Syria’s Crisis and the Israel-Hezbollah Cease-Fire
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Hi, I'm Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policies Editor-in-Chief. This is FP Live. Welcome.

Something strange is going on right now. Joe Biden is a lame duck president. And I'm not sure if this happens every time there's turnover in the White House, but the news cycle is haywire.

Mass protests in Georgia, the country, to protest against the government's decision to suspend accession talks with the European Union, quote, until the end of 2028. Martial law and then not, and now impeachment proceedings in South Korea. That all media in South Korea are coming under the control of

of martial law command. And a shock in Syria, where rebel groups took over the country's second largest city. And they are moving south towards the city of Hama. That's significant. I'm not saying all of this is connected to the presidential transition here, but there actually is an element of opportunism while bigger powers are focused elsewhere.

Russia is preoccupied with the war in Ukraine. Iran is smarting from developments in Gaza and Lebanon. And with those two powers being the main backers of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, perhaps it's no coincidence that rebel groups decided to strike Aleppo. This is a big deal. Assad took four years to control that territory. The rebels took less than four days to win it back.

Why does it matter? And what happens next in Syria? We're going to talk about that today, but also discuss what we thought would be the biggest story this week. And that's the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah after nearly 14 months of war.

My guest today is perfectly placed to analyze all of that and then also to go to 30,000 feet and give us the bigger picture on America's role in the Middle East. Fawaz Jorjez is a professor at the London School of Economics. He is Lebanese-American and the author of many books on the Middle East, including most recently, What Really Went Wrong? The West and the Failure of Democracy in the Middle East.

Things are moving quickly everywhere, as I said, so I should point out this interview was recorded on Wednesday, December 4th. As always, you can write us at live at foreignpolicy.com. Let's dive in. Fawaz, welcome. Thank you. I'm delighted to talk to you. It's a pleasure to have you on. So let's start with the news out of Syria. How surprising is this?

Well, it was really a shock more than a surprise. What has happened in Syria in the past few days is more of a military and political earthquake. We knew that the Assad government is very weak, but we did not really appreciate the capacity and the willpower

and the organization of the Syrian opposition led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham which is the vanguard Islamist Salafist movement in Syria. Even though I was surprised or shocked by the stunning defeat of the Assad forces not just in Aleppo, in many parts of Syria, northwestern Syria, I think reflecting on what has happened, I mean I think we should not have been surprised. Why?

The Syrian war has really never ended. It has been dormant since 2019, 2020. And I think the Assad government is a shadow of its former self. There are four reasons quickly to really help us to understand why the Assad government, I mean, or some part of it collapsed in the past few days. The state capacity has been degraded a great deal.

as a result of American sanctions that have really exacted a heavy toll on the Syrian economy and society. American sanctions, and many people don't really know, have popularized the Syrian population, including the social base of Assad itself. And also Israel's attacks, hundreds of attacks, in particular in the past years, have also degraded the military infrastructure of Syria. And as you've said, Ravi,

Syria's main superpower pattern or great power pattern, Russia, is preoccupied in the Ukraine. And Iran is also preoccupied in Gaza and Lebanon trying to defend itself. And the opposition led by the Islamist and the nationalist opposition have been biding their time, waiting for the right opportunity. And they seize the moment because they realize this is their moment

And Turkey, of course, has provided major critical logistical and intelligence and military support for the opposition. And here we are. The Syrian war has been reignited, which is really a tragedy for everyone, in particular the population in Syria. I just spent another beat on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Tell us a little bit about their background, what they hope to get out of this moving forward.

Well, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham used to be called a Nusra Front, which was really an affiliate of Al-Qaeda Central. Its leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is Abu Muhammad al-Ghulani.

and Abu Muhammad al-Gulani was a quite a part and parcel of the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In fact, Abu Muhammad al-Gulani was sent to Syria by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who was the leader of ISIS or the Islamic State. But Abu Muhammad al-Gulani

proved to be a very cunning and calculating operational leader in Syria between 2011 and 2013. He became really too big for his own good. He decided to really split from the Islamic State that was led by

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. And he really proved to be quite a capable leader on the battlefield in Syria. He carried out his affiliates and his operations, hundreds of targeted bombings against the Assad regime.

So in the past few years, as a result of the defeat of the Islamic State, Abu Muhammad al-Gulani, who was the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, decided to change the name of al-Nusra Front and decided to really split from al-Qaeda Central. Because once he had a major fight with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2013, he basically swore allegiance to Ayman Zawahiri, who was the leader of al-Qaeda.

And this tells you a great deal about the civil war that raged within the jihadist camp. I mean, the jihadists are not really as unified and united as they would like us to believe. But in the past few years, Hayat al-Tahir al-Sham has developed its own identity, even though it's a Salafi Sunni movement, its leaders and Abu Muhammad al-Gulani would like us to believe that not really part of the Salafi jihadist movement on al-Qaeda. But the big point is the following.

Hayat Tahrir Sham is the most powerful faction among all opposition. It's the vanguard. It's literally leading the fight against Assad. It has more than 10,000 really skilled and hardened fighters. And in particular, it's not just about the numbers, it's the willpower, the motivation, and the willingness to really fight and die. And I think regardless of what happens, if indeed

the opposition basically scores a decisive victory against Assad, I think Hayat Tahrir Sham will own Syria and but Muhammad al-Gulani will most probably become the leader of Syria. Wow.

One more question on Syria, and then I know we need to move on to a few other topics in the Middle East. Just to broaden it out, and you went there briefly earlier. So Syria has been a proxy battlefield for larger international players for a very long time. And when you think about the question of why now?

One theory is that all these other bigger players were distracted. So Russia is embroiled in Ukraine. Iran is very much weakened after significant blows to Hezbollah and Hamas. America is in transition. But Fawaz, there is another theory that Russia, in fact, wanted to pressure Syria to reach some sort of a back-end deal with Turkey.

and basically to get to a point where you have an internationally recognized political solution so that Moscow can go in and profit off of reconstructing a war-torn Syria. What's your sense of what's really going on here? I don't buy it at all, Ravi. This is really, in fact, the reverse is true. What has happened in the past few days represents a major setback for Russia.

a personal setback for the Russian President Putin. It was Russia's military intervention in Syria in 2015 that turned the tide of the war in Assad's favor. And in fact, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the opposition view Russia as the enemy, that's it.

My take on it, in fact, the reason why the opposition, both the Islamist and the nationalist opposition, decided to really strike now because they realized that Russia has been pooling its asset of Syria in the past three years. Russia really now has a very tiny contingent, mainly air force. But I think it's Turkey that really played a key role, allegedly played a key role, according to my understanding. And the reason why, because Turkey realized

that Assad has been really dragging his feet, that Assad is not really interested in any kind of political settlement that integrates the opposition into the political process, that Assad's motto is what the opposition has not really taken on the battlefield cannot really take on the negotiating table. So Turkey wants to really change the political order in Syria. Remember, you have three million Syrian refugees in Turkey.

and the Syrian refugees really have weighed down the political and social and economic order in Turkey. So Turkey would like the Syrian refugees to go back to Syria, and also Turkey has a bigger aim, which is to really defeat the Kurdish forces who are affiliated and who are really supported by the United States. So basically to force Assad

to integrate the opposition into the political process and have a political solution and also to really strike against the Kurds who are basically in President Erdogan's eyes represent a strategic threat to Turkey both in Syria and also within the Turkish political system. Wow, this really is 3D chess but let's move that chessboard a little bit to another country, to Lebanon.

And I think one way of reading last week's ceasefire deal with Israel is that both Israel and Hezbollah needed it. So Hezbollah suffered immense losses. Israel is tired of fighting a two-front war. Is this a deal that can last, though? Well, what I fear, Ravi, is that the United States tailored the ceasefire to suit Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's interests.

And many Israeli officials have made it very clear that the Biden administration has given Benjamin Netanyahu written assurances that Israel has the right to strike targets in Lebanon when and if it perceives there are threats in Lebanon. And Israeli Prime Minister has made it very clear on multiple interviews inside Israel that even though there's a ceasefire, he said the war does not end.

that Israel preserves the freedom of action in Lebanon. And as we have seen in the past few days, according to the Lebanese army, I'm not talking about Hezbollah, according to the Lebanese army and the Lebanese government, Israel has violated the ceasefire more than 50 times. And it has really carried out attacks outside of southern Lebanon. What Israel, what I fear the most is that Israel is trying to establish a pattern

a freedom of action after the six days ceasefire. What Benjamin Netanyahu is trying to do is to really Syrianize Lebanon, that is by having the freedom of action to carry out attacks anytime that he and his security apparatus feel like it. The same way in the West Bank, the occupied West Bank, the same way in Syria, the same way in Lebanon. I hope I am wrong.

what I hope Benjamin Netanyahu is trying to do by violating the ceasefire agreement and by carrying out dozens of attacks is basically to reassure his extremist coalition

that the ceasefire itself does not really mean that Israel is weak, that Hezbollah will continue to replenish its arsenal. So I'm hoping once the 60 days basically are over, the ceasefire will hold. And the reason why I'm a bit hopeful is that both sides, Hezbollah and Israel, have a vast interest in not really returning to the intense face of hostilities.

And of course we have to wait and see what role the United States plays because the United States is in charge of the international committee overseeing the ceasefire. So without American pressure on Israel,

I fear that the ceasefire could basically implode, but I'm hoping that after 60 days we'll have the Lebanese army deployed in southern Lebanon, we'll have the ceasefire basically consolidated, and that basically would be the best option for everyone, for Lebanon and also for Israel.

You're sort of sketching out there the immediate short term for Hezbollah as well here, but I'm wondering about the longer term for Hezbollah. And this takes me to a question from one of our subscribers, Sonia Martinez. And the question is, how easy is it to reactivate after senior leadership dies?

And in a sense, this isn't just a question for Hezbollah, but also more broadly, when you look at learnings from other militant or terrorist groups across the region and the world, what happens when you decapitate top leadership? What happens next? Well, there is no doubt that Hezbollah's military and political and leadership capacity has been degraded.

Hezbollah leaders have made it very clear, in particular its new leader Naeem Qassem. He more than once he said we were out of balance, we were basically battered, we were incoherent and he said the attacks and the losses were very painful, are very painful, are very heavy. There is no doubt about that but Hezbollah is not defeated. Hezbollah is down but Hezbollah is not out.

It still has thousands of hardened fighters. It still has missiles. We don't know the numbers. Israel says that it basically destroyed 70% of Hezbollah's army.

arsenal missile arsenals but many American and other experts dispute this particular number because even to the last day Hezbollah was really targeting the very hard Tel Aviv and Haifa and more importantly Ravi on this particular point knowing a bit about Hezbollah as a social

and religiously driven social movement. Hezbollah has the ideological imagination to really basically shield itself from great losses and regenerate

and its social base of support which is the largest in Lebanon in terms of electoral votes and in terms of very resilient, very solid. So I have no doubt in my mind that Hezbollah will try to regenerate and try to revive. But Hezbollah, if I may take a minute, has three major challenges.

I mean, I think Hezbollah has to basically reactivate and replenish its arsenal under fire, while under fire, that Israel will continue to hammer Hezbollah even during the ceasefire. And the second point

Iran will find it very difficult to provide Hezbollah with the arms and money that it used to do. And the reason why, because Israel now controls the skies, whether you're talking about Damascus or whether you're talking about Beirut and the Americans in Iraq as well. And finally, I think the most important challenge that will face Hezbollah is internal Lebanese politics. Lebanese society is deeply polarized.

And more and more Lebanese are asking the questions, why do we have to really basically suffer the consequences of a war with Israel? Why does Hezbollah take decision on the behalf of the Lebanese people and the Lebanese government?

So all in all, I think Hezbollah will have to think very hard about the way forward, not just militarily and politically, but also in the kind of what kind of relationship it will have to the Lebanese state as a major political actor. My hope is that Hezbollah will become deeply and deeper engaged in the Lebanese political system.

And this will really give Hezbollah a broader and a bigger stage, a broader stage to play as opposed to just making the Israel-Palestine conflict as the most foundational and fundamental aim of its strategy.

But Fawaz, I have to ask, do you think that is a more hopeful outcome that you can moderate Hezbollah or that you can replace it with a political movement in Lebanon that is empowered and, you know, is not really involved in attacking Israel as its first order of business?

Well, I mean, I think on this question, the reason why Hezbollah does what it does, Ravi, for your audience, is that Palestine is very fundamental to the identity of Hezbollah. That Palestine is not really a tactical or utilitarian thing. And it's not just for Hezbollah. It's for millions of people in the region, truly. Palestine is a... I mean, it resonates deeply in the Arab and the Muslim imagination.

And for Hezbollah, remember, Hezbollah had not existed before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. So Hezbollah, like Hamas, are byproducts of Israel's military, the use of overwhelming military, basically, force. And finally, on this particular point, if we really want to change

the geopolitical structure to change, to really basically shift from violence and force and war into stability and security. I mean, I think the underlying fundamental question is Israel's military occupation, Palestinian lands. It's Israel oppression of the Palestinians. The Israel-Palestine conflict, and I'm not exaggerating, is the most fundamental fault line in the region.

And even Iran, people talk about Iran and its intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The reason why Iran does what it does, the reason why Iran basically expands its influence in Gaza and Lebanon and other places, because you have Israeli military occupation. If you really want to limit Iranian influence, if you really want to fetter Iranian hand, there is no other way to find a political vision.

that grants the Palestinian self-determination and basically help the Palestinian establish a state of their own. I am not here, I don't know what the Palestinians want, but I think the first and the most important thing is to end Israel's military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem and grant the Palestinians the right to self-determination.

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On the topic of Iran, if you were Benjamin Netanyahu, you would say, well, wait a minute, we managed to decimate Hamas. We managed to decimate Hezbollah. And in doing so, we've weakened Iran like never before. So to your point about Iran, this doesn't look very good for them the past year. No, not at all.

I think what has happened in the past year represents a major setback for Iran. And what's happening in Syria could be really catastrophic for Iran. Syria is the vein and the base and the station by which Iran provides support.

for its ally in Lebanon Hezbollah and also for other allies. The loss of Syria would really mean catastrophic and also what we need to understand I mean I think if I were sitting in Tehran, Israel has humiliated Iran multiple times, infiltrated the decision-making process, violated its sovereignty

attack its leaders and scientists and it's also delivered major blows to its allies, in particular Hezbollah, the pride and joy of Iranian influence. But again, don't ever underestimate Iran and don't ever underestimate what Iran could do. Iran has multiple options and as the Iranian leadership

and many Iranian leaders including the Iranian foreign minister last week when he was talking to his European counterparts. The Iranians now are contemplating weaponizing their nuclear program.

are contemplating having a nuclear option as a deterrence against Israel and the United States. So even though Iran has suffered a great deal without a political settlement, that is, if Benjamin Netanyahu, and this is, I've spoken too much on this particular point, I mean, Benjamin Netanyahu's biggest prize is not Hamas, is not Hezbollah, is not Syria, it's Iran.

And he made it very clear in the past two weeks after the ceasefire in Lebanon. He said he wants to focus on Iran. And what I fear the most, what I fear the most, Ravi, in the next one or two years, Benjamin Netanyahu will most likely redouble his efforts

to drag the United States into war against Iran, to try to convince the Trump administration, the coming Trump administration, to destroy Iranian nuclear program. This is what he has been really gunning for in the past one year. He has failed with the Biden administration. I think he feels that the dream team that Donald Trump has really basically appointed could really present him.

with the key to unlocking the puzzle, the Iranian puzzle.

And of course, if Iran were to if Israel were to want to do that, it does need American support militarily for the bombs that are needed to go deep enough to actually affect the nuclear installations in Iran. And of course, there are many, many of them. So it doesn't have that kind of ammunition on its own. It would mean American support. That was what about Gaza?

As we talk about the Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire, has Gaza been forgotten? Does a ceasefire in one part make it more or less likely that you could see some progress on a ceasefire in Gaza? Well, Ravi, if you listen to Biden officials, you think that the ceasefire in Lebanon paves the way for a similar ceasefire in Gaza.

Antony Blinken and other officials have made it very clear. I mean, they're hoping. But the reality is we have to really not only listen to Benjamin Netanyahu, but take what he says seriously because he has been true to his word. He made it very clear in order to reassure his extremist far-right coalition that the ceasefire in Lebanon will allow Israel to refocus on Gaza

We have many reports, I don't need to tell you and your audience, from independent sources, that Israel plans a long-term occupation of Gaza, that Israel is establishing military bases all over Gaza, that Israel, basically some of his allies and coalition members, hope to build settlements in Gaza. And in terms of forgetting Gaza, I mean, it's really a moral stain on our conscience, all of us, on humanity.

We talk about Gaza in terms of really a geopolitical question. You have more than 44,000 civilians who have been killed, more than 100,000 that have been injured. Hospitals, clinics, universities, schools, libraries, mosques, churches. Gaza is a wasteland, literally a wasteland. And Benjamin Netanyahu and his coalition, again, independent sources, have used starvation as a weapon of war.

what's happening in North Gaza, it's catastrophic. The world does not really capture the loss and suffering of what the people in Gaza have been subjected to. You wrote recently, Fawaz in The Guardian, that if the United States does not demand an immediate ceasefire and halt Israel's escalations, this period may be remembered as the rupture that ended the US-led order. Expand on that. Well, you know,

First of all, I am really vehemently critical of the Biden administration, both as an academic and as an American. I'm very critical of the Biden administration because of the colossal failure of the Biden administration to bring the war to an end in Gaza.

his colossal failure to prevent the war from escalating into neighboring countries. I ask myself a very simple question, and many people, I'm not the only one. I say to myself, the first question: Who feeds Benjamin Netanyahu war in Gaza? We, the United States, have provided Israel with 18 billion dollars in arms and ammunition in the past one year. I ask myself, who shields Israel in the Security Council? How many vitas has the United States used?

And when the International Criminal Court indicted Benjamin Netanyahu and his defense minister, President Biden said he was outraged. He said it's outrageous. I wish that the president would feel outrageous about the crimes and the massacres in Gaza.

And yes, truly, and I'm not exaggerating, I had never ever seen so much anger and rage in the Middle East against the United States and in many parts in South Africa, in Latin America, in Indonesia, in Malaysia. Many people in the global south ask the question, I mean, obviously there is one rule for the West and one rule for the rest.

And we know from the surveys that we have seen in many parts of the world that China is gaining momentum, that the major winner of all of this is China. The United States during the war on terror from 2001 to 2021 basically provided China with major opportunities to expand its influence worldwide. It seems to me, again, the United States by failing to use leverage

with Benjamin Netanyahu in order to bring about a ceasefire and in order to bring the Israeli hostages back home.

We're not the only one who are pleading, who have been pleading with President Biden. Israeli families are desperate to have their boys and girls, their women and men to return home. And they should be. And also you have more than 10,000 Palestinian, 12,000 Palestinian prisoners who have been rotting, many of whom are children, are rotting in Israeli prison. This is where President Biden, the major failure. And Gaza will be remembered as much as Biden's war, not just Benjamin Netanyahu's war.

And of course, now one of those two people is departing from the scene. And very soon, the United States will have President Trump in place. What is your sense of how he might shift U.S. policy on this conflict? Well, I wish you had not asked me this question, Ravi, because I've been raving about Biden. But I think what we're going to see is a much worse presidency. What we know about Donald Trump

Not only he is unpredictable, not only he is chaotic, not only he is all over the map, but the team he has really put together, the far-right extremist coalition, Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition, called it a dream team, to me is a scary team.

The next, the two priorities, the two priorities that Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump will share together is basically the annexation. I mean, you and I have not really talked about the likelihood of a Palestinian state.

But what Netanyahu and his coalition are gunning for, basically the annexation of the West Bank, the occupied West Bank, the last bit of territory that has not really been annexed by Israel. And the second priority is Iran. Most of the appointments by President Trump really share visceral

anti-Iranian views and our warmongers too when it comes to Iran. So what I fear is that what we're going to see in the next one or two years, not only the prospect or the likelihood of annexation of the West Bank, but what I fear the most is really all-out war with Iran.

What gives me hope. There are two aspects here that could constrain some of what you're describing, and maybe you were about to go there, but, you know, on Iran, there is a significant anti-war strand, not only within some of Trump's picks, but in the broader MAGA movement and in the United States more broadly, where an increasing number of Americans have no more appetite for, you know,

losing people abroad for being embroiled in wars abroad. And then the other one, as far as annexing the West Bank goes, that would be completely against what Saudi Arabia wants. And we know that one of the things that both Israel and the United States want in the next year or so is to try and restart the normalization process with Saudi Arabia. And

For Riyadh, even though Mohammed bin Salman is a monarch, it would be very hard for him to sell to his people a further annexation in that part. I was planning to say that President-elect Trump's anti-war temperament could be the major guardrail against the warmongers among his officials, because you're right.

Donald Trump does not really want wars. He has made it very clear he wants to end the wars in the Ukraine, in Lebanon and in Gaza as well.

But I think what we need to understand is that the president, as President Barack Obama used to say that "everything rests in me". To what extent? I mean, keep in mind that it was President Trump who ordered the assassination of General Soleimani and the two countries came really very close to the brink of all-out war. Here is the other scenario that I was going to... I think Iran is really genuine

and Iran is really anxious about the coming Trump administration. What we could see really is a kind of breakthrough, a kind of diplomatic breakthrough between Iran and the Trump administration. And Iran has been making, you know, many statements that they really want to restart the diplomatic process with the United States. On the question of Saudi Arabia, I don't know if I have more time. I think the biggest prize for Donald Trump in the region is Saudi Arabia.

is where the money is. And for Donald Trump is follow the trail of money you understand Donald Trump. And Saudi Arabia has made it very clear that it has increased the price, the cost of normalization with Israel. And Donald Trump is going to come back to the idea of normalization, the relation between Saudi Arabia and Israel. But the question at the end of the day, it's not really what Saudi Arabia

and Donald Trump want. The question is what Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right extremist coalition want too. This is a deeply ideological coalition. It really is view the world through the lens of settlement and greater Israel. And the challenge is we have, of course, we have to wait and see. My hope is that Donald Trump anti-war temperament will prevail.

and will prevail in the sense of bringing about a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program and probably a kind of, I mean, I know based on everything, there is no light at the end of the tunnel for the Israel-Palestine conflict. But who knows? Let's hope that Donald Trump surprise all of us and bring about not only an end to the war in Gaza, but also an end to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

You've been quite critical of both US policy and Israeli policy. And frankly, you've criticized all comers, which is a good thing. But to flip that for a moment, Fawaz, if you were an Israeli leader, what would you do?

to improve Israel's security, which ultimately is the thing that worries it the most, that post-October 7, it shook the country to its core at an existential level, which has led to everything you've been describing in the last 14 months. What would an alternative strategy be? Ravi, I've written on this particular point. I have really a radically different take. The question for me is,

is not security or absolute security. Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli leaders have, they want absolute victory which does not exist. What I really want for the region, for the Palestinians and for the Israelis is peace and permanent peace and reconciliation. Instead of being a military fortress, Israel must

have a genuine reconciliation with the Palestinians. For me, the existence of the Jewish community in the heart of the Arab world is the highest priority. It's not about the security or the ideological rubric of Benjamin Netanyahu. How do you anchor, how do you integrate Israel into the social fabric of the region? How do you make Israel a good citizen in the region? The Palestinians, Ravi,

could be the moral conscience of Israel in the same way that black Americans are the moral conscience of the United States. This means what? It's very simple for Israel to be integrated into the social fabric of the region to ensure the long-term survival of the Jewish community requires a fundamental shift

in the imagination and strategy of the Israeli leadership. And what I mean by reconciliation, it's not about whether 28% of the Palestinian territory is about genuine reconciliation. Coming to realize that security for Israel means security for the Palestinians and security for the neighborhood. This is a long-term transformative paradigm as opposed to really security in terms of degrading Hamas, degrading Hezbollah, degrading

degrading the various groups that fight Israel because this is just one round temporary uh love and finally on the question of normalization I think Israel has Israel and the United States have really made major fundamental mistake by focusing on top-down normalization with autocratic Arab leaders what Israel and the United States need to do is normalization from bottom up

for Israel to end its occupation of Palestinian lands, for Israel to acknowledge the historical suffering of the Palestinian people, grant them self-determination, and for the United States, for us,

to stop arming Israel and making it a military fortress. Ravi, I really believe deep in my heart, not just in the United States, has not been a true friend of Israel. The United States, by making Israel a military fortress, it basically prevented Israel from coming to terms with its neighbors, from reconciliation with the Palestinians. This is a transformative paradigm. I don't think I'm going to see it in my lifetime, but I hope

the new leadership in Israel and the Palestinian will come to realize that reconciliation is bigger and greater than just a piece of territory. It's about really integrating and reconciling and living in one piece of land, both communities. You know, that last point you were making about the United States' role in the Middle East, I mean, you've written a whole book on this and you've been writing and speaking about it for years. Part of what's changed in the last year is

a lot of countries in the global south, which you were referring to earlier, feeling like they've been let down by the United States, that the United States has double standards when it comes to international conflicts. What do you think that means for American power in the next decades, given that this is a trend line we've seen for well over 20-odd years,

And there's no sign of that trend line changing with a new president coming in who, you know, has espoused an America first policy. Well, I mean, I ask myself, I mean, you know, as much as I do, to what extent does the United States really have moral authority in the world?

I mean, that's the question. Travel and ask about, ask people in the world. People say, I mean, critics in the United States say everyone wants to come to America. That's a different question from the question about America's leadership, America's moral authority, America's credibility in the world.

But the United States, I mean, here you have the relationship between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Biden. In fact, Israel behaves as the greater partner, as the big partner. Benjamin Netanyahu has a vision. He wants to remake the Middle East in Israel's terms, while Biden focuses on the ceasefire in Gaza. And the U.S. is declining hegemon.

So what you have now is that more and more middle powers are coming to realize you cannot really count on the United States anymore. And that's why China is not just gaining in terms of economic measures. We keep focusing on economic measures. I think in terms of soft power, I think in terms of credibility, I think it's in more authority, even though I'm not comparing the United States to China, that's not.

The question, even Saudi Arabia, just to give you an idea, one of the most important middle powers dependent on the United States is basically positioning itself for the Trump administration.

diversifying its foreign policy, deepening its relations with China, gradual and serious normalization with Iran, because they realized even the Arab state, I mean, think about it. The United States, the Biden administration has insulted and humiliated its own Arab allies. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, all of them have been begging the United States to use leverage with Israeli prime minister. So yeah, I mean, I think similar to the,

America's War on Terror, I feel that this chapter, when the history of this chapter is written in the next 10 or 15 years, it really will be seen as representing a fundamental rupture in international relations and deepening America's decline, in particular in terms of moral authority and credibility in the world. Fawaz, I'm afraid that's all we have time for today. Thanks for joining us. Thank you. Thanks again, Rafiq.

And that was Fawaz Jajez, Middle East expert and a professor at the London School of Economics. Next week, we are going to look at the chip wars with the man who literally wrote the book on it, Chris Miller. How a Trump administration will manage the battle to control high-end semiconductors.

Subscribers can send us questions. We often use them. And you can become a subscriber too by using the code FPLive. There's lots else ahead on our site. Just go to foreignpolicy.com slash live to take a look. FPLive the podcast is produced by Rosie Julin and the executive producer of FPLive is Dana Schoen. I'm Ravi Agrawal. I'll see you next time.

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