Exiled Crown Prince: ‘Iran is on the brink of a revolution’
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The Iranian people are there not just to save themselves. They're sending a message to the world that we are your solution. Why are you not on the right side of history? And I need to be able to tell them I'm trying my best to make sure that the world this time doesn't abandon you and stands with you as opposed to an obstacle to your liberation. I'm Roland Oliphant, and this is Battle Lines.

On this bonus episode of Battlelines, I speak to Reza Pahlavi, the son of Mohammad Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran who was overthrown in 1979.

The Crown Prince has lived in exile ever since, but he now believes the regime could be heading to collapse and is positioning himself as the potential figurehead of a democratic transition. I asked him why he thinks Iran is headed for a revolution like the one that overthrew his father, why he believes he could lead such a change, and what he thinks Western governments should do at this moment in Iranian history.

Reza Pakhlavi, welcome to Battle Lines. We're very pleased to have you on Battle Lines, partly because it feels like Iran is at a critical moment. It feels like a lot of people are saying to us, including people we speak to inside Iran, that the regime feels more fragile than it has for many, many years.

possibly since the revolution. And therefore your role as a spokesman, I suppose, for anti-regime opposition groups outside is fascinating. But before we get into that, I wanted to talk about you because not many people are royalty in exile.

Could you just tell us a bit about your life? What's it like being Reza Pakhlafi? Well, the way you pose the question is clear that, you know, from the day I was born to the point of being groomed to one day as a crown prince feeling my father's shoes, at least that was the path. I come out of Iran right after I graduate from high school. I go to the

under a graduate pilot training program in Greece Air Force Base after having had some flying experience back in Iran. And in the midst of all this, the revolution happens. My parents leave the country. It's a complete sea change. And all of a sudden, you live in a new reality. And what does that do to me? It puts me in a situation where

Shortly after my father passed away in Cairo and the war breaks out between Iran and Iraq, and my first intervention regarding Iran post-revolution was, I'm willing to join our air force to fight against the invading enemy, was my first reaction. And my dedication to the cause of Iran's liberation started right then.

So for the past 44 years and counting, my entire life has been dedicated to that cause. So it never occurred to me to fall into the mindset of, you know, lamenting being exiled, but more what is first and foremost a patriotic duty, not because of expectation, but because of voluntary obligation.

that has guided my long journey of fighting for that liberation from day one. And I think, you know, 44 years later, we are now, as you put it, at a point that not only the regime is at its most vulnerable and weakest state, but at the same time, never has our nation been more ready to

for that change. So I think right now we are talking about a very critical window that has opened with the historical opportunity to change the direction of history

as a result of the kind of change we hope finally we are able to achieve in Iran, which is really a liberation of the people from the yoke of an extremely repressive dictatorial regime and ultimately achieve what is the only salvation and path to Iran's future, which is a secular democratic alternative to the current religious dictatorship. That has been my mission in life. And you've been very clear about that. I really want to get into the details in this moment. A couple more questions about you. I'm wondering...

You were basically, as you said, you were groomed to be a king, essentially. That's what you understood you were going to be. When the revolution happened, you must have thought about this a lot, I suppose, over the years. I mean, did it come as a shock? Did you have any sense of what was about to happen? I don't think a lot of people did, including the revolutionaries. The interesting thing is that as there were obviously clear line of demarcations back then, oddly enough today, there's a path to convergence now.

Because as a result of these 44 years, I think the nation as a whole has come to the conclusion that it is possible to find areas of being like-minded for the best interests of the nation in the future rather than being stuck with our past. Although a lot of lessons can be drawn from the past, mostly not to repeat the same mistakes again. And I think that's a learning curve. It is a sign of a society that matures as a result.

It is the fact that the reason why secularism in Iran is now an understood principle is because we had to experiment and live under a clerical dictatorship to appreciate the importance

secular values and the importance of separation from church and state, as the saying goes, as a prerequisite to democracy, as a means to not allow for any single ideology, whether it's Marxism or Islamic ideology, to be the singular dominating ideology at the expense of discrimination and repression of other people who are not like-minded. That's the whole net result of our journey as Iranians

in recent history that puts us now on a path of clear vision of we know what we don't want, but it's also important to understand what we want. And not only that, but how can we get there?

Which is exactly why the campaign that I'm leading today for transition to the next democracy is critical to see how are we going to navigate these various phases in which we are now until the regime collapses and then what happens after that during the transition. You speak very confidently of the inevitability of regime collapse.

Let's dig into the immediate nitty gritty of what's happening now. So as we understand, Iran is in a very difficult economic situation. The currency has fallen even since President Perseverance came in and it suffered traumatic military setbacks abroad with the loss of Bashar Assad and the battering that Hezbollah and Hamas have taken and so on. Amid all this, Donald Trump has shown up.

has returned to his maximum pressure policy and there seems to be a debate in Iran about whether to talk to the Americans or not, about whether or not to get rid of the nuclear program. Let's start with

the current status of that debate. This week, Ayatollah Khamenei essentially said there shouldn't be any talks. He said there can be no negotiations with such a government. The Americans didn't uphold their end of the last deal. The very person who's in office today tore up the agreement. That's Donald Trump. This is an experience we must learn from. We negotiated. We gave concessions. We compromised. We didn't get the results we aimed for and so on. So essentially, the Supreme Leader seems to have said, no, we're not going to talk despite this suggestion.

I'm interested in why you think he's saying that. And do you think there's an element of bluster at the surface and perhaps talks happening behind the scenes? Essentially, I think Khamenei is caught in a bind because on the one hand, if he caves into that pressure of engagement, he loses his core base of support as if he was compromising the situation.

inherently anti-Western, hostile to America, hostile to Israel narrative that the regime has pretty much introduced itself to the world since. All of a sudden, that shift would mean that not only he gains much by it, but he loses more of his core support. And he also knows that by caving in, it's the beginning of the downfall. And so it's the last

of resisting and buying time to see what else could occur in the meantime may be enough to regroup. And as a result of what you rightfully pointed that, you know, the decimation of both Hamas and Hezbollah and, of course, the loss of a critical ally.

Being Bashar Assad in Syria makes him even more isolated than ever before. And maybe that one of the calculations from whether it's the Trump administration or others is that under the circumstances, perhaps that's one way that they might finally say, OK, we really don't have any choice but to engage.

But we see the double language, you know, which one are you going to believe? Are you going to believe what Jabhat Zarif says in Davos or are you going to believe what Khamenei says that, you know, that's not at all? So if anything, net-net, Khamenei seems to be giving what perhaps what Trump is hoping for to say to the world, wait a second, I still give them a chance. They are the ones rejecting this. Therefore, let's move on to the next phase.

It seems to be the current positioning. But I think we need to think a little bit beyond that because irrespective of what you invoked here, focusing too much on the tree at the expense of forgetting about the forest is also another thing I'd like to attract your attention to. Go on. By that, I mean that if we isolate the whole problem to be the nuclear issue,

We forget about the other aspects of the regime's impact on regional instability, maintaining the proxy pressure, the narrative of financing radical elements that promote anti-Semitism here and there or intimidates journalists here and there or everything else that they've been behind. What about those aspects? And the fact that at the end of the day, the ultimate solution to the problem

would be what role a different Iran can play if indeed the hope is to create an element of stability in the region as opposed to gearing up for potential conflicts and escalation of that.

And for that reason, I think that Western diplomacy, particularly in Europe, has been behind the curve in understanding that. And that's something I've been arguing for all these times, that the initial premise of expectational behavior change was wrong from the get-go.

in the sense that it's a lack of recognition of the DNA of this regime, of why it is that it cannot, on the basis of compromise, coexist with the world as we know it. And it's essentially because they are completely opposed to the values that exist in the free world, of human rights, of democracy, of fighting any kind of discrimination. And, you know, where the regime stands is the total opposite of where Iranians stand.

And rather than investing on the people as the agent of change, we've been focused on trying to force them to change their behaviors

either by sometimes the stick or sometimes through appeasement, but we haven't obtained any result, have we? And continuing on the same path and repeating the same approach, hoping for a different result, simply is a waste of time. In that case, what should be done? So you're essentially saying the idea of engagement with the regime in the hope that it will moderate its behavior or give up the nuclear ambitions that it denies having,

is a false premise.

Are you then a fan of Donald Trump's maximum pressure campaign? Because that didn't change their behavior either last time? Or do you think the Americans have got the wrong end of the stick? And do you know what the Americans are planning? You spend a lot of time in Washington. Good question. Well, if you look at what happened under Donald Trump's first mandate and the maximum pressure campaign, and to what extent it curtailed the regime's abilities in some way by restricting them to have access to more funding or what have you, was certainly effective. And

And we see through various statistics of how much of an impact it had. So much as just to give you one line item example, the level of executions in Iran was more than half the amount between his predecessor Obama and his successor Biden. And that was as a direct result of that maximum pressure campaign. During his second mandate, of course, he's resorting back to maximum pressure, mainly because they know it has been effective.

and mainly because they know that as a result of Biden's appeasement tactics, which released more than $100 billion worth of revenue that Iran should not have had in the first place had the oil sanctions been implemented.

Had that played into the scenario of strengthening their proxies, and I don't think that October 7th was a coincidence. I mean, it was a result of the regime being emboldened, and in fact, it became even more viral and aggressive, not to mention the repression at home. Since the Mahsa Amini revolution- Are you saying that October 7th was directed from Tehran? Well-

The celebration hours after the Hamas attack could not have been like not staged or planned from before and anticipating that, not to mention the fact that the Hamas leadership officially thanked the Islamic government for helping them in that attack. These are...

evident by all the reports that we all read in the media. So it's not like it's a confidential noise. It's out there in the open. But anyway, that's one singular issue. It's the collective approach. Getting back to the issue of maximum pressure and why it's important. Yes, maximum pressure is, of course, important, but it's not sufficient.

We've been asking the world to understand that the solution is ultimately regime change in Iran and not behavior change. But in order for regime change to occur, you have to have another component parallel to the maximum pressure, and that is maximum support. And what we've been talking to the Americans, to the Europeans, is the importance of if you really want to avoid military escalation and conflict...

where diplomacy has failed, let's not jump directly from failed diplomacy to contemplating conflict and war. There's a third option, and the best option are the Iranian people. And unlike other scenarios of regime change, we were poorly implemented and executed. Example, Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein and the beatification.

The change of regime in Iran's scenario has nothing to do with what the West in particular and America specifically has experienced since 9-11 in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Because the minute you invoke the concept, they say, oh, my God, will that mean we have to commit boots on the ground? And American taxpayers say we have to fund yet another campaign. And we have an answer to that. So the scenario of change in Iran does not have to implicate any foreign forces or any kind of occupation or military invasion because our army on the ground, our boots on the ground are the Iranian people in the first place, except for they're fighting the fight totally unsupported

by the Western free world. You're talking about a revolution in Iran. Well, it is a revolutionary or at least to say the very least a pre-revolutionary fervor. It's escalating every day. All the chants you hear on the streets, all the protests, all the demonstrations.

that specifically call for an end to this regime, death to the dictator, death to the Islamic Republic. In plain view, I mean, if you follow, especially the last few days on the anniversary, the 46th anniversary of the revolution, you hear that all over. And it's not just isolated to one pocket of resistance here and there. What I'm trying to say is back to the question of, is there a historical opportunity for change to happen? We believe yes. But I think that the failure of Western policymakers to catch up to where Iran is now in the

I think behind the curve could impede our success in finding a resolution to the ultimate problem. So what I'm saying is that this maximum pressure campaign should involve governments that now recognize that our best way to avoid escalation of conflict and giving that process a chance before it becomes inevitable because nobody wants to have conflict. First of all, us Iranians.

But we can offer an alternative to that. And the alternative is maximum support. So pressure from within combined with external pressure would be then sufficient to force the regime to paralysis and collapse. Actually, this is a good opportunity to ask a question I wanted to ask, which is that do you ever reflect on the kind of irony that you're calling for a revolution? You're calling for the same thing that happened to your father. And has what happened in 1979 changed?

Are there lessons there for this moment? Is there a kind of parallel between... You might take this... I don't want to offend you, but I mean, is there in a weird way a parallel between your father and Ayatollah Khamenei today? Have they found themselves in similar situations? Has the regime made the same mistakes that the monarchy made? Well, okay. No, it's a fair question. But in fact, let's dip right into it. Look.

When the revolution in Iran happened, we didn't have the experience of solidarity in Poland or the end of apartheid and the ANC and Nelson Mandela and scenarios of change that included the level of support that Western free world gave to dissidents and people who

to feel empowered so they could then overcome the challenges of putting an end to the Soviet Union or for that matter, the racist apartheid regime in South Africa. That experience was not there. So if today I'm telling you that part of our strategy is to use the experiences achieved successfully, for instance, we're talking about the transition phase. What do we do with the remnants of the regime? The truth and reconciliation path, transitional justice,

These are things that at the time were non-existent. And the most important argument that I would like to propose, which is the difference between 1979 and 2025, is the fact that back then nobody had an understanding of the alternative. Because the basic call was the Shah has to leave no matter what. Then we'll see what happens. Well, guess what? Khomeini happened. Nobody had a clue what he was going to do. And by the time everybody figured out, it was too late.

The difference is that this time we're not only saying that this regime has to go because everybody knows it has to go, including former reformists who now are on the converging path with us, understanding that that's the only way to our salvation. But it's a clear path to the alternative with clear propositions so that people this time don't have to guess. They will know what's been proposed. And for that instance, what I'm proposing as the transition phase is

is not only the role of the interim government that has to obviously manage the country's affairs in the meantime, but also how do we elect the first constitutional assembly where the debate over what the future should be, the constitution, the final form, is a project that is proposed to the nation and then Iranian citizens with a clear idea of all the alternatives plausible and possible are

will get to choose finally what it is that they want in their majority. In other words, this is, at the end of the day, the determining factor are the people. It's not going to be some concocted strategy of people saying, because you know what happened. I mean, for the sake of history, I think a lot of our listeners may not have even been born at the time this happened. Those of us who are old enough to remember, let's not forget one thing. Part of what led to the success of Khomeini was

was the fact that unlike Khamenei, who is willing to mercilessly kill hundreds of thousands of Iranian citizens if he had to, let's not forget that my father refused when he was pressured or at least questioned of where do you stand? Are you going to hold the fort? And he said, after 37 years of reign, how could I possibly refuse?

have my hand soiled with the blood of the people, that's not justification to retain the throne. And he voluntarily left the country, which led President Carter and his counterparts in Europe in the summit in the Guadeloupe six months before or three months before to say, now that the Shah is not willing to stand, we have no choice but to back Khomeini and the revolution.

led by the Carter administration with this infamous Green Belt theory that somehow a religious wall would be created to contain communism from spreading into the area. That was the theory back then. And oddly enough, when that backfired...

Then Saddam Hussein became the next shield to contain the regime from exporting his ideology, which led to the Iran-Iraq war. And following that, as a result of that, Saddam Hussein became a problem, which led to the first conflict in the Middle East during Desert Storm and Desert Shield. And later on during the Bush Jr., I mean, Bush's son administration, which was the whole shock and awe campaign and post 9-11 change of regime in Iraq and so on and so forth.

I'm just as a reminder, I'm saying that anecdotally just to understand what has happened in the last 40 years. So none of what we're proposing has any similarities to past experiences. You just said you think Western policymakers don't quite grasp this. They're behind the curve. You seem to include the Trump administration on that because you said maximum pressure is one thing, but there's got to be this other component that isn't there.

As we're speaking to you, and I say that because this podcast may go out afterwards, but as we're speaking, you're on your way to the Munich Security Conference. Before we get into who you're going to meet and what you're going to say to them, you were disinvited and then you were re-invited and it's been a little bit of a scandal. Could you tell us a little bit about that? Why were you originally told you could not attend? What was going on there? Clearly, there have been some pressure elements at play, but ultimately, the point really is to

address the fact that if there's any hesitation or reservation from fear of reprisal, that's really sort of buying to the blackmail game of hostage-taking by the regime or this and that. A few days ago when I was in Paris, one of the French senators that I met was saying, we are becoming hostages to our hostages.

And, you know, just caving into that means pretty much giving carte blanche to the regime to anytime they feel pressure to use the blackmail card and force governments to sort of back off from that pressure. This is pretty much a blackmail strategy. And the question that millions of Iranians are asking themselves, never mind me, I'm just a messenger.

But by silencing me, you're silencing the voice of millions of people who are the first victims of this regime. And in a way, when they associate that kind of caving in by Western diplomats in the name of trying to prevent some supposedly bad scenarios...

you could understand that people get enraged. We are thrown under the bus yet again. Was there a specific scenario? Was there a specific threat, you think, that led to the German government disinviting you? Or was it a general sense of let's not upset Tehran? I cannot speculate, but clearly there is something out there that caused this reaction. But the point is, you know, we move on. I'm

happy that I'm going to be able to go to Munich. Not just for that, there are other aspects of meetings with Iranian opposition groups to coordinate their efforts and meeting the victims of the Iranian repression, including young men and women who were

shot in the eye and things like that. And of course, meeting with media and what have you. But cutting back to the question you asked me right before you asked this question about the Trump administration, to the extent that I know because of my meeting or my team's conversation with members of the Trump administration's transition team and personal meetings I've had before with people like Marco Rubio, who I think is ever since the revolution in Iran, probably the first secretary of state that really understand how

issue and where Iranians stand and what are the dynamics of the kind of change we're proposing as well as of course his national security advisor that Mr. Walz that I also met in the last few weeks they seem to be certainly understanding of at least

the direction that we're saying and understanding that while maximum pressure has in fact paid some dividends, but they also understand that if we expect to ultimately find a resolution, you have to at some point think beyond the status quo. In that sense, I think the Americans are more ahead of the European counterpart of being more in tune with the immediate situation. And I think what's lagging behind, just to address that,

is that there has to be a pivot and a reconsideration of previous strategies or policies that now has to be more in tune with what it is that I hope they will realize is perhaps one way to ultimately remedy the problem, which goes back to maximum support parallel to maximum pressure.

If indeed the idea is to say we know the Iranian people are not the regime, and I'm glad that many politicians are beginning to highlight that more and more. I believe that a direct talk to the Iranian nation by a foreign official is critical. In fact, I remember suggesting this to Bibi Netanyahu when I saw him in Israel. I said, talk to the Iranian people directly. Here's the mic. They listen to you. Talk to them.

And you can imagine how important it is if tomorrow the British prime minister or the German chancellor, should they choose to do that, the impact it has. Because when you're fighting a cause of liberation, and if you want to be in tune with what you profess as being your value system of liberty and human rights and what have you,

It's a legitimate question that Iranian people say. Are you just saying this because you want to just dismiss it? Or do you actually mean it? And if so, what are you going to do about it? Can I ask you what the specific policy proposals you would put forward then are? Because maximum pressure, I think, is fairly easy to understand. It means very serious sanctions and it means tightening the sanctions that were always there as well. And additional sanctions. And additional sanctions. For instance, the listing of the IRGC on the list of terrorist organizations.

which a legislating part of Europe, most of them tend to agree, but it's a matter of governments now to actually adopt that and make that the policy, which is very important. Why? And I tell you that one of the factors that is important is because it also played to the scenario of maximum defections.

The more you target the regime's element of repression at home and terror abroad, and the ROGC has a major role to play in that, you send two messages. Number one, that the regime cannot count on that being anymore an option for them. But it also tells the people, particularly those who are part of that entity...

that we are condemned down the path of sinking with the ship. And maybe we should consider now a nexus strategy, which, by the way, we are offering them. The counter argument to that is that the IRGC is an enormous organization now, that if there is going to be regime change in Iran, that elements of the IRGC

IRGC are probably going to have to be involved in that or on board. And therefore, engagement makes more sense than declaring not only kind of generals at the top as terrorists, but like hundreds of thousands of, I don't know, 17-year-olds who've done their national service in the IRGC as terrorists. You don't buy that argument. I am really impressed with what we just said because you are one of the few journalists who makes that distinction, by the way.

And I would like to thank you for that. And I tell you why I'm saying this, because the fact to recognize that, yes, it is an extremely corrupt, mafia-like, militarized state that controls every aspect, including the Iranian economy. And yes, the top heads are benefiting, if you will, from this regime insofar as enriching themselves.

They already have an escape plan. They already have a villa somewhere else in the world that they can escape to and probably maybe some governments will refuse to give them asylum, but that's their problem, really not mine. But the bulk of the remaining, as you just said, why should they be victim of the situation? Why should not we allow them an exit strategy to join with us and survive regime change?

I was pointing to you earlier that bad example of regime change in Iraq and the debathification process. Well, that's why perhaps outlawing the entire IRGC and saying that, well, you did your national service in the IRGC. You stood on a checkpoint in Balochistan for six months. And that means as far as the international community is concerned, you are a terrorist and you can never travel might just

drive people closer to the regime than not? What the legal determination is, I don't know, but I'm more focused on the idea and concept of national reconciliation.

You know, the transitional justice aspect. And in that sense, in that sense, understand that one of the things that exists in our campaign of civil disobedience based on nonviolence, non-confrontation in terms of this becoming violent and people firing at each other.

and a sense of stability and security, which starts with the elements that have the guns, the military and the paramilitary forces. And the fact that we don't want to encourage a scenario that leads towards anarchy rather than a controlled implosion. It cannot happen unless you have the tacit collaboration of military and paramilitary sources. The exception is for those who have their hands soiled with the blood of the people who will have to account for

to justice one day. We cannot deny people justice. But I'm not talking about kangaroo trials. I'm talking about sticking to the very principle. And that's exactly where our legal experts step in to, in fact, talk about that and utilize the experiences that successfully put an end to certain regimes. And I think transitional justice is the key element. But beyond that is the fact that those who are not to be put in the same

placed as those who are either corrupt or criminally responsible should be able to know that they have a place in the future, meaning that they don't have to think that they are condemned to stick to the regime to the very end, guilty or not. That's really exactly the demarcation line. So it's really like a tripod. Imagine that if we were to achieve...

Understanding, of course, that the aim is to put an end to the problem and cutting the snake's head at its source, which is Tehran from day one. How do you achieve that? Not by means of external intervention, but counting on the people being the agent of change. You have to think of empowerment as the third way and ultimate solution. So you have the maximum pressure component that could increase.

listing of the IRGC, perhaps even if they start playing the dirty game of hostage taking, sanction the diplomats, you know, revoke their visas, expel them, whatever.

But also, parallel to that, a campaign of maximum support. Example, what can be done to make sure that Iranians have access to information, not cut off from the world, access to the internet. We saw what Elon Musk did with Starlink and, you know, be able to remain connected. And that continues to be an important and vital part of the necessity of organization and planning and organizing and communicating, media censorship, journalists, activists, civil society, all of that.

On top of it, perhaps find solutions to support labor strikes. If you think that's such a good idea, what do you make of Elon Musk basically wiping out USAID? And we know for a fact that USAID money was funding...

Iranian language independent media, which has now had to fire lots of people because of that. Is that counterproductive in your view? Well, you know, the justification of what this administration is doing or not really, they should be able to explain what's the rationale behind it. I think what's the issue of messaging is

If that's what you're pointing to, I really think that the reflection of the ask and will and desire of the people in Iran should be the one that needs to be highlighted. You cannot design and concoct what should be the message if it's not relevant to the ask of the people in Iran in the first place.

And often we have seen that what seems to be the broadcast to Iran is not necessarily the ask of the people, but it's pretty much manipulated in some way or the other by elements that are not really addressing that. Having said that, I'm not against any form of continuation of those kind of supports, so long as they're beneficial. Now it's for the administration to explain why it is that they think in some cases it is or it is not. It just seems to me that you're talking about maximum support and the mechanism for maximum support.

has just been blown up? Well, there are so many different avenues of communicating with the people. The question is not which agency is supposed to do it or not. The principle of communication and remaining in contact, not just between Iran and the outside world,

But for Iranians among themselves, we're talking about access, we're talking about VPNs, we're talking about social media, we're talking about every element that empowers a nation to be equipped with the tools to be able to then organize themselves better and communicate their message.

This is basically what we are trying to achieve. And, you know, if we have to argue with certain governments that what you're doing here is productive or maybe what you're doing is counterproductive, well, we certainly have those discussions, too, which goes beyond the scope of this interview. But, yes, I mean, we're trying to be very practical and effective.

At the end of the day, what I hope to be able to achieve by everything that we communicate to these governments is that if you believe that people need to be empowered, then let's find what exactly it is that you can do to be of help. And, you know, as long as the questions is in that direction, we'll be happy to share our views with them. And we have a lot of proposals and suggestions as to how to do that. I want to ask a question about you and your role in all this.

I don't really want to rehash kind of do you want to be king of Iran? Because I know your standard answer is it's up for the people to decide that. I'm not kind of trying to come back and have a monarchical restoration. But, you know, but I think I think the really key question is, look, one of the problems with the Iranian opposition, one of the reasons there hasn't been a revolution, one of the reasons, you know, the woman life freedom protests kind of petered out in a way is

is this really serious fractiousness in the opposition and a lack of prominent leadership, partly because potential leaders in Iran have been systematically kind of eliminated. Are you the person who can play that role as a figurehead? Well, first of all, thank you for this question. I always say I never stated my mission in life to be running for office, and it still remains the same. I do realize, however, that

The amount of popularity and trust that my compatriots and oddly enough and most importantly today's generation of young Iranians place in me and their ask for me to intervene, to do something about bringing about that transition has led me to accept the challenge and accept the responsibility of offering my services to be that leader of transition.

Any other subject other than addressing the transition would be putting the carriage before the horse. And I'm not preoccupied by what will happen next. I think the most important thing is to have a successful campaign at the end of which we are liberated and we finally have a true secular democratic system in the country. Regardless of what its final form would be, that's the choice of the Iranian people. Yeah, sure. I'm wondering what makes you think you can do it because, for example...

there was an alliance at the beginning of the Women, Life, Freedom protest. I think it was called the Masa Contract. Charter. Charter, yeah. You were part of that. Yes. And it fell apart. Yeah. How can you change that? Is there any way of actually overcoming these...

You've tried to unify the opposition in other words, and it hasn't worked. Is there a way around that? You know, I am barred from divulging the internal discussions by means of the fact that we adhere still to what was agreed among ourselves to adhere by the Chatham House rules of not discussing internal things out there in the open. So I have to be respectful of that. Since then, a lot of other things have changed.

The most notable change is that outside of the conventional secular democratic opposition to the regime, both at home and abroad, now we have the beginning of signs of defections and convergence that is coming into play. There are elements that were previously perhaps the most committed to the regime. I will give you a tacit example. His name is Mehdi Nasseri. He used to be a right hand to Khamenei.

the equivalent of the editor-in-chief of the Pravda in Moscow with Kayhan. And he's been very bravely engaging that we need to work with each other. He wants to work with me. He has been talking to me. And that's the beginning of that process of convergence that there are many like him who know that the impasse has been created, that you can no longer

sustained the concept of reform from within. We are past the regime, and therefore former reformists are not beginning to converge with those of us who from very beginning questions whether or not an Islamic regime is a solution to our problem. These are the new changes since then that are beginning to occur, plus some indications of defections. How do we build on that, to your point? To be making it, to simplify the concept,

I think we are, and this is not just, I think, limited to Iran. I think this is perhaps almost a universal issue. I think we deal with two categories of people. There are those who continue to be part of the problem, but there are also those who want to be part of the solution. And for those who are in the second category, it may be that they had completely different paths before. The important thing is not what they did in the past, but what they are willing to do now and for the future.

So the basis of this coalition, the basis, and I call it the coalition of the willing. There are people who want to work with one another, understand that we are not mandated to decide for the people, but it behooves us as Democrats to provide people with the means to

self-determination, and ultimate choice. So the path in that is how do we achieve that? The process of getting to the transitional phase. So you have a coalition of forces that will be part of the replacement to the regime after its collapse to manage the transition in terms of the obvious running of the country in the meantime, but prepare the grounds for the election of the constitutional assembly.

because we know that we don't agree on every point. What keeps us together are three basic principles. Let me indicate them. It is important for us that Iran's territorial integrity doesn't come into question. We believe in the importance of a secular democratic system as a clear separation of religion from state. As a prerequisite to democracy, that's not negotiable. And of course, every principles of human rights that has to be incorporated

They will have a constitution, of course, the rule of law as a guarantee of putting an end to any form of inequality or discrimination. These are the minimum conditions that we all have to adhere to, to set the basis of cooperation and coordination of efforts. Can I ask? That's the premise. It's about legitimacy and credibility. So in my encounters with, I've been lucky enough to report from Iran a couple of times quite briefly, but in my encounters with

with ordinary Iranians inside Iran, including those who are very critical of the regime and really dislike it. The one thing they sometimes, seems to me, they dislike more than the regime is critics of the regime abroad who they feel are

you know, just not going through everything that they're going through. And I've had more than one conversation with, you know, very anti-regime people from Tehran saying, there's one thing I can't stand and it's all these exiles and a diaspora in the West telling us what to do. Do you recognize that? And how do you overcome that? Do you think you're able to overcome that

I'm going to share with you what I know personally, talking to political prisoners, talking to the civil society sector in Iran, whether they are lawyers or doctors or people in the intelligentsia, universities and so on and so forth. As a matter of fact, when it comes to how to orchestrate and organize ourselves inside Iran,

Because you mentioned the term leadership, and it is important. At some point, you have to take it beyond the streets because you can only do so much in terms of resistance and demonstration. But to orchestrate a campaign, you have to be able to organize at home. The single most specific—actually, two. One is domestic, one is foreign. The single most indication that I receive—

is that it is very difficult for us to organize ourselves in a very visible way, especially if it's premature, because we will be immediately cracked down upon. So we have to rely on you guys outside to help us with it at first.

So contrary to that particular narrative you alluded to, it is not necessarily the case. In fact, they are telling us we can't do much from inside at first. You need to start it from abroad, but then transition it inside. And we rely on you to be our voice to the outside world. Plus the fact that I think that many elements in the diaspora were not necessarily politicized in the sense of something that

As we say in Farsi, we have a good expression. It says, you're not in the garden. It looks like you're, you know, that's a Farsi expression. But those who understand and connect with it are extremely valuable because part of our maximum support campaign is

is to mobilize the Iranian diaspora in how they can be of help to support our activists at home. So, yes, there are always some cynics who perhaps are disillusioned or frustrated or angry, but I don't think that's really the case. I really think that the potential that the diaspora can play

People who were the first victims of this regime, people who had to escape the country because of all sorts of threats to them, either because they were members in the former system or they were Jews or Baha'is or you know the story. But look at all the success stories of Iranian expats that have been successfully integrated into British society or French society or American society.

And it's a dream for the would-be Iranian entrepreneurs of tomorrow.

who don't have a prayer chance to have under this corrupt system. And they look at successful models outside and they say, we should be the next Pierre Omidyar of eBay. We should be the next Dara Khosrowshahi of Uber and so on and so forth. And, you know, they understand that the reason Iranians have been successful in countries that offer them that refuge but the chance to grow is the exact opportunity that we wish for them.

And they understand that and they want to rely on that. So it's not a divide, provided, of course, that at the end of the day, we recognize that the ultimate change comes from within. There's no question that the ultimate change comes from within. But we also have to understand that in order for the within to be successful, we cannot prematurely expose them.

Because they would be vulnerable at first. We need to strengthen that. That's why the external component is important. Not because I say so, because they say so. I wanted to finish, kind of come back to you and your personal kind of experience. And forgive me if this is a slightly, what's the word, esoteric kind of question. I mean...

Just reflecting on the peculiar situation you're in, right? You're a monarch in exile or a crown prince in exile. It's an unusual situation, but there's been, you know, there's numbers of people like you throughout history. It seems to me it's not, it's quite seldom that

exiled monarchs get to go back. And if we, I don't know if you're familiar with it, you know, in British history, there's the famous story of Bonnie Prince Charlie, who, you know, had to, like your father, his father was overthrown in the revolution, he fled, he tried to come back. It didn't really work because, because really, he was out of touch with the country, because really, the country didn't want the Stuarts back, and so on. And so it became a story that's very romantic, but

really didn't have a leg in in reality. Do you ever find yourself pondering that and thinking, am I going to be one of those? Is it something that you... Not based on the evidence, because I wish I could share with you everything that we see on social media, not to mention direct messaging to me via my various channels and platforms, Instagram, Telegram, and what have you. The degree of hope and expectation...

And the narrative of today's Gen Z, they say,

forgive our parents. We are not them. We're not going to do what they did and the huge mistake that makes us now have to live under this regime. It's amazing the amount of popularity and reflection, historic revision that exists now in this generation in terms of the respect they have for my grandfather and what my father tried to do that was not understood at the time. And this generation says we are not going to be

the revolutionaries of 1979. We are the generation that appreciates that. We're counting the days that you could be back in Iran. I would be happy to share with you all those remarks. And so it doesn't get to my head beyond the fact that I'm needed and I'm

answering to the call of duty, only to serve their ultimate aspiration, not because there's something in it for me. So irrespective of what my personal destiny would be, the only thing that is important for me and has been the story of my life and my mission in life and my sole mission in life is that a nation of that culture, that civilization, deserves better than what we have.

Especially when we know how many resources and opportunities we really have. Not just for ourselves, mind you, but the change in Iran will be a change for the whole world. The impact of a different Iran that is at peace with its neighbor, that doesn't have hatred for the Jews or the Arabs, but to the contrary, would be able to work together.

I suggested the Cyrus Accord as an elevation to the Abraham Accords for a good reason, because I know that different Iran would be so impactful, irrespective of what my role could be down the line. This is the future that I think Iranians would want to be proud of, just the same way that 25 centuries ago, when Cyrus the Great was the first declarer of universal declaration of human rights,

And when you see that young Iranians, Kurds, Baloch, Azeris, Christians, Zoroastrians, Muslims gather in Cyrus the Great's tomb,

And the regime, of course, they literally looks at that, that rise in a sense of national pride and identity. That's the ultimate driving force. The Iranian people are there not just to save themselves. They're sending a message to the world that we are your solution. Why are you not on the right side of history? And I need to be able to tell them,

I'm trying my best to make sure that the world this time doesn't abandon you and stands with you as opposed to an obstacle to your liberation. Thank you. I have one last question. Very, very quick. You say that you talk as a fact that the regime is going to collapse. A lot of people are talking about it now. When?

this year, next year? You know, I don't know. I used to have a crystal ball, which I'd lost a long time ago. I wish I was able to predict the timeline, but it's inevitable. Look, history has proven that even though most severe dictatorship don't last for a good reason, and we saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, where nobody thought that the Berlin Wall will ever fail, and it did. Nobody thought that there would be a change of regime in Syria. It did happen. There are many instances in history where people say, well, could it ever happen?

Honestly, when I was much younger, like 20, 30 years ago, I did that thing in my lifetime. I see the burning wall fall and it did. You have to ultimately believe in the resolve and the resolution of a nation. It's no longer a question of if. It's a question of empowerment, of faith and trust. And my message to the Iranian people at the end is I'm trying to move the needle from hope to belief.

Beyond hope for a better world, that you can believe that it actually be done because we can get it done. We have the resources. We have the ingenuity. The missing element is more support from the outside. Not because we are counting on it, mind you. We always tell ourselves we can only rely on our own resolve, irrespective of the world. But it would be a much easier path for us to have the support of the outside free world than not having it.

But that won't stop us from fighting for our freedom. We are committed to it to the very end. Reza Pakhlevi, thank you very much for joining us on Battlelands. Thank you for this opportunity.

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