue? It used to be for Dr. Mahathir. But of course, look, when Anwar Ibrahim was in trouble, where did he go? The U.S. He went to Georgetown.

You know who else went to Georgetown? Najib's two kids. That's right. There's some connectivity there. But Georgetown obviously is not a problem in U.S.-Malaysia relations. But Gaza obviously is. But what else? Is it human rights democracy? Is it disappointment on trade policy? What else is on that list? Yeah, disappointment on trade policy, the human rights democracy preaching will always be an irritant, as it has always been. Sorry, that's not going away. That's fair enough. And I think both sides understand that.

But on Gaza, Mike, if I just push back a little, I think it's a little different now. And part of that is Anwar Ibrahim's own conviction about what it really means. It's not a single issue, perennial obstacle to really cementing Malaysia-US ties. But I think it's a manifestation of...

a deeper problem and challenge for Malaysia, particularly under this Putrajaya administration. Because Anwar Ibrahim has referred to it as a form of colonialism that has not been resolved. It's occupation that is in violation of international law. So that rhetoric has always been there, of course, from Putrajaya. But I think given the

social media, the publicity surrounding what's happening in Gaza, I think it's a little different now to just treat it as a perennial irritation in the relationship. Fair enough. And it has evolved, as you say, because it's not just about support for Palestinians in the Muslim world. It's connected now to this narrative about the colonial oppressor class, which I personally think is

a pretty weak read historically. I think most Americans think that, certainly Israelis think that, but it is a very powerful narrative right now that is benefiting Russia among others. I mean, this sort of colonial oppressor narrative. Maybe I'm not capturing what you're saying accurately, but it seems that for post-colonial states,

this looks like an imperialist sort of colonial issue. I don't think that's personally factually quite right, but the narrative is pretty hard to get past. It's quite powerful, isn't it? Yeah. Okay, we have not resolved the Gauss issue. But look, that one is, I said perennial, but look, it's hard to see how this

gets resolved. So it's going to be a drag. What about trade and economic issues with the U.S.? Yeah, I think there's a recognition in Puchajaya, particularly since the tearing up of the TPP, that trade policy is not going to change on any fundamental level in Washington anytime soon.

And so that's why you've seen the Malaysian government taking on a different tact, where it's trying to position itself as this alternative to whether it's China, the US, Taiwan or elsewhere, looking for diversification options in the region. Malaysia, of course, offers a number of pluses in terms of, particularly in the semiconductor industry, it has five decades of experience.

But it also recognizes that there are some shortcomings that it will have to address on a structural level, namely human talent and the fact that it has to address the

this massive investment shortfall in its own semiconductor landscape. So that's why you've seen the government roll out, for example, this national semiconductor strategy that seeks to leverage on the geopolitical competition right now, but is mainly positioned to try to kickstart, give a real boost to the Malaysian domestic industry in order to move up that value chain.

Well, Malaysia has been an important part of the semiconductor production supply chain and value chain for decades and decades, especially for Japan. So that seems like a smart play. I don't want to just end the discussion about relations with that's as good as it gets. So let me try one more time. Is there a big move, a big play that a new Harris or maybe Trump administration could do? Is it?

My former White House brain says state dinner, but maybe that doesn't quite transform the relationship. Something more serious with IPEF, student visas or education. Is there some big play that the incoming next U.S. administration might think about that could do more than just maintain where we are? Yeah, sorry, I didn't mean to sound like Debbie Downer, but I'm a cynic. We're in the think tank security business. It's our job to be Debbie Downer. I'm a cynic by nature. So yeah, let me try to be a little more upbeat about this relationship.

So a low hanging fruit would be visas, at least for Malaysia. I don't know how low hanging that would be for Washington. But there is significant interest on both sides to get the relationship on a more sophisticated footing, particularly when it comes to the digital economy and the green economy. And I think there are opportunities there.

But regardless of what Washington does, I think Malaysia itself will have to know, understand and be aware of what it itself wants instead of responding as it has to extraneous factors around it. And so what I mean is being proactive in the policy space, being proactive in terms of ideas and bringing to the table those ideas instead of just waiting for the U.S. to say, here's what we have to offer. Good advice for both capitals.

You said earlier that Malaysia's foreign policy is basically a kind of Jeffersonian foreign policy, friendship with all nations. But I don't believe it for a minute because as we both know, some nations are friendlier than others. So what countries are Malaysia's most trusted partners behind the scenes? I've always thought Japan was because of the long history of investment and so forth. Who would you put at the top list within ASEAN, within the region, countries that

are natural partners with Malaysia on problem solving that are trusted, that are avenues for Malaysia to exert strategic influence because of the partnership? It really depends on the issue. And I'm glad you brought up other ASEAN countries. One of Malaysia's most important relationships and some of the most frictious ties has been with Singapore and Indonesia. Those countries, because of their proximity to Malaysia, are probably the most important partners

Japan has been a long-trusted partner in terms of economic ties, but also particularly with what's going on in the South China Sea, maritime capability support. Malaysia and Japan actually just concluded a comprehensive strategic partnership last year.

It seems as if everybody's concluding comprehensive strategic partnerships with each other. Only the Malaysia-US partnership remains at the comprehensive non-strategic level so far. So maybe that's another opportunity to try to elevate that partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

You're doing all the work for the Harris or Trump NSC. Thank you. All for free. And Japan? Historically, you know, Mahachiro loved Japan when he was prime minister the first time and encouraged Japan to stand up to the U.S. more and be more of a leader of Asia. Is that still the zeitgeist in KL?

Yeah, there is a nostalgia and an affinity for the 1980s Look East policy that Mahathir put in place. And there's actually been a reboot of that Look East policy. Japan has always been at the forefront of that policy. But of course, it encompassed Korea, Taiwan, what used to be the little dragons of Asia at the time.

And so I think a lot of that is still in place and in play. Korea is also becoming a really important partner to Malaysia in many respects, but particularly in the digital and green economies. Even Taiwan, you know, the semiconductor value chain trying to attract more Taiwanese investment to Malaysia because of the national semiconductor strategy is

So, circling back to what I said earlier, it really depends on the issue. I don't know that Malaysia is a BFF to any particular country on a permanent basis. And the intensity of that friendship just depends on what issue is at hand. I love the acronym BFF. It is funny how in international relations, we inevitably start talking about

this stuff like it's a high school cafeteria. The Singapore point is interesting. You can still Google or look on YouTube and find the Tunku, Tunku Abdul Rahman's 1965 press conference where he announces that Malaysia is kicking Singapore out of the country. And he just looks so annoyed at Lee Kuan Yew, just annoyed. But Singapore-Malaysia relations are, and it's no secret, by the way, that the Singapore defense force and defense strategy was

at least 30, 40, maybe 50, 60 percent about the Malaysian threat. We're in a much better place now between Singapore and Malaysia, I assume. Yes, I have some of that concern. You still hear from some segments of Singaporean society, though. Yes, yeah. I remember when I was in the Pentagon in the 90s, we were pushing in the ASEAN, PMC and other places this idea of

military transparency. And some people thought, well, ASEAN would be a good place to start, but it wasn't because Singapore and Malaysia and Indonesia did not want to be transparent about their plans to fight each other because of unresolved issues. But we are indefinitely in a much better place. But do you say something about ASEAN and Myanmar? I know in the past, Malaysia tried, I think Prime Minister Najib, for example, to get some resolution in Myanmar recognizing the

that it was a bleeding wound in ASEAN. It was undermining ASEAN's ability to maintain any cohesion at a time of geopolitical fracturing. Has KL given up on Myanmar, do you think? And if so, what's the real thinking about the utility of ASEAN? With particular regard to Myanmar, there's a real intractability that nobody has managed to crack, let alone ASEAN.

When Saifuddin Abdullah was foreign minister under the Mahdi II administration, because of his personal inclinations to human rights issues, you saw a more activist stance from Putrajaya on the Myanmar issue. And there was some level of shuttle diplomacy that Saifuddin conducted when he came to Myanmar.

Ever since the change in leadership in the foreign ministry in U.S. Maputra, there's been a much quieter approach. And I think that's because of the personality of who is minister right now. But substantively, the policy still remains the same. You're trying to get Myanmar to move to a different place other than where it is now, to a much better place, I should say, not a worse place.

and abiding by the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, which has been heavily criticized. But there's been no real alternative to the Five-Point Consensus that I think really structurally tries to address what is going on in Myanmar. So Elena, thank you so much. It's been fascinating. Malaysia does not...

pop up in geopolitical discussions of the region, right? People talk about Japan, of course, and China. They talk about the Philippines. Vietnam is strategic and visibly so. Malaysia maybe doesn't want to be viewed as a strategic player, but it is. And it's quite fascinating, as you explained just now, what should people read that you've written or others have written if they want to learn more about where Malaysia's foreign policy trajectory is?

People can Google what I've read about Malaysia's foreign policy, but my colleagues in Malaysia, people like Kwek Cheng Chui,

Peter Ngao, Ngao Chow Bing have written quite a bit on Malaysia. Cheng Shui is a dear friend of mine, and I call him the king of hedging because all he ever writes about is Malaysia's hedging. So if you're interested in kind of the theory of Malaysia's foreign policy positions, I encourage you to read his work. Excellent. Well, thanks very much for joining us. I know you're in the middle of a house move, so really appreciate you taking the time. Thanks very much, Elina. Thanks so much for having me, Mike. It's been a pleasure.

For more on strategy and the Asia program's work, visit the CSIS website at csis.org and click on the Asia program page. And for more on the U.S. Studies Center in Sydney, please visit ussc.edu.au.